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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the competitive and learning strategies of Thai 
auto-part firms, in particular the impact of the differences in strategies on the firms’ learning 
activities and mechanisms. The study finds that firms’ strategies, learning activities, and learning 
mechanisms interacted to form either a fast or slow rate of firm capability accumulation. The 
conceptual and analytical framework integrates four components: 1) the changes in the external 
meso-environment, 2) firm competitive and learning strategies, 3) firm learning activities and 
mechanisms, and 4) firm capability development. In addition, the behavior of firm owners and its 
top managers were also explored. The frameworks are used to build a causal model to explain how 
different firm strategies contribute to different types of learning activities and mechanisms, and 
finally how these systemic elements interacted together to shape the latecomer firms’ capability 
accumulation pattern and finally their “capacity to learn”.
The research adopted a qualitative multiple-case study approach, with cross-case 
comparisons, involving nine Thai auto-part firms. The primary data comprised semi-structured 
interviews and some direct observations, while the secondary data comprised many documents from 
both the nine firms and the supporting organizations. The use of a wide range of sources, including 
interviews with industry experts, contributed to the reliability of the assessments of firm level 
strategies, activities, and performance. The analysis comprised a painstaking iterative process of 
analyzing the interview transcripts, drawing analytical tables and figures, writing analytical memos, 
and consolidating these into nine detailed case study write-ups.
The analysis shows that the performance of these nine firms -  in terms of growth, exports, 
product sophistication, etc. -  diverged over time. The empirical evidence suggested that Thai auto­
part firms’ competitive and learning strategies evolved differently, and that those strategies were 
shaped by and influenced: 1) their subjective perception of changes within the meso-environment 
and 2) the firms’ stock of accumulated capabilities. This impacted the way the firms chose their 
learning mechanisms and conducted their learning activities. Depending on the types of strategies 
(conservative or ambitious), the firm’s learning activities progressed either gradually or swiftly 
from simple activities to more complex ones. Similarly, depending on the level of effort, 
coordination, and synergy achieved in concurrently managing strategies, learning activities and 
mechanisms, the firms either achieved a fast or a slow rate of capability accumulation. It is argued 
that regardless of firm differences, one thing remains crucial -  the systemic learning property (i.e. 
the firm’s “learning system”). Viewing the changes within the meso-environment as business 
opportunities, the “strong learner” firms tended to formulate aggressive competitive and learning 
strategies, engaged in a more diverse, complex (yet focused) learning activities, and achieved 
synergy between the passive and active learning mechanisms. In short, these firms had a well- 
aligned learning system. In contrast, the “weak learner” firms viewed the meso-level changes more 
as threats. They had conservative strategies, inadequate learning effort with poor transition to 
complex learning activities, and lack of synergy between the passive and active learning 
mechanisms. In short, these firms had a poorly-aligned learning system. Additionally, the role 
played by the Thailand Automotive Institute could be crucial to assist the weak learner firms to 
transition to become stronger, and avoid being “locked in” to a poorly-aligned learning system.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the research problem, sets out the research 
objectives and the scope and focus of thesis, and provides a brief outline of each chapter.
1.1 Background and Motivation
In today’s globalized world, one of the key strategic assets is knowledge (Winter,
1987) and the key process to acquiring knowledge is learning (Lundvall, 1996; Veras-Cruz
et al., 2005); and furthermore, the truism is all firms need to learn and continuously change
if they are to survive the competition (Bessant, 2003; Bessant and Francis, 1999).
Consequently, “learning has become a key question for managers [and policy makers]”
(Hakansson et ah, 1999: 445), and many firms in the developing countries realize the
importance of learning process, knowledge and capability development to their on-going
success. Some firms, however, have not yet come to such a realization and face the grave
consequences of becoming the casualties of globalization.
This research focuses on the management of learning process in Thai firms and
specifically addresses the concepts of firm’s competitive and learning strategies and the
issue of firm capability development. Thailand is a latecomer country with much learning
and technological catch-up remaining to be accomplished1 2(see for example, Khaosaat
(1977), Santikarn (1981), Bell et ah (1982), TDRI (1989), Vongpanitlerd (1992),
Chantramonklasri and Pfotenhauer (1994), and Arnold et ah (2000)). Moreover, the
innovation (learning) system within Thailand is still highly fragmented with passive and
slow technological learning firms, ineffective government policies and stand-alone
education, and poor training institutes, and overall inadequate infrastructure support for
2
firm-level development. These conditions have perpetuated over the past fifty years 
(Amin, 2001; Intarakumnerd, 2004).
1 Both the technological capability o f  Thai firms and the country’s secondary school enrolment rates lagged 
behind most countries in the region. In addition, the institutions and public programs targeted at upgrading 
firms’ human resource training, skills development and formation o f knowledge networks had been rather 
ineffective compared with other countries in the region (Ghani et al., 2002: 46).
2 Intarakumnerd (2004) pointed out that Thailand’s innovation (learning) system was in a crucial transition 
towards a more coherent and stronger system. The main actor spearheading the change was the Thaksin 
government (from 2001 to early 2006). Since mid-2006 when there was unrest in the Thai political system 
(which culminated in the military coup d'etat in September 2006), the success o f such transition remains 
highly doubtful. Consequently it could be said that it is highly likely that the fragmented, weak Thai 
innovation system will continue to persist in the near future.
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Yet paradoxically, some Thai firms have managed to embrace the increased 
competitive pressure and started to acquire the “capacity to learn” and developed well- 
functioning “learning system” in order to attain competitiveness in certain product areas . 
This paradox naturally provides an interesting question relating to firm strategies, in 
particularly how they overcome such immense odds (i.e. capability gap, lack of skilled 
human resources, fragmented industrial policies, poor innovation system, etc.) and finally 
develop the “capacity to learn”. Consequently, the primary question this research sets out 
to answer is “within the poorly supported meso-environment, how can these Thai firms 
successfully acquire the ‘capacity to learn’ and increase the rate of capability 
accumulation.”
Thailand is undergoing a period of transition:
“...[The country] is not a highly successful ‘tiger economy’ such as Korea 
or Taiwan, nor is it a special case of a city state such as Hong Kong or 
Singapore -  moreover, it currently finds itself in a ‘sandwich position’ in 
respect to its competitive advantage. After having experienced remarkable 
growth in the decades prior to the Asian crises in 1997, Thailand is no 
longer a true low-wage country, but it is not a high-skill, knowledge 
economy either” [italics added] (Berger, 2005: 1).
It provides an excellent context for the study for three reasons (Abdulsomad, 2003: 6-7):
• Due to erosion of traditional comparative advantage, Thailand faced an increased 
pressure to transform the industry and move into higher value-added activities 
(Sheehan, 2005).
• Historically, there has been an intensification of export-led growth strategies that 
coincided with the withdrawal of state protection. These exports required higher 
levels of competitiveness in terms of product quality, lower cost, and on-time 
delivery, and to achieve these, higher-level of firm capabilities are required.
3 This claim is supported by the recent research findings on transnational corporations and innovation systems 
upgrading in Thailand: “there is clear evidence that Thai based firms have gradually developed TCs 
[technological capabilities] in due course o f industrialisation and are currently in the stage o f  overcoming 
intermediate to advanced thresholds [i.e. the movement from craft-based technician skills to design 
engineering (include reverse engineering) and technology research and development]. While sector affiliation 
and historic developments have strongly influenced these developments, the core driving force seems to be 
the competitive pressures associated with a liberalised world economy” [italics added] (Berger, 2005: 1 10).
In addition, an example of a globally competitive product produced from Thailand is the one-ton pick-up 
trucks (Anonymous, 2006c; Zagaroli, 2005); “Thailand has a strong and growing position for pick-up trucks 
in the world market ... Thailand is the second largest producer o f pick-up trucks worldwide behind the United 
States” (Porter, 2003: 24).
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• The new competition, as a result of globalisation and liberalisation, created both 
challenges as well as opportunities for the local Thai firms.
Hence, it could be said that Thai manufacturing firms currently face a grave imperative to 
upgrade, to successfully move out of the “sandwich position”, into a higher skill 
knowledge-based position and engage in higher value-added production activities.
Within Thailand, the automotive industry is particularly interesting since it has quite 
a long history of technological development, spanning roughly four and half decades. The 
industry underwent significant “swings of the pendulum” (i.e. sequence of changes in 
market factors, public policies as well as business opportunities and challenges) (Chitravas, 
2005a; Higashi, 1995; Poapongsakorn and Wangdee, 2000; Terdudomtham, 2004; 
Thanamai, 1985). In addition, during the financial crisis the automotive industry suffered 
the most severe impact (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000). Certainly, the sequence of 
industrial-level changes impacted firm’s perception of opportunities and challenges, and in 
turn, affected the formulation of firm-level for capability development. Hence the 
automotive industry offered a rich ground for exploratory research on issues such as the 
dynamics of firm-level strategies, its interaction with firm learning activities and capability 
development.
1.2 The Research Problem and Key Assumptions
To understand how some Thai firms successfully learn (or fail to learn) and develop 
their capabilities, the sequence of changes in the macro- and meso-environment must be 
taken into account. Similarly the disaggregation of firm-level learning processes must be 
made to attempt to build an inductive model capable of explicating firm-level competitive 
and learning strategies, their role in shaping the rates and types of capability development. 
With these overall objectives, the research focuses on three key questions:
1. What were the competitive and learning strategies of Thai auto-part firms?
a. How did these firms perceive the opportunities and challenges arising from 
changes in the macro- and meso-environment?
b. How did firms respond, in terms of their firms’ competitive and learning 
strategies, to these external changes?
2. To what extent can the differences in firm learning activities and mechanisms be 
explained by the differences in firm competitive and learning strategies?
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3. What are the implications of the firm “learning system” -  the dynamic alignment 
(and re-alignment) between the key characteristics of firm competitive and learning 
strategies and the learning activities and learning mechanisms -  on the rate of firm 
capability accumulation?
In answering these questions, there are two key assumptions:
First a starting point for the research is the concept of firm heterogeneity derived 
from the resource-based perspective (see for example, Penrose (1959), Helfat (2000),
Nelson (1991), Rumelt (1991), Teece and Pisano (1994) and Malerba (2002)). Even if the 
firms are experiencing the same sequence of historical changes within the Thai automotive 
industry, they are assumed that they may have different perceptions of business 
opportunities (and challenges) and hence, different competitive and learning strategies, 
different types of learning activities, and different rates and types of capability 
accumulation.
The second assumption is that firms with superior coordination and adaptation of 
their strategies, learning activities, and learning mechanisms are said to have higher-level of 
“capacity to learn” and thus will achieve faster rates of accumulation of capabilities.
Having stated these assumptions, the overall research aim is to attempt to explain the 
differing rates of capability accumulation among Thai firms, in terms of their 
heterogeneous learning and competitive strategies and learning activities.
1.3 Objectives of the Research
In line with the three research questions and the main aim, this thesis pursues the 
following five objectives:
• To elaborate the sequence of policy, market and institutional changes within the 
Thai automotive industry since its inception in the early 1960s;
• To link the sequence of meso-level changes with the dynamics of firm-level 
competitive and learning strategies, aiming to differentiate “strong learner” firms 
from the others
• To discuss the impact of differences in firm competitive and learning strategies on 
the firm-level learning activities, again aiming to differentiate “strong learner” firms 
from the others
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• To explore and explain the issue of the dynamic alignment (and re-alignment) 
among three key conceptual variables -  1) firm strategies, 2) learning activities (and 
mechanisms) and 3) firm capability development -  and how such multiple 
alignments could lead to accelerating or slowing down the rate of capability 
accumulation, again aiming to differentiate “strong learner” firms from the others
• To provide a normative framework for latecomer firm’s business managers facing 
the crucial issue of formulating firm competitive and learning strategies, aiming at a 
higher rate of capability development
1.4 Scope and Focus
The scope of this study is the Thai auto-part sector, which supplies auto-parts to 
both the replacement equipment manufacture (REM) and original equipment manufacture 
(OEM) markets. It focuses on a selected set of case study firms and in particular on their 
important historical transition periods in business activities (e.g. transition from 
replacement equipment manufacture (REM) auto-part trader to a manufacturer of original 
equipment manufacture (OEM) auto-parts, similarly the transition of OEM to ODM4 and 
OBM5, if any had occurred). The ownership of these firms is dynamic and some firms are 
currently within large corporate groups comprising many diversified businesses. Such 
firms are viewed at the group level (or at least the auto component and related parts of the 
group) in order to capture the “learning spillovers” and the sharing of the parent firm’s 
competitive and learning strategies within the corporate group. In addition, the dynamics 
of each firm as it grew from a small family-owned to a large multinational firm is captured. 
Consequently the focus is also on the historical transitions of these learning activities, 
learning mechanisms, human resources formation and development, and crucial firm 
resource acquisition and access to external resources. All these factors have an impact of 
firm-level strategies and capability development.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The research is reported in nine chapters (see Table 1.1).
4 Own design manufacture
5 Own brand manufacture
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Table 1.1 The Structure of the Thesis
C hapter C ontent / A rgum ent
P
ar
t 
I
1. Introduction • Background, Research Problem and Key Assumptions and Scope and Focus
2. L iterature  
R eview
• Review of Latecomer Firm Literature
• Review of Strategic Resource-based Management Literature
• Brief review of Innovation System Literature (for developing 
country)
3. C onceptual 
F ram ew ork
• Proposed framework comprising meso-level and, three key 
conceptual variables -  learning strategy, learning activities, and 
capability development
4. M ethodology
Research 
Method and 
Design
Case study method used aiming at cross-case comparison 
Operationalized variables:
• Competitive strategy -  competitive goals, product-market 
position, capability-market position
• Learning strategy -  learning goals, capability gap, internal vs. 
external, today vs. future, degree of aggressiveness
• Learning activities -  “what to learn” and “how to learn”
• Technological and organizational capability -  technical 
functions and level of complexity
P
ar
t 
II
5. F indings & 
A nalysis -  
Thailand 
Automotive 
Industry
• Describing the evolution of the Thai automotive industry
• Summary on the increasing importance of the key research 
issues
6. F indings & 
A nalysis -  
Firm-level 
Strategies
• Report of firm-level competitive and learning strategies
• Summary contrast the firm differences in strategies in terms of 
goals, competitive positions, capability gaps, etc.
• Mapping firms: internal vs. external, today vs. future, balanced 
aggressiveness vs. conservative
7. Findings & 
A nalysis -  
Firm-level 
Learning 
Activities and 
Capability 
Development
• Report of firm-level learning activities and mechanisms for 
capability development
• Summary contrast the firm differences in learning activities in 
terms of object of learning and learning mechanisms
• Mapping firms: continuity and level of capability in each 
technical function
P
ar
t 
II
I
8. D iscussion - 
An Inductive 
Explanatory 
Model
• The alignment between firm-level strategies and meso-level 
changes: contrast “strong learner” and “weak learner”
• The issue of dynamic multiple alignments among firm 
strategies, learning activities and capability development 
contrasting the “strong learner” and “weak learner” firms
9. C onclusions
• Contributions to literature and implications for managers and 
policy and possible future research
Source: own elaboration based on the research
6
Overall the thesis is divided into three parts. Part I starts with the Introduction followed by 
Chapter 2, which describes the relevant literature along two main lines: strategic 
management and economic development literatures. The strategic management literature 
will focus mainly on the capabilities view of the firm, with emphasis on the “modern” 
resource-based thinking such as the concept of core competencies, dynamic capabilities, 
and competence-based strategy. The economic development literature will focus on the 
issue of learning and capability development, using mostly the latecomer firms’ 
perspective. Other literatures locate at the periphery of these fields is related to Thailand’s 
innovation system development and the concept of absorptive capacity. Chapter 3 
synthesizes the findings from the literature review in terms of three key conceptual 
variables (firm strategies, learning activities and mechanisms and firm capability 
development) situated within the meso-environmental changes. The synthesis provides 
justification for the analytical framework at the end of the chapter. Chapter 4 elaborates on 
the multiple-case study research method and defines the operationalized variables used in 
the study. The chapter also elaborates on the definition of the various indicators used to 
operationalize the conceptual constructs.
Part II contains the analytical history of the learning and capability building 
processes of the nine Thai auto-part firms. Chapter 5 describes the sequences of changes in 
market, policy and institutional factors within the Thai automotive industry. The purpose is 
to provide sufficient background on meso-level developments, to link with the development 
of firms’ competitive and learning strategies. Then Chapter 6 elaborates on how different 
firms’ strategies have co-evolved with the changes in opportunities and challenges at the 
meso-level. The aim is to discern the different patterns of firms’ competitive and learning 
strategies, isolating the “strong learner” firms from the others. Chapter 7 reports on firm- 
level learning activities and learning mechanisms used for capability accumulation. Again, 
the aim is to isolate the “strong learner” firm patterns from those of other firms.
Part III comprises two final chapters: Chapter 8 analyzes the characteristics of
firms’ strategies, the differences in firms’ learning activities (and combination of learning
mechanisms) and differing rates and types of firms’ capability accumulation. The aim is to
highlight the alignment (or misalignment and re-alignment) among the three and how this
leads to slowing down or accelerating the rate of capability accumulation. The alignment
between firm-level strategies and changes in the meso-environment is also examined.
Chapter 9 concludes with the main features of the firm-level learning system, to explain
7
how firm strategies and learning activities work together to achieve the accumulation of 
capability. It also presents a more fundamental issue related to firm-level learning, the 
“capacity to learn” and firm “leaning system”, which arises out of the case study analysis. 
In addition, the chapter summarizes the research contributions, empirically and 
theoretically, and the significant implications for practicing business managers.
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Chapter 2 -  Review of the Related Literature
The main purpose of this chapter is to review the literature both on the development 
of “latecomer” firms6 and on strategic management, particularly that from a resource-based 
perspective. The objective is to identify overlaps and complementarities in these two sets 
of literature, in relation to the question of firm competitive and learning strategies and 
capability development. It is also the objective of this chapter to identify gaps in relation to 
that question and hence the opportunities to develop a more comprehensive and integrated 
analytical framework.
There are three main sections. The first section discusses the latecomer firm 
literature and assesses with the strengths and limitations of this work for this study. The 
second section discusses the strategic management and resourced-based literature with 
particular emphasis on firm learning strategy. It shows that historically this literature has 
been preoccupied with the strategy “content” issues. Very little work has been conducted 
on the role played by firms’ learning strategy, efforts and learning activities (i.e. the 
strategy “process” issues), especially for the latecomer firms7. The last section summarizes 
the “reciprocal” knowledge gaps that exist in both bodies of the literature, highlighting that 
neither bodies of literature on its own are sufficient to fill such gaps. Consequently it is 
argued that there is a need to build a more integrated, holistic conceptual framework that is 
capable of capturing the dynamics of latecomer firms’ capability development, and hence is 
relevant for strategic learning issues.
2.1 The Latecomer Firm Literature (LFL)
This section reviews the origins of learning and technological capability concepts; 
the taxonomies used in categorizing technological capabilities (including the extension to 
cover the non-technological functions); the important lessons learned from numerous 
empirical studies about the characteristics of learning and capability development; and 
finally, the role of absorptive capacity in latecomer firms’ learning. The section concludes
6 Hobday (1995a) uses the concept o f “latecomer firm” to described how firms in the newly industrialized 
economies attempted to catch up.
7 The latecomer firms’ viewpoint is lacking in not only the strategic resource-based literature (SRBL), but 
also in the strategic management literature in general since most research within this literature originated from 
the First World context.
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with the important points that could be drawn from the literature along with the existing 
limitations.
2.1.1 Origins of Technological Capability and Learning Concepts
2.1.1.1 Technological Capability Concepts
During the 1950s, 1960s and the first-half of the 1970s, much of the latecomer 
firms’ development literature neglected the need for (and the importance of) the creation of 
the indigenous technological activities in the developing countries (Abdulsomad, 2003: 11), 
and most literature emphasized the effort devoted to the transfer of technology in terms of 
choosing an appropriate foreign technology and technology transfer8 per se. Then in the 
latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the concept of technical change within the 
developing country context had shifted to focus more on the accumulation of “domestic” 
technical resources and the link to the creation of “indigenous technological capability” 
(Bell, 1984; Fransman and King, 1984; Teubal, 1984; Westphal et al., 1985). This led 
researchers in international technology transfer (from industrialized to developing 
countries), to focus more on determining the factors that impacted the development of 
indigenous capabilities in the late industrializing and developing countries (see for 
example: Enos and Park (1988) and Amsden (1989) on the case of Korean industrialization; 
Amsden and Kang (1995) on the case of Korean automotive industry; Scott-Kemmis and 
Bell (1988) on the case of India; and Bell et al. (1982) on the case study of inadequate 
learning in Thailand’s infant industry). Due to increased interest, more definitions related 
to technological capability were developed9.
Since the late 1970s, this concept of technological capabilities and learning has been 
a primary focus of LFL for nearly three decades (Kim and Nelson, 2000b: 1). A particular 
concern of the early work was the specification of the technological capability concept.
One of the first definitions of technological capability during the early 1980s was “the
8 Regarding “technology transfer”, Nelson (1990: 78) noted that this phrase is a misnomer and the use o f the 
terms “technological learning” is more appropriate. This was because the transfer recipient, the developing 
country, did not passively receive the imported technology as it is handed down from the industrialized 
country. Instead the recipient countries need to actively engage in a complex and costly technological 
learning process, to learn to achieve mastery o f  the imported technology.
9 For example, another definition o f technological capability included Enos (1991), who described the three 
main components o f technological capability: 1) human skills (i.e. the knowledge residing in the firm’s 
engineers and operators), 2) the institution (i.e. this allows human skills to be brought together and put to use), 
and 3) the common purpose (i.e. the knowledge necessary to absorb, adapt and improve on the technology).
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ability to make effective use of technological knowledge ... in production, investment and 
innovation” (Westphal et al., 1985: 171). Fransman and King (1984: 10) identified six 
different (technological) capabilities related to the production processes: 1) search for 
available alternative technologies, 2) selection of the most appropriate technology, 3) 
mastering the technology, 4) adaptation of the technology, 5) institutionalized search with 
the development of research and development facilities and 6) conduct basic research.
Later the definition of technological capabilities included additional concepts of 
technical change and specialized resources; for example Bell and Pavitt (1995: 71) defined 
technological capabilities as “domestic capabilities to generate and manage change in 
technologies used in production, and these capabilities are based largely on specialized 
resources” [italics added]. Today this definition of technological capabilities had been 
extended to empirically analyze the technological development in many different industrial 
contexts (see for example: petroleum industry (Acha, 2000); Brazilian steel industry 
(Figueiredo, 2001); Japanese and European optoelectronics industry (Miyazaki, 1994); and 
electronics industry (Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2001)). Others have broadened the definition 
of technological capabilities to include the non-technical dimensions such as: marketing 
functions (Ernst et al. (1998a), Tran (1999)); technology linkage capability (UNIDO, 2002; 
Virasa, 2005); and managerial and organizational function (Weinstein and Azoulay, 1999: 
43). In addition, Virasa (2005: 98-99) pointed out that the process of a firm’s technological 
capability development is not limited to just the technical dimension per se, but rather it is 
highly related to the non-technical dimension such as the firm’s business model10.
Regardless of its origins and development, almost all of the conceptual definitions 
regarding technological and organizational capability stress the importance of skills, 
knowledge, and the role of conscious investment in the firm-level acquisition of capability. 
In addition, embedded within the capability acquisition process are the learning processes 
and the use of such processes to acquire the necessary knowledge to manage technical 
change. Consequently, it appears that firm learning process could be defined as the process 
of knowledge acquisition and conversion whereby firm can develop the technological and 
organizational capability.
10 He based his ideas on the Thailand’s National Innovation Survey (2000 and 2002), which stated that there 
are three types of business model: locally-owned brand manufacturer (OBM), locally owned original 
equipment manufacture (OEM) supplier, and locally-owned niche-focused venture.
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2.1.1.2 Learning Concepts
Historically, prior to the early 1980s, most of the learning and technical change 
research had been conducted in industrialized countries and little is known about learning 
within the developing country context (Bell et al., 1982). In addition, the learning concept 
was mainly concerned with the concept of a the mechanistic “learning curve” or Boston 
Consulting’s “experience curve” or economist’s “learning by doing” (Arrow, 1962). These 
concepts proposed that learning is automatic and it is a by-product of production 
experience.
In the mid-1980s, this concept of “automatic” learning by doing was rejected by 
various scholars. For instance, Bell (1984) stated that learning is not automatic and that 
generally there are two types: doing-based and non-doing-based learning. The latter 
requires more conscious investment in efforts. He argued that the doing-based learning per 
se is insufficient for successful development of capability. Similarly, Bell and Scott- 
Kemmis (1990) found that the predicted efficiency and cost savings outcome from 
“automatic” learning by doing did not occur and it was probably because of the failure to 
invest in sufficient learning effort and other factors such as lack of properly managed 
structure and poor learning conditions. Later this concept of costly learning was applied 
into the firm-level study on technological accumulation, capability acquisition and 
development (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; 1995).
Today, it is clear that building firm-level capabilities requires purposeful 
management of the firms’ learning processes (Dutrenit, 2000; Kim, 1997a; Lall, 1987). As 
Bell and Pavitt (1995: 100) have succinctly pointed out that
“Technological [and organizational] capabilities are not acquired as an 
automatic by product of investment and production activities. They are 
accumulated through conscious and continuous investment by firms in 
specialized, change-generating [or learning] activities, comprising product 
design, production engineering, quality control, training and linkages to 
foreign sources of technology ... [italics added]”
Purposive learning processes are a “a pathway to accumulate certain types of technological 
capabilities” (Figueiredo, 2001: 31). Rush et al. (2004) draw on Bell and Pavitt (1993), 
Lall (1992), Kim (1997a) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990), in proposing a model of an 
“extended learning processes” comprising eight key elements11:
11 These eight elements were developed as categories in an audit tool for firms.
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• Awareness and willingness of the need to change
• Searching for triggers for change
• Regular audits of existing competencies (or capabilities) including core ones
• Development of technology strategy based upon core competence
• Assessment and selection (exploration) or range of technological options
• Acquisition of technology
• Implementation and absorption of technology
• Learning through development of internal capabilities (Rush et al., 2004: 328)
This extended learning concept assisted in categorizing firms’ learning ability according to 
their degree of awareness of the need to change and the degree of their preparedness and 
readiness to change (Ibid.).
Since learning is not merely automatic “learning by doing”, but requires investment 
of effort (Bell, 1984; Kim, 1998; 1999) and effort put into learning activities are 
consciously designed to improve performance (Pavitt, 2002). In addition, at times several 
learning mechanisms are to be executed concurrently to achieve successful accumulation of 
innovative capabilities (Kim, 1998; Tran, 1999). These authors implicitly suggest that the 
investment in the formulation and implementation of the firm learning strategy is 
important. All of all these studies point towards the importance of learning strategy in 
directing (and coordinating) firms’ diverse learning activities and keeping them in focus.
An explicit learning strategy could play a key role in maintaining a firm’s 
continuous learning activities through time. This concept of firm competitive learning 
strategy has not been thoroughly developed in the literature. Moreover, it is not clear how 
such strategy would relate to the latecomer firm’s learning activities and the issue of 
capability development. One notable exception would be Rush et al’s (2004) “extended 
learning process”, it discusses the formulation of technology strategy based upon firm core 
competencies. However such discussion is restricted to technology strategy per se and does 
not provide a comprehensive framework for a firm competitive and learning strategy.
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2.1.2 The Taxonomies of Technological and Organizational 
Capabilities
There are many ways to categorize firm-level technological capabilities. One 
taxonomy for classifying technological capabilities provided by Lall (1992: 166). Lall 
(1992) classifies firm ’s technological capabilities into three levels o f complexity (simple 
routine capabilities, adaptive/duplicative capabilities, and innovative capabilities) and six 
operational areas (pre-investment, project execution, process engineering, product 
engineering, industrial engineering and linkages). Based on this classification, it was 
possible for a firm  to have different or uneven accumulation o f level o f capabilities for each 
operational area. Similarly, Bell and Pavitt distinguished between “ production capacity” 
and “ technological capability” , stating that the latter involves more effort in the generation 
and management o f resources pertaining to technical change and involving the management 
o f knowledge, skills and experience (Bell and Pavitt, 1995: 78). Importantly they also note 
that technological capabilities also involve the management o f institutional structures and 
linkages, both intra- and inter-firm (Ibid.). With this distinction, they developed taxonomy 
o f technological capabilities comprising three main technical-functions (investment, 
production, and supporting) and within each there are four levels o f complexity (a level o f 
basic routine production and three levels o f technological capabilities: basic, intermediate 
and advanced) (Ibid.: 84). The Lall (1992) and Bell and Pavitt (1995) taxonomies have two 
similarities:
• Both focus on two similar major dimensions: technical functions and levels o f 
complexity o f capabilities.
• Both acknowledge that the movement from simple (basic-level) to advanced 
(innovative-level) capabilities is not automatic and requires purposeful investment 
in complex learning processes involving the management o f technical change.
Despite the similarities, there is also an important difference:
• By disaggregating the levels o f firm technical capabilities into four levels, Bell and 
Pavitt’ s taxonomy clearly distinguishes between the ability to exploit the existing 
production technology and routine production activities (the first level indicates the 
“ production capacity” ) versus the capability to manage and generate technical
12 This idea was derived from Katz (1987), Dahlman et al. (1987) and Lall (1987).
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change (the latter three levels indicate “innovative technological capability”)13.
This was done to emphasize the dynamic aspect of technical change since 
production capacities are static attributes and technological capabilities, on the other 
hand, are more dynamic and crucial to successful management of technical change14 
(Albu, 1997: 7). In contrast, Lall’s technological capability framework comprises 
three levels of technological capability (basic, intermediate and innovative) and 
implicitly addresses the above issue.
Other taxonomies extended the “technological” aspect of capabilities to include other non­
technical element, such as marketing capabilities (Ernst et al., 1998a; UNIDO, 2002), the 
inclusion of these capabilities was necessary because they were pre-requisites (in some 
industries) to the successful build-up of technological capabilities (Ibid.). Apart from the 
addition of marketing and technology linkage capabilities, the UNIDO framework13 
(UNIDO, 2002: 96) utilizes the same matrix structure as described by Lall (1992) and Bell 
and Pavitt (1995).
The significant insight provided by the many taxonomies above is the fact that as a 
given firm moves up the capability ladder (i.e. from the routine/basic production 
capabilities to the innovative/advanced capabilities), it is possible that two or more 
technical-functions could differ in the depth as well as the rate of accumulation of 
capabilities. Also the distinction between the routine production capabilities and the 
innovative technological capabilities is the key issue, since at each stage it is likely that the 
accumulation of these two different capabilities requires different managerial functions on 
the management of firm strategies that often involve two aspects: 1) the varying degree of 
technical change (which to a certain extent dependent on the environmental factors 
impacting the firm) and 2) the types and sequence of capabilities that must be accumulated, 
with respect to firm’s strategies. Here in this study, it is argued that these two issues would
13 Historically, this distinction was elaborated by Bell (1987) as three categories of technology flows: Flow A, 
Flow B and Flow C. Flow A deals with ordinary importation of capital goods, technology, engineering and 
services, and Flow B comprises the skills and know-how to operate and maintain the established production 
technology. It is only in Flow C that the knowledge and expertise for implementing technical change was 
discussed; Flow C also refers to the “know-why” dimension of technology.
14 “A firm with no technological capabilities at all, would be rigidly unable to adapt to any changes in its 
environment, and would not survive long. However, the fact that a firm has a limited set of technological 
capabilities, and uses these to gradually improve production capacity, may not always be adequate either. In 
the long run, such a firm may not be able to change radically enough to bridge the discontinuities that 
occasionally arise in technical change, and may be out-competed by those that can” (Albu, 1997: 9).
15 Berger (2005) pointed out that this UNIDO framework on firm technological and organizational capability 
is one of the latest developments on the concept.
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also involve the crucial role played by firm competitive and learning strategy.
Unfortunately, these “matrix type” taxonomies of capabilities provide very little in terms of 
explicating the concept of firm competitive and learning strategies and its role in firm 
capability accumulation (Chitravas, 2005b: 1-2).
2.1.3 Technological Capabilities and Learning: Lessons from the 
Empirical Studies
Most latecomer firm empirical studies focus primarily on the learning activity 
characteristics and how these contribute to technological capability accumulation. Hobday 
(1995), focusing on the East Asian electronics industry in four countries16, found that firms 
must engage in a painstaking, costly learning processes (a “hardslog”) in order to build 
technological capabilities. He found that as firms learned to increase their export activities 
(i.e. export-led technological learning); they progressed gradually from simple to complex 
process and product technology. These latecomer firms learned in a cumulative and path- 
dependent manner, from original equipment manufacture (OEM), then to original design 
manufacture (ODM) and finally to original brand manufacture (OBM) (Ibid.: 1184). This 
did not imply the simple (automatic) linearity of learning progression, but suggested that 
technological catch-up occurred cumulatively, when each capability was successively 
learned by the latecomer firms.
Later Hobday (2000) engaged in a comparative analysis study between two types of 
learning: the East Asian “OEM system” and the Southeast Asian “TNC-led” development. 
He found that the two had more similarities, despite their differences. Though these 
frameworks provided useful insights into the process of latecomer firms’ learning, 
innovation and capability development, the OEM-ODM-OIM/OBM17 model was criticized 
as being too simplistic (i.e. focused on product upgrading per se) and did not fully capture 
the various other types of upgrading (i.e. process, organizational, etc.) that could possibly 
occur in the latecomer firms context (Berger, 2005: 29-30), see also Wong (1999).
Other recent empirical studies include Figueiredo (2001), who extended Bell and 
Pavitt (1995)’s framework to explain the differences in the rate of technological capability 
accumulation and operational performance in two large Brazilian steel firms18. He
16 These four countries are South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.
17 OEM = Original Equipment Manufacture; ODM = Original Design Manufacture; OBM = Original Brand 
Manufacture; OIM = Original Idea Manufacture (Hobday, 2000)
18 These two firms are USIMINAS and CSN.
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conducted a pair-comparison between two firms by constructing the technological 
capability development paths and corresponding learning processes and found that because 
USIMINAS engaged extensively in effective knowledge acquisition as well as knowledge 
conversion processes19, it was able to achieve a faster rate of technological capability 
accumulation, and in turn achieve better operational performance, when compared with 
CSN. This finding illustrated the crucial importance of the proper management of intra- 
and inter-firm learning processes (in particular, the knowledge acquisition and conversion 
processes), implying the critical role that could be played by firm competitive and learning 
strategy in guiding such processes.
Dutrenit (2000) studied the “transition problem” faced by a large Mexican glass 
production firm“ . She examined why a large corporation, such as Vitro Glass Containers, 
despite having achieved innovative capability in almost all the technical functions21, did not 
successfully acquire the “strategic capability”. She argued that the firm expended 
insufficient learning effort in a system to manage the knowledge conversion, creation and 
integration processes. Again it is implied that if this firm put in place a properly-managed 
“learning strategy” that could assist in directing the resources to be invested in such 
knowledge management processes (i.e. knowledge conversion, creation and integration), 
then it is highly likely that the transition process would be successful.
In contrast to Dutrenit (2000), recent positive developments of latecomer firms’ 
innovative capabilities were illustrated by Ariffin and Figueiredo (2001), who studied the 
technological and innovative capabilities in electronics industry in Malaysia and Brazil 
(Manaus). They found that the majority of the electronics firms surveyed had achieved the 
“intermediate innovative capability”22. They concluded that the widely held negative view 
about these developing country’s electronics industries consisting solely of “screw-driver” 
plants is misleading and misplaced. Similarly, for successful spin-off case, Xie and White 
(2004) offered to explain the interactive process of firm competitive strategy, sequential
19 Here Figueiredo (2001; 2002b) defined “effective” knowledge acquisition and conversion processes as 
processes that possess the following four key features: 1) sufficient variety, 2) continuous intensity, 3) 
good/excellent functioning and 4) strong interaction among the processes.
20 This “transition problem” is the challenge to manage the transition from advanced innovative capabilities to 
strategic (knowledge management) capabilities at the global frontier. Due to poor knowledge management 
system, the firm failed to fully complete this transition process (i.e. there was a pre-matured truncation).
21 This achievement was assessed using the matrix taxonomy of technological capabilities provided by Bell 
and Pavitt (1995: 84).
22 Their capabilities were at level 4, with level 6 being the highest level.
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learning activities, and capability development of the Chinese Lenovo Group“ . The case 
illustrates that it is possible for a latecomer firm to challenge the incumbents and competes 
head-on with the multinational firms (Ibid.: 418).
Another latecomer firm empirical study was conducted by Gammeltoft (2004), who 
studied the technological capability development in the Indonesian electronics industry. 
Drawing on the TDRTs (1989) framework, he delineated firm technological capabilities 
into four main types: process acquisitive, process operative, process change, and product 
change. The latter two deals with the “change capability,’' in terms of process and product 
adaptation and innovation. In his study, he concluded by rejecting the idea that within the 
Indonesian electronics industry there are only two types of firms (i.e. domestic market- 
oriented companies and foreign export-oriented ones). This study provides fruitful insights 
into the firm categories and the capability development; however it did not highlight the 
resulting firm heterogeneity as arising from the issue of differences in firm-level 
competitive and/or learning strategies and their capability development.
Similar in the overall objective in understanding firm-level technological capability 
development, but situated in a different context, Tran (1999), who focused on the 
Vietnamese electronics and textile industries, found that effective learning outcomes were 
most likely when the local firms used a combination of several learning mechanisms. In 
particular, the study found that interactive learning between foreign and local firms (i.e. 
user-producer interaction) was a crucial source of technical knowledge for the local firms 
(Tran, 2002). The study concluded that relying on only one learning mechanism will 
highly likely lead to poor accumulation of firms’ technological capabilities.
Although not discussed in great details, Tran also acknowledged that “Firms’ 
strategies are key ... for their TC [technological capabilities] accumulation and learning” 
[original italics] (Tran, 1999: 295) and
“carefully designed [firm-level] strategy, well-thought plan of action and 
investment for learning [i.e. learning strategy] should help the firms know 
how to become more competitive” (Tran, 2002: 26).
However the author limited the analysis to only two types of firm competitive strategies:
diversification and specialization; very little attention was paid to the role played by firms’
learning strategy, in particular the issue related to firm strategic goals and capability gaps
23
23 This group is a successful personal computer manufacturer, who recently has successfully taken over IBM 
in China and started to produce Lenovo-brand computer.
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were not discussed. The same criticism applied to all the other empirical studies discussed 
above; the explicit treatment of the generic firm-level competitive and learning strategies 
and its link with the capability development is mostly missing from their discussions.
2.1.3.1 Thailand Empirical Studies
Bell et al. (1982) conducted one of the early empirical studies on technology 
development and policy issues in Thailand. They investigated the non-successful 
upgrading at a Thai galvanized steel plant. The study found that the plant did not 
sufficiently invest in the explicit in-house efforts to improve the process and equipment, 
despite the introduction of the new capital equipment. They concluded that the Thai 
policymakers had to question the effectiveness of the protectionist policy.
Another early large-scale study24 was conducted in three sectors: biotechnology, 
material technology, and electronics technology (including information technology) (TDRI, 
1989; Vongpanitlerd, 1992). This study categorized the technological capabilities into four 
levels“ : 1) acquisitive capability, i.e. the ability to search, assess, negotiate and procure 
technologies, set it up and commence production; 2) operative capability, i.e. the operation, 
control and maintenance of production facilities, skill development, production planning 
and quality control; 3) adaptive capabilities, i.e. technology digestion, minor product and 
process modifications; and finally 4) innovative capability, i.e. the ability to create major 
changes in existing products and processes or the invention of new ones through in-house 
R&D and design engineering. The findings revealed that most Thai firms successfully 
acquired the operative capability, followed by acquisitive and adaptive capabilities. As for 
the innovative capability, very few Thai firms had achieved this. The findings also 
revealed the following problems:
• Science and technology manpower shortage and inadequate firm-level human 
resources development
• Policy failed to create the “right amount” of competitive pressure, forcing firms to 
learn and build technological capabilities.
• Foreign direct investment (FDI) does not lead to effective technology (and 
knowledge) transfer
24 This study also involved expert such as Larry E. Westphal.
25 The four-level technological capability definitions employed in this study are both “conceptually 
illuminating and sufficiently concrete and detailed to serve as a sound basis for an empirical analysis” 
(Gammeltoft, 2004: 51).
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• Lack of long-term entrepreneurial attitudes on technical development and poor firm- 
level linkage to the science and technology community (i.e. poor firm and public 
organization linkages)
Despite its significant findings, the TDRI (1989) study remained generalized at the 
industry-level, and the firm-level process of competitive and learning strategies, learning 
activities, and capability development (and the linkage among the three concepts) remained 
largely a “black box” 26; in particular the issue of inter-firm differences and the 
evolutionary changes within the firms were not touched upon (since the objective of the 
study was mainly a cross-sectional survey focusing on the inter-industry comparison).
In the late 1990s, another study (Arnold et ah, 2000) sponsored by the World Bank 
was commenced; its purpose was to analyze the policy framework and institutional 
structure that support Thailand’s technology development. The framework divided the 
firms into four types: Type 1 (low-capability firms), Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 (high- 
capability firms). The category was based upon the firm’s varying degrees of the demand, 
awareness and understanding regarding technical change. The study found that most Thai 
firms belong to Type 1 and 2, while only a few firms had reach Type 3 (Arnold et ah, 2000: 
57). Overall the authors also concluded that most Thai firms have rather weak 
technological capabilities; this finding was corroborated by a subsequent study (World 
Bank, 2002) which concluded that technology and innovative capabilities of Thai firms lag 
behind others in comparable Asian countries. Both the World Bank (2002) and Arnold et 
ah (2000) findings agreed with the previous study, conducted by TDRI a decade earlier, 
which reported that almost no firms reached the level of “innovative capability”.
Contrary to the above findings, two recent large-scale Thailand Innovation 
Surveys (conducted in 2000 and 2002) found that since the 1997 financial crisis, the 
private firms are in a transition:
“Past studies suggest that passive and slow learning of firms. Now [there are] 
some changes: several large conglomerates invest more in R&D; a number 
of smaller firms collaborate more with universities; several Thai 
subcontractors were forced to carry out product design and improve 
efficiency; and emergence of small number of own design/own R&D start­
up firms” (Intarakumnerd, 2003: 33).
26 These words are borrowed from Rosenberg (1982).
27 The large-scale survey conducted in 2000 involved a response o f  more than 1,000 firms, and similarly the 
one in 2002 received a response o f  more than 2,000 firms (Intarakumnerd, 2003: 5).
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Though these large-scale surveys provided rich insights into the policy formulation and 
measures for institutional support at a macro-level, their analyses on the micro firm-level 
heterogeneity in terms of the learning and competitive strategy and their impact on firm- 
level capability development are still limited. In particular, the explanation of factors 
relating to Thai firms’ transition to invest more in R&D, increased collaboration with non­
firm organizations and the shift towards more product design activities were not explored in 
great depth and is still lacking; this research will attempt to redress this knowledge gap.
Within the Thai automotive industry, Nawadhinsukh (1983) studied the ancillary 
firms technological development through the historical analysis of:
• the development of foreign and domestic vehicle assemblers and auto-part suppliers
• firm-level response to the early government industrial development policies
The in-depth analysis described the impact of the local content program and concluded that 
the technical progress was minimal with: poor technology transfer, lack of skills and low 
job creation. In addition, it was also concluded that subcontracting has failed to play a 
major role in technical development of the ancillary firms (Ibid.: 222-226). Focusing on 
the similar issues, Kaosa-ard (1993) examined the role of transnational corporations on the 
development of Thai automotive industry. The purpose was to evaluate the benefits from 
technology transfer. Similar to the earlier studies by Nawadhinsukh (1983) and TDRI 
(1989), Kaosa-ard found that there was underdevelopment in the local firms’ technological 
capability and learning:
“ ... while the quantitative aspect of development, measured by the number 
of local [auto-part] firms, has been respectable, qualitative growth is much 
less impressive” [italics added] (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 11).
Recently research on the Thai automotive industry development received renewed interest: 
1) Abdulsomad (2003) historically analyzed the differing automotive industrial policies 
between Thailand and Malaysia and their differing impacts on firms’ technological 
capability development and 2) Techakanont (2002) investigated the actual practice of 
technology transfer in an automobile assembly project and later looked at how three local 
supplier firms develop the technological capabilities (Techakanont and Terdudomtham, 
2004).
Using the technological capability framework provided by Ernst et al. (1998b), 
Abdulsomad concluded that different industrial policies have mattered in the building of
technological capabilities and that in both countries “the long period of protectionism ...
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has made many local [auto-part] firms internationally less competitive” (Abdulsomad,
2003: 267). Despite such findings, the study also pointed toward the positive influence of 
joint venture,
joint venture arrangements are another feasible method for local auto 
parts manufacturers in both countries [i.e. Malaysia and Thailand] to 
accumulate technological capabilities” (Ibid.: 268).
In other words, the local auto-part firms with higher-level capability were those that
involved in foreign joint ventures.
Located at a much more micro-level than Abdulsomad (2003), Techakanont (2002) 
focused on the characteristics of technology transfer process (both inter-firm and intra-firm) 
and reported on the critical success factors. He concluded that strengthening of the 
linkages between local (Thai) suppliers and foreign final product producers (i.e. carmakers) 
should be one of the government’s policy priorities. This conclusion agreed with that of 
Abdulsomad (2003), stating that foreign joint venture arrangements are important to the 
local firms’ capability development.
Though these empirical studies provided critical insights into the comparative 
policy analysis between Thailand and Malaysia (Abdulsomad, 2003) and in-depth 
investigation of the technology transfer process (Techakanont, 2002), they did very little 
the analysis of the differences at the inter-firm level, regarding firms’ learning strategy, 
their learning activities, and the mutual dynamics that impact the firms’ capability 
development.
In sum, the stylized facts derived from the many learning-related empirical studies 
are:
• Learning is costly (and not automatic), context-specific, and requires intensive 
management effort. For instance, “ ... learning is not automatic -  there must be 
motivation to enter the [learning] cycle” (Bessant and Francis, 1999: 375). “It is 
often idiosyncratic, cumulative, dynamic and uncertain in outcome, involving both 
knowledge and experience. Learning is usually costly and often difficult to 
undertake” (Hobday, 1995b: 1190) and often times involves the process of trial and 
error (Govindarajan and Trimble, 2004: 69). Similarly, "... learning takes time, and 
the process of learning is specific to each industry and activity (i.e. context- 
dependent)” (Lauridsen, 2002: 160).
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• In the developing country context (where capital goods sector and formal research 
and development are weak) learning occurs most often via informal activities such 
as continuous improvement in processes (i.e. modification of capital goods within 
the capital goods using sectors) and product improvements (Gammeltoft, 2004: 51).
• There are many mechanisms through which learning occurs28: learning by “active” 
doing" , learning by prior knowledge accumulation (for e.g. the hiring of capable 
workers to increase the capability to learn prior to engagement in the learning 
activities ), learning by local training (on-the-job and off-the-job), learning by 
searching (Bell, 1984) and collecting information and learning by foreign 
connections (Tran, 1999: 20-21) and by forming foreign joint venture(s) 
(Abdulsomad, 2003). Others studied the firms’ learning mechanisms through 
technology transfer that include foreign technological assistance (Techakanont, 
2001; 2002; Techakanont and Terdudomtham, 2004). Other types of mechanisms 
include learning by user-producer interaction32 (Lundvall, 1992) and learning by 
visiting (Caplan, 2005).
• Based on the empirical work of Figueiredo (2001; 2002a) and Dutrenit (2000), 
firm’s learning and competitive strategies can play an important role in directing the 
firm’s learning activities in order to achieve a fast, systematic rate of capability 
accumulation.
• Within the context of Thailand, there is a shift. On the one hand, some studies 
(Ghani et ah, 2002; Kaosa-ard, 1993; TDRI, 1989) reported on the negative findings 
regarding the country’s technological development. On the other hand, large-scale 
surveys indicated otherwise, that this view is changing towards a more positive one 
(Intarakumnerd, 2003; 2004). However, both views still achieve very little to
28 Over the recent years, the number of “learning by .. .” mechanisms has multiplied greatly (Berger, 2005: 
15).
29 Tran (1999) included the word “active” to distinguish this mechanism from the mainstream economist’s 
“classical” view of automatic “learning-by-doing” (Arrow, 1962).
30 Some scholars might prefer to call this “leaming-before-doing” (Pisano, 1996b).
31 This learning mechanism implies that there are at least two sources of learning for firms: internal and 
external. This idea is not new, as Levitt and March (1988: 321,329) explicated that firms can engage in 
either “learning from direct experience” or “learning from the experience of others”. For latecomer firms, 
“learning by foreign connection” is considered one mechanism of learning from the external sources. They 
are many other sources such as firm collaborating with business associations, government (non-firm) 
organizations, customers, competitors, to name a few.
32 Johnson (1992) emphasizes the importance of interaction in all types of learning.
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attempt to explicitly explain the important role played by firm-level learning and 
competitive strategies in impacting such shift.
2.1.4 Absorptive Capacity and Latecomer Firm Learning
How external, new knowledge can be internalized into the latecomer firm depends 
crucially on the “absorptive capacity” 33 (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 569), i.e. “the ability 
of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information and assimilate it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128). One way of increasing firms’ 
absorptive capacity is through a deliberate, strategic learning effort (Kim, 1998; 1999). In 
explicating the learning process at Hyundai Motor, Kim (1998) breaks down the absorptive 
capacity into two major elements: prior knowledge base and intensity of learning effort (a 
more important element34). Berger (2005: 20) proposes two more elements: organizational 
factors (organizational structure, internal communication arrangement and managerial 
human resource management) and human capital (refers to firm’s employees and the 
quality of their education).
In addition, a more fundamental issue not described here is the link between firm 
learning and competitive strategy and its association with these elements of absorptive 
capacity. In disaggregating the absorptive capacity concept, Zahra and George (2002) 
pointed out that there are: “potential absorptive capacity” and “realized absorptive 
capacity”, and the former deals with knowledge acquisition and assimilation capabilities, 
while the latter deals with transformation and exploitation of knowledge. Furthermore, the 
potential absorptive capacity is linked with the firm’s learning strategy since it provided the 
firm with the ability to acquire and assimilate new external knowledge, to potentially 
augment its existing absorptive capacity. Consequently, it is likely that all of the above 
absorptive capacity elements must be taken into account in a firm’s learning and
33 Kumar et al. (1999: 86) stated that one of the important elements for building firm technological capability 
is the “technology absorption capacity” (see Bell (1987)). It discusses the importance of existing level of 
firm’s absorptive capacity in determining the extent to which the firm can participate in the technology 
transfer process, and also, the type of technology which the firm can efficiently operate and later improve 
upon.
34 Kim (1998) added that even if the (latecomer) firm has low prior knowledge base, it could acquire the 
absorptive capacity it desired by exerting (and continuously maintain) the high level of learning effort. This 
was certainly the case of Hyundai Motor (Korea) during its early stages of development. Following the same 
argument, Criscuolo and Narula (2002: 6) stated “Absorptive capacity accumulates only if  an effort [i.e. 
learning effort] to internalise the external knowledge is exerted and in particular if the prior knowledge has 
been applied to the solution of problems [italics added].”
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competitive strategy contexts; and these elements have particular significance for the 
sequencing of firm learning activities, learning mechanisms and stages in capability 
development.
2.1.5 Summary of LFL
The latecomer firm literature provides several very useful contributions toward the 
framework for a firm learning strategy, but it also has limitations. First are the 
contributions:
1. The literature discussed in detail the essential characteristics (e.g. various learning 
mechanisms, improvements in production activities, product modification, etc.) of 
the learning activities at the firm level and implications for the design of industrial 
development policy. These studies commonly pointed towards the significant role 
of conscious investment in indigenous technological learning effort, which can 
mediate the rate of accumulation of technological capabilities.
2. The stylized facts that (technological) learning process is not automatic, and can be 
costly and requires deliberate investments in time, financial resources, human and 
other resources that contribute to the build up of the elements of firm absorptive 
capacity.
3. The crucial role played by investment in learning effort and other resources implies 
that proper management of the learning process is required; this is a potential area 
where firm learning and competitive strategies could have a significant role in 
directing such activity.
Secondly, the review of LFL also suggests the following key limitations:
1. Though implied as important in each of the conceptual areas above, the literature 
pays little attention on the important role played by firm learning and competitive 
strategies in directing firm learning activities and mechanisms. Little discussion 
was made relating to the (deliberate) investment in formulation of such learning 
strategy that is part of the investment in learning effort. In addition the literature 
does not offer to explicitly explain the detailed elements involved in process of 
managing firm learning strategy; in particular it lacked the description with regards 
to learning goals, (awareness of) capability gap(s), and the acquisition of knowledge 
in response to such goals.
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2. The LFL tends to assume the prior existence of the simple routine production 
capabilities (either as simple assembly or production via OEM sub-contract). It 
considers this capability as the minimum level, whose accumulation seems to be 
automatic; consequently it ignores the crucial played by firm learning strategy in 
directing the learning activities to accumulate even the simple routine production 
capability. In particular, issues such as firms that were mere traders or distributors 
(i.e. replacement equipment manufacture, REM), then leveraging off their 
intangible assets and entering for the first time into the OEM production sub­
contract and building the simple, basic routine production capabilities were not 
addressed.
3. Similar to above, the transitions from simple to intermediate and finally to 
innovative capabilities were assumed to occur automatically, without the active 
involvement of firm-level learning and competitive strategies and their interplay 
with firm learning activities and mechanisms. In particular, the role played by firm 
competitive and learning goals and the awareness of its capability gap and gap­
closing strategy in managing the transitions were not explicitly discussed.
2.2 The Strategic Management and Resource-based 
Literature (SRBL)
This section reviews the literature that addresses strategic management issues from 
a resource-based perspective. The final section summarizes with a discussion on the 
strengths and limitations of the SRBL as a framework for this study.
2.2.1 Origin of Concepts: Resource, Capabilities and Core 
Competencies
Credited by many as one of the forerunners of the resource-based concept, Penrose 
(1959) makes a crucial distinction between resources and the services of resources (i.e. 
capabilities):
“ ... resources consist of a bundle of potential services and can, for the most 
part, be defined independently of their use, while services cannot be so 
defined, the very word ‘service’ implying a function, an activity” (Penrose, 
1959:25).
Furthermore resources are further classified into either physical resources or intangible 
resources. Physical resources include tangibles such as production plant, equipment, land,
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raw materials, work-in-process goods and other natural resources and human (and 
intangible) resources comprise unskilled and skilled labor, clerical, managerial and 
administrative staff. Penrose (1959) was amongst the first to suggest that it is not these 
resources that deliver value, but the services (i.e. the capabilities) that these resources 
render.
Following Penrose, Richardson (1972: 888) defined capabilities broadly as 
“ appropriate knowledge, experience and skills”  while Nelson and Winter (1982) dedicated 
an entire chapter35 o f their book discussing the theoretical basis o f organizational 
capabilities based on the concept o f individual routines and skills. Later Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) extended the capabilities concept further and developed the influential “ core 
competence” concept. Consequently, it could be said that historically within the resource- 
based perspective, the terms resources and capabilities/competencies are more than just the 
neoclassical concepts o f “ land, labor and capital”  and that between the tangible and 
intangible resources, the resource-based concept paid more attention to the latter which 
included among others, the intangibles human resources, knowledge and intellectual 
capital.
2.2.1.1 Conceptual Implications
Resources tend to be more fungible and more likely to be sourced via market 
exchange, whereas the services or capabilities (i.e. managerial skills or organizational 
capabilities) are more firm-specific, non-tradable, involve partly-tacit knowledge (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1966) and usually must be built from within (Chandler, 1992; 
Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). This implies that efforts must be expended by 
a management team to oversee the development o f capabilities through deliberate 
investment in learning processes. Penrose argued that the limits to a firm ’s growth rate 
were the result o f managerial constraint (i.e. limits o f managerial ability) and the managers’ 
behavioral elements (Kor and Mahoney, 2000: 116). Consequently it could be said that 
firm  learning is one o f the key strategic factors that, i f  managed properly, w ill lead to 
reducing limits to a firm ’s growth rate since according to Penrose’s ideas, learning w ill 
enable the firm to utilize it resources better and more efficiently, leaving more idle 
resources to be put to more productive use to fuel firm ’ s growth.
35 Chapter 5: Organization Capabilities. Later both Nelson and Winter co-edited a book with Giovanni Dosi 
on the nature and dynamics o f organizational capabilities (Dosi et al., 2000).
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In addition, it could be argued that it is highly likely that if firm learning and 
competitive strategies are brought into strong focus by including them as part of managers’ 
routines in firm capability development, then the firm will attain the “capacity to learn and 
adapt”36 (Beer et al., 2005) and endure (more or less) perpetual growth, despite the 
turbulent, evolutionary and ever-changing external environment. Moreover, the 
development of a “capacity to learn” becomes even more important when the external 
environment is turbulent and firm must develop new capabilities.
2.2.2 The ‘outside-in’ of Firm Strategies
Viewing the firm as the main unit of analysis, Penrose and other scholars 
acknowledged that the external environment (for example competitors, suppliers and 
customers) has a significant effect on managerial capabilities and the growth of the firms, 
but she did not explicitly “spell out” the crucial drivers in the environment . This was 
conducted by Porter (1980) who divided the environment into the operating and the general 
environment. Porter developed the “Five Forces model” suggesting that the competitive 
dynamics in an industry are shaped by
• Threat of new entrants
• Threat of substitute products or services
• Bargaining power of suppliers
• Bargaining power of buyers
• Extent of industry rivalry
Later in the early 1990s, Porter proposed a dynamic theory of strategy but still largely 
based the core idea of firm success on two variables (both at the industry-level): the 
attractiveness of industry and the firm’s competitive position within the industry (Porter, 
1990; 1991). He also described how activities within the firms contribute to building firm’s 
competitive position. Porter’s ideas provide significant insights into competitive strategy 
with the (attractive) industry as the unit of analysis, but they address very little the 
significant role played by firm’s learning in choosing a competitive strategy. The 
framework places very little emphasis on firm heterogeneity.
36 In their original paper, the authors named this capability as organizational “fitness” -  i.e. the firm’s capacity 
to continuously learn, adapt quickly and in advance o f a crisis (Beer et al., 2005: 463).
37 This issue was noted by Chandler (1992: 86) who stated “ ... the concept o f the firm’s activities and growth 
developed by Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter and Edith Penrose, was first spelled out by Richard Nelson 
and Sidney Winter in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982).”
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Because this “outside-in”38 approach does not address the firm heterogeneous 
aspects of firm capabilities (Rumelt, 1991; Stalk, 1992), it has little to offer on an analysis 
of different learning strategies and learning activities and their roles in underpinning firms’ 
competitive advantage. The approach also neglects the role played by technological change 
within the ever-changing external environment that significantly affects the competitive 
position of the firm, and how in that context, firm learning and capabilities accumulation, 
when applied in a timely manner, are able to improve the competitive position (Tidd et al., 
2001:78-79).
In sum, the “outside-in” approach lacks an adequate perspective on heterogeneous 
firm resources and capabilities and the role of firm learning strategy and different processes 
of capability development. Hence, this approach provides only “an incomplete portion of 
the whole picture”.
2.2.3 The ‘inside-ouf39 of Firm Strategies
Many researchers have drawn attention to the limitation of the “outside-in” 
approach. For instance, drawing on “strategic factor market” (Barney, 1986), Barney 
(1991: 112) pointed out the crucial link between firm resources and the sustainability of 
competitive advantage and developed the well-known framework incorporating four 
indicators to assist in identifying firm’s strategic resources: valuable, rare, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable (VRIN). Similarly, Peteraf (1993) concurred with Barney and developed 
an explicit “Resource-Based Model”40 explaining firm’s sustained competitive advantage. 
Both scholars acknowledged the insufficient “outside-in” approach to strategy and the need 
to look more inside the firms for sources of competitive advantage. This was due to the 
increase in the degree of turbulence within the external environment; in particular, Barney 
(1995: 49) has stated
38 The words “outside in” was borrowed from Javidan (1998: 60) and Drejer (2004: 514); these strategic 
management scholars referred to the traditional strategic planning process where the planner starts with 
external analysis and then follows by the internal analysis. In addition, Drejer argued that “this is a reactive 
approach to strategic management since it involves adapting the resources or competencies o f the firm to the 
market conditions and competitive posture” (Ibid.).
39 The words “inside out” was borrowed from Javidan (1998: 60); they are used to refer to the strategic 
planning process where the planner starts with the internal analysis and then follows by the external analysis.
40 In this model, there are four “cornerstones” o f competitive advantage: 1) heterogeneity, 2) ex post limits to 
competition, 3) imperfect mobility and 4) ex ante limits to competition. These “four conditions must be met 
for a firm to enjoy sustained above-normal returns” (Peteraf, 1993: 185-186). In an extensive review o f  
resource-based view literature, Prior (2003: 18) acknowledged that Peteraf model is probably the “most 
comprehensive theory o f competitive advantage based on the RBV [resource-based v iew ]...”
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. [the] environmental analysis ... is only half the story and that the ... 
development of tools for analyzing [external] environmental ... has 
proceeded much more rapidly than the development of tools for analyzing 
firm’s internal strengths and weaknesses” [italics added].
Coining the term “resource-based view”, Wernerfelt (1984: 176) examined how firm 
competitive advantage resulted mainly from resource-product portfolio (called “resource- 
product matrix”41 and not merely from isolated analysis of product-market positions). 
Similarly in the same year, Rumelt (1984) introduced the concept of “uncertain 
imitability”42 to reflect the heterogeneity among firms; firms are different because of their 
unique products, which comes from each firm’s unique set of resources and capabilities. 
Rumelt argues that the shift in the conceptual view of the firm, from a product-market to a 
product-resource competitive position view, has strong managerial implications:
“In essence, the concept is that a firm’s competitive position is defined by a 
bundle of unique resources and relationships that the task of general 
management is to adjust and renew these resources and relationships as time, 
competition, and change erode their value” (Rumelt, 1984: 557-558).
Responding to the static resource-based view concept, Dierickx and Cool (1989) further 
developed the resource-based view, based on the concepts of “stocks” (i.e. resource stocks) 
and “flows” (i.e. learning and resource/capability building). They argued, through the use 
of a bathtub metaphor43, that both “stocks” and “flows” are necessary for firm 
development.
“ ... at any moment in time, the stock of water is indicated by the level of 
water in the tub; it is the cumulative result offlows of water into the tub 
(through the tap) and out of it (through a leak). ... the amount of water in the 
tub represents the stock of know-how at a particular moment in time, 
whereas current R&D spending [or spending on learning process] is 
represented by the water flowing into the tap; the fact that know-how 
depreciates over time is represented by the flow of water leaking through the 
hole in the tub [italics added]” (Dierickx and Cool, 1989: 1506).
41 In his original paper, Wernerfelt utilize the resource-product matrix as a preliminary analysis tool for 
assisting firm in managing its changing resource position (as opposed to Porter’s product-market position) 
over time.
42 See also Lippman and Rumelt (1982) for more discussion of the concept.
43 Jantunen (2002) pointed out that this early attempt made by Dierickx and Cool (1989) was to develop the 
“dynamic” version of the then “static” resource-based view. Later, similar attempts to extend the “static” 
resource-based view were made by Teece and Pisano (1994), Teece et al. (1997) and Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003).
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They added, "... while flows can be adjusted instantaneously, stocks cannot [original 
italics]” (Ibid.). Here the implication to the idea of resources and capability is that it takes 
time and much learning effort to build the “stock” of resources and capabilities (Miyazaki, 
1994; Stalk, 1992); this implies that the firm’s competitive and learning strategies are most 
likely necessary to plan the investment in such learning effort and to attempt to augment the 
“stock” of capabilities.
Despite different emphases, many scholars support the resource-based view on firm 
learning strategy that the firms generally consist of a portfolio of resource-market positions 
which it must learn to manage if it wants to achieve competitive advantage. Similar to 
Porter’s over-emphasis on the external (industrial) competitive forces, this “early” 
resource-based view can be too introspective a focus on static resources and with 
insufficient attention on the external environment such as the industrial dynamics, market 
factor uncertainty, industrial technological change and the institutional factors (Jantunen, 
2002; Porter, 1991). In addition, the resource-based view focuses on internal firm 
resources in isolation from other firms and non-firm organizations, paying little attention to 
the dynamic system effects and resource interconnectedness (Foss and Robertson, 2000: 2). 
Moreover, the issue of how these resource characteristics impact the development of firm- 
level learning processes and competitive strategies and capability development, leading to 
firm competitive advantage is also lacking (Bromiley and Fleming, 2002; Priem and Butler, 
2001).
Later in the 1990s, the core competence approach was developed by Prahalad and 
Hamel44 and other scholars (Hamel and Heene, 1994; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Heene 
and Sanchez, 1996; Javidan, 1998; and Lei et al., 1996); in the same period, Leonard- 
Barton introduced the concept of core (technological) capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
1995). This was the first time that strategy (and management) researchers have seriously 
examined the central role of technological competencies (Tidd et ah, 2001: 132). Instead of 
planning strategy based on neutralizing threats and strengthening product-market 
competitive position, Prahalad and Hamel viewed strategic thinking in terms of “core 
competence”. Prahalad and Hamel (1990: 81) defined core competence as “the collective 
learning in organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies” [italics added].
44 Wernerfelt (1995) believes that Prahalad and Hamel were responsible for (rapid) diffusion o f  the resource- 
based view into practice.
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Similar to Prahalad and Hamel but with more focus on the “organic” perspective of 
learning, Leonard-Barton (1995: 27) defined core technological capability as distinct from 
other lower-order capabilities and argued that it has four key components: 1) people’s skills 
(i.e. employee knowledge and skills), 2) the embedded knowledge within the physical 
systems (e.g. equipment, software), 3) the managerial systems that facilitate the knowledge­
building activities (e.g. systems of education, rewards and incentives) and 4) values and 
norms that serves as mediators to select the types of knowledge to be developed [original 
italics]. On the whole, the core competence/capability scholars believed that a firm’s 
successful competitive strategy must be built on a firm’s internal core competencies 
(Javidan, 1998) and these must be managed as an inter-dependent, well-functioning 
knowledge system (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 1995).
Having its roots in the “economic” resource-based view45, the core competence idea 
can be too introspective and lacks the “outside-in” view of competitive position and 
industry analysis (Porter, 1991). The concept of core competence, if overemphasized by 
the exploiting firms, will cause the firms to fail to renew the existing competencies and 
possibly lead to “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1995: 33) or “competence trap”46 
(O'Driscoll et al., 2001: 76). Moreover, the core competence perspective is always 
described as a historical account of successful global firms which usually remained at an 
abstract level and rather static47.
These limitations prompted scholars to develop an approach that simultaneously 
incorporates both the “inside-out” and “outside-in” perspectives as well as incorporating 
more dynamic elements such as organizational learning (Dunphy et ah, 1997) and meta­
learning (Lei et ah, 1996), learning organization (Garvin, 1994; Senge, 1990), knowledge, 
organizational behavior and continuous innovation in a competence-based strategic 
management framework48.
45 The “core competence” concept is essentially a management version o f the “economic” resource-based 
view thinking (Barney, 1991; 1995; Wernerfelt, 1995).
46 Here the competence trap is defined as “the failure to reconcile the competence leveraging with competence 
building can lead to competence trap.” Early development o f the concept o f “competency traps” was made by 
Levitt and March (1988), and later, Levinthal and March (1993).
47 Drejer criticized that the core competence concept implicitly stated that core competencies do not need to 
be developed over time (Drejer, 2002: 102).
48 See for example: the concept “combinative capabilities” (Kogut and Zander, 1992); likewise, the concept o f  
“integration capability” (Iansiti and Clark, 1994); Collis and Montgomery (1995) on improving the “static” 
resource-based view to include the changes within the external environment and recently integrating the 
resource-based view with organizational economics into a dynamic framework explicating corporate strategy; 
Sanchez and Heene (2004) on competence-based strategic management model; Sanchez et al. (1996) on the
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2.2.4 The Dynamic Resource/Competency-based Theory
To resolve issues of either too outward or too inward a focus and the tendency to a 
static view on competence-based strategic management, the idea of integrative, dynamic 
competency-based theory has emerged. However, this idea is not new. Commenting on 
the legacy of Penrose, Rugman and Verbeke (2002: 771) state:
“Her insights on the [firm] growth process, especially the enactment of the 
[external] environment and the discovery of productive opportunities [i.e. 
the internal capabilities to render productive services] through a dynamic 
learning process but guided by path dependencies49, remain as relevant 
today as 40 years ago” [italics added].
The early resource-based view neglected the complex relationship between the resources, 
capabilities and learning strategy that partially derived from anticipation of changes in the 
external environment and firm’s strategic plan to seize future business opportunities. The 
emphasis of the integrated view is on both the external environment and the firms’ 
realization of opportunities, as Collis and Montgomery (1995: 119) rightfully stated:
“The [emerging modem] resource-based view o f the firm  ... combines the 
internal analysis of phenomena within companies ... with the external 
analysis of the industry and the competitive environment... Thus the 
[modern] resource-based view builds on, but does not replace, the two 
previous broad approaches to strategy by combining internal and external 
perspectives” [original italics].
Other scholars also attempted to integrate both the external environment and firm resources 
in their framework50. In addition to the integration of the external and internal views, the 
perspective on dynamism (i.e. changes through time) of firm strategy and learning activities 
also matters, as Penrose stated:
“ ... ‘history matters’; [firm] growth is essentially an evolutionary process 
and based on cumulative growth of collective knowledge [and capabilities] 
in the context of a purposive firm” (Penrose, 1995: xiii).
dynamics o f competence-based competition; Amit and Schoemaker (1993) on integrating the resource-based 
view with external industry analysis; and Drejer (2002; 2003) on linking competence development to 
innovation and organizational learning.
49 The concept o f “path dependencies” here is taken to mean “a firm’s [current learning processes and] 
capabilities are defined very much by where it has been in the past and what it has done” (Augier and Teece, 
2006: 404) and that “history matters” (Teece, 2000: 113, see also Nelson and Winter (1982)).
50 For instance, Amit and Schoemaker (1993) attempted to explicitly link the resource-based view, an industry 
analysis framework, and the behavioral decision theory to better explain the concepts o f “strategic assets” and 
their impact on organizational rent.
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This reinforces the modern resource-based thinking with regards to firm heterogeneity that 
firms differ in their historical knowledge base, in the learning and competitive strategies 
used to acquire external resources, and in their internal development o f capabilities. These 
factors underpin the emergence o f the development on a modern resource-based concept.
2.2.4.1 The Modern Resource-based Concept
Scholars in the field o f both economics and business policy had extended this 
“ early”  resource-based view to incorporate other aspects relating to firm resources (both 
internal and external) and firm  competitive advantage. There were two main development 
directions o f the “ modern”  resource-based concept. The first was based on the criticism 
that the original resource-based concept is rather static and did not incorporate change; this 
was provided by the proponents o f the dynamic capabilities view51 (Teece et al. (1990),
Dosi and Teece (1994), Teece and Pisano (1994), Teece et al. (1997))52.
The second development emphasized the integration o f other concepts into the 
resource-based thinking framework, including: organizational learning (Bierly and 
Hamalainen, 1995; Drejer, 2000; Wang and Ahmed, 2003; West and Burnes, 2000), 
knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2000), 
knowledge-based organizational capability (Grant, 1996; Metcalfe and James, 2000; 
Spender, 1996), knowledge strategy (Zack, 1999; 2002) and learning and innovation 
(Drejer, 2003; Lam, 1998).
Historically, Teece’s dynamic capabilities framework originated at about the same 
time as the idea o f Prahalad and Hamel’s core competence (Teece et al., 1990; 1992) and 
that the framework “ has been presented as an alternative to Porter’s (1980) ‘outside-in’ 
competitive forces model as well as the inside-out resourced based”  (Antonacopoulou et al., 
2005: 24). The dynamic capabilities approach emphasizes learning and focuses on three 
key elements that directly affect the firm learning and competitive strategies: path, position 
and processes (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). Teece’s idea is by far the most 
useful framework for analyzing firm learning and innovation strategy (Tidd et al., 2001: 69)
51 For more articles related to dynamic capabilities concept, please refer to the special issue o f Industrial and 
Corporate Change (1994) on this subject.
52 See also Augier and Teece (2006), Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Hilliard (2004), Buenstorf and Murmann 
(2005), Zollo and Winter (2002) on learning mechanisms and dynamic capabilities, Winter (2003) on 
explicating the concept o f dynamic capabilities, Fujimoto and Orihashi (2004) on the case studies o f Toyota 
and Mitsubishi carmakers, Lei et al. (1996), Adner and Helfat (2003), Madsen and McKelvey (2005), and 
Ferdinand et al. (2005)).
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since it integrates the former resource-based thinking with the Schumpeterian view of 
competition (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Mahoney, 1995; Nelson, 1991; Wernerfelt,
1995). Nelson (1991) and other evolutionary economics scholars (Dosi et ah, 2000) had 
earlier argued that a central issue for strategic management should be the firm-specific 
dynamic capabilities in a Schumpeterian and evolutionary context; firms must be 
understood in terms of their diversity in strategy, structure and core competences (Dosi et 
ah, 2000; McKelvey, 1998) and problem-solving routines (Dosi and Marengo, 1993) and 
how these elements change through time.
In this view, firm-specific dynamic capabilities are the source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Teece (1994: 538) pointed out two key definitions: “dynamic” 
means
“the shifting of character of the environment; certain strategic responses are 
required when time-to-market and timing is critical, the pace of innovation is 
accelerating, and the nature of future competition and markets is difficult to 
determine” [italics added]
and “capabilities” means
“the key role of strategic management [and managers] in appropriately 
adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal and external 
organizational skills, resources, and functional competences [and 
capabilities] toward changing environment” [italics added] (Ibid.).
From these two definitions, it is easy to see that the powerful insight within the dynamic 
capabilities view incorporates: 1) both the external and internal changes to the firm’s skills, 
knowledge and resources and 2) these firm-level changes must be in constant interaction 
with the ever-changing, turbulent environment. In addition, within the dynamic capabilities 
framework, firm’s competence and capabilities rest fundamentally on three key themes: 
paths, positions and (organizational) processes (see also Kim and Nelson (2000b: 6)).
Teece (1994: 541) defined these as:
• Paths refer to “the strategic alternatives available to firm, and the attractiveness 
of the [business] opportunities which lie ahead.”
• Positions refer to “[firm’s] current endowment of technology and intellectual 
property, as well as its customer base and upstream relations with suppliers.
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• Processes refer to “the way things are done in the firm, or what might be 
referred to as its ‘routines’ [i.e. the firm’s managerial, organizational and 
learning processes]”
Having defined these three constructs, he later stated: at any point in time the firm’s 
capability is collectively encompassed by its “processes” and “positions”. Similarly, at any 
point in time, the firm must choose its future development “paths”, and that firm’s 
competitive advantage and strategic capability hinge on “what a firm can do and where it 
can go [as a result of] the topography (i.e. historical accumulation and choice of) of its 
processes, positions and paths” (Teece, 2000: 116).
Though powerful in its key conceptual constructs, the dynamic capabilities view is 
in its preliminary development phase and lacks sufficient empirical evidence (Jantunen, 
2002; Williamson, 1999), and this makes it difficult to identify firms that possess dynamic 
capabilities (Blyler and Coff, 2003). Arguing that firm-specific competencies is the 
underlying factor influencing differences among firm dynamics and the degree of 
sustainability of firm competitive advantage, Pavitt commented:
“The identification of dynamic competencies is inevitably itself part of a 
learning process, and is [currently] neither an elegant theory enabling 
scholars to predict outcomes, nor a simple recipe enabling managers to 
achieve corporate success” [italics added] (Pavitt, 2002: 10).
Consequently, what is needed in this area is more empirical studies (Pavlou and El Sawy, 
2005), both at the industry-level and firm-level, to establish the “microfoundations of 
dynamic capabilities” (Jantunen, 2002: 53).
A number of researchers in Europe, including Anders Drejer, Ron Sanchez, Aime 
Heene and Howard Thomas, have worked on problems related to competence-based 
strategic management and competition (Heene and Sanchez, 1996; Sanchez, 1993; Sanchez 
et al., 1996), organizational learning and innovation management (Drejer, 2000; 2003; 
McKee, 1992; Stata, 1989), learning and knowledge assets (Sanchez and Heene, 2005). 
Other scholars worked on combining industrial organization, spatial competition, strategic 
groups and cognitive communities into a theory of resource-based view and competence- 
based competition (Thomas and Pollock, 1999). In a series of articles and books, Drejer 
explored the linkage among organizational learning and the different elements of 
competence development (Drejer, 2000; 2001a; 2001b) and later attempting to link the
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concept of core competence to strategic management and establish the notion of 
“competence-based strategy” (Drejer, 2002).
Sanchez and Heene (2004: 5) discuss the competence-based view of the firm, in 
which they view firm as an open system composed of six main “system elements” [original 
italics]:
• Strategic logic -  refers to the operative rationale for achieving organizational goals 
through the coordinated resource deployments
• Management processes -  refers to the coordination mechanisms for acquiring, 
leveraging and deploying resources
• Intangible assets -  refers to the knowledge, intellectual property, reputation and 
relationships
• Tangible assets -  refers to the physical assets such as plant, equipment and so on.
• Operations -  refers to firm’s operational activities
• Product offers -  refers to the entire package of benefits and costs a customer 
imagines when thinking about purchasing the product
It could be argued that both the “strategic logic” and “management processes” are the most 
relevant elements to firm’s learning strategy and that the ability to effectively direct firm’s 
learning activities must be based upon at least two key elements: data53 from firm’s existing 
assets (intangible and tangible), operations and product offerings and external data on 
resources that are available to firms, the “firm’s addressable resources”54 (Ibid.: 82).
Some scholars in the resource-based field have argued that among all the firm 
resources, knowledge is the most important one (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Liebeskind, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996). The implication is that to maintain firm 
competitive advantage, firm knowledge must be strategically managed. This implies that 
firm must link the business development strategy (i.e. competitive strategy) with the 
learning (or knowledge development) strategy (Zack, 1999; 2002). Other scholars also 
extended the resource-based view beyond a single firm’s boundary to include the
53 Basing the concept on the systems theoretic framework, “data” refers to the feedback comprising 
information and knowledge that the strategic managers received from managing the various functional 
resources o f the firm. The data will enable the managers to make appropriate adjustments to decisions, 
policies, procedures and budgets (Ibid.: 5).
54 Sanchez and Heene define firm-addressable resources as the resources that an organization does not own, 
but can be access through market transactions (what economist called factor markets). Another type o f  
resource described by these authors is firm-specific resources and these are internal resources o f  a firm such 
as permanent employees, machines and other physical assets.
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“ relational aspect” , i.e. the inter-organizational relations (Acedo et al., 2006; Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Nobeoka and Dyer, 1998) and firm capability 
development within the learning networks (Bessant and Francis, 1999; Bessant et al., 2003; 
Hakansson et al., 1999). The main focus o f these recent studies is on the concept o f 
management o f firm knowledge sharing (and shared learning) and the effectiveness o f the 
inter-firm learning processes in building firm capabilities (Bangens, 1998; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998; Mikkola, 2000); these scholars argue that much o f the “ early”  resource- 
based view literature addresses very little o f such issues, hence an extension to inter-firm 
relations is justified.
2.2.5 Strategy as Learning and Knowledge Strategy
The strategic management literature is essentially divided into two streams: the 
content and the process. Most o f the above discussion o f SRBL (with the exception o f 
dynamic capabilities55) had reviewed only the content perspective: what you need to have 
to sustain competitive advantage, not on what you need to do. The core issue o f identifying 
the strategic learning process that firms must engage in order to create competitive 
advantage is mostly lacking in all the strategic management theory:
“ While there has been considerable progress in developing frameworks that 
explain differing competitive success at any given point in time, our 
understanding o f the dynamic processes [i.e. learning processes] by which 
firms perceived and ultimately attain superior market positions is far less 
developed”  (Porter, 1991: 95).
“ ... it is disturbing to note that the theory on strategic management, over the 
past decade, has failed to provide [prescriptive] models and framework for 
[strategic managers] ... it seems as i f  scholars within the area has been 
engulfed in a fruitless war over who and what [i.e. the content] defines 
competitive advantage, rather than on how [i.e. the learning process] to 
create advantage”  [italics added] (Drejer, 2004: 517).
Similarly, McGrath et al. also stated their view on strategy research:
" ... the [learning] processes used to develop new sources o f advantage are 
as important to the long-run competitive vita lity o f a firm as the content o f 
any given advantage”  [italics added] (McGrath et al., 1995: 252).
Consequently it is worthwhile for scholars to pay more attention to the (learning) process-
side o f strategic management models or frameworks and in particular to how learning
55 Lewis (1995: 38) stated that the dynamic capabilities approach’s “ emphasis on learning and the constraints 
on learning reflects the key issues in the process-based [rather than content-based] strategy perspective.”
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strategies form in firms (Mintzberg, 1993; 1994). Mintzberg proposed that formal strategic 
planning per se is doomed to fail and that learning is inherent in the process of forming 
strategy56 (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). There will always be continuous adjustment 
along the way to achieve a dynamic fit (alignment) between what is realized from strategy 
and its intended, original plan57. The implication of Mintzberg’s emergent strategy 
approach is that within an ever-changing industrial environment, it is highly likely that 
firm’s learning strategy is an emergent, rather than a rationally planned one, making the 
formulation of firm-level learning strategy itself a learning process (Tidd et al., 2001: 69- 
73; 2005: 401-402). In short, firms must engage in a process of “learning to learn” 
strategically (Bessant and Buckingham, 1993: 223).
Consequently, firm managers should attempt to distinguish among the different 
levels of (technological) firm learning: operational, tactical and strategic and at the strategic 
level, managers should develop the firm strategic ability to “learning to learn-how-to-learn 
and unlearn from experience” (Carayannis and Alexander, 2002: 629) or adopt a “learning 
approach to strategy” (Mumford, 2000). Others similarly described two or more different 
levels of learning: “adaptive learning” (i.e. learning associated with simple first-order 
change) versus “generative learning” (i.e. learning that can enhance organization’s creative 
capacity through second-order change) (Senge, 1990: 14) and from “single-loop” (i.e. the 
detection and correction or organization errors to allow firm to pursue its existing 
objectives) to “double-loop” (i.e. the understanding of ways that organizational errors were 
detected and corrected) and finally to “deutero learning”58 (i.e. the fundamental inquiry into 
the firm’s learning system and how well it functions) (Argyris, 1977; Argyris and Schon, 
1978).
Despite the difference in the detailed definitions, these scholars agreed that “higher- 
level learning” (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 810) exists and that such higher-level “strategic
56 In addition, Mintzberg (1990) categorized ten distinct “schools” within strategy research, one o f which is 
the “learning schools”, which describes the process of strategy making as an emergent process.
57 Mintzberg (1978) and Mintzberg and Waters (1985) dubbed this concept “realised”, “intended” and 
“emergent” strategies (Ibid.).
58 This type of learning is sometimes called “meta-level learning” (Lei et al., 1996) or “triple-loop learning” 
(Easterby-Smith, 1997: 1106), and it is usually associated with an understanding on how to identify which 
kind of learning activity and mechanisms are required for a particular situation/task and how to manage such 
selections (Bessant and Buckingham, 1993: 223). Some scholars remarked that deutero learning is essentially 
a sub-category of double-loop learning and it is highly similar to the concept of firm dynamic capabilities 
(Weinstein and Azoulay, 1999: 42). Likewise, other scholars also remarked that double-loop learning is 
similar to that of dynamic capabilities because “it implies a learning process which changes the values and 
operating assumptions of the organisation ...” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2006: 7).
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learning” (Dodgson, 1993; Thomas et al., 2001) is necessary if firms wanted to renew itself 
into new competitive realms (Lei et al., 1996) and to increase the rate of capability 
accumulation by means of enhanced, innovative organizational routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) or organizational capability (Winter, 2000). They further agreed that most 
firms that are unable to engage in the higher-level learning process will be unable to 
compete in the long term (Beckett, 2001) and that these firms cannot maintain an effective 
control of the various “operational” and “tactical” learning processes (Carayannis and 
Alexander, 2002). This argument could be extended further to postulate that firms without 
the deliberate strategy to engage in higher-level learning are unable to regulate the lower- 
level learning processes, and this would lead to the slowing down of the accumulation of 
firm capabilities. This thesis will attempt to further explore the validity of such an 
argument.
Recognizing that in developing a knowledge strategy one must consider two 
dimensions of knowledge and learning strategy (Zack, 1999): first is the exploration versus 
the exploitation (March, 1991) and second is the internal versus external learning 
dimensions, and the combination of these two sources to maintain synergy and build firm 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Based on these dimensions, Zack (1999: 126) has 
made two assertions: 1) the link between knowledge management and business strategy, 
which is currently lacking, must be put more into practice and 2) business managers are in 
need of a framework to assist them to understand the knowledge-strategy and learning- 
strategy links. Here it is argued that not only do these knowledge strategy, learning 
strategy, and business (competitive) strategy simply link to each other, but they also must 
link in a systemic way to enable a firm to achieve higher rate of capability accumulation.
2.2.6 Summary of SRBL
The review of the above concepts from the strategic resource-based literature 
revealed the following strengths and limitations. First are the strengths:
1. It offers great insights into learning strategy formulation, how the tensions between 
the internal organization (i.e. management of resources and capabilities) and the 
dynamics of the external environment (customers, competitors and suppliers) 
contributed to shaping firm’s competitive and learning strategies. In addition the 
underlying premise of this literature is persistent firm heterogeneity with respect to
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their resources and capabilities and thus possibly persistent differences in the firm 
learning and competitive strategies.
2. The “modern” resource-based concepts also incorporate much dynamic elements 
related to the process of learning and capability building, such as organizational 
learning, knowledge and innovation, and the view that a firm’s learning and 
competitive strategies are also important parts of its learning process, and they must 
be properly managed and aligned with the learning activities and mechanisms. 
Secondly, the review of the SRBL also suggests the following limitations:
1. The literature (in particular, the “original” resource-based view) offers very little 
discussion regarding the significant role played by the deliberate investment in 
learning effort and learning activities, especially in the context of a latecomer 
firm59.
2. The operationalization of the key constructs within the “modern” resource-based 
concept is mostly lacking. This has implication for developing country context; 
without such operationalization, the latecomer firms’ managers (and policymakers) 
could not clearly see the linkage among the competitive and learning strategies, the 
learning activities, and firm resources and capabilities, and how these elements 
interdependently link into the concept of latecomer firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage. Consequently, more empirical studies that focus on such 
operationalization are needed.
2.3 Summary and the Literature Reciprocal Gaps
From the review of both LFL and SRBL above, it is argued that there exist mutual 
gaps between both bodies of literature. The characteristics of such gaps are that the 
strength (or weakness) of LFL becomes the weakness (or strength) of SRBL (see Figure 
2 . 1) .
59 For example, the studies conducted by Mathews (1998; 2002) stated that the “original” resource-based view 
was inapplicable and inappropriate to context o f  a developing country firm. Instead o f targeting 
resources/assets which are inimitable, non-substitutable, and difficult to transfer (Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993), latecomer firms should acquire the initial competitive advantage by acquiring assets that are more 
imitable, substitutable, and easier to transfer (i.e. the “inverse” o f  the former criteria).
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Figure 2.1 The Literature Reciprocal Gap
Latecomer Firms Literature (LFL)
Limitation
LFL weakness = 
SRBL strength
Very little discussion on firm 
strategies and how they 
strategically direct firm learning 
activities
Very little attention is paid to 
the “catch-up” mode of learning 
activities and efforts of 
latecomer firms
SRBL weakness = 
LFL strength
Limitation
Strategic Resource-Based Literature (SRBL)
> Reciprocal Gap
Need for 
Integration
Source: own elaboration based on the research literature
In other words, it is easy to see that the gap in LFL is the strength of SRBL and the same is 
true vice versa. For instance, the LFL mentions much about how latecomer firms must 
initially engage in effort-intensive learning activities in order to build the basic 
technological and organizational capabilities, whereas the SRBL focuses more on the 
ability to sustain the pre-existing firm competitive advantage and does not discuss much 
about the latecomer firms’ learning processes. In reality, however some successful 
latecomer firms also possess the “strategic learning” capability (in the SRBL sense) and 
this assists the firms in moving up the capability ladder. This issue was not sufficiently 
mentioned in the LFL.
Consequently, the integration o f the two bodies o f literature involves combining the 
reciprocal strength from each literature (i.e. at the same time, neutralizing the weakness of 
each literature). Conceptually the integration would yield a more enhanced, holistic 
conceptual framework with an improved ability to effectively capture the dynamics of 
latecomer firms’ competitive and learning strategies, learning activities (and mechanisms) 
and the rate and types of capability accumulation. As a result, this study seeks to locate at 
the integration o f the two bodies of literature to address the interdependent and complex 
relationship among the three key conceptual issues (i.e. strategies, learning process, and 
firm capability development) in the latecomer firm context (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual Model of Latecomer Firm Capability Development
Advanced
Capabilities
Intermediate
Capabilities
Basic Capabilities
o
Source: own elaboration based on the research literature 
Notes: 1)CS = Competitive Strategy
LS = Learning Strategy
LAM = Learning Activities and Mechanisms
CD = Capability Development
2) The study focuses on the shaded circle areas, where both the LFL and SRBL paid 
little attention and largely failed to sufficiently explain the dynamics
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Chapter 3 -  Conceptual and Analytical Frameworks
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an integrated analytical framework based 
on two levels, the meso-level and the firm-level. The first section discusses the framework 
for assessing the impact of the external factors on firm’s competitive and learning 
strategies. Here both firm competitive strategy and learning strategy are defined. The 
second section explicates the definitions and the frameworks for assessing the firm-level 
learning activities, the learning mechanisms and the type as well as the level of 
accumulation of capabilities. The final section argues that this proposed framework is 
capable of capturing the dynamics of latecomer firm technological and organization 
capability development, taking into account the dynamics occurring among: competitive 
strategy, learning strategy, learning activities and capability development. In short, the 
proposed framework attempts to capture the latecomer firms’ dynamic capabilities building 
process.
3.1 Environmental Factors, Firm Competitive Strategy and 
Learning Strategy
3.1.1 Macro- and Meso-Level Factors
3.1.1.1 Contributions from LFL and SRBL and Limitations
As discussed in Chapter 2, the LFL suggests that the external environment certainly 
has a range of impacts on the firm learning processes. For instance, both UNIDO (2002) 
and Ernst et al (1998a) explicitly defined one category of firm capability as “linkage 
capability”, which deals with how a firm links with external sources of knowledge. 
Likewise, Tran (1999; 2002) described the important linkages between local firms and 
external foreign connections in capability development. Similarly, Virasa (2005: 99-101) 
acknowledged the importance of firm “external linkage capability”, but did not explicitly 
delineate this concept with firm-level learning strategies60. However, these studies neither 
systematically identify the types of external meso-level factors nor how the sequence of 
changes in these factors affects firm-level competitive and learning strategies.
60 However, in terms o f firm competitive strategies, Virasa (2005: 98) described the linkage between firm 
linkage capabilities and their “business model”, grouped into three types: locally-owned brand manufacture 
(OBM); locally-owned original equipment manufacture (OEM); and locally own niche-focused venture.
44
The strategic management clearly acknowledges the importance of the external 
environment, starting with Porter’s industrial five forces framework (Porter, 1980). Then 
in the early 1990s when the resource-based view became dominant, the firm internal 
resources (and capabilities) were the central focus and the external environment took a 
subsidiary role. The external environment became important again under the recent 
dynamic capabilities framework (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). In this 
framework, one of the main emphases is on the rapidly “shifting character of the 
environment” (Teece and Pisano, 1994: 537); and its implications on the need for firms to 
timely adapt, integrate and reconfigure internal and external skills, resources and 
knowledge. But the framework did not explicitly spell out the factors or actors (i.e. 
customers, suppliers, public organizations, business associations, etc.) within the external 
environment that may affect the firm-level competitive and learning strategies.
Even though both LFL and SRBL suggest that the researcher cannot deny that each 
firm is embedded within an industry (or industries) and that the industry normally 
comprises a group of firms offering similar products or services, as well as supporting 
organizations and institutions, neither body of literature on its own is capable of specifying 
the types of actor within the external environment that may shape firm-level competitive 
and learning strategies. For instance, the LFL acknowledged the importance of a firm’s 
external linkages and their impact on firm capability development (Ernst et al., 1998b; 
Poapongsakorn and Tonguthai, 1998; Tran, 1999; Virasa, 2005), but declined to state the 
specific factors (for e.g. government policies, industrial regulations, rival firms’ upgrading 
activities, establishment of supporting organizations, etc.) within the external environment 
that were affecting firm learning and capability development. Similarly, the SRBL (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) also acknowledged the industry competitive 
dynamics, linkages with other firms and organizations, but did not systematically list such 
external factors. Consequently, to address such issue we shall turn to a discussion of the 
innovation systems literature, which does address this issue, particularly focusing on the 
developing country perspective.
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3.1.1.2 Innovation Systems Literature61
Since the 1980s, the concept of innovation systems has been developed in order to 
more adequately explain technological change, and its role in the long-term economic 
development of a nation. Innovation systems operate at many hierarchical levels and 
boundaries: national innovation systems (Dosi et al., 1988; Freeman, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; 
2003; Nelson, 1993); regional (geographical) innovation systems (Braczyk et ah, 1998; 
Ohmae, 1993); and sectoral innovation systems (Breschi and Malerba, 1995; Malerba,
2002; Scott-Kemmis et ah, 2005). These various studies have pointed toward the two key 
features of any innovation systems: the main actors (i.e. the different organizations and 
firms) and the linkages among these actors that enable them to function together as a 
learning system. These innovation system concepts were developed in a developed country 
context, and some scholars have proposed that the application of such concept to a 
developing country context is still lacking (Alcorta, 2005; Intarakumnerd et ah, 2002).
In contrast to Intarakumnerd et al (2002), this study has taken a narrower focus at a 
single sector (i.e. the automotive industry) and defined the actors within the sectoral 
innovation system (Malerba, 2002; Scott-Kemmis et ah, 2005) to comprise mainly three 
distinct types: 1) the institutions (inclusive of industry incentives, regulations and 
development policies), 2) the private business firms (i.e. the carmakers and the auto-parts 
firms) and 3) the non-firm organizations (see Chapter 5 for details). Together these three 
actors and their interactions62 shaped the firm-level competitive as well as learning 
strategies. Furthermore, some larger Thai auto-part firms (i.e. the conglomerates) also 
attempt to shape the evolution path of the industrial environment through affecting the 
public policy decisions by the state and its agents.
3.1.2 Firm’s Competitive Strategy: Paths and Positions
Having a foundation on industrial organization economics, Porter (1980) identified 
three generic types of firm competitive strategy: cost leadership, differentiation, and focus,
61 This section highlights the role o f industry-level dynamics and meso-level change in generating challenges 
and business opportunities. It is intended to clarify which factors, actors and important linkages within the 
industry environment could affect firm-level competitive strategy, learning strategy, learning mechanisms and 
the process o f firm capability development. This section is by no means an exhaustive review o f  the 
innovation systems literature; as this is outside the scope o f this thesis.
62 The interactions represent market as well as the non-market ones. Further the interactions are also shaped 
by the process o f communication, exchange, co-operation and competition; all shape by the institutional 
environment (Malerba, 2002).
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and proposed that firm competitive success depends upon choosing only one of the three 
strategies (Porter, 1985: 36-38). He also cautioned firms not to be “stuck in the middle”
(i.e. especially not to mix cost leadership with differentiation strategy). However, this 
prescription has proven to be rather inaccurate or inadequate in some competitive situations 
(see for example, Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Sanchez and Heene (2004: 30-31), Alkhafaji 
(2003: 132-133) and Grant (2002: 89-91)). In addition, Porterian industrial organization 
economics did not place great emphasis on: the role of firm strategic learning, the 
importance of firm capability acquisition and development, and finally, the issue of 
uncertainty and path dependency in firm learning and capability development.
Rather than focus on seeking attractive positioning within the industry, Sanchez and 
Heene (2004: 136-139) have proposed a new view of firm’s competence-based competitive 
strategy based on various sources of cooperative gain. For instance, a firm could gain more 
by cooperation with the suppliers to develop better inputs and improve the supply chain 
coordination (Bessant, 2003; Bessant et al., 1999; Nobeoka et al., 2002). Likewise, the 
firm could cooperate actively with the buyers to define better products and provide better 
services (Von Hippel, 1988). The view also acknowledged that cooperation with other 
actors in the external environment is important, and implicit in these collaborations is the 
crucial issue of firm learning. What was uncovered from these studies is the key finding 
that firm’s competitive strategy is not only restricted to firm positioning within an attractive 
industry per se, but also include active strategizing about searching for synergistic 
cooperation to augment firm’s learning opportunities and its absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990).
Though enlightening in their explication of the key concepts related to firm’s 
competitive strategy, these frameworks did not highlight the need to conceptually link 
firm’s competitive strategy with its learning strategy. In particular, the frameworks did not 
explicitly state how the firm’s competitive goal relates with its learning goal; the issue of 
dynamic alignment between the two and how this would impact the rate of learning and 
overall firm capability development. Moreover, the frameworks above were based upon 
the empirical case study of large corporations located within the First World context; hence 
little attention was paid to the context of latecomer firms located within a developing 
country.
In this research, the firm competitive strategy refers broadly to a firm’s perception
of opportunities and threats and its corresponding decision of where it wants to locate
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within the existing value chain and product-market position (Porter, 1998) (i.e. to be first- 
tier auto-part OEM supplier, second-tier auto-part supplier or replacement equipment 
producer, etc.). In other words, given a firm accumulated capabilities, the competitive 
strategy refers to: a firm’s sense on the existing as well the emerging business opportunities 
and threats and the decision on what to produce; the business and market(s) it wants to be 
in; and its formulation of corporate long-term goals and short-term objectives. The firm 
chooses the competitive “path” it wishes to pursue in the future. Such decisions are often 
constrained by where the firm has been and where it is at currently (i.e. they are path 
dependent (Dosi et al., 1988; Teece and Pisano, 1994)). The dynamism of firm’s 
competitive strategy is included in this definition, since over time firm’s decision plan may 
change as a result of turbulence within the industrial environment.
The gap, or the misfit, between a firm’s goals and its existing position is 
highlighted; if the gap is large, then it is usually the result of a firm quite ambitious 
competitive goal and its chosen competitive “path” that lies close to or at the “upper 
boundary” of the feasible development path (see Figure 3.1). However, a large gap or 
stretch competitive goal does not automatically imply that the firm is highly competitive 
relative to its competitors; it must be able to realize its ambitious goal through successful 
management and implementation of learning activities and capability development.
This is very much a function of the firm’s top-level managers (or entrepreneurs), 
who must have the capacity to sense the sequence of changes within the meso-environment 
and the search for business opportunities. These managers must also have the ability to 
seize the available opportunities and overcome any problems that may occur. Normally 
such situations force managers to set high, stretch learning goals and to assess the degree of 
realization of firm’s competitive strategy when it is implemented. The competitive strategy 
envisaged here also includes the related plans for supporting activities and capabilities that 
the firm will need to successfully execute its competitive strategy. This then serves as a 
platform for firm to set up its learning strategy.
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3.1.3 Firm’s Learning Strategy: Paths and Positions
When a firm has high stretch competitive goal, it often must also have an ambitious 
learning goal. For instance, if the firm competitive strategy states that it wants to become a 
first-tier auto-part supplier (the competitive goal), it is required to learn efficient supply 
chain management (the overall learning goal). In other words, along with these stretch 
competitive and learning goals the knowledge or capability gap between firm’s existing 
capabilities and its targeted capabilities may be rather wide. Hence if the firm wishes to 
compete successfully, there is a need to timely close this capability gap through the 
acquisition of the requisite capabilities.
Through the formulation of an appropriate learning strategy (i.e. setting the learning 
goal with a conscious awareness of the knowledge gap) a firm can increase its chance of 
successfully directing the learning activities to build the firm capabilities. Consequently in 
this study the firm’s learning strategy is defined as the emergent plan formulated and 
executed by the firm management in acquiring the requisite skills, knowledge and 
capabilities in order to enhance the likelihood to compete successfully in the future. Firm 
learning strategy also assists in giving firm learning activities a sense of direction and 
cohesiveness in aiming at building firm capabilities.
Firm learning strategy is emergent since a complete understanding of complex 
interactions between changes in the external environment, firm strategies, and firm 
capability development process is virtually impossible (Tidd et al., 2005). At best, a firm 
could partly comprehend the strengths and weaknesses of its existing capabilities and how 
this interacts with its ability to seize future business opportunities and neutralize threats. 
However, this does not imply that all firms have the same degree of emergence in their 
competitive and learning strategies. It only implies that the emergent learning and 
competitive strategy characteristics are important and must be taken into account when 
describing a firm model of capability development process.
Keeping in mind the emergent characteristics, it could be said that the formulation 
of firm’s learning strategy is not automatic. It is a complex process involving several 
factors: the changing external environment; firm’s competitive strategy; learning 
opportunities, existing firm capabilities; and the possible executable learning activities (i.e. 
knowledge acquisition activities). Additionally, the firm must know what it must know
about these factors in order to appropriately define a learning goal. This is also complex
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since the firm will face the “learning paradox, [which means] until you have learnt 
something you cannot properly specify what you need to learn” (Arnold and Thuriaux,
1997: 39) and likewise,
there are no simple answers regarding what a firm must know to be 
competitive -  if there were, then there would be no sustainable advantage”
(Zack, 1999: 133).
Similarly, there is neither a single right way nor a clear roadmap on how to quickly become 
a successful learning organization (Appelbaum and Gallagher, 2000). Consequently, it 
could be said that, like competitive strategy, the process of formulating the firm learning 
strategy is an emergent one (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) and at best conjectural, albeit it 
is an important component within the overall firm capability development.
From the SRBL, a suggestion to resolve such learning paradox is to develop firm 
core competencies based upon specifying “strategic architecture” (i.e. organizational 
roadmap that identifies which core competencies to build) (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994: 117- 
118) and “strategic intent” (Ibid.: 141), which refers to the ambitious strategic goal for 
firm’s future development of these core competencies. Such suggestion has elegance in its 
descriptive presentation; however, it lacks the operative and prescriptive rationale on how 
the firm managers gradually identify the firm’s strategic architecture as well as the strategic 
intent through a series of long trial and error learning processes (Tidd et al., 2005: 193). In 
other words, the core competence perspective is an abstract, descriptive historical account 
of successful global firms and implicitly state that core competencies do not need to be 
developed over time through organizational learning processes (Drejer, 2002: 102). In 
addition, since the firm’s future capability needs cannot be known with certainty, part of the 
learning strategy (for e.g. future learning goals and attempt to fill the capability gap) must 
be imagined with some degree of disciplined creativity, i.e. in correlation with the firm’s 
aforementioned competitive strategy and the opportunities and challenges available within 
the meso/industrial environment.
In addition, there are at least two important tensions in the formulation of firm 
learning strategy. First, the firm learning strategy must strike the right balance between 
exploitation and exploration (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991); in other words, a 
too conservative learning strategy will overemphasize on the exploitation of today’s 
capabilities and focus mainly on firm survival and most likely fail to sufficiently 
experiment and build the necessary capabilities for supporting firm’s future growth. Firm
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learning strategy that overly emphasizes exploitation will drive out the exploration aspect.
It is important to note that successful learning organization must maintain a proper balance 
between the two in order to balance capability development for both current survival and 
future growth (Beckett, 2001: 6).
Likewise, Winter (2000: 987) stated that if one allows the exploitative learning to 
dominate, then the firm’s learning process would tend to end too soon and has a relatively 
inferior achievement in capability development outcome. Sanchez and Heene (2004: 9) 
described this issue as the choice between “competence building” and “competence 
leveraging”. Here “competence building” implies that the firm qualitatively adapts and 
improves on new kinds of resources or capabilities coordination to assist the firm to achieve 
its future competitive goals (i.e. exploring with future competence); where as “competence 
leveraging” refers to the way firm seeks to achieve its competitive goals by using similar 
type of capabilities that it already possesses, and there is no qualitative change in the 
capabilities (i.e. exploiting today’s competence).
Another tension in the firm learning strategy is achieving the right balance between 
the acquisition of internal and external capabilities and attempting to integrate the two to 
achieve synergy as well as balance63. In short, firm learning strategy must simultaneously 
maintain external as well as internal consistency (Lei et al., 1996: 562). This was similarly 
described in the literature as the firm “combinative capabilities” (Kogut and Zander, 1992) 
and “integration capabilities” (Iansiti and Clark, 1994), i.e. the ability to integrate the prior 
knowledge base of the firm with the internal learning as well as the external learning 
activities. In this research, the tension between internal and external learning is highlighted 
since most firms today are not able to perform all the activities in-house (Hamel, 1991; 
Heller and Orihashi, 2003); “ ... very few firms can successfully ‘go it alone’ anymore” 
(Teece, 1992: 3), and inter-firm collaboration (Chen and Qu, 2003) and “learning from 
others” (Garvin, 1994: 24) are almost a necessity.
Other scholars also emphasize different ways firm learn to tap into the sources of 
external capabilities and learning. There are many advantages for latecomer firms in 
leveraging external or shared learning within a group of firms within a supply chain
63 If the firm learning strategy focuses too much on the internal side; it would most likely suffer a “learning 
myopia” condition (Levinthal and March, 1993), which describes the situation where firms are locked into 
their short-run success formulas and neglected the perception o f  external stimuli for change and avoid the 
exploration o f long-term, future learning and capability development.
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(Bessant et al., 1999) or firms within a learning network (Bessant and Francis, 1999;
Bessant et al., 2003; Deyo and Doner, 2000; Hakansson et al., 1999; and Styhre et al.,
2004) and/or learning by visiting other firms and organizations (Barnes et al., 2001; Caplan,
2005) . For instance, today first-tier auto-part suppliers frequently have to send their “guest 
engineers” to visit the multinational carmakers to collaborate on new product design 
activities; these auto-part firms are “learning by visiting” and collaborating with other firms 
(Caplan, 2005).
Most often the latecomer firms, who are mostly deficient in their existing 
capabilities, have to search for successful access to the external sources of capabilities (i.e. 
linkage for learning), and for other advanced firms and organizations to assist them with 
their internal development of capabilities. For instance, within the automotive industry, 
most of the first-tier auto-part suppliers develop extensive linkages with the multinational 
carmakers which often involve expert technical assistance and sometimes formal joint 
venture agreements. But the strategic question of how much should be built in-house 
versus how much to source externally is also part of the focus of this tension on the firm 
learning strategy. It is widely acknowledged in the LFL that the latecomer firms will most 
likely have to acquire capabilities through externa! linkages (usually through foreign firms), 
and due to the partially tacit knowledge involved with such capabilities, some capabilities 
cannot be easily transferred. Therefore, these capabilities must still be built in-house.
3.1.4 Summary on Environmental Factors and Firm Strategies
This above sections has reviewed the literature related to both competitive as well 
as learning strategy. It is now propose that a framework and definitions for firm 
competitive strategy and learning strategy below serve as useful tools for later analysis on 
firm strategic learning process.
3.1.4.1 Defining the Key Characteristics of Firm Competitive Strategy
There are three key characteristics of firm competitive strategy, and all are related 
in ways that firm competes against its rivals to attempt to achieve competitive advantage. 
The first two characteristics relate to the issue of competitive positions and the latter is 
focused on the firm unique competitive goal (see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Key Defining Characteristics of Firm Competitive Strategy
Dimensions of 
Competitive Strategy
Defining Characteristics
Product-market Position
What products to produce and for which market segments 
Who are the customers and their locations 
This also includes an establishment of new line(s) of business 
through corporate and/or business diversification
Resource/capability- 
market Position
What existing capabilities are needed to “stay in the game” 
What new capabilities are needed to “stay ahead of 
competitors”
What capabilities are needed to collaborate with others (i.e. 
suppliers, customers, and non-firm organizations)
Competitive Goal
Which competitive “path” or “paths” to take in the future with 
respect to the firm’s existing “position” comprising existing 
capabilities and assets (inclusive of firm learning capability), 
products, competitors, customers and suppliers
Source: own elaboration based upon the research
• Product-market position -  For product-market position, firm competitive strategy 
refers to the managerial decision on: products to produce; for whom (i.e. 
customers); for which market segments the products are intended (i.e. inclusive of 
market location: domestic or overseas); and the competitive advantage of these 
products compared with similar other offerings in the market (Porter, 1980; 1985). 
Furthermore, it also includes who are the customers and what are their demands and 
how the firm attempt to fulfil such demands (Drejer, 2002). This broad definition 
would serve the purpose of linking firm decision on what capabilities to develop to 
either maintain a particular product-market position or move into a new product- 
market position. Consequently, this view on product-market position is not static 
(as in a Porterian sense); the firm is capable to both influence and be influenced by 
the product-market position. Moreover, this position will shift according to the 
meso-level changes and evolution.
• Resource/capability-market position -  For resource-market position, the firm 
competitive strategy refers to two things: which capabilities are needed to sustain 
the existing product-market position (i.e. the necessary capabilities to maintain a 
viable business) or which capabilities are required to move into a new product- 
market position (or positions) (i.e. the new capabilities necessary for future growth 
or business/corporate expansion). It is important to note that the choice between the 
two is intimately linked with the firm learning strategy. Since to be able to achieve
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the aspired resource-market position, firms usually have to either acquire new 
capabilities or improve on existing capabilities. Thus firms need to formulate the 
learning strategy to develop capabilities and to utilize these capabilities to 
manufacture the targeted product as demanded by customers who are located within 
a particular market segment. However, this definition is not to be misconstrued that 
firms are passive actors waiting to adjust their capabilities according to given 
changes in the external environment. In some successful cases, firms could 
anticipate the emerging customer needs and engineer their own product-market as 
well as resource/capability-market positions.
• Competitive goal -  this refers to chosen competitive “path” or “paths” of the firm. 
In other words, where the firm wants to be in the future with respect to its current 
“position”. Firm competitive goal reflects where its future and existing products 
will be located within the existing product-market position as well as the 
capabilities required to maintain such a position. Firm competitive goal also 
implies how the firm engages in setting ambitious target of building new 
capabilities to move into new product-market and/or resource/capability-market 
positions.
3.1.4.2 Defining the Key Characteristics of Firm Learning Strategy
There are four key characteristics of firm learning strategy, and these are closely 
related to the three characteristics firm competitive strategy (as defined above) (see Table 
3.2):
• Learning goal -  In this research, the learning goal is defined as the firm’s emergent 
target to acquire a specified level of knowledge, skills and experience as well as 
requisite resources to build the firm capabilities. In practice, a firm could define 
any targeted knowledge it wishes to acquire; however, when the learning strategy is 
implemented there could be some obstacles preventing firms from achieving its 
target. Hence, firms often need to make continuous adjustment along the way to 
arrive at an emergent fulfilment of its learning goal. In addition, for any well­
functioning learning strategies, the learning goal has to be specified in such a way 
that there is an appropriate dynamic alignment (i.e. fit) with both the competitive 
goal and the firm’s learning activities and mechanisms.
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Table 3.2 Key Defining Characteristics of Firm Learning Strategy
Dimensions of 
Learning Strategy Defining Characteristics
Learning Goal
Firm’s target to acquire a specified level o f knowledge, skills and 
experience as well as the requisite resources/assets to build the 
firm capabilities.
Capability Gap
The discrepancy between the firm’s existing level of capabilities 
(i.e. what the firm current possesses) and the requisite capabilities 
that must be acquired (i.e. what the firm must possess to compete)
Exploiting and/or 
Exploring
The trade-off between learning to leverage today’s capabilities 
(i.e. exploitation and survival per se) versus learning to build 
capabilities for future competition (i.e. exploration, both survival 
and future growth).
Internal and/or 
External
The trade-off or the complementarities between learning internal 
and learning external sources of knowledge for capability 
acquisition. Achieving synergy and integration between the two is 
the key.
Source: own elaboration based on the research
• Capability gap -  this is defined as the misfit or the discrepancy between the firm’s 
existing level of capabilities and the requisite capabilities that must be acquired for 
firm to accomplish both the learning goal and competitive goal.
• Exploring versus exploiting -  this refers to the managerial decision that focuses on 
the trade-off between learning to leverage today’s capabilities (i.e. exploitation) 
versus learning to build capabilities for future competition (i.e. exploration). If the 
firm management chose to lean towards the exploration side, then it might choose to 
set highly ambitious goals relative to the firm existing capabilities and thus create 
an “intentional” capability gap64.
• Internal versus external tension -  this refers to the ability o f the firm to balance 
the two main sources o f knowledge for capability acquisition and to achieve the 
synergy as well as integration among the two for efficient learning.
It is important to note that embedded within all the above characteristics is the issue of 
emergence. The process of change is too complex for any firm to understand the whole 
process completely (Tidd et al., 2005), thus it is highly likely that these learning strategy 
characteristics will emerge through time as firms adapt themselves to the changing internal 
and external conditions.
64 The LFL literature discussed this concept in terms o f “crisis construction” (i.e. an internally-constructed 
crisis proactively set up by the top managers to intensify the employees’ learning effort to expedite learning 
activities, augment firm absorptive capacity and achieve a faster rate o f firm capability development) (Kim, 
1998).
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3.1.4.3 Defining the Framework for Firm Strategies
The above discusses two types of firm strategies: competitive and learning. Below 
is the discussion that concerns the two different levels within each type of firm strategies, 
see Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Firm Strategies Matrix
COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY
(sensing)
LEARNING STRATEGY (seizing)
Level 1 (Ill-functioning) Level 2 (Well-functioning)
Level 1
(Ill-functioning)
Unsustainable business 
operations: unable to capture 
the business opportunities, 
lacking both the sensing and 
seizing abilities (possible 
disaster)
Poor or intermittent sensing of 
emerging business opportunities, 
yet possess the learning ability to 
seize the existing opportunities
Level 2
(Well-functioning)
Capable to continuously sense 
the emerging business 
opportunities, but unable to 
seize it, either due to poor 
learning capability or 
unwillingness to invest in 
sufficient acquisition of the 
requisite capabilities
“Strategic Learning Capacity” 
defined as the ability to timely 
sense the emerging business 
opportunities and seriously 
commit to timely and 
sufficiently invest in the 
acquisition of requisite 
capabilities in order to 
successfully seize the business 
opportunities
Source: own elaboration based on the research, inspired by Augier and Teece (2006: 408)
For firm competitive strategies, there are two levels: Level 1 (ill-functioning) and
Level 2 (well-functioning). At Level 1, firm competitive strategy comprises a poor
understanding of its product-market positioning and the inability to prepare firm
capabilities for appropriate position of resource-market positioning. Also notable at this
level is the firm poor ability to set its competitive goal, or if it does the competitive goal is
defined in such a way as to sustain the existing business operations without much focus on
sensing future business opportunities. The choice of competitive path at Level 1 is closer
towards the Lower Boundary of the feasible paths (see Figure 3.1). On the contrary, firm
competitive strategy at Level 2 comprises a good ability to sense the emerging as well as
existing business opportunities within the meso/industrial environment. These firms have
the ability to set a more ambitious goal, i.e. strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989),
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relative to its future product-market as well as resource/capability-market positions. The 
choice of competitive path at Level 2 is located closer to the Upper Boundary as defined in 
Figure 3.1.
For firm learning strategies, there are also two levels: Level 1 (ill-functioning) and 
Level 2 (well-functioning). The learning strategy at Level 1 occurs when the firm does not 
have sufficient capability to plan for and coordinate the diverse learning activities. In other 
words, even though the firm is able to sense the emerging business opportunities, it could 
not commit itself to invest in sufficient learning activities as well as coordinating the 
various learning mechanisms to build the requisite capabilities in order to seize such 
opportunities. Similar to the firm’s path on competitive strategy, the choice of learning 
path at Level 1 is closer towards the Lower Boundary (see Figure 3.1), where the firm lacks 
the “strategic intent” (i.e. ambitious learning goal and serious commitment to achieve it) 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1989).
On the contrary, Level 2 learning strategy describes the firm who has the ability to 
seize the upcoming business opportunities; the firm has the ability to commit itself to the 
necessary investment in planning for and coordinating the diverse learning activities as well 
as the learning mechanisms necessary to build the requisite capabilities. Again this is 
similar to the firm’s competitive strategy path that is closer to the Upper Boundary (see 
Figure 3.1). where the firm possesses the “strategic intent” and the commitment to utilize 
its learning strategy as “stretch and leverage” on firm capabilities (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989).
3.2 Firm’s Learning Activities, Learning Mechanisms and 
Capability Development
This section reviews three concepts: firm learning activities, learning mechanisms 
and capability development. The final section highlights a framework integrating the 
relationships among these three concepts.
3.2.1 Firm’s Learning Activities and Learning Mechanisms: 
Processes
3.2.1.1 Firm Learning Activities
From the LFL, many empirical studies have shown that firm capability building is 
the outcome of firm-level cumulative and path-dependent learning processes, and that these 
learning processes are neither automatic nor costless (Ariffin and Figueiredo, 2001;
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Dutrenit, 2000; Figueiredo, 2001; Kim, 1998; Miyazaki, 1994). The LFL also elaborates 
the elements o f firm learning processes, with particular attention paid to the factors that 
have contributed to successful learning (i.e. fast learning rate). The learning activities are 
also related to different types o f learning. For instance, firm-level learning activities are 
concerned with product design and process engineering improvement, existing product 
improvement, new product development and linkages to foreign sources o f technology 
(Bell and Pavitt, 1995). No matter how diverse and varied these activities are they seemed 
to share eight common (learning) activities, as defined in the “ extended learning processes” 
(see Chapter 2 pp. 12-13).
Here it could be argued that implicit in the elements o f the “ extended learning 
processes”  are the similarity with the aforementioned concept o f firm  learning and 
competitive strategies. For instance, firms who are aware and timely search for the trigger 
for change (i.e. Level 2 learning strategy) w ill most likely assess their own existing 
competencies relative to the market needs (i.e. competitive strategy based on the 
resource/capability-market position). To increase the awareness and search ability, the firm 
learning activities could involve benchmarking, collaboration in supplier “ cooperation for 
development”  club, and collaboration with other public research organizations; these 
involvements could lead the firm to develop relevant technology strategy based upon its 
existing competencies. Furthermore the issue o f assessment and selection, acquisition, and 
implementation o f technology can be explained via the firm ’ s choice among the available 
technologies and equipment and the choice o f learning mechanisms which after successful 
implementation would lead to the development o f firm ’s internal capabilities. However, 
the explicit explanation on the impact o f firm ’s competitive and learning strategies (for e.g. 
firm  goals and the tensions within a firm ’s learning strategy) in guiding the firm “ extended 
learning process”  is still missing.
3.2.1.2 Firm Learning Mechanisms
Many learning mechanisms were identified in both the LFL and SRBL: learning by 
doing (Arrow, 1962); learning by problem solving and “ templating”  (Von Hippel and Tyre, 
1995); learning before doing65 (Pisano, 1996a; 1996b); learning by doing and learning by
65 This is different from the classical “ learning by doing” (Arrow, 1962). It is based on the estimates that up 
to 70 per cent o f the product’s cost are determined during the design stage; therefore, it would make economic
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using (Rosenberg, 1982); learning and innovation (Boerner et al., 2001); and, learning by 
operating, changing, searching, hiring and training (Bell, 1984; Kim, 1998). Here, the latter 
three learning mechanisms are considered to be non-doing based and to involve more 
investment in learning effort. Recently, other scholars advocated the integration of various 
types of learning mechanisms and formed the concept of: “integrated learning” (Bessant et 
al., 1996); learning by visiting as a hybrid between learning by doing and learning by 
searching (Caplan, 2005); and learning by performing strategic experiments (Govindarajan 
and Trimble, 2004).
From the SRBL, Zollo and Winter (2002) focus on “deliberate” learning 
mechanisms to build firm dynamic capabilities. In their conceptual framework, these 
learning mechanisms linked the evolution of firm dynamic capability with the changes in 
its lower-level operating routines66 (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and these learning 
mechanisms were of three types: experience accumulation (semi-automatic, not highly 
deliberate and requires the least level of investment in learning efforts), knowledge 
articulation and knowledge codification (more deliberate and requires high-level learning 
efforts) (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 340). Drawing on the original concept of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), Lane and Lubatkin (1998: 462) have explicated the 
concept of “relative absorptive capacity” and identified three methods of learning new 
external knowledge: 1) passive, 2) active and 3) interactive. These could be viewed as firm 
learning mechanisms since passive learning occurs when the firms simply acquire 
knowledge through codified journals, seminars and other publications, and active (i.e. semi­
automatic) learning occurs when the firm performs more conscious learning activities such 
as benchmarking and obtaining competitor’s intelligence; however, this still occurs at arm’s 
length and lacks any significant interaction during the transfer of the partly tacit technical 
and organizational knowledge.
Whereas, the more deliberate mechanism involving interactive learning usually 
requires the learner to access the knowledge sources through a long-term contact and
sense to learn to solve any the design problems prior to the production stage (Tidd et al., 2005: 384). Thus 
the term “learning before doing” any production activities.
66 Here the concept of lower-level operating routines is defined as “behavior that is learned, highly patterned, 
repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge—and the specificity of objectives” 
(Winter, 2003: 991). This is different from the firm (dynamic) organizational capabilities, which is defined as 
“a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its implementing input flows, confers upon 
an organization’s management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type” 
(Ibid.).
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communication (for e.g. face-to-face interaction, dialogue, long-term strategic alliances 
such as joint venture). In this mechanism, the learner firm will be able to understand not 
only just the observable components of the transferred knowledge (i.e. the codified 
knowledge), “but also the more tacit components: the ‘how and why’ knowledge” (Ibid.: 
463). Likewise, Styhre et al. (2004: 963) discovered that the interactive learning 
mechanisms such as face-to-face interaction and continuous dialogue among employees 
during training are important for development of firm learning capability. In addition, 
these scholars also advocated that interactive learning mechanism per se would not ensure 
the full potential of the development of firm learning capabilities, the firm needs to 
complement it with the passive learning mechanisms as well (Ibid.: 964); note that this is 
similar to the concept of “integrated learning” (Bessant et al., 1996).
The relevance of different types of learning mechanism, advocated by both LFL and 
SRBL, depends on: the strategic context of the firm; the type complexity of products and 
technology; and the knowledge acquisition involved. For instance, in acquiring technical 
knowledge, learning by doing, by using and by conducting R&D may be appropriate (Chen 
and Qu, 2003: 863); where as if one wants to acquire managerial knowledge, learning by 
“benchmarking” or “best practice” may be more appropriate (Ibid.). All of these contextual 
factors are normally governed by the firm’s competitive and learning strategies. A firm 
with a “well-functioning” learning strategy (i.e. Type 2 learning strategy) will tend to 
engage in more advanced, complex types of learning activities, which would involve a 
coordination of a range of learning mechanisms. Such a firm would also stress the more 
active mechanisms such as learning by searching, hiring, training (i.e. the non-doing based 
learning) (Bell, 1984) and learning by visiting (Caplan, 2005).
But prior studies on learning mechanisms have not attempted to fully explain the 
linkage between firms’ competitive and learning strategies, and the choice of learning 
mechanisms. In addition, the role played by firm strategies in directing firm learning 
activities, and the issue of the dynamic alignment (and re-alignment) among firm strategies, 
learning mechanisms and learning activities within the context of a changing meso- 
environment has not been systematically analyzed in these studies.
Henceforth, the role played by the interaction between firm competitive and
learning strategies and its effect on firm learning activities and mechanisms should be made
explicit. By linking both types of firm’s strategy with the learning activity and the choice
of learning mechanisms, it is possible to explain how firm strategies assist in providing the
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diverse set of learning activities with a focus and continuity. Then it would be possible to 
explain how such deliberate (yet emergent) firm strategies contribute to impacting the rate 
of firm capability development.
3.2.2 Firm’s Capability/Competence Development
The process of capability building discussed in the LFL involves complementarities 
between technology imports and the development of indigenous capabilities, implying that 
the latecomer firms must engage in both in building their own capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 
1995); in other words, imported technologies are not substitute for the development of 
indigenous firm capabilities. Almost all the latecomer firms capability development is 
initially involved with the catching-up (Gammeltoft, 2004; Hobday, 1995b; Tran, 1999) 
and not with sustaining a pre-existing competitive advantage (Mathews, 2002). 
Consequently, the objective of LFL is to explain how firms can successfully catch-up by 
developing the minimum necessary technological and organizational capability (UNIDO, 
2002). However, the interaction between firms’ competitive and learning strategies and 
learning activities in contributing to the rate of capability accumulation in the catching-up 
process has received little explicit discussion in the LFL.
From the SRBL, the actual process of capability building or competence 
development receives lesser focus due to much emphasis of the literature on the 
sustainability and durability of competitive advantage (see for example, Wernerfelt (1984), 
Barney (1991), and Peteraf (1993)) rather than the process of building the initial or 
minimum level of capability in the first place. The SRBL assumes that firms already 
possess the minimum-level of capabilities necessary for sustaining their competitive 
position, and that these firms are focusing on how to further solidify their competitive 
sustainability. Moreover due to this emphasis on the sustainability (and equilibrium) 
perspective, an operational model explaining the initial organizational learning processes 
(i.e. the disequilibrium process) that the firms had to undergo to achieve the attributes of 
sustainable competitive advantage is mostly lacking (Drejer, 2002: 104).
Some SRBL scholars attempted to fill this void by proposing the concept of 
dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997), but still the empirical 
extension of the key concepts (i.e. paths, positions, and processes) is lacking (see Section 
2.2.4.1). While a few scholars (Jantunen, 2002; Pavlou and El Sawy, 2005) have attempted
to operationalize these concepts, these works have concentrated on the industrialized
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country context, and the application o f the dynamic capabilities framework to the 
developing country context is still mostly lacking67.
Drawing on the insights provided by both LFL and SRJBL, it could be said that the 
process o f capability development is both important and complex. It could involve either 
building the minimum requisite capabilities for catching-up (i.e. LFL) or 
sustaining/building the advanced capability to ensure competitive advantage (i.e. SRBL). 
Capability development surely involves a learning process and an operationalization o f key 
concepts is needed to arrive at a better model, capable o f explaining the process o f building 
up latecomer firm dynamic capabilities. In particular, missing from both literatures is the 
explicit explanation o f latecomer firm ’s strategies to manage the capability transitions (see 
Figure 2.2).
The latecomer firm ’s sequential transitions from minimum level o f routine 
capabilities to intermediate-level and then high-level innovative capabilities need to be 
explained in terms o f firm ’s competitive and learning strategies, taken together as “ strategic 
learning capacity”  for successful capability development (see Figure 3.2). Here firms who 
possess such capacity are able to successfully set both competitive and learning strategies, 
achieving dynamic alignment. Together these strategies and proper alignment would serve 
as a focusing device for later implementation on the firm ’s choice o f learning activities and 
selection o f learning mechanisms. Thus these elements (i.e. firm strategies, learning 
activities, and learning mechanisms) work together as a “ learning system”  that w ill enable 
firms to successfully transition from minimum level o f capabilities to intermediate and then 
innovative capabilities. It is proposed here that firms that possess the “ strategic learning 
capacity”  w ill achieve more effective function o f learning activities and learning 
mechanisms when compared with firms that do not have such capacity.
3.2.3 Summary on Learning Activities, Mechanisms and 
Capabilities
The above sections have reviewed the literature related to learning activities, 
learning mechanisms, and capability development. Framework and definitions for these 
concepts w ill be developed to serve as a useful tool for later analysis on firm  learning 
activities and the process o f capability development.
67 Notable exceptions include K im ’s (1998) detailed study o f learning and capability building at Hyundai 
Motor, and John Mathews who developed a “ modified”  resource-based framework suitable describing 
latecomer firms’ learning and creation o f dynamic capabilities (Mathews, 1998; 2002).
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3.2.3.1 Defining the Framework for Firm Learning Activities
Learning activities are the activities that the latecomer firms carry out to develop 
technological and organizational capabilities (Hobday, 1995b). Others have defined 
learning more strategically as the interaction among firm resources, innovative capabilities 
and competence in a purposive search for competitive advantage (Dodgson and Bessant,
1996). In this study, firm learning activities are taken in a more narrow sense to refer to 
firm development related to its functional activities, ranging from preparation for 
investment activities to production process planning and product engineering, and finally 
linkage and marketing activities. However, having defined learning activities in this way 
does not preclude the link with the firm strategic elements (i.e. firm competitive and 
learning strategies). As stated above, the study attempts to explicitly link firm strategies 
and its learning activities and mechanisms. For instance, firm competitive and learning 
strategies on meeting higher customer needs and market expectations are certainly 
impacting the way firm decides to implement learning activities on the new/improved 
products and production processes.
This concept of firm learning activities is not limited to just technological 
dimension per se, it also includes other internal organizational activities that lead to the 
development of firm capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1988) such as human resource training, 
quality certification, and other operational problem solving activities (Drejer and Riis,
1999). Due to this varied nature of the learning activities, there needs to be some categories 
in order to systematically assess the way these learning activities are both simultaneously 
guided by firm learning strategy and the contributions these activities make to the firm 
capability development. One way of achieving this is to categorize firm learning activities 
according to a well-defined structure, stating what the firm learns in terms of its technical 
and non-technical functions.
In short, firm learning activities comprise two parts: the object of their learning, 
“what a firm learns” (for e.g. incremental improvement of existing processes/products or 
development of new process, product, problem-solving technique, investing in new 
production facility, etc.) and “what a firm does to learn” or “how a firm learns” (i.e. the 
learning mechanisms such as doing, changing, hiring, searching, visiting, and human 
resource training). In this regards, Humphrey and Schmitz (2002: 19) provided four forms 
of learning activities within a developing country context:
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• Process Upgrading -  refers to the ability to transform inputs into outputs more 
efficiently. Here the object of learning is “process”.
• Product Upgrading -  refers to the ability to move into more sophisticate product 
lines. Here the object of learning is “product”.
• Functional Upgrading -  refers to ability to acquire new functions (or 
abandoning/unlearning the existing functions); to increase the skill context of 
activities. Here the object of learning is firm “functional area”.
• Inter-sectoral Upgrading -  refers to ability to apply the competence/capability 
acquired in one sector and use it in another. Here the object of learning is 
“competence application” to a new functional area or industry.
In each of the above upgrading/leaming activities, it is possible that a firm could engage in 
a number of learning mechanisms. For instance, a firm could upgrade its production 
process by performing existing routine production activities (i.e. learning by doing), 
searching for new technological equipment (i.e. learning by searching), and hiring capable 
engineers and technicians (i.e. learning by hiring).
Another useful source of firm learning categories is the taxonomy of firm functions 
in the technological capability framework devised by Lall (1987; 1992) and Bell and Pavitt 
(1995) arvd technological and organizational capability framework (UNIDO, 2002). 
Drawing on both the upgrading activities (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Schmitz and 
Knorringa, 2000) and firm functions classified according to technical and organizational 
capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Lall, 1992; UNIDO, 2002), the following adapted 
definitions are defined for five different types of learning activities (see Table 3.3):
• Investment activities -  these learning activities comprise the project preparation, 
project execution ability, equipment selection and investment in new facility.
• Production activities -  these learning activities include the process engineering 
aspect, quality management, routine maintenance, capacity stretch, process 
modifications, production management techniques (JIT, TQM, etc.) and continuous 
process improvement (inclusive of quality management systems).
• Product activities -  these learning activities comprise the basic product design, 
product quality management, minor/major product adaptations and improvements, 
and new product innovation and research.
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Table 3.3 Framework for Firm Learning Activities
Types of 
Learning 
Activities
Defining Characteristics
Investment
Activities related to firm’s ability to improve upon the existing or 
building new production and administrative facilities (inclusive of 
project management issues)
Production
Activities related to the improvements or installation of new 
production facility, inclusive of routine production management and 
equipment maintenance issues
Product Activities related to adaptation to the existing or building new products, inclusive to product design and engineering activities
Technology
Linkage
Activities related to the ability to transfer technology into the firms 
from external sources, both domestic and international sources, 
inclusive of the management of the means of transfer (i.e. licensing, 
joint ventures, etc.)
Marketing Activities related to obtaining knowledge about the markets (both domestic and overseas) to plan for the firm marketing strategy
Source: own elaboration based on the research
• Technology linkage activities -  these learning activities include procurement and 
transfer of technology from sources that are mostly external to the firms 
(domestically and/or internationally); also included in the networks established with 
the technology suppliers, customers, and other firms and public organizations .
• Marketing activities -  the learning activities include firm market research and 
product promotion activities. It could be either for the domestic and/or export 
markets. At the advanced stage, firm activities will include own design or brand 
manufacturing (ODM/OBM) with systematic brand management. This also 
requires firm to carry out advanced brand creation and maintenance.
It is important to reiterate that while the learning activities are defined as “what the firms 
learn”; the learning mechanism is defined as “how the firms learn”. The two are 
conceptually intertwined and complements each other, and must be analyzed together.
3.2.3.2 Defining the Framework for Firm Learning Mechanism
The LFL literature comprised many examples illustrating the concept of firm 
learning mechanism. For instance, Bell (1984) clearly distinguished two main types of 
learning mechanisms: doing-based (learning by operating and changing) and non-doing
b8 Networking is included in this learning activity category since “networking increases learning” (Hakansson 
et al., 1999: 450).
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based mechanisms (learning by searching, hiring and training). The former involved semi­
automatic efforts expended by the firms, but the latter involve more investment in effort 
and purposive search which are necessary to acquire capabilities. Similarly, Tran (1999) 
extended Bell’s (1984) framework to include more learning mechanisms such as learning 
by linking with foreign sources of technology and two types of learning by training: on- 
and off-the-job. Tran concluded that the use of multiple learning mechanisms will more 
likely result in successful development of technological capabilities, and that reliance on 
any single mechanism is less effective for capability accumulation. Likewise, from the 
SRBL, firm dynamic capabilities are more likely build through the implementation of 
deliberate learning mechanisms (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and usually involves the 
interactive forms of learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) or sometimes active learning 
within a network context (Bessant et al., 1999; Bessant et al., 2003).
Drawing on the insights from both the LFL and SRBL, the following are two 
learning mechanisms defined in this study:
• Semi-automatic (passive) learning mechanisms -  these are the mechanisms 
that firms use to acquire lower-order operational capabilities by merely 
conducting the normal learning activities such as doing production tasks and 
producing simple products. This is similar to the “experience accumulation” 
learning mechanism (Zollo and Winter, 2002), the passive learning methods 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) and the doing-based learning mechanisms (Bell, 
1984; Tran, 1999).
• Purposive (active) learning mechanisms -  these are the more active (and more 
conscious) mechanisms that firms used to acquire higher-order change­
generating activities (Bell and Pavitt, 1995). It is also similar to the deliberate 
learning mechanisms involved with the knowledge articulation and codification 
and higher learning investment (Zollo and Winter, 2002), the interactive 
learning method (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), and the purposive non-doing-based 
learning mechanisms (Bell, 1984).
The implication for distinguishing the two learning mechanisms is it enables the study to 
link the different types of firm competitive and learning strategies with the different types 
of learning mechanisms.
This study accepted Kim’s (1998; 1999) and Lane and Lubatkin (1998) ideas on
absorptive capacity and applying it to the issue of firm conscious choice of learning
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mechanisms. Often times, the latecomer firms would face the problem of low level of 
initial absorptive capacity when compared to that of advanced firms. However, if these 
latecomer firms possess the strong “willingness to learn”69, which will more likely result in 
choosing to engage in more “purposive learning mechanisms” rather than the “semi­
automatic learning mechanism” per se, and then they could successfully augment their 
absorptive capacity (Kim, 1998).
Moreover, it is proposed that latecomer firms that have a “strategic learning 
capacity” (see Figure 3.2) have the “willingness to learn” and will most likely be able to 
execute a higher proportion of purposive learning mechanisms than firms who possess 
either the “ill-functioning” competitive strategy or learning strategy. This, however, does 
not mean that firms can learn without the semi-automatic learning mechanisms. It means 
that both learning mechanisms should exist in a complementary way; and both should be 
guided by the firm competitive and learning strategies. The main point here is for firms to 
achieve synergy and integration among the two types of learning mechanism.
3 .2 .3 .3  Defining the Framework for Firm Capability Development
In this study, the concept of firm capability is adapted from the earlier definitions of 
“technological capability” (Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Dahlman et al., 1987; Lall, 1987; 1992; 
Westphal et ah, 1985), but with an augmentation to other non-technical aspects such as 
linkage and marketing capabilities (Ernst et ah, 1998a; Tran, 1999). There are two reasons 
to include the non-technical aspects. First was due to Schmitz and Knorringa (2000: 195), 
whose study on local firms’ learning found that most multinational buyers assisted in 
upgrading the local firms’ technological capabilities, but not the marketing or other 
upstream capabilities. This was due to the fear that local firms, once they acquired the 
branding or marketing capability, are capable to directly competing head-on with 
multinational firms. Another was due to Leonard-Barton (1988; 1995), who explicated the 
importance of the non-technical capabilities such as organizational capability, managerial 
and employees skills and firm’s values and norms.
69 On this point, Schmitz and Knorringa (2000: 190-191) have demonstrated that the issue o f “willingness to 
learn from foreigners (i.e. ‘global buyers’)” is one o f the factors that helps explain the difference in the 
latecomer firms’ production capabilities and their differing ability to meet the competitiveness demands o f the 
global buyers. Though initially lacking sufficient capability, latecomer firms who possess the “will to learn” 
and consciously link up with foreign firms perform better on: product quality; price (cost); punctual delivery; 
flexibility (i.e. changes in production orders); and design and engineering activities.
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As a result, firm capability in this study is defined broadly as the resources needed 
to generate and manage technological as well as non-technical changes, and include skills, 
knowledge and experience and organizational management/development ability. This 
study uses the framework on firm technological and organizational capability development 
suggested by UNIDO (2002), and based on (Lall, 1992), as it is based on this wider concept 
of firm capability (see Table 3.4).
The choice of the UNIDO (2002) framework was due to:
• It was based on the frameworks of Bell and Pavitt (1995) and Lall (1992), which 
have been adapted and used successfully in many empirical studies to categorize the 
types of capabilities by technical functions as well as the technological depth of 
each function70. The UNIDO (2002) framework emphasizes the “nature of capacity 
building strategy and effort”, which is congruent with the objective of this research.
• The framework is not limited to technological capability and includes other non­
technical functions (i.e. linkage and marketing) as well. In addition, both the 
linkage and marketing capabilities are further divided into domestic and foreign; 
this is a useful disaggregation since for latecomer firms who often times had to 
develop (technology) linkage with foreign firms prior to any significant 
development of firm capabilities. Also for a latecomer firm who have grown to 
become a large conglomerate, it is able to significant move from only the domestic 
sales into the export market. This framework could capture the firm’s transition 
into the export market.
70 For example of empirical studies, see Ariffin and Figueiredo (2001), Figueiredo (2001) and Dutrenit (2000)
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3.3 The Dynamics of Latecomer Firm Strategies, Learning 
Activities and Capability Development
This section reviews the dynamic capabilities framework and its applicability to the 
developing country context. Of interest are the firm-level changes in four key constructs: 
firm competitive strategy, learning strategy, learning activities, and firm capability 
development.
3.3.1 The Dynamic Capabilities of Latecomer Firms
As discussed in Section 2.2.4.1, dynamic capabilities framework lacks sufficient 
empirical studies and there is a need to establish more empirical foundations (Augier and 
Teece, 2006). The thesis will attempt to extend the dynamic capabilities concept further to 
include the latecomer firm empirical studies focusing on differences in firm strategies, 
learning activities and mechanisms, and the resulting different rates and types of capability 
accumulation71. The success of such attempt is likely due to David Teece who stated:
"... [Dynamic capabilities framework] has [been] developed based on 
insights from the recent history of innovative firms in advanced industrial 
countries. While the institutional context is often rather different from what 
exists in newly industrialized countries [and other developing countries], 
many of the basic processes of learning and advancement taking place inside 
the firm are applicable in other contexts as well” [italics added] (Teece,
2000: 106).
He added,
“Firm-level work on competency and capabilities in developed countries is 
put forward to assist the understanding of economic development in newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs)” (Ibid.: 122).
Consequently, the latecomer firms’ dynamic capabilities framework should learn from the
advanced country research findings. Even though latecomer firms are at a disadvantage in
terms of poor resources and insufficient capabilities, there is still some hope for these firms
to catch up through proper management of learning “processes” and careful choice of
development “paths”.
71 In this regards, Hobday (2005: 136) stated the importance o f  such an attempt on the extension o f the 
dynamic capabilities framework, “An elaboration o f latecomer firm ‘positions, paths and processes' would be 
useful in understanding why innovation [and learning] occurs in [latecomer firms in] some developing 
countries but not in others [i.e. other firms] and for identifying the barriers and enablers o f innovation at the 
company level” [italics added].
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“While the positions of firms in NIEs may not initially be advantageous, 
firms in NIEs can catch up by being better at [learning] processes, and by 
astutely selecting and following desirable paths ... the disadvantages 
associated with [latecomer firms’] poor market and asset positions can be 
readily overcome if there is the organizational commitment to do so”
[original italics] (Teece, 2000: 123).
Consequently, it is argued that for latecomer firms to be better at their learning processes, 
they must commit themselves to properly manage their choices of: competitive and learning 
strategies (i.e. their “paths” and assessment of current “positions”); well-organized 
implementation of firm learning activities; and synergistic combination of semi-automatic 
and purposive learning mechanisms (i.e. their “processes”). In short, these firms must 
consciously manage their dynamic “learning system” comprising -  firm strategies, learning 
activities, and learning mechanisms -  to overcome the initial disadvantage of inferior asset 
positions.
3.3.2 The Dynamic Multiple Alignments
The dynamic capabilities framework emphasizes integration, reconfiguration, and 
framing, and reframing of latecomer firm’s resources and capabilities in order to create 
superior advantage. These activities require a firm to continuously align (and re-align) its 
competitive strategy, learning strategy, learning activities (and mechanisms) in order to 
develop firm capability. From the SRBL, alignment could be defined in many ways. For 
instance, Ward et al. (1996: 622) referred to the alignment between manufacturing strategy, 
competitive strategy, external environment, and organization structure. In doing so, they 
developed a framework for different strategic configurations. Similarly, Beer et al. (2005) 
defined the organizational alignment concept as “fit” (i.e. strategy should fit with the 
external environment, organizational design, culture, and leadership) and “fitness” (defined 
as the firm’s ability to learn). Both fit and fitness are dynamic, and needed to be 
continually revised and adapted to the changing external environment (Ibid.: 455).
In this research, the “dynamic multiple alignments” refers to the synergistic 
relationship between the firm competitive strategy, learning strategy, learning activities, 
and learning mechanisms. In addition, the firm choice of strategies has to be constrained
72 It is “dynamic” because it involves continuous re-alignment over time. It is “multiple” because it involves 
more than one elements to be aligned.
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(or supported) by its existing stock of capabilities. Below is the description of four types 
of alignment which the latecomer firm must continuously manage.
First is the alignment between meso-level changes and firm competitive strategy 
(Antonacopoulou et al., 2005; Ward et ah, 1996). Here the issue is firms normally do not 
set ambitious competitive goal for no apparent reasons, and firms that do usually will 
probably not survive for very long. Usually the impetus for such competitive goals may 
come from new customer requirements, increased competitive pressure within the market 
and/or firm own perception (sensing) of possible technological and market opportunities 
(Tidd et ah, 2005). Likewise, firm competitive strategy could be affected by the industry 
undergoing structural changes such as deregulation, technological advances and 
globalization (Ratnabhas, 2003). Regardless of the factors impacting firm-level 
competitive strategy, the key point is that firm’s competitive strategy must be well aligned 
with: both the evolution of opportunities and threats within the external environment and 
the stock of internal firm’s resources and capabilities.
Second is the alignment between firm competitive strategy and its learning strategy 
(Lin et ah, 2001; McKee, 1992: 243-244; Tidd et ah, 2005). Since learning is not 
automatic and most firms are “reluctant learners” (i.e. they are not interested in learning 
investment unless it is really necessary to do so) (Tidd et ah, 2005: 82); hence, the learning 
strategy must support the firm’s competitive rationale. For instance, if the firm set as its 
competitive rationale, “to become a first-tier auto-part supplier”, then its learning strategy 
should comprise: the ability to set learning goal focusing on achieving the various 
dimensions of operational competitiveness (for e.g. high quality, punctual delivery and low 
cost). In addition, a first-tier auto-part supplier must also be committed to invest in 
sufficient learning of new technology and equipment in order to properly collaborate with 
the carmakers. Here the key point is that firm learning strategy is linked with firm 
competitive strategy and that the two must be aligned. The implication is amidst the 
turbulent external environment where firm competitive strategy is under constant flux, the 
learning strategy must be continually re-aligned accordingly as well.
Third is the alignment between firm learning strategy and its learning activities and 
mechanisms (Kenny, 2005: 110). Once the firm competitive and learning strategies are 
aligned, then it must ensure that the implementation of learning activities and the choice of 
learning mechanisms are properly managed and aligned with its strategies. For instance, in
the first-tier auto-part supplier example, to achieve firm operational competitiveness (i.e.
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high quality, low cost and punctual delivery) the firm must execute business/corporate-wide 
learning activities such as benchmarking, total quality management and just-in-time. In 
addition, the learning mechanisms involved would include a synergistic combination of 
semi-automatic (doing-based) mechanisms as well as the purposive (more active) 
mechanisms. These learning activities and mechanisms must be properly aligned with firm 
learning strategy.
At times, the firm may set ambitious competitive goal, which in turn lead to stretch 
learning goal and wide capability gap. This would then require a diverse set of learning 
activities and mechanisms to achieve the stretch goal. Here part of the alignment issue 
between firm learning strategy and activities is the ability to continually maintain alignment 
between learning strategy and learning activities (and mechanisms). When the learning 
strategy is stretch, there is a high possibility that the firm will have to re-align its learning 
activities and mechanisms.
Figure 3.3 Dynamic Multiple Alignments of a Firm
►
Learning 
Activities and 
Mechanisms
Capability
Development
Dynamic
Multiple
ALIGNMENTS
Learning
Strategy
Stock of 
Accumulated 
Capabilities
Competitive
Strategy
Source: own elaboration based on the research
Finally, there must be an alignment between firm learning activities (and 
mechanisms) and the -  firm capability development (see Figure 3.3). The issue is starting 
with firm competitive strategy that senses the business opportunities (and threats) within
the external environment, then this translates into firm learning strategy, which in turn
directs the implementation of learning activities and mechanisms. The loop returns back to
the original position, when a firm has developed new (or enhanced its existing) capabilities
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to meet the market needs and augmented its capability stock. Equipped with higher level of 
capability, a firm is now able to formulate more ambitious competitive and learning 
strategies and embarked on more diverse (yet focused) set of learning activities and 
mechanisms. For a “strong learner” firm, this self-reinforcing positive “learning system” 
tends to continue and fuels firm growth.
3.3.3 Summary: Framework on Firm Learning System and 
Capability Development
This chapter sets out to integrate all the concepts introduced and produces a more 
holistic analytical framework based upon firm dynamic capabilities and multiple 
alignments. It attempts to explain the process of firm learning (in a systematic, strategic 
way) and its rate of capability development through the following factors: sequence of 
evolutionary changes within the external environment; firm-level competitive strategy; firm 
learning strategy; and the learning activities and learning mechanisms; and finally the rate 
and type of capability development.
Today, it is widely acknowledged in innovation management and learning studies 
that change is ubiquitous, inevitable and is an important pre-requisite for survival. 
Consequently all things are changing and nothing is at rest: the global, national and meso 
environment are changing; the firm’s strategies as well as the internal resources and 
capabilities are also changing. So the central issue is firm dynamic alignment (Beer et al., 
2005; Ferguson-Amores et al., 2005; Flung and Lien, 2005; Lin et al., 2001; Saint-Onge, 
1996; Ward et al., 1996). Here the chapter has explicated that multiple alignment requires 
to the ability to adjust whatever is necessary (firm competitive strategy, learning strategy, 
learning activities and learning mechanisms) in order to achieve an increased rate of firm 
capability accumulation. From this explanation, the implication is that the managers must 
possess (or learn to possess) the ability to adapt, reconfigure, and integrate both internal and 
external capabilities. In other words, the managerial dynamic capability certainly impacts 
the ability to concurrently perform multiple alignments. Not only does multiple alignment 
includes the ability to balance the tension of competing for today (exploitation) and 
tomorrow (exploration) and monitor the changing environment with foresight, but it also 
includes the ability to put in place a well-functioning overall firm learning system.
73 Porter (1996) called this as “fit”. However, the alignment concept emphasized here is more than Porter’s 
idea o f external competitive industrial positioning.
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Furthermore based on the premise that firm heterogeneity exists and is persistent 
among different firms, it is expected that different latecomer firms will achieve different 
degree of multiple alignments (i.e. a continuum from total misalignment to full alignment). 
It can be hypothesized that firm who achieves multiple alignments (and continual re­
alignments) in a timely manner will be able to fully capitalize the benefits arising from the 
implementation of its learning strategy and properly managed learning activities. These 
firms will be able to build capability and achieve competitiveness. On the other hand, firms 
who failed to manage the multiple alignments will be less likely to fully realize the positive 
impacts of the implementation of its strategies and learning activities. It is conjectured that 
at best, these firms will survive the competition, but their stock of accumulated capability 
would be insufficient to support future growth.
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Chapter 4 - Research Methodology and Design
This chapter explains the choice of research method used and the research design 
for data collection and analysis. It also outlines the tools and techniques that were used for 
the data analysis. This study sought to examine firms’ strategies, learning activities, and 
capability development over as long a period as possible in order to explore the dynamics 
of firm learning processes.
4.1 Revisiting the Research Questions and Objectives
This study focuses on three questions:
1. What were the competitive and learning strategies of Thai auto-part firms?
a. How did these firms perceive the opportunities and challenges arising from 
changes in the macro- and meso-environment?
b. How did firms respond, in terms of their firms’ competitive and learning 
strategies, to these external changes?
2. To what extent can the differences in firm learning activities and mechanisms be 
explained by the differences in firm competitive and learning strategies?
3. What are the implications of the firm “learning system” -  the dynamic alignment 
(and re-alignment) between the key characteristics of firm competitive and learning 
strategies and the learning activities and learning mechanisms -  on the rate of firm 
capability accumulation?
The objectives of this study are:
• To elaborate the sequence of policy, market, and institutional changes within the 
Thai automotive industry since its inception in the early 1960s and link these to the 
dynamics of firm-level competitive and learning strategies.
• To assess the impact of differences in firm strategies upon the firm-level learning 
activities and learning mechanisms
• To explore and explain the issue of the dynamic alignment (and re-alignment) 
among three key conceptual variables -  firm strategies, learning activities (and 
mechanisms) and firm capability development -  and how such multiple alignments 
could lead to accelerating or slowing down the rate of capability accumulation, 
again aiming to differentiate “strong learner” firms from the others
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This research assumes that no two firms are alike and that firm heterogeneity prevails even 
if these firms are operating within the same industry and locating within the same country.
It also assumes that how different firms perceive the changes within the external 
environment will influence how firms differently acted in engaging in a set of learning 
activities in order to build its capability.
4.2 Research Scope and Analytical Framework
4.2.1 Research Scope
As elaborated in the analytical framework below (see Figure 4.1), central to this 
research is the relationship between four firm-level characteristics:
• competitive strategies
• learning strategies
• learning activities and mechanisms
• capability development
The research acknowledges that other firm-level factors such as organizational culture and 
individualistic leadership behavior exist and have certain influences on firm strategies, 
learning activities, and capability development. However, these issues are largely outside 
the scope of this research and are not discussed extensively here.
4.2.2 Unit of Analysis
As a general rule of thumb, the unit of analysis should be defined in relation to the 
way the research questions have been defined (Yin, 1994: 22) and how one defined what a 
“case” is (Ibid.: 21). In this study, the research questions concern relationships between 
firm strategies, learning activities, and capability development, and these occur at the firm- 
level. Hence, the appropriate unit of analysis is the Thai auto-part firm. As the research is 
explicitly concerned with the influence of the external environment on firm strategies, the 
research identifies and assesses the characteristics of the external environment and changes 
within that environment (see Chapter 5).
4.2.3 Analytical Framework
The conceptual framework for this research was described in Chapter 3, and the 
analytical framework is summarized in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Analytical Framework (elaborated)
Firm Competitive 
Strategy
Firm Learning 
Strategy
Firm Learning 
Mechanisms
Improved or New 
Firm Capabilities
Firm Learning 
Activities
Firm’s Stock of 
Accumulated 
Capabilities
Macro- and Meso-
Environment
Source: own elaboration based on the research
Seeking to capture external opportunities and neutralize threats, firms formulate their
competitive strategies. These competitive strategies are then translated into firm learning
strategies, which are in turn translated into firm learning activities, and then learning
mechanisms. Through the effective implementation of learning mechanisms and learning
activities, firms improve existing capabilities and/or build new capabilities. This increase
in the firm’s stock of capabilities may enable a firm to formulate more competitive
strategies to further seize the external business opportunities and/or to neutralize threats.
The double arrows in Figure 4.1 denote that there is an interaction between the two
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strategies and learning activities and mechanisms. This assumes that the strategies that a 
firm develops are appropriate and that the learning mechanisms and activities are also 
consistent with the strategies.
4.2.4 Operational Variables and Rating Criteria
The analytical model requires the operationalization o f five key conceptual 
constructs:
• Meso-level sequence o f changes
• Firm competitive strategy
• Firm learning strategy
• Firm learning activities
• Firm learning mechanisms
The operational variables selected for each construct above are set out in Table 4.1.
4.3 Research Design
This section explains the researcher’s choice o f a multiple-case study method, and 
discusses sample selection, the design o f research instruments, and the design and outcome 
o f the pilot fieldwork.
4.3.1 Why Case Study?
The choice o f the case study method was based on three analytical decisions.
First, the research questions aimed at explaining “ how”  the sequence o f changes within the 
external environment impacts the firm-level competitive and learning strategies and “ how” 
these different firm strategies (over time) lead to different ability to manage the learning 
activities and mechanisms. According to Yin (1994; 2003), “ how”  and “ why”  questions 
are best answered via the case study method. Since the study aims at understanding the 
dynamic firm-level changes over time, the use o f mail-questionnaires and other cross- 
sectional survey methods would be inappropriate.
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Table 4.1 Operationalized Variables
Conceptual
Construct Operationalized Variables (Assessable Indicators)
Meso-level
Changes,
Thai
Automotive
Industry
Objective:
To investigate industry evolution, implications to firm strategies and learning 
Policies: investment promotion, import substitution industrialization, 
rationalization, export-oriented industrialization, trade agreements, and 
industrial promotion (e.g. Automotive Master Plans, Detroit of Asia Project). 
Market Characteristics: protective measures, economies of scale, product 
fragmentation, growth rates, demand growth, increase in division of labor, 
international division of labor, liberalization, and product mix (e.g. market share 
of one-ton pick-up trucks). Opportunities/threats to firms.
Public Organizations: changing roles plaved bv Ministry of Industry, Office of 
Industrial Economics, Board of Investment and Ministry of Finance.
Private (Ouasi-Public) and Business Associations: changing roles plaved bv 
Federation of Thai Industries (Automotive Industry Club, Auto-Part Industry 
Club), Thai Automotive Industry Association, Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers 
Association, and Thailand Automotive Institute.
External Events: oil crisis of 1970s, Plaza Accord in 1985, AFTA since 1993, 
1997 financial crisis, and WTO regulations on local content requirement.
Firm
Competitive
Strategy
Objective:
To measure past and current changes in firm competitive strategy 
Perceptions: business opportunities or threats/challenges, from changes within 
the external environment.
Competitive Goal: which development path to take, for e.g. to become an OEM 
auto-part supplier or to become an ASEAN regional OEM auto-part suppliers. 
Competitive Positions: product offerings with respect to market, capabilities 
with respect to market, and capabilities for survival/growth/collaboration 
Other Plans/Wavs to Compete: cost leadership, product differentiation, 
enhancing product quality, purchasing/outsourcing strategies, process and 
product improvement plans, human resource strategies, business diversification 
strategy, and improved supply chain management.
Firm
Learning
Strategy
Objective:
To measure past and current changes in learning strategy, learning plans 
Learning goal: The required target knowledge. Knowledge is required to fulfil 
the competitive strategy, learning plan implementation, knowledge-acquisition 
activities.
Capability gap: Awareness of the existing and/or future gap and the learning 
plans to address these gap(s)
Learning plan: strategv to close capabilitv gap. what to learn, learn from whom, 
and human resources training plan
Balancing the tensions: learning modern technologv for future competition 
versus learning to exploit today’s technology, learning to balance as well as 
integrate internal resources with external ones.
Source: own elaboration based on the research analytical framework (Figures 3.3 and 4.1)
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Table 4.1 (continued). Operationalized Variables
Conceptual
Construct Operationalized Variables (Assessable Indicators)
Firm Learning 
Activities
Objective:
To assess the various types of firm learning activities, and linking them to 
firm strategies and types of learning mechanisms 
Learning investment activities: For e.g. plant expansion, new plant 
construction, and project execution and management ability, domestic or 
overseas, and collaboration in investment projects
Learning production process improvement activities: lowering defect rates, 
improve yield/efficiency/productivity, and enhancing process quality 
Learning product improvement activities: Improving or modifving the existing 
product, designing products, advanced design ability, and product testing.
Link and leam activities: Relationship with domestic and foreign technology 
suppliers, informal links, licensing, formal links (foreign joint ventures), and 
relationship with the public organizations and business associations 
Learning market activities: For e.g. ability to market the products and/or 
services, conduct market research, and systematic brand management, and 
domestic market and/or export
Firm Learning 
Mechanisms
Objective:
To assess the various types of firm learning mechanisms, and linking them to 
firm learning activities and new/improved firm capability 
Semi-automatic mechanisms: For e.g. leaming-bv-doing production activities, 
by modifying simple production/product activities, and by performing minor 
changes. Obstacles during learning.
Purposive mechanisms: For e.g. leaming-by-searching, -visiting, -hiring, - 
training, -design and R&D, leaming-before-doing, and by performing major 
changes. Obstacles during learning.
Firm
Capabilities
Objective:
To measure the rates, levels, and assess the types of firms’ accumulated 
capabilities. Also to link firm’s accumulated stock of capabilities to its ability 
to formulate competitive and learning strategies.
Functions: Investment, production, products, industrial engineering, human 
resources development, technology (linkage), marketing.
Levels: basic/routine, intermediate/adaptive/duplicative and innovative.
Rate: Changes in the levels through time, the final levels accumulated, fast, 
moderate, or slow.
Source: own elaboration based on the research analytical framework (Figures 3.3 and 4.1)
83
Second, the case study approach allows the researcher to examine a phenomenon of 
interest in its natural setting and meaningful theory could be generated from the 
understanding gained through multiple sources of evidence (Voss et ah, 2002; Yin, 1994; 
2003). Overall, the study attempted to “explain” the functioning of the firm learning and its 
contribution (positive or negative) to the development of firm capability. Consequently, 
given that the main objective is (again) to answer the “how” questions by “explaining” the 
dynamics of firm learning and not simply describing the historical events, the case study 
approach is appropriate (Yin, 1994).
Third, several prior empirical studies focusing on similar concepts had effectively 
used the case study approach to gain greater understanding. For instance, Figueiredo 
(2001; 2002a) used an in-depth comparative case study approach to successfully describe 
and explain the inter-firm differences in the technological capability-accumulation paths. 
Similarly, Dutrenit (2000) chose a single case study approach to successfully explain the 
failure of a latecomer firm to upgrade from innovative capability into a strategic 
(knowledge management) capability. In both studies, the case study approach was used to 
address the key questions related to “how” and “why” learning and knowledge management 
processes were functioning adequately or poorly.
4.3.2 Why Multiple-Case Design?
This study adopted the multiple-case study approach (Voss et ah, 2002; Yin, 1994) 
due to three reasons74.
First, based on the assumption that firms are heterogeneous with respect to their 
strategies, learning activities, and accumulated capabilities, the research not only seeked to 
identify relationship between the variables based on changes over time in one firm, but also 
attempted to comparatively analyze the difference of these variables betw>een firms.
Second, “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, 
and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 1994: 45). A 
multiple case study approach gives the researcher confidence that the emerging analytical 
framework is more generic (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 29). In
74 A single-case design has limitations (Leonard-Barton, 1990), one of which is the limits to the 
generalizability of the Findings, conclusions, empirically-derived model from just one case study (Voss et al., 
2002: 201). A multiple-case design could reduce the depth o f study when resources are constrained; however, 
it could also augment the external validity, and assist in guarding against the researcher’s bias that occurs 
when using only a single case study (Ibid.: 202-203).
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other words, multiple-case study design allows the researcher to enhance the external 
validity75 and “analytical generalization” (Yin, 1994: 10). The approach also enables the 
researcher to perform:
• Within case data analysis
• Cross-case analysis -  “searching for cross-case patterns” (Eisenhardt, 1989:
533)
It is argued that both analyses are necessary for this research to achieve a better 
understanding of how Thai firms manage their learning.
Third, this research analyzes the inter-firm differences in temporal patterns of 
capability development. There are two issues here: the temporal pattern and the inter-firm 
comparison. Since learning processes and other change processes are complex, an analysis 
on only the current firm learning and competitive strategies and capabilities will not suffice 
because these current capabilities and strategies are shaped by the previous strategies and 
other related historical events. In short, each firm’s unique path plays a crucial role here. 
Moreover, the issue of inter-firm comparison over time is also important since the research 
attempts to differentiate the inner workings of a well-functioning firm from that of a poor­
functioning one. A multiple-case approach is necessary for this analysis.
4.3.3 Why the Thai Automotive Industry?
There are two reasons why this study chose to focus on a single industry -  the Thai 
automotive components industry. First, the study was interested in exploring neither the 
inter-sectoral nor cross-national differences in these relationships. Therefore, the study 
adopted the “specific industry” criterion to assist in eliminating the bias that could arise 
from selecting firms that are located in different industries. Since doing so would confound 
the firm-level differences with the sectoral-level differences. Furthermore, it would also 
confound the difference in firm-level strategies, learning activities and its capability 
development with the sectoral-level differences. In addition, this criterion also assisted in 
isolating the causes of heterogeneity among firms exclusively related to firm-level factors, 
and minimized the effects from either the sectoral-level or the cross-national differences.
75 Here “external validity” is taken to mean “analytical generalization” (Yin, 1994: 36-37), and in this study, 
the aim is to build a general explanation (i.e. an analytical model/framework) that fits each o f the individual 
cases (i.e. the auto-part firms), even though the cases will vary in their idiosyncratic details.
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Second, the Thai automotive industry is an industry that has been in existence since 
the 1960s; and there exists a large supplier base o f auto-part producers (see Figure 5.5).
This provided the researcher with the ability to systematically select a sample o f firms 
based on the availability o f public information and adequate access to senior managers o f 
the firm. The industry also offers a rich ground for exploratory research on issues such as 
the dynamics o f firm-level strategies and the interaction between firm strategies, its 
learning activities, and capability development.
4.3.4 Sampling Issues
4.3.4.1 Sample Size
In conducting case study research, “ there is no ideal number o f cases [and] ... the 
number o f cases to be studied depends on the focus o f the research question’' (Darke et al., 
1998: 281). As a rule o f thumb, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that for theory building using a 
case study approach, the desirable number o f cases should be between four and ten. While 
drawing on both Darke et al. (1998) and Eisenhardt (1989), the decision on the number o f 
firms to be sampled was also based on two other considerations:
• The number o f cases should be sufficiently large to enable the researcher to 
encompass a range o f variation more or less representative o f the sector ".
• The number o f cases should realistically take into account the issue o f resource and 
time constraints, and feasibility o f firm-level access, in order to realistically assess 
the collection o f the required data.
Considering these factors, the study chose to focus the bulk o f data collection on nine Thai 
auto-part firms. These nine Thai auto-part firms were not selected at random (i.e. random 
sampling in a statistical sense), but were selected purposefully.
4.3.4.2 Purposive (Theoretical) Sampling
In general, qualitative research samples tend to be purposive, rather than random 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 27), and case study research is no exception. This study chose 
the nine auto-part firms purposively (see Table 4.2), and Y in ’s (1994: 46) two types o f
76 This is not to be misconstrued that the sample chosen was representative in a statistical sense. This issue 
generally does not apply for the case study method (see Yin (1994; 2003) for detailed discussion).
86
T
ab
le
 4
.2
 P
ro
fi
le
s 
of
 th
e 
Sa
m
pl
ed
 F
i
V3
E
.5 .1 I
.  g -5
a
’5-s
U
j*»
1ELc-3
C/0
C.
3O• U
o
T3QJ
JS
3
t/2
w
T3n
.2 a01 3 a> (J
Oh W
C/2oa
Ä ©
S g-
3 E
U
Oh
O
/*--V
E 23
O &
S b 
ö 5c o
.0 8
Pu on
■3
-GH
-aG
8 ^<u 5
C / 0  3
4. S  
.b b
tu '3
0ß
.E
sio
3
CD
C/2
-oc3
O
3 /— 
3 JD
Ü £
•3 ^ 3 o
c/5
tu E
o
3
3
m
2
S
0ß
.s
b
o
U
o
3
3V_s
b o
•3 3
•Ö >5
3 o 2
.S 8 g
tU  C/O
T3G
3
O
3 ^  
3 CD—
b £•3 £
-  § 1- o
E E
o
3
3
>—'
b
T3G
Ou<u
on
Oß
.£
j=o
3
CD
GO
cuc/o
U
E
s -
E
o
Oo
cn
A
Q
i  I  
e  o .5tu
I o
tu on
Ct
3o
E o
o
o
o
c/o _ 
H §■ 
o
H
H
r-
oo
3
-o
si o
3 
CD 
C/5<u
T3 O
o 
2
D Si 
s i 3^ CQ c
•S .1
< D  = 2  
C/5 • ^
3 G 
Si c  
.. G 
a> • —■
3 C co 3) s
& a I
” m
ea
ns
 th
e 
fir
m
 is
 1
00
%
 T
ha
i-o
w
ne
d
“replication logic” guided the choice of firms (see Table 4.2). Through Yin’s “literal 
replication”, the study chose a subset of firms that were broadly similar in terms of their 
strategies, learning activities and mechanisms, and rate of capability development, and 
through the use of “theoretical replication”, the study chose another subset of firms that 
were different in terms of the above concepts. The overall purpose of performing both 
“literal replication” and “theoretical replication” was to spread the selected cases (firms) on 
conceptual grounds (i.e. wide range of difference in strategies, learning activities and 
mechanisms), and not on (statistical) representative ground. In this way, if the proposed 
analytical model could explain the relationship between variables in all the sampled firms, 
the model has a higher explanatory power and is more robust (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Yin, 1994).
4.3.5 Preliminary Design of Case Study Interviews
About two months prior to the pilot fieldwork, the design of the interview questions 
started and was based on the analytical framework (Figure 4.1). The operationalized 
variables (Table 4.1) guided the development of detailed interview questions. The 
interview questions were divided into three distinct sets.
The first set dealt with firm-level strategies and targeted the firm top management 
personnel (for example firm owners, chairman/president, or managing directors) (see 
Appendix C). The second set of interview questions targeted the operational personnel 
within the business firms (for example engineers, technicians and other shop-floor 
workers). The last set of interview questions focused on the external organizations77 (if 
any) that assisted the business firms in formulating their upgrading/learning strategies, 
providing consultancy advice on learning activities and aiming to speed up the capability 
building process. These three sets of interview questions were tested during the pilot 
fieldwork (Section 4.3.6)
In addition to the interview questions, secondary data related to the nine Thai auto­
part firms was actively sought. The search techniques included on-line searches and 
contacting researchers working in Thailand, including Thai academics who conducted past 
research within the Thai automotive industry. All of these served as important sources of
77 Examples of these organizations are the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) and Thai Auto-Parts 
Manufacturers Association (TAPMA).
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information and ideas both for further modifications to the interview questions during the 
pilot fieldwork and for the overall research.
4.3.6 Pilot Fieldwork
The pilot fieldwork started in March 2004 and ended in May 2004. The objective of 
pilot fieldwork was to put the above three sets of interview guides through a “test”, and to 
determine the appropriateness of using a tape recorder during the interview.
4.3.6.1 Pilot Sample Firms and Organizations
The choice of sample firms and organizations within the pilot case study was based 
on the following factors:
• Convenience, accessibility (Yin, 1994) and relatedness to the conceptual issues
• A recommendation made by an ex-advisor78 to the Thailand Automotive 
Institute on which firms could serve as exemplary case study candidates, given 
the research conceptual and analytical frameworks and objectives.
Five business firms and five organizations were chosen for the pilot case study 
(see Table 4.3).
Additionally, two public conferences attended during the pilot fieldwork served as 
a useful exploration to assess the feasibility of the research design. These conferences 
enabled the researcher to have direct face-to-face contacts with the prospective firms’ key 
informants (usually senior level executives) and to provide first impressions that later built 
accessibility to firm-level interviews and internal documentation. In addition, the 
conferences also allowed the researcher to meet with people in the Thai automotive 
businesses, leading to informal conversation regarding the industry context. For instance, 
the information obtained comprised past government policies that assisted or hindered the 
auto-parts firms, the current status of Thai automotive industry development, and the 
current learning obstacles and opportunities facing the auto-part firms.
78 This ex-advisor earned his doctoral degree from Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of 
Sussex.
79 The first conference (Thai Automotive 2004) occurred on March 22-23, 2004, and the second (Automotive 
Manufacturing 2004) was held on May 6-8, 2004.
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Table 4.3 List of Firms and Organizations Visited During the Pilot Fieldwork
Description of the Respondent Type (Firm / Organization)
Date
Interviewed
Automotive brake manufacturer Firm 29 April 2004 12 May 2004
Automotive alloy wheel manufacturer Firm 4 May 20045 May 2004
Automotive synthetic leather manufacturer Firm 10 May 2004
Automotive general assembly plant Firm 22 April 2004
Automotive seat manufacturer Firm 14 May 2004
Ex-advisor to Thailand Automotive Institute who now 
operates his own consultancy firm Organization
6 April 2004
International policy researcher who had worked closely 
with the Thai Board of Investment (BOI) and previously 
conducted qualitative study on Thai automotive industry
Organization
27 March 2004
International policy researcher who previously conduct 
large-scale survey study of Thai automotive industry Organization
7 April 200480
Policy researcher at National Science and Technology 
Development Agency (NSTDA) Organization
30 April 2004
Academic who completed his PhD thesis on Thai 
automotive industry81 Organization
26 April 2004
Source: own elaboration based on the data collection
4.3.6.2 Use of Tape Recorder
Using a tape recorder to capture the interviews has certain advantages and 
disadvantages. One advantage is the researcher can obtain complete transcripts of the 
interviewees’ responses as well as comments. The disadvantage is that the interviewees 
may be reluctant to disclose confidential and sensitive information. Drawing on Darke et 
al. (1998), who advocated the use of a tape recorder82, the researcher experimented with the 
use of tape recorder during the pilot fieldwork and discovered the benefit o f a set of “warm 
up” questions83 asked during the first few minutes o f the interview. This would allow the 
interviewees some lead time to get acquainted with the tape recorder and may lower their 
reluctance to disclose some important information. As a result, with the use of “warm up” 
questions, interviewees’ reluctance to tape recording appeared less significant.
80 After the interview, the person responded to the researcher’s request for assistance. He commented on the 
pilot interview guides and the overall approach to data collection strategy suitable for the Thai automotive 
industry.
81 The thesis topic focuses directly on the inter-firm and intra-firm technology transfer and local (Thai) firm 
capability formation.
8: Darke et al. stated “ ... if the research is being undertaken as part o f higher education thesis process [i.e. 
PhD thesis],/«// transcripts o f  interviews should be obtained” [italics added] (Ibid.: 283).
83 The “warm up” questions refer to the questions that are quite easy to answer. For instance, the questions 
could be related to the background o f  the firm or the firm current operating characteristics. An international 
consultant, who is also one o f the key informants during the pilot fieldwork, provided this advice.
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Consequently, the benefit of having a full transcript of the interviews outweighed the 
potential disadvantage of using a tape recorder.
4.3.6.3 Resulting Pilot Analysis
After completing the pilot fieldwork, the researcher performed pilot data analysis 
which comprised combining the interview data with the firm secondary data and wrote a 
short analytical text for each firm (i.e. case). In addition, the researcher attempted cross­
case comparison to highlight the differences in firm strategies, learning activities and 
capability development, and conducted a public presentation (a “midterm report”84) stating 
the preliminary findings. Both the pilot case study and the presentation assisted in 
uncovering three important design and analytical issues.
First, during the pilot fieldwork, one of the interviewees was “put o ff’ by the 
requirement to have to sign the Written Consent formed provided by the university Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix A). As a result, this person was highly skeptical and quite 
reluctant to divulge any crucial information, in particular that relating to firm strategies.
Second, the issue of firm learning process needed to be made more explicit and 
more problem-focused. In other words, the learning concept by itself is quite complex and 
rather abstract for these practical firms. To enable these firms to understand what is being 
asked and enhance their ability to answer the interview question, the interview questions 
related to learning strategy and activities were based on specific problems that occurred 
within the firm’s natural setting.
Third, the issue of stimuli for learning is also important and appears to be under­
emphasized in the pilot interview guide. In particular, it is of interest to seek out why some 
firms took on an ambitious learning strategy and what are the particular costs and benefits. 
An issue raised by an academic colleague during the “midterm report” was the impact on 
firm learning that were caused by the external factors. For instance, most first-tier Thai 
auto-part firms have intimate contact with the multinational carmaker; therefore, the 
carmaker’s upgrading strategy would certainly have great impact on the local firm’s 
decision to learn.
84 This was conducted as a requirement of the Australian National University PhD guideline. The audience 
comprised academic colleagues (lecturers, researchers, and fellow PhD students) from the National Graduate 
School o f Management, Innovation Management and Policy Program, and the Research School o f  Social 
Science (Development Economics).
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In all, these three issues were incorporated into the design of detailed interview 
guides for the main fieldwork.
4.4 Data Sources and Purpose
4.4.1 Primary Data
The study utilized two main sources of primary data: semi-structured interviews and 
direct observation. The purpose was to gain an understanding of the contextual as well as 
current issues relating to firm strategies, learning activities, and the overall process of 
capability development (see Table 4.4).
First, in-depth semi-structured interviews85 were the main source of information. 
The rationale for using semi-structured interviews was to maintain flexibility as well as 
sufficient rigor. This “flexibility” meant that the interviewees received the opportunities to 
suggest any other related responses that were occasionally missed by the researcher, and at 
the same time, not constraining them to answer according to certain pre-specified rating 
scales or answer choices86. On the other hand, it was also undesirable to use the open- 
ended questions since this would allow the respondents too much freedom (i.e. lack of 
“sufficient rigidity”), which would eventually lead to the researcher facing the problem of 
irrelevant data or data overload. Hence, neither the formal-structured interview nor the 
open-ended interview was chosen, and the selection of semi-structured interview was most 
suitable for this study.
Second, direct observation was used as a complementary source of information. 
After each interview with a business firm, the researcher asked for a permission to have a 
production site tour. While on tour, the researcher had the opportunity to look at the 
product while it is being manufactured, and also conversed with production line foremen
85 Yin (1994: 85) stated the advantage o f using a semi-structured interview, “... the interviews may still 
remain open-ended and assume a conversational manner, but you are [also] more likely to be following a 
certain set o f questions derived from the case study protocol.”
86 The semi-structured design is very much suitable to issues such as firm competitive and learning strategies 
since for heterogeneous firms each top manager (or owner) has his/her own vantage point o f the current 
market trends and pressures that push their firm to either urgently or slowly develop certain types of 
capability. As such the interview guides for top managers and operational personnel should be different.
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and technicians regarding the sequential production steps as well as the technology utilized 
during production process87.
Table 4.4 Sources of Data and Purpose
Type Sources of Data Purposes
S e m i-s tr u c tu r e d  In te rv ie w s: - Gain deeper
• Interview with firms’ top management understanding of firm-level
• Interview with firms’ operational staff - strategies, learning
engineers and technicians activities and process of
• Interview with non-firm organizations capability development
such as Thailand Automotive Institute, - Gain deeper
Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers understanding of the Thai
Association, Federation of Thai Industry automotive industry
(Automobile Industry Clubs), National context, public assistance
Primary Science and Technology Development and other upgrading
Data Agency, academics, and external 
consultants
policies
D ir e c t  O b ser v a tio n : - Multiple sources of
• Plant site visits (including conversation evidence, enhance
with shop-floor foremen and technicians) interview validity and
• Corporate meetings and minutes of control researcher’s bias
meetings - Opportunity for the
• Firms engaging in the continuous researcher to assess the
improvement activities and human validity and reliability of
resources training the research interviews
D o cu m e n ta t io n : - Multiple sources of
• Corporate annual reports, internal evidence and enhance
documents and on-line web pages construct validity
• Corporate press releases, brochures, - Gain deeper
minutes of meeting and newsletters understanding on Thai
• Industry conference proceedings automotive industry & the
• Industry handbooks and directories nine sampled firms
Secondary
Data
P u b lic  S em in a rs: - Gain deeper
• Thai Automotive 2004 Conference understanding of Thai
• Automotive Manufacturing 2004 automotive industry context
Conference - Validate interview from 
key informants
T r a in in g  C o u rses: - Multiple sources of
• These were courses offered by Thailand evidence and control of
Automotive Institute. Examples 
comprised Metal Fatigue Analysis and 
Computer Aided Design and Engineering.
researcher’s bias
Source: own elaboration based on the research
Additionally, the technicians also described any production problems that they were trying 
to solve as well as the level of operational performance. For some firms (especially the
87 The researcher graduated with an undergraduate and a postgraduate degree in Industrial and Operations 
Engineering (The University o f Michigan) and had some experience with the automotive manufacturing 
environment.
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small-and-medium-sized enterprises), the researcher directly observed the workers who 
participated in the training sessions (both on- and off-the-job) conducted by both the 
Japanese and Thai experts88. Moreover, the researcher gained permission from Thailand 
Automotive Institute (TAI) to follow several Japanese experts and Thai “engineer 
counterpart” into the field. This enabled the researcher to directly observe the actual 
learning activities and mechanisms (for example off-the-job training and on-the-job 
problem solving sessions) taking place within the firms. Such observations enabled the 
researcher to better assess the interview data, eliminating the possibility that the firms may 
“say one thing, but does another”.
4.4.2 Secondary Data
In addition to the primary data, the study aimed to achieve triangulation, enhance 
the construct validity of interview findings and counteract the researcher’s bias during data 
collection and analysis (Darke et al., 1998: 286). Hence, three sources of secondary 
(complementary) data were collected.
First, documentation was another source of complementary information. These 
included company annual reports, corporate brochures, newspapers, newsletters, minutes of 
meetings, bulletin board announcements, conference proceedings, Thai automotive industry 
handbooks or directory89, progress reports and other articles that appeared in press releases 
and mass media.
Second, public seminars and conferences constituted other sources of information, 
the two main conferences attended by the researcher include: Thai Automotive 200490 
(March 22nd-23rd) and Automotive Manufacturing and Automotive Assembly Congress 
200491 (May 6th-9th). In both conferences, two key informants (also interviewees) publicly
88 For example, at one instance the Thailand Automotive Institute personally asked the researcher to “stand 
in” as an “engineer counterpart” (i.e. an engineer who worked in the field alongside the Japanese expert). The 
experience served as an excellent opportunity for the researcher to assess the firm’s empirical learning 
activities, and again, to assess the validity o f interview data.
89 There were two types o f directory. The first was a publication (in 2003) that results from the collaboration 
of Automobile Industry Club, Auto-Parts Industry Club, Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association, and The 
Thai Automobile Industry Association. Second were the publications by the Society o f Automotive 
Engineers, Thailand (TSAE). Three volumes, from 2001 to 2003, were acquired. These handbooks aid in the 
selection of firms for case study.
90 Organized by The Asia Business Forum and the conference titled, “Trends, Developments and Challenges 
Facing Thai Automotive Industry”
91 Organized by Reed Tradex, Thailand and supported by the Thailand Ministry o f  Industry and the Thailand 
Automotive Institute.
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presented their views on the Thai auto-part firms’ upgrading strategy and the role of public 
policy.
Third data source included the researcher participation in training courses offered 
by the Thailand Automotive Institute92. The objectives (and the benefits) of attending these 
courses were twofold: to meet and get acquainted with the engineers from targeted case 
study firms and to survey what courses the targeted firms were interested in as part of their 
human resource development programs (i.e. off-the-job learning strategy). Achieving these 
objectives assisted the researcher in formulating a more focused set of subsequent questions 
during the main fieldwork interviews. These questions solicited more information on the 
issues such as human resource development strategy and personnel off-the-job training 
programs, and how these contributed to speeding up firm’s capability development.
4.5 Main Fieldwork Preparation and Strategy
The main fieldwork started in September 2004 and ended in December of 2004, and 
its preparation started in July 2004. Drawing on “lessons learned” during the pilot 
fieldwork and the comments from the “midterm report” presentation, main fieldwork 
preparation comprised adjustments to the operationalized variables, some modifications to 
the detailed interview questions, and the overall interview strategy. Overall, the interview 
preparation was divided into two main types: business firms and non-firm supporting 
organizations. In addition, the business firm interview guide was further subdivided into: 
top management (and managers) guide and operational staff guide. In about a month prior 
to the intended interview date, the targeted interviewee was first contacted through a formal 
invitation letter stating a brief synopsis of the research and seeking permission for an 
interview.
4.5.1 Interview Preparation for Business Firms
The focus of the business firms’ interviews was on their perception of the changes 
within the external environment (i.e. the opportunities and threats), firm-level competitive
92 With background training in engineering (both bachelor and master degree), the researcher was able to 
adequately understand the concepts explained during lecture. In addition the researcher met some key 
informants from the targeted case study firms, who participated in the same training course.
93 This letter also received a formal endorsement from Thai Board o f Investment (BOI), stating the 
importance o f the research and persuading Thai firms to participate in the research study (see Appendix B)
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and learning strategies, learning activities and mechanisms, and the rate and type of 
capability accumulated.
4.5.1.1 Top Management and Managers
Here the interview guide aimed to solicit information related to firm-level strategies 
and the perception of changes within the external environment. Each interview was divided 
into three sections (see Appendix C l.l) . The first section is related to the firm’s general 
background information. The second section solicited information on external factors that 
were considered by the managers to be opportunities or threats as well as the impact on 
firm strategies. The final section consisted of questions related to firm strategies and 
requirements for further capability development. Overall, this interview guide was much 
shorter than the one used for operational staff^4.
4.5.1.2 Operational Staff
The aim of this interview guide was to solicit detailed information related to firm- 
level learning activities, learning mechanisms, and capability development. Each interview 
guide was divided into seven sections (see Appendix Cl .2). The first section is the general 
background information and the other five sections focus on the learning activities 
(investment, production process, product, linkage, and marketing) and implemented 
learning mechanisms (passive, active, or combination). The last section focuses on the 
outcome of these learning activities.
4.5.2 Interview Preparation for Non-firm Organizations
The interview with non-firm organizations was designed to target the support 
activities provided by these organizations for the business firms, in terms of assisting Thai 
firms with strategy for upgrading and engagement in various learning activities. The 
responsibilities of these organizations range from supporting and enhancing private sector 
competitiveness (such as Thailand Automotive Institute) to business associations who 
lobby the Thai government for increased industrial protection (such as the Thai Auto-Parts 
Manufacturers Association).
94 The shorter interview guide for top management is appropriate since it is reasonable to assume that firm 
executives were always busy, and therefore the main focus of the interview should be on firm’s strategies and 
not on operational activities.
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The interview aimed to solicit information regarding the environmental factors 
(inclusive of public policy and incentive factors) that retarded or facilitated the 
implementation of Thai firm learning strategies, learning activities and the process of 
capability accumulation. Each interview guide was divided into three sections (see 
Appendix C2). The first section asked about the organization’s background and its 
objectives (or its mission statement). Then the second section included the questions about 
how the organization perceived the impact of the external factors on the Thai auto-part 
firms. In particular, the organization should state what it viewed as Thai firms’ learning 
enablers and/or obstacles. The third section comprised strategies for assisting Thai firms 
for learning and capability development, in particular, what significant role did the 
organization played in the Thai firms’ capability development95.
4.6 Data Collection Process
This section describes the interview strategy implemented during the main 
fieldwork, the construction of a “case study database”, and the resulting data collected.
4.6.1 Interview Strategy
The study utilized the following steps and information solicitation techniques 
during the interviews.
• Once the organization accepted the request for an interview, the follow-up 
telephone call was made to confirm the organization’s choice of appropriate 
meeting time, date, and place.
• For each organization, the first person interviewed was usually the Director (in the 
case of non-firm organizations) or the firm owner (or chief executive, in the case of 
business firms), who is mainly responsible for drafting and implementing the 
overall firm strategy. The focus was on this person’s perception of the changes 
within the external environment, and the formulation of firm competitive and 
learning strategies.
95 For example, the interview guide prepared for the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) included questions 
relating to specific technological assistance programs, the timing and duration o f such programs, and the 
availability and appropriateness o f consultancy programs. Also solicited were information about the 
composition o f the consultancy group, the expected program outcomes, and the major obstacles encountered 
during the program implementation. In addition, the TAI also provided other related information such as the 
Thai Automotive Master Plan (2002-2006), the Automotive Human Resource Development plan, and the 
“Detroit o f Asia Project”.
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• Even though the tape recorder captured the interviewee’s response, the researcher 
also actively wrote down notes on the important key points during the interview. 
These notes later assisted the researcher, when reviewing the interview transcripts 
during data analysis, to remember to highlight the key points. Additionally, often 
times the engineers wrote down the technical (schematic) drawings on pieces of 
paper during the interview. These were collected by the researcher after the 
interviews.
• If the upcoming interview was the second time with the same interviewee or firm, 
then the tape recording from the previous interview was studied and notes were 
taken96. In addition, a review of other relevant (or updated) complementary data 
was also conducted about the interviewee or firm. These activities were conducted 
to ensure that the researcher did not suffer from faded memory or asking the same 
questions twice. Rather the objective of the second interview was to probe into 
deeper analytical issues related to a concept or event described by the interviewee 
(during the first interview). This procedure assisted in modifying the interview 
guide for the second interview. It also assisted in locating the second interview 
response within the context of the first one; and in essence, the researcher was 
conducting a simple preliminary data analysis while collecting data.
• After each interview with a business firm, the researcher asked the company for 
corporate brochures, annual reports, and other information that is relevant to the key 
issues explored in this research. In addition, the researcher also requested for a 
guided plant tour.
All interview questions always started out with simple ones relating to the background of 
the interviewee and his or her job responsibilities97. Then it proceeded to a more 
challenging set of questions such as firm learning strategies, policy issues, product 
improvement, production process capability and the type of technical assistance received. 
Following this guideline, the “general questions” achieved the objective of broadly probing 
the general issues relating to the interviewee and his/her role within the firm or 
organization. These questions also assisted the interviewees to feel more confident as the 
interview session progressed.
96 This was usually done the night before the next interview.
97 These were the “warm up” questions referred to earlier in Section 4.3.6.2.
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In contrast, the more “specific questions” were targeted at specific “critical 
incidents” or episodes that had occurred or currently occurring. For instance, when an 
engineer described the production process improvement techniques, the researcher asked 
him to provide a concrete example of such activity98. Questions relating the rationale of the 
engineer’s action were also used; these questions usually begins with “why did you do this” 
or “why don’t you do this”.
4.6.2 Case Study Database
Prior to data collection, the researcher followed the suggestions provided by Yin 
(1994: 95) and Darke et al. (1998: 283) and established a “case study database”. Each case 
has one corresponding database, which comprised all the primary and secondary data 
associated with the case99. The aim was to create a systematic method for storing 
information, enabling the researcher to accurately retrieve them for later data analysis.
Here, Darke et al. (1998: 286) stated that a well-organized case study database, during the 
data collection process, provides the researcher with a good foundation for cross- 
referencing and citations of important evidence for later data analysis. As a result, this 
would ensure the reliability as well as relevancy of the data collection process.
4.6.3 Outcome
The data collection process was completed when the criteria of “saturation” was 
reached (i.e. diminishing return on receiving marginal information about the case when 
performing an additional interview or direct observation) (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Table 4.5 provided a summary of all the collected data. In total, the main fieldwork data 
were collected from nine Thai auto-part firms, four multinational carmakers and 
assemblers, seven non-firm automotive organizations, and more than 45 interviews. 
Additionally, there were more 15 direct observation episodes made at the business firm 
production sites and during their human resources training programs. For secondary data, 
the researcher had collected over 300 pages of data (on average) for each firm.
98 Often times, technical drawings on scratch paper and whiteboard usually accompanied the engineer’s 
explanation to clarify the conceptual ideas conveyed.
99 For data that are hard copy such as field notes and corporate brochures, the individual case information was 
stored in a separate filing cabinet. Similarly, for electronic data (for example MS Word files, electronic 
memos and notes), each case information was stored in a computer using a clearly defined, separate folder.
99
Table 4.5 Summary of the Collected Data
Organization PeopleInterviewed Direct Observation Secondary Data
Firm AH 
Group100
Senior 
Manager 
(twice)101, two 
production 
engineers
Plant tour and casual conversation 
with technicians
Two annual reports, a 
presentation of productivity 
improvement program, 
press releases, previous 
published research reports, 
corporate websites, and 
minutes of a board meeting
Firm CSP General 
Manager, one 
engineer
Plant tour, casual conversation with 
technicians, casual conversation with 
general manager, observations of off- 
and on-the-job training sessions 
offered by Thailand Automotive 
Institute (TAI)
Company brochure, 
company bulletin board, 
information from TAI
Firm CPC President, one 
engineer
Plant tour, casual conversation with 
technicians, observations of off- and 
on-the-job training sessions offered 
by Thailand Automotive Institute 
(TAI)
Corporate press releases, 
information from TAI, 
company websites
Firm D Group Founding
president
(twice),
Engineer
Manager
(twice)
Plant tour, casual conversation with 
technicians, conversation with the 
president during the public seminar
Corporate websites, 
information from ex-advisor 
of TAI, and information 
from an ex-engineer of TAI
Firm L Managing 
Director, Plant 
Manager, two 
design
engineers, one
production
engineer
Plant tour and design department 
tour, casual conversation with two 
engineers during off-the-job training 
course offered by TATu2.
Company websites and 
press releases, information 
from ex-advisor of TAI, 
company product brochure
Firm S Group Vice president,
general
Engineering
Manager,
production
engineer
Plant tour, casual conversation with 
production engineer, observations of 
off- and on-the-job training sessions 
offered by Thailand Automotive 
Institute (TAI), stood in as a 
“counterpart engineer”103
Corporate websites, annual 
report, press releases, public 
speeches of the vice 
president (see footnote #26), 
information of productivity 
improvement from TAI
Firm SOM President, and 
one engineer
Plant tour, observations of off- and 
on-the-job training sessions offered 
by Thailand Automotive Institute 
(TAI)
Information from TAI
Firm TKT Managing 
Director, one 
engineer
Plant tour, casual conversation with 
the president during the public 
seminar
Corporate websites, annual 
reports, press releases, and 
company digital 
presentation file
100 The word “group” signifies that the firm is a corporate group consisting of more than one subsidiary firm, 
some of which are foreign joint ventures.
101 Meaning interviewed the same person twice.
102 The title of the training course is “Metal Fatigue”.
103 “Counterpart engineer” means Thai engineer who accompanied the Japanese expert during the technical 
assistance program organized by TAI. The researcher participated as a counterpart engineer for Firm S 
Group.
100
Table 4.5 (continued). Summary of the Collected Data
Organization People Interviewed Direct Observation Secondary Data
Firm TS Group Vice President, Plant Plant tour of the R&D Corporate websites, public
Manager, R&D facility, Plant tour of the speeches of the Vice
manager, design production line, casual President104, information of
engineer, general conversation with quality productivity improvement
Administrative control engineer, project from TAI, and
Manager, three conversation with executive corporate press releases
production engineers President during public
seminar
Assembler B Ex-Managing Plant tour Not applicable
Director105 (twice) and
production engineer
Carmaker H Vice President Plant tour Corporate website, press
releases
Carmaker M President and two Plant tour Corporate website, press
engineers releases
Carmaker T Vice President Plant tour Corporate website, press
releases
Policy research President and Vice Not applicable Not applicable
firm President
National Science Policy Researcher Not applicable Organization website,
and Technology documents on industrial
Development technical assistance
Agency programs, and other policy
measures
Thailand Senior Manager, Not applicable Organization website,
Automotive Supplier Development published case study,
Institute Manager, consultancy published automotive
engineer, ex-advisor, master plan, various issues
head of Japanese of newsletter and quarterly
technical experts and a magazines
policy analyst
Thai Auto-Parts President, one engineer Not applicable Organization website,
Manufacturers published conference
Association proceeding, and published
Thai automotive industry
directory
Thai Automotive Ex-President Not applicable Organization website,
Industry published Thai automotive
Association industry directory
ASEAN President Not applicable Organization website, press
Automotive releases, and magazine
Federation articles
Society of President Not applicable Automotive industry
Automotive directory, from 2001-2003
Engineers, (3 volumes), various issues
Thailand of newsletters and
magazines.
Source: own elaboration based on the research
104 These speeches were given during the two conferences in Bangkok: the Thai Automotive 2004 and the 
Automotive Assembly Congress 2004.
105 This person works in the Thai automotive industry for more than 35 years and had witnessed many 
important historical events within the industry. After retiring from assembler B, he went and worked as 
operation director of a company, a sibling company of Firm TS Group.
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4.7 Data Analysis Process
Drawing on Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and Huberman (1994), and Gibbs (2002), 
there were four stages in data analysis:
1. Categorizing the extensive field notes, interview transcripts and other secondary 
sources into themes.
2. Performing within-case (i.e. within firm) data analysis and writing case study 
reports
3. Searching for cross-case patterns in order to gain deeper understanding into 
analytical issues that cause the differences in firm learning and capability 
development, and writing a case study report
4. Ensuring the analytical validity and reliability
4.7.1 Tools for Preliminary Analysis  -  NVivo
The completed interview transcripts and field notes contained more than 400 pages 
of raw data. Analyzing this amount and variety of information created a complex process 
that required proper, systematic data management. NVivo is a “computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis” tool that assisted the researcher to achieve such purpose106 
(Gibbs, 2002: 10-11). Assisted by NVivo, the researcher was able to efficiently accomplish 
two data management tasks. First, NVivo assisted the researcher in efficiently as well as 
systematically sorting the raw data into the pre-specified analytical categories (see Table
4.1 and Figure 4.1). Second, the sorting process was conducted iteratively and flexibly, but 
not rigid. This meant that the researcher was always conscious of any new important 
empirically-derived categories that could arise from interpreting and analyzing the raw 
data. Throughout this process, the researcher maintained an active engagement with the 
raw data, constantly writing down conceptual ideas as interim “memos”107 (i.e. analytical
106 It is important to note that the researcher implemented NVivo as a complementary assisting tool and not as 
a substitute for in-depth data analysis. As Gibbs (2002: 10, 13) correctly stated “The real heart o f the analysis 
requires an understanding o f the meaning o f the texts, and that is something that computers are still a long 
way from being able to do so. ... [NVivo] is just a tool for analysis, and good qualitative analysis still relies 
on good analytic work by a careful human researcher...” Additionally, one could argue that usefulness o f  
NVivo is in assisting the research to achieve the prerequisites o f  really effective qualitative analysis, that is, to 
efficiently, consistently and systematically manage and process the raw data (Ibid.).
107 Miles and Huberman (1994: 72) commented on the benefits o f using memos during data analysis: “Memos 
are primarily conceptual in intent. They don’t just report the [raw] data; they tie together different pieces o f  
data into a recognizable cluster, often to show that those data are instances o f a general concept.” In NVivo,
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annotations) as they arose (Gibbs, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Writing these 
memos constituted the preliminary analysis of the raw data.
4 . 7.2 Within-Case Data Analysis
Drawing on Eisenhardt (1989: 540) and Miles and Huberman (1994), the individual 
firm’s case study database was analyzed for within-case patterns of changes through time, 
according to the conceptual themes. The process followed two steps. First, a list of 
chronological events related to firm-level strategies, learning activities and capability 
building activities were created. Tables and data display matrices assisted the researcher to 
tabulate the firm’s evolution of product offerings, series of technological assistance, and 
joint venture agreements. Second, the preliminary write-up of each individual firm 
followed. During the write-up, the researcher paid attention to two things: the sequential 
nature of events and the analytical analysis under each time period. As a result, each 
individual firm write-up consisted of three main sections: 1) the firm background 
(inclusive of its start-up) and current operating characteristics, 2) the changes in meso- 
environment, firm-level strategies and learning activities during the firm’s intermediate 
phase, 3) the changes in meso-environment, firm strategies and learning activities during 
the current phase108.
The within-case data analysis allowed the researcher to analytically capture the 
dynamics of the analytical constructs through an intimate familiarity with the evolution of 
each firm. The analysis allowed the researcher to characterize each firm’s choice of 
strategies, learning activities and mechanisms, and its rate of capability development. In 
other words, for each firm the researcher was able to gain an understanding of:
• how the sequence of changes within the meso-environment impacted on firm-level 
competitive and learning strategies
• to what extent the changes in firm-level strategies impacted the set of firm learning 
activities and learning mechanisms
• how each firm strategies, learning activities, and capability accumulation 
co-evolved
these memos can be electronically attached to a specific position within the raw data (either interview 
transcript or description of a direct observation), providing the researcher with the original reference source 
(Gibbs, 2002: 84-85).
108 For definitions of these different phases, see Table 6.1.
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Through this deeper understanding, the researcher sought to understand the relationship 
between firm strategies, learning activities, and learning mechanisms, and finally, how 
these elements mutually contributed to a firm  capability development.
4.7.3 Cross-Case Data Analysis
Cross-case (i.e. between firm) comparison was even more complex than within-case 
analysis. Two issues needed to be described and analyzed concurrently across firms: the 
comparative evolution o f each dimension o f firm  behavior (e.g. strategies, learning 
activities, and mechanisms) and the interdependencies (or relationships) among these 
dimensions as they constantly evolve. Moreover, since each firm had different 
establishment dates, the cross-case comparison was more challenging. To facilitate the 
analysis, the common phases were defined for all the firms. These common phases were: 
start-up phase (i.e. the firm ’s establishment period), expansion phase (i.e. the firm ’s growth 
period) and adaptation phase (i.e. the firm ’s current period). Additionally, in each phase, 
the firms were in itially grouped according to:
• the similarities and differences in the defining characteristics o f their competitive 
and learning strategies (see Table 4.1). (For instance, firms that perceived changes 
within the external environment as opportunities and implemented rather ambitious 
learning strategies were grouped together.)
• the similarities and difference in their leaning activities and choice o f learning 
mechanisms (see Table 4.1). (For instance, firms that possessed a diverse (yet 
focused) set o f learning activities and a synergistic combination o f more purposive 
learning mechanisms were grouped together.)
To ensure reliable analysis, multiple tables as well as matrix data displays were 
constructed. For each conceptual construct (for example, firm strategies or learning 
activities), the researcher developed an analytical table, and compared this performance 
across all the firms for a particular time period (for example, during start-up phase). This 
procedure was repeated twice for the other time periods (i.e. one for the expansion phase 
and another for the adaptation phase). Consequently, for each dimension o f performance, 
there were three tables, each describing a different time period and seeking to uncover the 
convergent (or divergent) pattern across all firms. This pattern-searching procedure
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allowed the researcher to explore the data in many divergent ways, guarding against the 
possible of drawing immature conclusions without considering the rival explanations109.
4.8 Research Ethics
In late 2003, the researcher applied for the ethics approval prior to commencement 
of any fieldwork activities. The process comprised:
1) submitting an outline of the research methodology used
2) a synopsis of the interview questions
3) a Written Consent form (for interviewee to sign) (see Appendix A)
The Written Consent form stated that each respondent has the right to choose to either 
accept or refuse the researcher’s request for an interview. The ethics application was 
approved in February 2004.
109 Yin (2003: 163-164) stated that one of the criteria that makes an “exemplary case study” is the ability for 
the study design to consider the alternative (rival) explanations.
105
Chapter 5 - Thai Automotive Industry Analysis
The aim of this chapter is to map the evolution of Thai automotive industry 
since its inception in the early 1960s. This chapter serves to elaborate the main actors 
whose actions have shaped the context in which Thai auto-part firms have operated, 
planned their strategies and upgraded firm capabilities. This main focus is on the 
technological and organizational development of the Thai automotive firms. The 
history of the Thai automotive industry spans roughly four and a half decades of 
development. Within this duration there were many important historical events; some 
were policy-related whereas others were politically related.
Thai automotive industrial development can be divided into three distinct 
periods. First is the period from 1960s to 1980s; it started with simple assembly 
activities and most firm learning activities concentrated on importing completely knock 
down (CKDs) auto-parts and assembling them in Thailand. There were initially no 
manufacturing activities. In the early 1970s, some assemblers, to comply with 
increased LCR, started some manufacturing activities. At this stage some Thai and 
foreign joint venture firms setup small manufacturing facilities and started simple 
production activities'10. By the late 1980s, the intermediate manufacturing and some 
export activities had begun. Progressive localization schemes had compelled many 
Japanese-owned carmakers to search for local manufacturers who could produce auto­
parts. In most instances, the Japanese called upon their supplier affiliates'11 in Japan to 
come and invest in manufacturing operation in Thailand. Throughout this period, the 
automotive industry had registered trade deficits (see Figure 5.1) and government 
rationalization policies attempted to remedy this problem .
The second period starts with the early export-oriented policies in the late 
1980s and ends with peak automotive sales prior to the 1997 crisis. During this period, 
the Thai government decided to remove the restriction on the import of completely 
built units (CBU) cars, decreased the import tariff of CKD auto-parts and increased 
openness to FDI and ownership of assembly plants. In terms of regional collaboration,
110 Simple parts such as car batteries, wheel rims and exhaust pipes were produced.
111 Japanese carmakers have three types of suppliers: 1) affiliates, 2) close associates and 3) general 
vendors. Among the three, the “affiliates” are arguably the most capable (in terms of design technology 
and capabilities) and have made joint investment with the carmakers (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 11). This 
implied the intimate long-term relationship between the carmakers and their affiliates; hence arguably the 
affiliates are also very trustworthy business partners.
112 For e.g. implementation of import ban on small vehicles in the late 1970s.
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Thailand, decided to commit itself to develop the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
The Thai economy grew at an unprecedented rate during late 1980s to mid 1990s; this 
caused an upsurge in demand for vehicles, especially one-ton pick-up trucks. The 
sequence of these events increased the pressure for Thai firms to start to shift their 
learning strategies and to build technological capabilities.
The third period of Thai automotive industry is the full liberalization phase 
with the government aiming to build a regional export base. After the 1997 financial 
crisis carmakers experienced a sharp decline of the domestic market sales and were 
forced to export their products in order to survive. In 2000, the local content 
regulations were abandoned along with a revised automotive tariff structure. The 
following sections will delineate each period in greater details, linking changes in 
policy and market conditions with changes in firm-level competitive and learning 
strategies and efforts of local auto-part firms.
5.1 From Assembly to Semi-Manufacture: the 
Localization and Protection Phase (1960s to 1980s)
5. 1.1 The Institutions
Prior to the 1960s the automobile industry in Thailand was virtually non­
existent; but some Thais were passionate about automobiles. For instance, the first 
Mercedes Benz arrived in Thailand only four years after it was bom in the 1900 in 
Germany (ASEAN Autobiz, 2005)114. Prior to and during the 1960s almost all the 
vehicles on Thai roads were brought in by either the members of the royal family or the 
wealthy social elites115. These vehicles were brought in as completely built-up (CBU) 
cars and they were distributed via a small number of distributors (Abdulsomad, 2003: 
45). These distributors dominated the market during the time and there were negligible 
domestic manufacturing activities (Nawadhinsukh, 1983).
In the early 1960s the Industrial (Investment) Promotion Act116 (IPA) was 
enacted and a wave of assembly operations in Thailand started. The automotive
113 The local content regulations were abandoned in January 2000. At the same time, the import tariff on 
the CKD auto-parts was increased to 33% in order to continue to provide some protection for the local 
auto-part firms.
114 The first Mercedes made its arrival to Siam (former name of Thailand) on December 19, 1904 and 
served the royal activities of King Chulalongkom (King Rama V) (ASEAN Autobiz, 2005: 58)
115 Popular imported vehicle brands were Austin, Morris, Hillman, Vauxhall, Standard, Triumph, Ford, 
Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, Opel and Volkswagen (Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 114).
116 Prior to the 1960 and 1962 Industrial Promotion Acts, there was the 1954 Industrial Promotion Act. It 
was the first time that the Thai government granted promotional privileges to the industries and also the
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industry was classified under category B and, as such, the IPA allowed a 50 percent 
reduction of import duties and trade taxes on completely knock-down (CKD) units.
This led to the establishment of a handful of automotive assembly plants (see 
Nawadhinsukh (1983: 181)) of which the Thai Motor Industry Company was the first 
(OIE, 2004: 6). Later during 1970-1977, nine more assembly plants were established 
(see Nawadhinsukh (1983: 182)).
During the period of 1961 to 1968, the Thai government built more roads and 
other infrastructure under the National Economic Development Plans. Vehicle sales 
increased from 3,934 units in 1961 to 70,946 units in 1968 (Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 184), 
of which only 13,639 units were locally assembled. In 1975 the production capacities 
of assemblers were six times more than the sales of vehicles (Doner, 1991: 198) and 
this led to the problem of lack of economies of scale and fragmentation, and later the 
problem of the severe trade deficits (see Figure 5.1). To rectify the over-supply 
problem, the Board of Investment (BOI) decided to end the promotion of investment 
for assembly plant by 1969 and MOI issued policies to address the problems of the 
trade deficits and market fragmentation.
To remedy the problems, in 1969 under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry 
(MOI) the government set up Automotive Industry Development Committee (ADC) 
whose responsibility was to oversee the future development of the automotive industry. 
The setup of ADC signified the beginning of an active role by the Thai government in 
the development of the industry. In issuing the Automobile Industry Development 
Policy in July 1971118, the committee (ADC) attempted to accomplish two goals.
first time that the government focused the industrial development strategy on private business 
enterprises. Since the Thai government lacked experience in implementing such act, the 1954 Act was 
unsuccessful in promoting private investment (Thanamai, 1985: 29-34). Later in 1959 the Board of 
Investment (BOI) was established to provide investment incentives to industries that were deemed vital 
to economic development (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 13). It issued the Industrial Promotion Acts (1960 and 
revised in 1962) (Thanamai, 1985) and Industrial Investment Act (1965) (for more details see 
Nawadhinsukh (1983: 187)).
117 The AIDC was established on August 26, 1969 (Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 187; OIE, 2004: 6). Later it 
was called Automotive Development Committee or simply Automotive Committee (Thanamai, 1985:
112). The committee comprised high-ranking officials representing the Ministries of Industry and 
Commerce, the Customs Department, the Land Transport Department and the Board of Investment.
118 The 1971 automobile industry was the first o f its kind issued by the MOI via the ADC. “The heart of 
the policy was a 25 per cent LCR (Thanamai, 1985: 117).”
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Figure 5.1 Trade Deficits
Thai Auto Industry Trade Deficits (1965-1990)
T&— Total 
Imports
■*— Total 
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Balance
^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
Year
Sources: adapted from Department of Customs and Kaosa-ard (1993: Table 2)
First this policy attempted industry rationalization, limiting the number of 
assembly plants and model series. To reduce the degree of market fragmentation and 
achieve economies of scale, the ADC issued a ban on the establishment of new 
assembly plants for passenger cars and restricted the number of car models that were 
assembled locally and the engine sizes (Terdudomtham, 1997: 9). Specifically the 
passenger car assembly plants currently in operation were not allowed to produce more 
than three models and three engine sizes, of which only one could exceed 2,000 c.c. in 
capacity. In addition to these limitations an assembly plant might produce either 
passenger cars or commercial vehicles (truck, bus and others), but not both. Therefore 
existing assembly plant that had been producing both passenger cars and commercial 
vehicles must now concentrate on only one type of vehicle; this one-type-rule was 
effective at the end of 1972 and applied to newly established assembly plant 
(Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 188; Thanamai, 1985: 129-130). Moreover there was a 
restriction on setting up new assembly plant; new plant applying for a license from 
MOI must be: 1) producing at a daily rate of thirty cars on an eight-hour work schedule 
and 2) have a minimum investment in machinery and buildings not less than 20 million 
Baht (Thanamai, 1985: 130).
x-x x x x x x x x x
=j -20
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Second, the ADC’s 1971 policy discussed the minimum LCR in 1971 which 
later became effective by the end of 1974 (Terdudomtham, 1997: 4). The rationale for 
choosing local content as the main strategy of automobile industry policy was the belief 
that this would create business in industries that were linked with automobile 
production and in turn would create employment. In addition, it was the government 
expectation that the local content scheme will encourage the transfer of know-how 
(from foreign to local firms) and assist in the upgrading of technical standards of local 
auto-parts industry (Thanamai, 1985: 119).
In addition to setting up the rationalization and LCR, the ADC would act as a 
policymaker. Additionally, the ADC would act as a coordinating agency among the 
Ministries of Industry, Finance, Commerce and Customs Department and the Board of 
Investment. The coordination was necessary since the automotive policy is a “package 
policy”119 which required a combination of various policy measures such as tax 
protection, tax exemption, import restrictions and financial support (Thanamai, 1985: 
113-114). The 1971 automobile policy sought to ensure the industry transition from 
merely assembly to semi-manufacture through compulsory use of local content 
(Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 188). By the end of 1971, just when the first automobile policy 
was about to be implemented, the military coup took place and the policy was revised 
to become the 1972 automobile policy. The one difference between the two policies 
was the omission of car models and engine sizes restriction in the latter policy 
(Thanamai, 1985: 139); thus the 1972 policy contained only the restriction on minimum 
capacity and investment levels for new assembly plants. This partially explains why 
the attempted rationalization failed during the latter half of the 1970s and the Thai 
market remained fragmented. Despite the differences, both 1971 and 1972 policies 
shared a similar emphasis on the LCR. In all, the localization policy was the main 
force shaping the Thai automotive industry (Anonymous, 1994), thus it is worth going 
into some depth regarding its historical origin.
5.1.1.1 The Local Content Requirements and the Phased Increases
LCR policy has been used by many countries to accomplish the following two
objectives (Abdulsomad, 2003: 106):
119 This package policy concept was suggested to the Head of Industrial Economics and Planning 
Division at MOl by UNIDO experts assistance program during 1967-1971 (Thanamai, 1985: 1 15).
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• To develop a country’s automobile industry from simple assembly to semi- or 
full manufacture
• To create and enhance the local auto-part industry
In Thailand, the first LCR policies were implemented at the beginning of 1975 and 
stated that vehicle assembly plants must used at least 25 per cent local content for 
passenger cars, van and pick-up; 20 per cent for commercial cars (chassis-with- 
windshield); and 15 per cent for other commercial cars (chassis-with-engine, without 
windshield) (Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 183; OIE, 2004: 6; Terdudomtham, 1997: 4).
The policy for the phased increase in LCR was declared in 1978. It comprised 
the following requirements (Abdulsomad, 2003: 107; Higashi, 1995: 18)
(see Figure 5.2):
• The currently operating assembly plants must increase the local content of 
passenger cars from 25 to 50 per cent within five years (1980-1984) (OIE, 
2004: 6) and in the first two years must reach a LCR level of 35 per cent and 
gain a yearly increase of 5 per cent for the next three years (Nawadhinsukh, 
1983: 190).
• The medium-to large-sized trucks must have an increase in LCR from 20 per 
cent in 1980 to 45 per cent in 1985 with a 5 per cent increase per annum.
• Similarly pick-up trucks must have a phased increase from 20 per cent in 1980 
to 61 per cent in 1989. In addition from July 1989 the government required 
assemblers to fit locally produced engines into pick-up trucks with engine 
capacity up to 2,500 c.c. and the LCR for engine parts must increase from 20 
per cent in 1990 to 80 per cent in 1996 (a 10 per cent increase per annum) 
(Higashi, 1995: 18; OIE, 2004: 8).
By 1982 when the government was about to follow the next phased increase of local 
content, it had re-examined the original plan. The re-examination was undertaken as
190part of a larger industrial restructuring plan .
120 In accordance with the fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan, the Industrial 
Restructuring Committee was formed in 1981. One o f the committee’s tasks was to restructure the 
automotive industry.
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In 1984 the decision was to freeze the local content for passenger cars at 45 per cent121 
with introduction of the compulsory auto-parts list applied to the overall contents (OIE, 
2004: 7). Later in 1986 the freeze at 45 per cent was replaced with the two annual lists 
of LCR, developed by the ADC, for passenger car assembling122.
In addition to the LCR, the government also introduced measures to make 
localization and rationalization policies more effective.
• Total ban on the import of CBU passenger cars123 was initiated on January 31, 
1978. Later in 1985, the ban was partially lifted for passenger cars with engine 
larger than 2,300 c.c. (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 3)
• The prohibition on establishment of new car passenger assembly plants was 
announced in 1978 (OIE, 2004: 6; Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 3).
• In 1978 the MOl issued a restriction on the introduction of new series of 
passenger cars (OIE, 2004: 6); the anticipated outcome was to promote 
economies of scale (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 3).
• in addition the “mandatory deletion” of specific auto-parts (brake drums and 
exhaust systems) was introduced. In the 1980s, the ADC announced the seven 
auto-parts that were required for truck assembly124.
• In 1984 the MOI announced the limitation of up to 42 series of passenger cars 
could be produced by the whole industry and that only 2 models were allowed 
for each series. In addition, there was an environmental standard restriction; 
any domestically produced cars must use the exhaust-pipe systems certified by 
the Thailand Industrial Standards Institute (OIE, 2004: 7).
121 Prior to the decision to freeze local content at 45 per cent, there was a plethora of political infighting, 
a “policy deadlock” (Thanamai, 1985: 182), between the multinational carmakers, the private auto-part 
firms, the National Economic Social and Development Board (NESDB) and the Ministry of Industry 
(MOI). The NESDB and the World Bank expert believed that the local content should be frozen as soon 
as possible (during the time it was at 40 per cent for passenger cars); however the private auto-part firms 
believed that they could supply parts up to at least 80 per cent of the local content of the carmaker 
assembly plants and they expressed their disagreement via the Association of Thai Industries (ATI). The 
MOI believed that a 100 per cent LCR was possible via appropriate tax incentives. Finally after a 
meeting with associated parties the MOI and the ADC announced that local content should be frozen at 
45 per cent starting from August 1983 (see (Thanamai, 1985: 168-173, 180) for more details).
122 These were Parts List A which was compulsory for all assembly and Parts List B which allows 
assemblers to choose the auto-parts. The requirement stated that the combined local content of auto-part 
from List A and B shall be at least 54 per cent (OIE, 2004: 8).
123 The ban included both car and motorcycle and was initiated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) in 
order to reduce the trade deficit (OIE, 2004: 7). “The only CBU imports allowed were by Thai nationals 
returning home from their overseas stay of more than 18 months, provided that their cars were less than 2 
years old. However, these importers were required to pay high import duties of 150%” (Panichapat and 
Kanasawat, 1997: 3).
124 These auto-parts were radiator, exhaust pipe set (inclusive of muffler), battery, leaf spring, tire and 
inner tube, safety glass and drum brake (OIE, 2004: 7).
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Despite these stricter measures, the localization and rationalization policies from early 
1970s to mid 1980s were not effective and faced several problems (Panichapat and 
Kanasawat, 1997: 3):
• Prior to the import ban in 1978, many imported CBU automobiles directly 
competed with locally assembled cars. In addition the tariff incentives for CKD 
assembly were not adequate to compete with CBU import (Panichapat and 
Kanasawat, 1997: 3).
• By 1986 despite the progressive localization policy, only a handful of new 
component manufacturers were set up in Thailand (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 
1997:4).
• There were too many assembly plants and car models to achieve economies of 
scale (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 3). The government attempts at 
rationalization during the 1970s did not succeed in reducing the sector trade 
deficit125 (Thanamai, 1985: 162).
• Assemblers could manipulate the local content formula by inflating the prices of 
locally purchased components.
5.1.2 The Private Business Firms
5.1.2.1 Assembly Firms
As a result of the government import substitution strategy and the 1960s' 
Investment Promotion Acts, many automotive assembly plants were established. 
Nawadhinsukh (1983: 181-182) reported the establishment of the following local and 
foreign joint venture assemblers:
• Thai Motor Industry Company in 1961
• Thonburi Automobile Assembly Plant Company in 1961
• Kamasutra General Assembly in 1962
• Siam Motors and Nissan Company in 1962
• Toyota (Thailand) Company in 1964 and 1975127
125 Even though the CBU imports decreased the imported CKD kits however were on the rise; this 
contributed to prolonged trade deficit problem.
126 This firm is a joint venture between Anglo-Thai Motor and Ford from England (which later became 
Thailand Ford Motors). It was the first automotive assembly plant that started operation in 1961. The 
production volume was 310 passenger cars and 215 trucks; its market share was 12 per cent while the 
total sales of vehicles (in 1986) were 3,934 units (Terdudomtham, 1997: 3).
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• Prince Motors (Thailand) Company in 1965
• Isuzu Motors Company in 1966
• Thai Hino Industry Company 1966
• United Development Industry Company in 1966
• Thai Pradith Assembly Plant Company in 1968
Many of the foreign automotive producers were granted generous incentives from the 
BOI and decided to enter local assembly. These carmakers utilized a product 
diversification strategy to capture the existing market demand. But given the small size 
of the domestic market and negligible exports128, this increase in the number of 
assemblers and the number of vehicle models per assembler had led to an inefficient, 
import-dependent assembly industry. The situation also led to serious foreign 
exchange deficits in the late 1960s (Abdulsomad, 2003: 46). “In 1966 the deficit 
amounted to US$233 million and in 1969 it increased to US$554 million” (Thanamai, 
1985: 106). Despite the policy restriction, the number of assembly plants increased 
from twelve to eighteen due to the following reasons (Thanamai, 1985: 145):
• Speculation (prior to the early 1970s) that the government might issue a ban on 
CBU import, whereas the government did not implement a total ban on 
imported passenger cars until the beginning of 1978
• The continuing growth of the domestic automobile market
Coping with Increased Localization
In the late 1970s, after the LCR and protective measures were implemented, 
most carmakers and assemblers coped with the increased localization policy using three 
strategies: 1) internalization of body sheet stamping and painting processes; 2) 
encouraging foreign investment by their affiliated auto-parts suppliers and 3) 
procurement from local auto-part firms (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 2).
The Western carmakers who could not cope with the 1978 import ban on CBU, 
and the phased increase in LCR, were forced out of the Thai market (Janssen, 1987: 18;
127 In 1975 Toyota invested in the second assembly plant. The major reason for the investment was that 
most investors expected the Thai government to ban the importation of CBU cars. They speculated 
correctly as the Thai government did ban the import of CBUs in 1978.
128 By 1978 the auto-parts exports from Thailand were about 78.4 million Baht (Anonymous, 1989b) and 
the export of CBUs did not occur until 1988 when Mitsubishi exported its passenger cars to Canada. It 
was the first time that any assemblers in Thailand had exported vehicles (Terdudomtham, 1997).
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1994)129. On the other hand, despite the bitter complaints about the phased increase of 
LCR130 and the lack of economies of scale, the Japanese carmakers were more resilient 
and did their best to “blend in and control” the Thai automotive organizations and 
complied with Thai government policies. To meet with the progressive increase in 
LCR, the carmakers lured their affiliated auto-part suppliers from overseas to invest in 
Thailand.
5.1.2.2 Auto-part Firms
In 1961 the auto-parts that were produced domestically included technologically 
simple items such as rubber parts, batteries and leaf springs (OIE, 2004: 6). In 1970, 
there were several dozen firms most producing simple replacement parts (Doner, 1991). 
This number increased to 112 in 1977 (Terdudomtham, 2004: 34). Most of these were 
Thai-owned as during the first half of 1970s the Japanese auto-part firms were not 
interested in investing in Thailand due to the country's small and fragmented market 
size, high production costs, and frequent labor strikes (Thanamai, 1985: 156).
During 1978-1986, a handful of new local auto-part firms were set-up and the 
expansion of existing firms was significant (Maennel, 2001: 20). In addition, most 
local auto-part firms started with production of replacement equipment parts (spare 
parts) as these did not require the same level of quality control as original equipment 
manufacture (OEM) parts. Examples of such parts included tires, batteries, and 
paint131. After 1975 as the phased increase of LCR came into effect, the domestic auto­
parts on all vehicle models grew to include the exhaust system, fuel tank, radiator, seat 
assembly, glass, carpet, interior soft trim, door-trim panel and wiring harness 
(Nawadhinsukh, 1983: 207). During the first half of 1980s when the Thai automotive 
industry was under the “progressive localization scheme”, most Japanese carmakers 
found it necessary to invite their more sophisticated suppliers to invest in Thailand 
(Kaosa-ard, 1993: 11). Moreover during the latter half of 1980s when the Japanese yen
129 For example, “General Motors and Ford, in an attempt to avoid political and economic risks, pulled 
out of Thailand completely in the late 1970s. Fiat also withdrew from Thailand because it could not 
meet the higher local content ratio and then sold its factory to Isuzu” (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 
4).
130 The Japanese assemblers did not like the LCR because of: 1) the high cost penalty for locally 
produced auto-parts, 2) the lack of discipline of local firms to achieve on-time delivery and 3) the poor 
quality of locally-made auto-parts (Siroros, 1997: 15).
131 Nawadhinsukh (1983: 207) pointed out that these auto-parts were procured locally for three reasons: 
1) they are bulky or easily damaged parts, 2) they are available locally at competitive prices and 3) they 
are standardized products and non model-specific
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appreciated under the Plaza Accord agreement even more Japanese carmakers and their 
affiliated suppliers came to Thailand (see “peak #2” in Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Movements of Japanese Component Manufacturers to Thailand
Year Prior
1965
66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91- Total
Production
Bases
5 5 11 5 4 32 5 67
Technical
Assistance
0 2 3 7 21 7 42
Peak
#1
Peak
#2
(Unit: number of incidences)
Source: adapted from Higashi (1995: 19)
5,1.3 The Non-firm Organizations
Prior to the 1970s, the number of carmakers and auto-part firms was limited. 
There was little development of business associations to link with the government on 
policy planning and implementation. With the exception of the Association of Thai 
Industries (ATI) which was established in 1967, the other sectoral organizations were 
established during the mid-to-late 1970s. These included the Automotive Industry 
Club, the Auto-Parts Industry Club, Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association, and 
Thai Automobile Institute Association. To fully understand the functions of each these 
organizations a bit of ATI history is in order followed by the specific histories of the 
inception of each of the following four automotive organizations.
First is the establishment of ATI. In 1967, a group of Thai industrialists 
organized an association which they called the “Association of Thai Industries”. The 
ATI was responsible for protection of its members’ interests and to act as a linkage 
between the government and the industries. For instance, during the formation of the 
1971 automobile policy the ATI provided three suggestions (Thanamai, 1985: 127):
1) policy should be clear-cut and consistent
2) policy should protect the local industries from foreign competition
3) policy should contain restriction measures on the new entrants
117
These ATI members were not limited to just Thai nationals, foreign carmakers and 
joint ventures were allowed to be members. In fact, these foreign firms and foreign 
joint ventures dominated most ATI decisions .
In 1976, both the Automotive Industry Club (AIC) and Auto-Parts Industry 
Club (APIC) were established and both were under the supervision of the Federation of 
Thai Industries133. The AIC consists of assemblers (mostly foreign carmakers) who 
coordinated with APIC and the government in overseeing the development policies. In 
addition the AIC also organized training courses and technical seminars for its 
members (Media Overseas, 2003: 48-49). The AIC comprised mainly the Japanese 
carmakers (Abdulsomad, 2003: 71). Likewise, the APIC was to coordinate with AIC 
on issues such as the development of the Thai auto-part industry, assistance in solving 
problems related to auto-parts industry, research promotion and support and providing 
policy recommendation to the Thai government (Media Overseas, 2003: 52-53).
Dissatisfied with their limited voice within the AIC and APIC, which were 
dominated by the foreign and joint venture firms, the Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers 
Association (TAPMA) was established in 1978 as an independent entity. About two- 
thirds of TAPMA’s management board were all Thai with no foreigners (Siroros, 1997: 
15-16)134. TAPMA’s objectives were to pursue the interest of locally-owned auto-part 
firms and to lobby the Thai government for increased protection via a higher level of 
local content and high import tariff and taxes. TAPMA successfully lobbied the 
government to increase the LCR from 25 per cent (in 1974) to 50 per cent by the end of 
1983 (for passenger cars) and to 45 per cent for commercial vehicles by the end of 
1 9 8 4 13:* (Siroros, 1997: 18-19; Terdudomtham, 1997: 5).
132 Within the association there were industrial clubs, each associated with a particular industry. Each 
club has an elected chairperson from its members; an example of a large firm that was (and still is) 
influential in the automobile club was Toyota, which represented the Automobile Assembly (Industry) 
Club (Thanamai, 1985: 123).
133 The name “Federation of Thai Industries” (FTI) was used in 1987. Prior to this, the association was 
known as the “Association of Thai Industries” (ATI). The FTI operated under the supervision of 
Ministry of Industry (MOI); similar in its objective as the ATI, FTI was designed to enable close co­
operation between public (MOI) and private sectors in Thailand in policymaking and implementation.
14 The deeper issue here was the fact that most local auto-part firms were unhappy with the way the 
foreign carmakers impeded the phased increase of LCR. They wanted to be able to exert more influence 
on the Thai government to further increase the localization of auto-parts production. Through the 
establishment of TAPMA, these auto-part firms’ bargaining power against the foreign carmakers had 
increased.
Ij5 In addition from the early to mid-1980s the auto-part firm association were gaining strength in both 
expanding membership base as well as exerting more policy influence on the Thai government (Doner, 
1991: 208).
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In addition, the Thai Automotive Industry Association (TAIA) was established 
in 1981. Its objectives were to coordinate among the other industry organizations; 
specifically it assisted in coordination among the vehicle assemblers, the auto-part 
firms and the engine manufacturers. The coordination was not limited to cars as it 
included motorcycle manufacturers as well. In addition the TAIA represents the Thai 
automotive industry in the ASEAN Automotive Federation (AAF) and it relays back 
important regional business information to the Thai automotive businesses and the 
government136 (Media Overseas, 2003: 42-43).
5.1.4 Summary and Implications on Firm Strategies and 
Learning
On the whole, several observations could be drawn related to limited firm 
learning (and strategy for upgrading) from the analysis of Thai automotive industry 
from the 1960s to 1980s:
• The growing number of assemblers and vehicle models led to a fragmented 
market and diseconomies of scale in production. This also led to truncated firm 
learning since most firms had to cope with shifts in production model or small- 
batch production, lacking continuity in learning of production of auto-parts. 
Policies implemented were aimed at alleviating the balance of payment 
problem. Little was the government worried about the strategy for firm 
upgrading. The government was not focused on using rationalization plan and 
LCR as tools for enhancing technical knowledge transfer from the multinational 
carmakers to the local Thai firms (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 15).
• Despite the failure of government policies to facilitate the knowledge transfer, 
the analysis indicated that some upgrading activities did occur. The localization 
requirements provided by the government led to moving the industry forward, 
from merely assembly of imported CKD kits to the semi-manufactured of auto­
parts. However, this did not occur until mid-1970s; since during the 1960-1973 
the Thai automotive industry was mostly assembly-oriented and not 
manufacturing (Thanamai, 1985: 104). After the enactment of policy in early 
1970s and the implementation of LCR from 1975, the government provided the 
local auto-part firms with the opportunities to learn via the manufacturing of
136 This role of “information broker” and market intelligence assists the stakeholders in improving 
awareness of market trends and in policy formulation.
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simple auto-parts such as batteries, exhaust system, wheels, and seats and so on. 
As it was easier for firms to start their learning with technologically simple 
auto-parts prior to progressing to more complex ones; this localization scheme 
appeared to provide a good starting point for the systemic and sequential 
accumulation of firm capabilities.
• By the end of 1980s, the challenge remained for Thai auto-parts to meet the 
requirements of foreign assemblers and carmakers on three criteria: high 
quality, low manufacturing cost, and on-time delivery. But most local auto-part 
firms were accustomed to the production of simple replacement equipment parts 
for after-market sales, and they lacked the necessary capabilities to meet these 
requirements. This is because the focus of government policies (for e.g. LCR) 
was not on firm upgrading, but on solving the trade deficits problem per se. 
Consequently, there were no systematic programs to assist the local auto-part 
firms in becoming more competitive (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 15).
• The challenge for the government was to create an environment whereby not 
only more localization could occur via FDI, but also the quality of the 
technology being transferred would increase. By the mid 1980s, the 
government was working on the localization of engine production. It was 
expected that this project will lead to building the Thai automotive industry as a 
full-manufacturing industry and not merely assembly plants of imported CKD 
auto-parts.
5.2 From Protection to Partial Liberalization Phase 
(late 1980s to pre-1997 crisis)
5.2.1 The Institutions
From mid- to late-1980s, it was realized that the Thai automotive industry had 
been over-protected (Poapongsakom, 2004: 161), and that the import substitution 
industrialization had failed to substantially transfer technology (knowledge) to the 
ancillary firms. Specifically the policies had failed to promote learning and the 
enhancement of firms’ competitiveness . The Thai government issued more 
liberalization policies that encouraged increased FDI, increased openness and a
137 “The auto industry is one of Thailand’s largest and least competitive, and suffers from having too 
many players” [italics added] (Handley, 1991: 34).
120
commitment to regional ASEAN free trade area138 (AFTA), and promoting 
manufacturing export (Janssen, 1987: 18). These early liberalization policies, in the 
context of a stronger Japanese yen, encouraged more FDI into Thailand (Ibid.). As the 
automotive industry underwent liberalization, many local firms and organizations 
lobbied harder for continual increase in LCR and prolonged industrial protection.
5.2.1.1 Incipient Lowering of Protection and Increased Competition
In 1990, the MOI removed the limitation on the maximum number of allowed
series for passenger car assembling139 (OIE, 2004: 8). Other liberalization policies of 
the Thai automotive industry occurred during the Anand government in July 1991M0. 
For instance, for vehicles over 2,300 c.c. duties were reduced from 300 to 112 per cent, 
and for smaller vehicles the reduction was from 180 to 60 percent and CKD parts duties 
were reduced from 112 to 20 per cent (Handley, 1991: 34). In addition, the import ban 
on new cars with engines under 2,300 c.c. was lifted (Anonymous, 1991b).
The liberal policy impact were twofold: 1) narrowing the price gap between 
locally assembled vehicles and imported CBUs; “the cuts reduced the passenger car 
retail prices by 12 to 33 per cent, although the prices are still very high” (Anonymous, 
1994: 20) and 2) increased competition of imported CBUs with domestically assembled 
vehicles. The Thai government aimed to make local carmakers work harder under a 
more competitive environment (Handley, 1991: 34). The lowering of these duties were 
done almost overnight and the highly-protected Thai automotive industry was abruptly 
exposed to external competitive pressure (Kaosa-ard, 1993: 15). Despite the 
liberalization, the policy of high LCR continued (see Table 5.2).
5.2.1.2 The Push to Maintain and Increase Localization
The LCR continued to increase throughout this period. By 1991, the local
content for passenger car reached 50 per cent, and in 1994 the minimum LCR was 54
lj8 “The ASEAN Free Trade Area was established in January 1992 to eliminate tariff barriers among the 
Southeast Asian countries with a view to integrating the ASEAN economies into a single production 
base and creating a regional market of 500 million people. The Agreement on the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area requires that tariff rates levied on a 
wide range of products traded within the region be reduced to no more than five percent. Quantitative 
restrictions and other non-tariff barriers are to be eliminated. Although originally scheduled to be 
realized by 2008, the target of a free trade area in ASEAN was continuously moved forward” (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2002: 1).
139 The maximum number was set at 42 series for the whole industry and the restriction was imposed in 
1984.
140 This government was dominated mainly by the liberal technocrats who felt that most customers had to 
carry the “unfair” burden of paying excess prices for domestically assembled vehicles and decided to 
slash import duties on motor vehicles.
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per cent for passenger cars, 81 per cent for pick-up trucks, and 70 per cent for pick-up 
truck engines. The distinction was made between petrol- and diesel-engine vehicles. 
The LCR for the former was increased to 60 per cent in 1994 and for the latter it was 
set at 72 per cent (Terdudomtham, 2004: 39) (see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Local Content Requirement (LCR) in 1994
Vehicle Type LCR (percentage ranges)
Passenger Cars 54 per cent and compulsory parts from a list
Pick-up Trucks
• Diesel engine
• Gasoline engine
72 per cent and 111 compulsory parts
60 per cent and 103 compulsory parts
Trucks and Buses 50 per cent• Cab or chassis
• Chassis and windshield 45 per cent
• Chassis and engine 40 per cent
Sources: adapted from Ministry of Industry (MOI) and Abdulsomad (2003: 109)
To further increase the local production of more complex auto-parts, the government 
revived the diesel engine project141 and issued mandatory policies for domestic engine 
production: engines for passenger cars in 1987 and diesel engines for pick-up trucks 
issued in 1989 (OIE, 2004: 8; White, 1988).
More attention was paid to the pick-up truck production due to the far less 
fragmented nature of production and the higher likelihood of achieving economies of 
scale. The “diesel engine” policy which re-emerged in 1985 had a specific focus on 
engines for one-ton pick-up trucks (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 4). This policy 
impacted the carmakers’ strategy; since the Thai market lacked the economies of scale 
for any one carmaker to produce a complete facility to manufacture all the engine parts, 
the carmakers collaborated in a joint venture to manufacture the engines (Panichapat 
and Kanasawat, 1997: 13). Moreover to further increase the production scale and
141 This project was started back in 1978 by the Board of Investment (BOI), who allocated 25 million 
Baht to the three Japanese firms who agreed to start the engine production by 1981 with a 20 per cent 
local content for the first four years. However in 1978-79, the demand for diesel engines was minimal 
(i.e. lacking minimum efficient scales for production), and these firms could not start the production.
The project re-emerged in 1985 due to three reasons: 1) diesel engine was suitable for the Thai economy 
where the most popular vehicle has been the pick-up trucks , 2) there was a trend that in the future that 
the government may ban the import of diesel engine, hence the production of domestic diesel engine had 
a bright future, and 3) there was an improvement in the relationship between the public and private sector 
to pressure the Japanese firm to set up more joint ventures and to engage in active technology transfer to 
Thai firms (Siroros, 1997: 29).
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achieve minimum efficient economy of scale, a portion of the manufactured engines 
were designated for exports142 (Siroros, 1997: 29).
5.2.1.3 Research and Development Promotion
The Thai government had been promoting research and development (R&D) 
activities since the 1980s and organizations that promoted R&D included:
• The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE), who since 
1987 has provided the Research and Technology Development Revolving Fund 
(soft loans)
• The National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) has 
provided soft loans and grants since 1988. But these were limited to only three 
areas: 1) bioscience and biotechnology, 2) materials technology and 3) applied 
electronics and computers technology.
• The Board of Investment (BOI) has granted R&D promotional privileges since 
1989.
Most of these incentives were “supply push” rather than “demand pull” technology 
development143 (Ghani et al., 2002: 55). Furthermore due to the limited resources, few 
of the R&D promotions were in the automobile industry and this led to a small impact 
on the rate of firm-level learning activities and its capabilities accumulation 
(Terdudomtham, 2004: 41). Hence it could be argued that during the 1980s the overall 
impact of R&D policies were minimal.
5.2.1.4 Export Promotion and Further Liberalization
In August 1994, the BOI issued reduced import taxes for CKD auto-parts from 
20 per cent to just 2 per cent. This new tax rate was applied only to auto-parts that 
were used in production of vehicles for export. The Thai government expected that 
through this and other investment incentives Thailand will become an export base of 
vehicles and auto-parts (Siroros, 1997: 64). In addition, in 1995 the Office of Industrial 
Economics (OIE) had drafted a proposal for developing the export of vehicles and auto­
parts. Some of the suggested strategic measures included: a free trade zone, 
streamlined application process and paperwork processing for import and export,
142 At the time, the Thai market could handle about 70,000 engines per year while the minimum efficient 
production output is 140,000 per year; hence half o f the engines produced will be exported (Siroros,
1997: 30-32).
143 In addition, most R&D promotions had been spread widely over many fields and industries, i.e. they 
were non-sector specific.
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removal of the restriction on the percentage of foreign equity in assembly plants, tax 
structure reform, and increased product standardization (Siroros, 1997: 70). Additional 
measure from the BOI included the investment promotion for assemblers (the last such 
promotion was provided in 1970) (Ibid.).
5.2.2 The Private Business Firms
Since the Plaza Accord agreement of 1985, most Japanese firms were 
enthusiastically seeking to invest overseas, and one of the main FDI destination within 
ASEAN was Thailand (White, 1988). From 1987 to 1996, the Thai automotive 
industry had grown rapidly with sales of one-ton pick-up trucks leading the way. FDI 
was not limited to Japanese carmakers; the US and European carmakers were investing 
heavily as well. FDI by carmakers also led to FDI by their affiliated first-tier suppliers. 
Hence, FDI into the sector had increased dramatically during this period.
5.2.2.1 Assembly Firms
In 1989, Isuzu, Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toyota collaborated together to make 
diesel engines for one-ton pick-up trucks (Janssen, 1987; Panichapat and Kanasawat, 
1997: 13; White, 1988). The collaborative efforts enabled these carmakers to comply 
with the Thai government compulsory policy on the locally produced diesel engines. 
These engines were used in domestic pick-up truck assembly and for export to regional 
markets. The Vice President of a carmaker expressed the positive aspect of this 
project:
“Until this [diesel] engine project came along, no one thought about 
exporting. Cost and quality control could be targeted solely at the Thai 
market. ... But now, with the yen appreciation, everyone is talking about 
exporting, and quality and cost must be aligned to the world market”
(White, 1988).
By 1993, both Toyota and Isuzu had exported about 200 million Baht in diesel 
engines144 (Janssen, 1994: 7). During this period, other carmakers who had exported 
were:
• MMC Sittipol (a local joint venture between Mitsubishi Motor Corp (Japan) and 
a Thai firm) started the export of Lancer passenger cars to Canada in 1988
144 See also Siroros (1997: 20, 29-32) for more details on the development of Thailand’s diesel engine 
project
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(Kaosa-ard, 1993: 11; White, 1988). This was part of the firm’s six-year 
100,000 car contract with Chrysler Canada Ltd (Handley, 1988: 74).
• Siam Motors Co. also exported 40 locally assembled Sunny sedans to Brunei 
(Handley, 1988: 74; White, 1988). In addition the firm planned for a 2 billion 
Baht (the first-phase of a 6 billion Baht) investment to manufacture cars for 
export (Cua, 1991).
Throughout the latter half of 1980s and early 1990s, many Japanese carmakers were 
eyeing Thailand as their strategic regional production base, and encouraging their 
affiliate supplier firms (keiretsu) to come and invest in Thailand. Indeed this was what 
happened in the Thai automotive industry during the time.
By 1994, Thailand was the fastest growing automotive market in the world and 
it had the biggest market for pick-up trucks outside the US (Johnson, 1994). The US 
and European carmakers wanted to make their presence in Thailand more solid145 
(more specifically, a re-entry strategy for US carmakers after pulling out in late 1970s 
due to Thai government onerous local content regulation).
For instance, Chrysler International Corp formed a joint venture with Swedish 
Motors Corp in 1994 and assigned a local firm, Thai-Swedish Assembly Plant, to 
produce Jeep Cherokee in September of 1995146. And by November 1995, Ford and 
Mazda had formed a joint venture (AutoAlliance Thailandu7) and invested about 
US$470 million in a plant to produce one-ton pick-up trucks; the targeted annual 
production capacity was 135,000 units148 (Pruzin, 1996). Finally, the last of the US 
“Big Three” made its decision in 1996 (Naughton et al., 1996). General Motors (GM) 
decided to invest US$750 million for a production plant in Thailand with an annual 
production capacity of 80,000-100,000 units. The Board of Investment (BOI) had 
granted GM with an exemption on corporate income tax for export for 8 years, a US$
145 The growth rate definitely also attracted the attention from BMW145 and the US “Big Three” (Peck, 
1995).
146 The joint venture was named “Thai Chrysler Automotive Ltd.” and it did not have any local 
production facility. It was important to note that prior to this time, there was no vehicle of American 
design being manufactured in Thailand’s local major assembly plants. Hence, Jeep Cherokees assembled 
at the Thai-Swedish Assembly plant signified the first re-entry of US cars in Thailand since their 
decisions to pull out of the Thai market since the late 1970s.
147 For more background information on the Ford and Mazda alliance, please see Heller and Orihashi 
(2003: 125-126).
148 The completed production plant began to produce pick-up models for Thai domestic market in mid- 
1998; and only about six months later, it began to export Ford and Mazda pick-up trucks to countries all 
over the world (except USA) (Heller and Orihashi, 2003: 130).
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15 million support for construction of the General Motors University149, and an 
exemption from the LCR in 19981 (Terdudomtham, 1997: 8).
5.2.2.2 Auto-part Firms
The strengthening yen during the latter half of the 1980s did not only lead to 
more FDI in assembly plants, but also an increase in the establishment of auto-part 
firms as well. By 1987, most foreign auto-part manufacturers (following the request 
from their associated carmakers) had invested in Thailand. The BOI estimated that by 
1994 almost half of the auto-part firms in Japan had commercial or technical 
cooperation in Thailand (Anonymous, 1994). Specific examples of large, multinational 
auto-part firms (some are joint ventures) that had invested in Thailand included:
• Toyota affiliates such as Toyota Autobody (who produced exhaust pipes and 
stamp parts), Nippondenso (electrical parts), Siam Toyota Manufacturing 
(engines), and Thai Engineering Products (disc and drum brakes) (Anonymous, 
1994)
• Siam Motors (Nissan) affiliates such as Siam NGK Spark Plug, Siam Parts and 
Engineering (trims and press parts), Siam Riken Industry (piston rings and 
cylinders), Siam Tsuchiya Manufacturing (air, oil and fuel filters), Siam GS 
Battery and Siam Kiki (air conditioners) (Ibid.)
• Twelve Mitsubishi affiliates had invested in Thailand to produce spare parts and 
CKD components for the Mitsubishi L200 one-ton pick-up trucks1' 1 
(Anonymous, 1990).
Most often these carmakers’ affiliated first-tier suppliers were located around the 
assembly plant, in close geographical proximity to ensure effective use of just-in-time 
management152.
For the local auto-part firms, most engaged in the production of simple stand­
alone parts such as wiring harness, tires, upholstery and springs; these parts sourced
149 After the 1997 financial crisis, the plan to construct such a university did not materialized and the 
impact of the crisis caused GM to re-adjust its production plan and production model accordingly.
150 The promise to GM to abandon the LCR in 1998 was two years earlier than what was mandated by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The idea of lifting LCR two years ahead of schedule was 
opposed by Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Association (TAPMA) and other organizations. These 
organizations claimed that the impact of 1997 financial crisis on auto-part firms was severed enough, and 
that the local firms should not have to deal with an additional challenge of LCR abandonment only one 
year after the crisis. The Thai government finally decided to stick with the WTO’s original date, which 
is to abandon the LCR at the beginning of 2000.
151 Most of these trucks were exported (Barnes, 1999).
152 This is called “satellite policy”, meaning that the Japanese carmakers encourage their own first-tier 
suppliers to relocate to Thailand and cluster around the assembly plants (Abbott, 2003: 141).
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cheap, local raw materials. Consequently, by 1991 these auto-part firms have gained 
region-wide (i.e. ASEAN) competitiveness (Handley, 1991: 34). Part of the 
explanation for increased firm competitiveness was the establishment of the US 
carmakers. These carmakers required the Thai auto-part firms to obtain QS9000 
quality system certification prior to becoming their suppliers (Poapongsakom and 
Wangdee, 2000: 15). On the other hand, the auto-part firms that were most worrying 
and suffered from lack of competitiveness were the ones in passenger cars sector; these 
firms would not survive without continued government protection (Handley, 1991).
5.2.3 The Non-firm Organizations
The existing organizations, namely AIC, APIC, TAPMA and TAIA, were the 
same ones that were established during the 1970s and early 1980s. No new 
automotive-related organizations were established during the 1980s. By early 1991, the 
government had introduced several measures to liberalize the automotive market, and 
some organizations (such as TAPMA) opposed and continued to lobby continuously for 
maintained protection via sustained LCR (Anonymous, 1991a). In addition, TAPMA 
also criticized the government decision to cut import tariff and taxes, stating that the 
imports of CBU vehicles had caused slow sales in the automotive industry which in 
turn had affected the local auto-part firms. Another problem that local auto-part firms 
faced was the high import taxes on raw materials; TAPMA had been requesting the 
Thai government since the 1980s to lower such taxes but had achieved no tangible 
positive response (Ibid.). Similarly, other organizations such as AIC also criticized the 
government for the sudden liberalization via lifting of the import ban on CBU 
passenger cars, allowing the imported cars to compete with the domestically assembled 
vehicles. The criticism pointed out that this competition will in turn reduce the 
domestic production volume and could lead to production diseconomies of scale 
(Siroros, 1997: 43). On the whole, the Japanese carmakers disliked the government’s 
liberalization policy and they fought for continued protection (Ibid.: 49-50).
5.2.4 Summary and Implications on Firm Learning
This analysis of the Thai automotive industry from late 1980s to pre-1997 crisis, 
when compared with the earlier periods of 1960s to 1980s, identifies the increase in 
both the government localization policy effort and the private firms’ learning efforts as 
important processes.
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First, the progressive localization scheme enacted by the government 
(especially the local production of diesel engines) led carmakers’ to a level of 
cooperation never seen before in any car industry153. Arguably, this cooperation also 
led to the transfer of knowledge and sharing of know-how regarding engine parts 
production among the partnered firms. This knowledge transfer and sharing also led to 
effective joint learning activities, shared problem-solving sessions, and thus higher 
level of firm capabilities. Second, the government’s export promotion scheme assisted 
the carmakers’ need to satisfy the minimum production economies of scale. In the 
process the carmakers had to re-adjust their product standards from the domestic to the 
export market. To ensure product competitiveness for exports, product quality and low 
cost must satisfy the overseas buyers. Thus it is argued that both the adjustment from 
domestic to export market and increased firm cooperation led to the changes in firm 
learning activities and problem-solving processes, which in turn accelerated the overall 
accumulation of firm capabilities.
The only challenge (or threat) that remained during this period was the duration 
of protection for the local auto-part firms. Since 1975, they had been under heavy 
protection (e.g. progressive LCR). The pressure of competition from imported CKD 
auto-parts was negligible, and with high LCR, these local auto-part firms were 
guaranteed the domestic market. The government was worried that these local firms 
would be less competitive in the long run. Moreover, Thailand, as a member of World 
Trade Organization (WTO), must comply with Trade Related and Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) and completely abandon its LCR by 2000. Therefore, the issues of firm 
upgrading (and learning) strategy and competitiveness received greater attention in the 
1990s.
5.3 From Post-Crisis to Full Liberalization: Current 
Phase
5.3.1 The Institutions
After the financial crisis, the government had paid greater attention to the issues 
of technology transfer and assistance to local auto-part firms (Terdudomtham, 2004: 
48). This was evident during the Industrial Restructuring Programs leading to the
153 “The deal [cooperation among Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi and Isuzu] marks, for the first time in the 
world history, the cooperation of competing Japanese automakers in engine production” [italics added] 
(Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 13).
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establishment of the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) in 1998. Since the Thaksin 
government (elected in 2001), the Thai automotive industry was targeted as one of the 
five key strategic industries (The Nation, 2002). The push from the government 
continued with liberalization policy implementation in order to establish the country as 
a production base of one-ton pick-up trucks and a regional export base. This was 
evident in TAT s submission of the country’s first five-year Thai automotive master 
plan (2002-2006) to the Office of Industrial Economics (OIE).
5.3.1.1 The LCR Abandonment and the Revised Tariff Structure
After protecting the Thai automotive industry for more than 25 years and
surviving the bid by General Motors to be removed by 1998, the LCR were abandoned 
at the beginning of year 2000l54. To ensure minimal disruption to the local auto-part 
firms, TAPMA lobbied the Thai government to raise the average CKD tax to 33 per 
cent155 from 20 per cent in order to extend some form of protection for Thai firms. OIE 
(2004: 11) viewed the simultaneous abandonment of LCR and the revision in tariff 
structure with new CKD definition156 as a package and considered this to be the 
“country’s giant step toward the liberalization scheme.”
As is usually the case, the policy sounded promising, but its implementation 
was problematic, especially the revision of automotive-tariff structure. This was 
succinctly expressed by TAI (2004b: 8-9): “the tax collection system for the Thai 
automotive industry is considered to be the most complicated in the world” [italics 
added]. Its revision was complex and progress was slow. The problem also was related 
to the classification scheme used for each type of vehicle. This problem is not new; as 
it was commented in 1991:
“... Thailand was criticized for maintaining an archaic and often self­
contradictory tax system that included some of the highest duty levels in 
ASEAN” (Handley, 1991: 35).
154 Through much debate, political infighting, and lobbying among the private organizations (for e.g. 
TAPMA and AIC), the Ministry of Industry had decided on how to ameliorate the effect o f the LCR 
abandonment.
155 Note that this is an average tax rate, implying that some imported auto-parts could pay taxes higher or 
lower than this value (personal interview with Senior Vice President, Carmaker H, December 23, 2004).
156 The Office of Industrial Economics utilizes this new CKD definition to specify the characteristics of a 
CKD auto-parts set to determine if it is allowed to receive the special tariff rate.
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5.3.2 The Private Business Firms
5.3.2.1 Assembly Firms
After the liberalization policies in the early 1990s, Thailand was the host of 
many carmakers who used the country as a production base for one-ton pick-up trucks. 
Examples of carmakers who had established pick-up production base include: 
Mitsubishi, AutoAlliance157, Isuzu, Toyota and Nissan (2004a). After investing 
heavily, Mitsubishi has made Thailand the sole global source for its L200/Strada pick­
up trucks (Media Overseas, 2003: 117). These trucks were sold domestically and 
exported around the world (personal interview with the Executive Vice President, 
November 30, 2004). In addition to trucks, Mitsubishi also exported passenger cars.
“Mitsubishi was the first company to begin to export its Lancer model 
mainly to the [overseas] market, with the result that Thailand became 
Mitsubishi's major export base, as ninety percent of production were 
exported to 138 countries in 1999” (Lehmann, 2004: 120).
Similarly, Toyota had relocated its one-ton pick-up truck production from Japan and
initiated a new large-scale production project (personal interview with the Vice
President, October 1, 2004).
“Toyota has moved its entire one-tonne pick-up truck production from 
Japan to Thailand and turned it into its world procurement centre by 
end-2002 under a US$ 815 million Innovative and International 
Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) project” [italics added] (Soon, 2003: 14).
In addition, Toyota also requested its first-tier global supplier (Denso) to invest in
massive plant expansion in 2002 .
In addition to pick-ups, other Japanese carmakers used Thailand as an ideal 
place to build the “Asian cars”159 with plans to export them. Honda had built the 
City]6°, while Toyota had responded with the Soluna161. The Soluna received much
157 AutoAlliance is a joint venture between Ford and Mazda.
158 Denso Corporation (Japan) planned to enlarge the Thai-based operation by more than 9 billion Baht 
(approximately US$ 225), of which 4.2 billion Baht was allocated for the new electronic common-rail 
(the latest diesel engine technology) plant, and the remainder for the expansion of the existing two 
factories (Wiriyapong, 2002).
159 “Asian cars” are defined as low-cost, small engine (1,300 to 1,500 c.c. capacity) passenger cars. It 
was the Japanese carmakers’ strategy to develop suitable products for the Asian markets. In addition, the 
design of these Asian cars utilized (as much as possible) the locally-made auto-parts. However, for the 
Toyota Soluna, the upstream research and development activities are still centralized in Japan (Lehmann, 
2004: 135).
160 “In April 1996, Honda Motor Co., Ltd., launched the City sedans as its strategic Asian car. The City is 
a 1,300 c.c., four-door sedan. At 398,000 Baht, it was 20 to 30 per cent cheaper than the Honda Civic” 
(Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 23).
161 “Toyota Motor (Thailand) Co., Ltd., also launched low-end line of Soluna passenger models in early
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attention from car buyers during its launch; at some instances, the customers had to 
wait for six months for the cars to be available for delivery (Anonymous, 1997c). To 
achieve the low manufacturing unit costs on the Soluna and the City, both firms must 
cut costs and there were two ways: through efficient sourcing of local auto-parts and 
through continuous productivity improvement. Measures used to increase productivity 
comprised changing production plant layout, automation of some operations, and 
integration of production lines that had become complex (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 
1997:23).
The FDI was not limited to the Japanese carmakers. The US and the European 
carmakers had decided to expand their production capacities in Thailand (see Figure 
5.3). All carmakers were expecting the Thai automotive market to continue its growth 
at rapid rates until the end of the millennium; unfortunately this was not the case after 
the 1997 financial crisis. The carmakers and their affiliated auto-part firms, who had 
invested heavily shortly before the crisis, were severely affected. They had to quickly 
re-adjust their strategies (from domestic market to export-oriented) in order to survive.
Impact of the 1997 Crisis on Assemblers
On the whole there were three main impacts on the automotive industry at the 
assembly (carmakers) level (Abdulsomad, 2003: 159-168). First is the change in 
ownership structure.
“[The] recent financial crisis has transformed local [Thai-owned] 
assemblers into minority partners. ... [The former] local assembly 
partners have become local dealers instead ...” (Abdulsomad, 2003:
167).
1997. Soluna is the first car mass-produced in Thailand to cost less than 350,000 baht. The four 
1,500 c.c. Soluna models on offer will range from 327,000 to 417,000 Baht. Toyota strafes to reduce 
costs by raising Soluna’s local content ratio to 70% or higher . . .” (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 23).
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Figure 5.3 Planned Capacity Expansion Prior to 1997
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1997 F 
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Total Annual Production Capacity
Sources: Assemblers’ Data, cited from Poapongsakom and Wangdee (2000: 5)
Notes: 1) GM = General Motors
2) F = forecasted values
3) the number in the parentheses (+...) represented each carmaker planned 
capacity expansion
Since many Thai-owned assemblers had large amount of US dollar denominated debt, 
the 1997 financial crisis (which caused a severe Baht devaluation) had weakened the 
local ownership in the automotive industry. Hence the ownership of the foreign 
partners had increased through injecting more capital into both the assembly and auto­
parts industry. Moreover in November 1997, the BOI had removed the restrictions on 
foreign equity shareholding and many foreign investors took advantage of this situation 
(Maennel, 2001: 23). All these factors contributed to the ownership structural change.
Second is the massive shrinkage of domestic demand for automobiles 
(Chitravas, 2005a) (see Figure 5.4). The automotive industry was hardest hit by the 
crisis (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000) and this shrinkage in demand forced the 
carmakers to shift the market strategy to export (Barnes, 1999). General Motors, which 
had earlier planned for an annual volume of 80,000 to 100,000 units, re-adjusted its 
plan and decided to scale back to 50,000 units and waited to see which model would be 
appropriate for production (Bardacke, 1998). After postponing its former date of
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commencement of operations and change of business plans162, in 1999 GM had decided 
to produce compact minivans (Chevrolet Zafira163) for both domestic market and 
worldwide export (Anonymous, 1999c). Other carmakers chose to either reduce or 
temporarily stop their production operations.
Figure 5.4 Production Adjustment of the Assemblers During the 1997 Crisis
Assemblers Adjustments
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Sources: IFCT (1997), cited from Poapongsakorn and W angdee (2000: 7)
The third impact from the crisis was the rise in exports. The Thai automotive 
industry became more export-oriented. Exports increased sharply from 16,419 cars in 
1996 to 125,702 cars in 1999. Of these exports, Mitsubishi Motors has been the largest 
exporter of CBU cars, and is exporting pick-up trucks to Europe and passenger cars to 
New Zealand (Abdulsomad, 2003: 167). Toyota Motors began to export pick-up trucks 
to Australia and New Zealand in 1998, while Honda also exported the Honda City (the 
Asian car) to Singapore and Brunei in 1997 and Honda Accord sedan to Australia and 
New Zealand in 1998 (Ibid.).
5.3.2.2 Auto-part Firms
Recall that before the 1997 crisis, Thailand was one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world; and most of the carmakers were on the rampant capacity 
expansion (see Figure 5.3). Likewise, these carmakers requested their affiliated auto­
part suppliers to pre-expand their production capacities (personal interview with the 
Managing Director of a major auto-part firm, November 5, 2004). In sum, at that time 
the future of the automotive industry was highly positive and no one expected any
162 The GM study group was formed soon after the 1997 crisis and made decisions regarding the question 
“Should GM pull out of Thailand?” In February 1998, the group “decided to stick with the project and 
absorb the short-term losses for the long-term strategic presence.” Moreover due to harsh competition 
from the Japanese carmakers, GM decided not to produce Opel Astra sedan as had originally planned. It 
chose to setup a new niche with the Zafira (a minivan) on a more modest scale (Boley, 2000).
163 The first Zafira was produced in May 2000 (Boley, 2000).
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external shocks. The 1997 crisis came as an unexpected event, surprising all these 
firms.
During this post-1997 crisis period, the auto-part firms were mainly divided into 
three groups: 1) those that survived the crisis “intact”, 2) those that survived the crisis 
but underwent change in ownership structure and 3) those that did not survived the 
crisis. The first category was mostly the multinational auto-part firms who received the 
overseas financial assistance from their parent carmakers. The second consisted of 
mostly Thai-foreign joint venture firms who had, prior to the crisis, invested in a major 
plant expansion via foreign debt financing, usually borrowed US dollars. The last 
group was small local auto-part firms who could not cope with the increased 
denominated US dollar debt. Once recovered from the crisis, the auto-part firms 
resumed their course in making Thailand the regional production base for export.
Impact of the 1997 Crisis on Auto-part Firms
For local firms, the economic crisis impacted in two ways (Abdulsomad, 2003: 
169; Chitravas, 2005a). First, the drastic decrease in domestic vehicles sales translated 
into lower domestic market auto-part sales. Second, the Baht devaluation led to higher 
imported raw materials cost and higher Baht amount to repay any US dollar 
denominated debt. The overall damage was quite severe.
“[Several years after the 1997 crisis,] about 600 local auto parts firms
have been closed or taken over by foreign firms since the crisis struck in
1997” (Abdulsomad, 2003: 169).
Those Thai-foreign joint ventures that survived the crisis could not increase their 
capital in the new recapitalization; they lost their majority shares to foreign owners164.
Some auto-part firms attempted to shift their strategies from domestic to export 
market. They formed “Auto parts Exporter Club”165, whose aim was to cooperate 
among club members to increase exports. One of the pressing issues for the majority of 
Thai suppliers was their inexperience with exporting activities. In addition, these 
suppliers also lacked sufficient capabilities to produce high quality products at an
164 For example, “Siam Cement Group [one of Thailand’s largest conglomerate group] sold its equity in 
Thai Engineering Product Co. Ltd. and Siam AT Industry Co. Ltd. to Aisin Takaoka (a Toyota group) in 
1999” (Ibid.).
165 The club contained about 20 local suppliers. Export strategy for these suppliers was not easy since 
local auto-part firms were faced with stringent requirements on product quality and also on the selling 
price.
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internationally competitive price (Chitravas, 2005a). However, despite these 
drawbacks, some auto-part suppliers have managed to learn to successfully export166.
5.3.3 The Current Industry Structure and Performance
The Thai automotive industry has a tier structure, with the vehicle assemblers at 
the top and the auto-part suppliers at the lower tiers (see Figure 5.5). There are 15 
assemblers (and carmakers) and 6 motorcycle manufacturers167. For the 4-wheel 
vehicles, the total annual production capacity in 2004 was well over 1 million vehicles 
(see Table 5.3). Among all the carmakers, Toyota has the highest production capacity, 
followed by Nissan and Isuzu.
Table 5.3 Production Capacity for Vehicles in 2004
Rank Carmaker/Assembly Plants Units per Year
1 Toyota Motor (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 240,000
2 Siam Nissan Automobile Co. Ltd. 143,900
Isuzu Motors (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 140,000
4 Auto Alliance (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 135,000
5 MMC Sittipol Co. Ltd.168 126,000
6 Honda Assembly Co. Ltd. 120,000
7 General Motors (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 110,000
8 Bangchan General Assembly Co. Ltd. 20,000
9 Thonburi Automotive Assembly Co. Ltd. 19,500
10 Siam Motors and Nissan Co. Ltd. 12,267
11 Y.M.C. Assembly Co. Ltd. 12,000
12 BMW Manufacturing (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 10,000
13 Thai-Swedish Assembly Co. Ltd. 6,000
14 Hino Motors (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 2 ,969m
15 Siam V.M.C. Co. Ltd.1™ N/A
Total Units 1,097,636
Sources: adapted from OIE (2004: Appendix Table A l) and Thai Automotive Industry
Association
166 For example of these firms, see Sections 7.3.1, 7.3.4, and 7.3.9.
167 This information was based on OIE (2004).
168 As of 2006, the company changed its name to Mitsubishi Motors Thailand (MMTh).
169 Estimated production volume from January to September 2002 (2003: 132-136).
170 This was the first Thai assembly firm dedicated to producing one-ton pick-up trucks. It has 
temporarily stop production operations shortly after the 1997 financial crisis.
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For the motorcycles, the total annual production capacity in 2004 was about 2.7 million 
units (see Table 5.4). Among all the motorcycle makers, Honda has the largest 
production capacity with over 1.4 million units, followed by Suzuki and Yamaha. 
Almost all the producers of motorcycle are Japanese. In the recent years, there was an 
emergence of an indigenous Thai motorcycle brand, Tigar171, and it was ranked fifth in 
the overall production capacity in 2004.
Table 5.4 Production Capacity for Motorcycles in 2004
Rank Assembly Plants Units per Year
1 Honda 1,400,000
2 Suzuki 500,000
3 Yamaha 450,000
4 Kawasaki 200,000
5 Tiger 60,000
6 JRD 144,000
Total Units 2,754,000
Sources: adapted from OIE (2004: Table A2) and the Board of Investment
At the level of auto-part firms, there are 709 first-tier suppliers (including 
motorcycles) and 1,100 lower-tier suppliers (i.e. Tier 2 and 3 and others) (see Figure 
5.5). The quantitative breakdown of first-tier suppliers based upon ownership is also 
shown in the figure. Note that most of the first-tier suppliers have either “pure Thai” or 
Thai majority ownership; however, to conclude that these first-tier Thai suppliers have 
high level of capabilities could be misleading.
It is important to look at the qualitative breakdown as well. The qualitative 
breakdown of the 709 first-tier suppliers is illustrated in Table 5.5.
Note that most of the Thai and majority Thai joint venture firms produced auto-parts 
that are either vehicle body parts or automotive accessories and others. Most Thai 
firms have insufficient capabilities to produce engine parts, automotive electronics and 
other high value-added parts.
171 Tigar is the Thai-owned motorcycle brand, which was first launched in mid-2002. It was established 
by an ex-Managing Director of the Thai Kawasaki Motors.
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Table 5.5 Structure of First-tier Auto-part Firms in Thailand
Ownership Type
100% % Thai % Foreign %
Auto-part
Type
Thai-
owned
Majority Majority Total
Engine parts 20 31.7 8 12.7 35 55.6 63
Electronics 15 38.8 10 19.2 27 51.9 52
Drive,
Transmission 
& Steering 
Parts
17 32.7 6 11.5 29 55.8 52
Suspension & 
Brake Parts
13 37.1 1 2.9 21 60.0 35
Body Parts 57 47.9 17 14.3 45 37.8 119
Accessories 18 46.2 2 5.1 19 48.7 39
Mold and Dies 8 36.4 1 4.5 13 59.1 22
Others 206 63.0 23 7.0 98 30.0 327
Total 354 49.9 68 9.6 287 40.5 709
(Unit: number of firms)
Source: Adapted from the survey by TAI (2003g: 46)
For instance in 2004, the auto-parts that were not produced (as a complete turnkey unit) 
in Thailand were: passenger car engines, differential gears, electronic systems, 
electronic control units, (chemical) substrates for catalytic converters and anti-lock 
braking system (Wanapha, 2004). Likewise, the Japanese organization viewed the 
majority of Thai auto-part firms as lacking sufficient capabilities.
“A member of Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 
reported that 80% of Thai parts and components production still falls 
short of international standards” (Abdulsomad, 2003: 73)
Hence it could be said that to move up the production value chain, the Thai government
via the BOI should invite foreign parts producer to invest in facilities producing these
high-value auto-parts. At the same time, the local firms should try to link-up with these
foreign firms (through either joint venture or subcontracting agreement) and engage in
the learning activities and build technological and organizational capabilities. This
thesis will argue that this linkage activity must be made as part of a firm’s learning
strategy.
5.3.4 The Additional Non-firm Organization: Thailand 
Automotive Institute
In 1998, TAI was established under the MOI mandate as the main organization 
responsible for supporting and promoting the development of automobile industry in
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Thailand, with the primary goal of enhancing global competitiveness (OIE, 2004: 9). 
The TAI is unique in two respects from the other previous business associations and 
organizations.
Firstly it has the responsibility of enhancing competitiveness of Thai auto-part 
suppliers. Historically, most of the organizations such as Thai Auto-Parts 
Manufacturers Association (TAPMA) were related to heavy political lobbying for the 
prolonged protection of the automotive industry; however, the TAI had shifted its 
emphasis from lobbying to embracing open competition and promoting technological 
upgrading of Thai firms. This was stated:
“The primary goal of TAI is no longer to lobby the government for 
protection but to enhance global competitiveness o f Thai firms in 
according with the new strategy of the automobile industry of the post 
protectionism period” [italics added] (Abdulsomad, 2003: 65).
Secondly, the TAI is an autonomous unit with extensive collaboration with the foreign
carmakers and Japanese organizations. For instance,
“The Japanese government and private sector are very active in the new 
assistance program through TAI. ... The Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) has selected Thailand as the first ASEAN 
country to receive assistance to upgrade its auto industry, in a 
programme designed to boost the competitiveness of 150 local auto 
parts firms within the next four years.” (Abdulsomad, 2003: 73)
As a result, examples of collaborative programs currently undertaken by TAI include
1 79the Automotive Experts Dispatching Program (AEDP) , “Automotive Technology 
Build-Up Program (ATBP)”, and the “Detroit of Asia” project. In addition, on 
September 2002, TAI drafted Thailand’s first automotive master plan.
5.3.4.1 The Thai Automotive Master Plans
In 1999, the first five-year master plan (2002-2006) was prepared as a roadmap 
for the Thai automotive industrial development (personal interview with the Acting 
Director of TAI, November 20, 2004). It was the first time that the Thai government 
assigned an organization such as TAI to develop such a plan:
“... Thailand does not have an Industrial Master Plan that can be 
regarded as the strategic outlines of her national industrialisation policy 
[for the automobile industry]. The first of such an Industrial Master
172 Since 2002, the AEDP has been effective in upgrading the local auto-part firms, especially the SMEs, 
who lacked experience in continuous improvement activities and other simple routine production and 
organization management capabilities (personal interview with Firm CSP General Manager, December 
15,2004).
139
Plan in the Automobile Industry was proposed by Thailand Automotive 
Institute to the Ministry of Industry after Thailand committed to [full] 
liberalisation in 2000” [italics added] (Abdulsomad, 2003: 81).
The MOI assigned TAI to undertake this master plan to be in accordance with the 9th
National Social and Economic Development Plan. The vision for Thai automotive
industry by year 2011 is to become “the automotive production base in Asia that adds
value to the country with strong domestic supplier base” and the four objectives are
(TAI, 2002b: 2):
• Thailand will produce at least one million vehicles per year (700,000 one-ton 
pick-up trucks and 300,000 passenger cars) with total production value of more 
than 500 billion Baht. Forty percent of which will be exported within 2006.
• Thailand will produce at least two million motorcycles per year with total 
production value of more than 100 billion Baht. Twenty percent of which will 
be exported by 2006.
• Thailand will produce internationally-recognized and standardized replacement 
equipment manufacturing (REM) parts with exports value of more than 200 
billion Baht by 2006.
• Thailand will have the capability to produce auto vehicles and parts with local 
value added of more than 60 percent by 2006 [italics added].
And the two main corresponding strategies are (TAI, 2002b: 2-4):
• Creating a predictable environment for business operations in the Thai 
automotive industry
• Enhancing the competitiveness of Thai auto-part industry
On February 28, 2006, the TAI had arranged a meeting to accomplish two objectives: 
to evaluate the outcome of the first master plan and to draft a second five-year plan 
(2007-2011) (Tiasiri, 2006).
5.3.4.2 The Challenge of Human Resource Development
A shortage of trained human resources has been major problem for Thailand 
industrial development and the automotive industry is no exception (Gearing, 2000; 
Poapongsakom, 2004; UNCTAD, 2003). The specialist training course such as 
Automotive Engineering has been severely limited. Among all the universities in
173 The production volume of 1.12 million vehicles per year was accomplished by the end of 2005 and a 
forecast of 1.24 million units vehicle sales is anticipated for 2006 (Prachachart Turakij, 2005; TAI, 
2005c)
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Thailand, Chulalongkorn University is the only one with four-year Automotive 
Engineering curriculum (TAI, 2004d), and since 1994, Toyota Motor Thailand has 
been collaborating with Chulalongkorn by providing instructors and design courses for 
Automotive Engineering students (UNCTAD, 2003: 57). Apart from Automotive 
Engineering, Toyota has signed a memorandum of understanding with Thammasat 
University to develop the Industrial Engineering department. Dissatisfied with the poor 
public support, in 1996 Toyota developed its own technical training center, which can 
issues certificates to those who pass its course (Ibid.). Thus it could be argued that this 
private sector firm is quite active in the human resource development programs.
On the policy side, one way of developing human resource is to setup a national 
strategic human resource development plan together with a strong leader, a “HR 
champion”, to push the plan forward. The plan should include a detailed outline of the 
upgrading strategies for improving the skill and competencies of the existing workforce 
within the automotive industry. It should also define the competency gaps, and look at 
competencies at different levels (for e.g. operational and managerial levels). In 
addition, this human resource development plan also needs multilateral cooperation 
among agencies, organizations (in particular TAI), and firms in order to function 
properly (Hongladarom, 2002: 10-11).
Following such recommendation, on December 2, 2003, the MOI established a 
strategic committee for automobiles174. The objective of the committee is to oversee 
that the implementation of the “Detroit of Asia” plans and to effectively reach the 
planned targets (Panthong, 2005b: 90).
5.3.5 Summary and Implications on Firm Learning
By 2006, the Thai automotive industry certainly had achieved the following:
• Economies of scale in one-ton pick-up trucks production via establishment of 
global production base and exports.
• Massive FDI from multinational carmakers around the world -  virtually all 
brands have invested in Thailand.
• For the first time in Thai automotive history, the production volume for 2005 
has exceeded one million units.
174 It comprised various people from different organizations such as TAI, TAPMA, AIC, APIC, BOI, 
Department of Industrial Promotion, Office of Industrial Economics, and a few private firms (TAI, 
2004g).
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Despite the achievements, the remaining challenges include:
• The Dean from Kellogg Business School commented on Thai firms’ R&D 
capabilities:
“Although most global automotive giants have established their 
production bases in Thailand, they still have not transferred any know­
how [on design technology]. He asserted that the key for a sustainable 
‘Detroit of Asia’ was to have product design and research and 
development move their base to Thailand as well” (Pandey, 2002; 
Pamsoonthorn, 2002).
• The government measures to ensure that carmakers take “deep root” within 
Thailand and enhance knowledge spillovers to local firms are lacking (personal 
interview with ex-TAI advisor , April 6, 2004). Without deep roots, the 
multinational carmakers could easily shift their established production base to 
other larger, more attractive emerging markets such as India or China; this is the 
latent risk facing the industry.
• The TAI, TAIA, an independent policy analyst, and an academic pointed out the 
following challenges (Brimble, 2002; Chaithirapinyo, 2002; Vanichseni and 
Tiasiri, 2002):
o Weak and disconnected R&D
o Inadequate skilled workers and lack of coordination among training 
centers
o Weak Automotive Engineering related curriculums at the university 
level
o Some vehicle models lack the necessary production economies of scale 
o For SMEs (auto-part firms) they need assistance in linking up with the 
multinational carmakers and programs for human resource development 
for their technical and marketing personnel 
o Taxes and tariffs for the automotive industry are generally high and have 
very complicated structures (Sutivong, 2002; TAI, 2003i). 
o The basic infrastructures are either unavailable or inadequate (Sutivong, 
2002).
175 This is the well-known Business School of Northwestern University in Illinois, USA.
176 The ex-TAI advisor earned a doctoral degree from Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), the 
University of Sussex in the UK. At the time of this writing, he was involved in the energy-conservation 
project with a first-tier auto-part firm based in Thailand.
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The transfer of product design and the R&D activities did not fully take place in 
Thailand because: 1) the low level of Thailand’s readiness and capability to conduct the 
R&D activities and 2) the issue of sharing of R&D activities between Japan and 
Thailand was not yet decided by the Japanese executives, as of now the engineers in 
Thailand are only allowed to participate in very little portion of the total R&D activities 
(personal interview with Japanese expert advisor at TAI, December 20, 2004).
From the past achievements and remaining challenges above, the automotive 
industry upgrading strategies (or policies) will need to address the opportunities for the 
indigenous auto-part firms to “link up” with foreign carmakers (customers), to acquire 
the necessary know-how on process and product design, and finally, to create final 
product that satisfy their customers. These industry-level strategies can only provide 
either incentives or infrastructural support to enable firms to develop the capacities to 
compete, and it is only a portion of the whole solution. Irrespective of these policies’ 
content and implementation, it is the Thai firms themselves who ultimately must act 
and want to be involved in such upgrading process.
Here the issue of firms’ competitive and learning strategies is definitely 
important, since the learning engaged by these firms will involve their abilities to 
timely monitor the changes within the external environment as well as the assessment 
of their own internal resources and capabilities to seize emerging business opportunities 
or to neutralize the upcoming threats. Firms that failed to take into account this aspect 
of competitive and learning strategies will most certainly be the ones that suffered from 
a slow rate of capability accumulation and get “lock in” to produce low-value added 
products. Until they realized the strategic importance of learning and embarked on the 
change process, this “lock in” will tend to continue.
5.4 Summary: Shifting Importance of Firms’ Strategies, 
Learning, and Capability Development
On the whole, the importance of firms’ learning, both strategy and activities, 
shifted from that of limited learning within a highly protected automotive industry to 
significant learning that is highly liberalized (see Table 5.6). As the above analysis had 
shown during 1960s to late 1980s, the Thai automotive firms (both carmakers and auto­
part firms) had very little pressure to learn. The market was domestically focused with
177 This advisor was formerly a Managing Director of Hino Motors (Japan) for more than 30 years.
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a high degree of fragmentation and frequent discontinuous learning activities. Since 
the late 1980s, when the Thai government encouraged higher localization of engine 
parts together with the Plaza Accord agreement, the Japanese carmakers began to 
augment their investment in Thailand and shifted their strategies from the domestic to 
the export market. The carmakers and auto-part firms were then required to understand 
the concept of product quality and cost deemed suitable for export. This prerequisite 
was an impetus for more intensive strategic effort invested in learning activities. 
Furthermore during the early 1990s liberalization policies, when the government started 
to lower the import duties and exposed the locally-made products to competition from 
imported products, the Thai firms were pressured to exert even higher efforts to learn. 
The 1997 crisis also served as an impetus to firm learning. Since the domestic market 
collapsed, the main survival route was to export.
Today, the Thai automotive industry is ripe with a multitude of learning 
opportunities. With the active role of TAI and the increasing presence of multinational 
firms’ R&D facilities178, Thai auto-part firms could enhance their competitiveness by 
collaborating with carmakers to oversee a profitable venture for all. More than ever, 
there is increasing evidence that some Thai auto-part firms actively engaged in building 
up their capabilities and invested in learning efforts to build capabilities in order to 
deliver exceptional value to their customers, both overseas buyers and the domestic 
carmakers. This evidence at the firm-level will be provided in Chapters 6 to 8.
178 For instance in mid-2005, Toyota officially opened its Toyota Technical Center Asia Pacific in 
Thailand (TTC-AP) (Thailand4.com, 2005). This center will perform R&D related activities (for e.g. 
vehicle base model development) and respond to the diversifying and increasingly sophisticated demands 
of the Asian markets. Additionally, this center will conduct extensive training of its employees which 
include: in-depth tuition covering vehicle components, language training, and professional skills 
development (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2005).
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Chapter 6 -  Firm Competitive and Learning Strategies -
The objective of this chapter is to describe and then analyze the differences in firm- 
level competitive and learning strategies of the nine case study companies over their 
lifetime. These findings will set the stage for the description of firm learning activities and 
capability development in Chapter 7, and the analysis in Chapter 8. Since the start dates 
and ages of the case study companies are different, common phases were defined to assist 
in the organization of the empirical findings and the analysis (see Table 6.1). There are 
three common phases:
Table 6.1 The Main Common Phases for Each Case Study Firm
Start-up Phase Expansion Phase Adaptation phase
Firm AH17’ 1979 to 1988 1989 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm CPC 1965 to 1970 1971 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm CSP 1995 to 2001 2002 to 2004 2005 to current
Firm D180 1966 to 1979 1980 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm L 1972 to 1990 1991 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm S181 1941 to 1965 1966 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm SOM 1990 to 1995 1996 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm TKT 1973 to 1990 1991 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Firm TS182 1960 to 1980 1981 to pre-1997 crisis Post-1997 crisis
Source: own elaboration based on the research
• The start-up phase
This covers the firm competitive and learning strategies of the entrepreneur(s) (the 
company founder) prior to the firm incorporation date as well as the first few years 
of the firm’s establishment.
• The expansion phase
This covers the period during which the firm strategies include plans for business 
expansion, usually in production capacity and/or product diversification. This phase, 
for most of the firms, coincides with the industry’s import substitution policy (i.e. 
prior to 1985) as well as the transition into the export-oriented regime during the 
rapid growth years (i.e. 1985 to pre-1997 crisis)
179 Sometimes refer to as Firm AH Group.
180 Sometimes refer to as Firm D Group.
181 Sometimes refer to as Firm S Group.
182 Sometimes refer to as Firm TS Group.
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• The adaptation phase183
This covers the time period from post-1997 crisis onwards, including the more 
recent stage of development. This phase, for most firms, will coincide with the 
Thai automotive industry approaching a full liberalization status, inclusive of a 
complete abandonment of local content requirements since 2000.
The chapter concludes with a summary (Table 6.5) on the emerging patterns of firm-level 
learning strategy, aiming to discern the differences in the key characteristics of learning 
strategy between the firms.
6.1 Learning Strategy During the Start-up Phase
6.1.1 Firm AH Group (1979-1988)
External Factors Shaping Firm AH Group Strategies
In the late 1980s, the Thai automotive industry had low production volume and the 
challenge was to reach the minimum economies of scale184. Firm AH Group product 
addressed this small market characteristic when it designed low-volume jigs, a niche 
product with few competitors. For each car model, there was low volume production and
IOC
thus the need for low-volume jigs . The Group1 s low-volume jig was unique and could 
manage to simultaneously keep the cost low and operate at low production rates, without 
sacrificing the product quality.
After the Plaza Accord Agreement in 1985, many Japanese carmakers and their 
associated suppliers invested in a Thai manufacturing facility. Due to the limited domestic 
market, these carmakers also had plans to collaborate regionally and to build an export 
base. Firm AH Group’s President had been involved with the automotive industry for 
almost a decade and understood the Japanese OEMs move towards an export strategy. In 
1988, the Group’s President intended to do the same by laying down the export strategy for
183 The word “adaptation” was used instead o f “liberalization” because in Chapter 5 liberalization was used to 
mean the liberalized automotive industry. Here in Chapter 6, the focus is on the firm and not the industry. 
Therefore, the adaptation o f  firms’ strategies is more appropriate.
184 Janssen (1987) reported that in the late 1980s Thai automotive industry had a small market size with 
100,000 vehicles sold annually. This leads to the problem fragmentation cross vehicle makes and models (see 
Chapter 5 for more discussion)
185 Here low volume means at a production rate o f  about 10 cars an hour (which is typical o f  any assembly 
plants in most Southeast Asian countries). This is in contrast to high volume production in Japan and USA 
where production rate is at about 50 to 60 cars per hour (Fairclough, 1995).
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the Thai-made auto-parts. To ensure successful export, the Group needed to ensure that the 
quality and manufacturing cost of his product was at least as competitive as his regional 
competitors. The President186 realized that he had to build a talented team of managers, 
design engineers, and technicians to accomplish the export task.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Having been in the automotive dealership (both in Malaysia and Thailand) for 
almost a decade, Firm AH Group’s President decided that the strategic goal of further 
development of his business lay in the auto-part manufacturing business. He realized that 
the Thai automotive market was small and lacked production economy of scale; thus the 
manufacturing business must target the export market. In order to ensure successful 
transition from a mere automotive dealership and engage in auto-part manufacturing 
business and export, Firm AH Group’s President delineated the following as the firm 
capability gaps.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
There were two strategic capability gaps. First was the lack of manufacturing 
experience. Since 1979, Firm AH Group had never been involved in any manufacturing 
businesses; all of its industrial experience was related to simple business of automotive 
dealership. However, the involvement with car dealership enabled the Group to establish 
linkages with the executives of several carmakers (Ford and Mazda). This assisted the 
Group in the search strategy and later on the acquisition of OEM manufacturing experience.
Second is the lack of capable human resources. Since the Thai automotive industry 
during the 1980s was small, all the universities lacked formal training courses in 
automotive engineering and it was not economically feasible for firms to invest large sum 
of money into formal training courses. To overcome this problem, using the information 
provided by the contacts from the automotive dealership business, the Group planned an 
acquisition of a Thai manufacturing firm187. Such acquisition will provide the Group with 
the experienced engineers and technicians that belong to the acquired firm. The Group
186 From here onwards, the words “President” will be used to refer to the President o f the particular case study 
firm under investigation. For instance, in section 6.1.1 “President” means “Firm AH’s President” and in 
section 6.1.2 “President” means “Firm CPC’s President”, and so on.
187 Firm AH Group’s President is somewhat a firm believer in strategic acquisition rather than a “greenfield” 
investment. He stated that buying up a firm is much quicker than starting a new one, in terms o f building 
human resources and operational capacity (Anonymous, 2004d).
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planned to engage these personnel in intensive, internal trainings and continuous 
improvement activities; the firm also provided incentives to retain the skilled workers.
6.1.2 Firm CPC (1965-1970)
External Factors Shaping Firm CPC Strategies
In 1965, the Thai automotive industry was in its infancy stage with: l) newly 
launched investment promotion policy, 2) a handful of automotive assemblers were 
established and 3) local content requirements (LCR) were in the early planning stage. With 
such meagre industrial development, Firm CPC learning strategy did not focus on auto-part 
industry at all. It was focusing on the production of household plastic goods and plastic 
children toys (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
Competitive and Learning Goals
During its start-up period, Firm CPC did not aim to supply any auto-parts and there 
was no strategic goal related to learning the production of auto-parts. Firm CPC wished to 
produce simple household plastic goods and planned to engage in sporadic, trial and error 
process improvement activities. Overall the firm learning strategy lacked an explicit 
strategic goal for process and product improvement plans and had no initial focus on the 
automotive parts.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
During its start-up, Firm CPC lacked sufficient manufacturing experience on even 
the simple plastic parts. The firm suffered from poor quality product produced using the 
manual injection machines. In addition, often times the firm could not manufacture, 
maintain or adapt the plastics injection mold. To remedy these problems, Firm CPC 
planned to hire foreign experts (Hong Kong and Chinese) to assist with the production 
process operations (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004). 
Furthermore, through expert assistance, Firm CPC also planned to engage in much learning 
by trial and error and experimentation; there was neither systematic process improvement 
nor any product improvement activities. Moreover, the production of auto-parts during the 
start-up period was mostly nonexistent.
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6.1.3 Firm CSP (1995-2001)
External Factors Shaping Firm CSP Strategies
Since the early-1990s, the Thai automotive industry had been approaching a 
liberalized regime. The liberalized measures included: a) the 1993 decision to abandon 
restrictions on foreign equity, thus opening for 100 per cent foreign share ownership in the 
automobile assembly; b) the free entry of assembly plants in March 1994 and c) the 
decision to totally cancel the local content requirements (LCR) by year 2000 (Lauridsen, 
2000: 31). In addition Thailand was committed to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA), which was established since 1992 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002). In responding to 
these industrial changes, Firm CSP promptly invested in the ISO 9000 quality accreditation 
and received the accreditation in 2001 (from www.tisi.go.th. accessed March 15, 2006).
Hence it could be said that during start-up phase, Firm CSP was well aware of the 
liberalized regime and the urgent need to plan its learning strategy to include accreditation 
of the internationally, well-accepted quality standard. But having started as a small family 
operated business, Firm CSP lacked the awareness that hiring the knowledge workers such 
as engineering graduates is crucial to the success in upgrading the quality standards. It was 
not until during the expansion phase that Firm CSP started to realize the importance of 
human resources and their continuous, systematic training.
Competitive and Learning Goals
The General Manager of Firm CSP had been working as an engineer in an 
aluminium die-casting company; he had extensive experience on the manufacturing process 
of aluminium products. But he lacked the experience in running his own business and 
supplying the OEM auto-parts to the carmakers, as a first-tier supplier. Hence the strategic 
goal of Firm CSP during the start-up phase was to acquire the technical knowledge on the 
aluminium die casting manufacturing experience, particularly for the supply of OEM auto­
parts as first-tier supplier. The firm planned to adjust itself to the ‘OEM culture’ of low 
cost, high quality and good punctuality.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
During its start-up, Firm CSP lacked systematic work arrangement to undertake the
large-scale production of OEM auto-parts and electrical appliance parts. This was part of
the reason why it undertook the ISO 9000 accreditation project. Moreover, in the near
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future, Firm CSP planned to engage in more systematic quality accreditation system to 
secure its status as a capable, OEM auto-part supplier. Firm CSP lacked the strategic focus 
and production experience on becoming a first-tier auto-part supplier; it would supply 
virtually any customers (not limited to just auto-parts, but include electrical appliance and 
electronics parts). This was because the firm needed to ensure substantial early cash inflows 
to meet its scheduled financial payback period (personal interview with Firm CSP General 
Manager, December 15, 2004).
6.1.4 Firm D Group (1966-1979)
External Factors Shaping the Firm D Group Strategies
In 1964, the Thai Office of Industrial Economics promoted the establishment of the 
motorcycle assembly plants, and later in 1971 the Ministry of Industry (MOI) announced 
the first motorcycle industry policy with local content requirements (LCR) of 50 per cent, 
to be achieved by 1973 (OIE, 2004: 6). About four years later, the MOI required that the 
motorcycle parts LCR be subject to a phased increase to reach at least 70 per cent within 
1979; this applied to all existing motorcycle assemblers. This early localization policy 
shaped the learning strategy of Firm D Group. The President said:
“Once the Thai government announced the phased increase in LCR, by 1977 
the Suzuki motorcycle maker had invited its first-tier affiliated supplier,
Nissin Kogyo (Japan), to come and invest in a manufacturing facility in 
Thailand. This prompted the Japanese to search for appropriate Thai firm 
[i.e. Firm D Group] as a potential joint venture partner” (personal interview 
with Firm D Group’s President, May 12, 2004).
By implementing the joint venture learning strategy, Firm D Group was planning for the
future collaborative learning opportunities open up through future technical collaboration
with the Japanese experts. It could be said that Firm D Group was quite alert to changes in
the industrial environment and searched for more learning as well as future business
opportunities.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm D Group’s early strategic goal was to form foreign joint ventures, and to gain a 
secure foothold in the manufacturing of original equipment manufacturing (OEM) 
motorcycle and auto-parts. The foreign joint venture was intended to facilitate the
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transition from an aftermarket (REM) auto-part distributorship to a manufacturing business. 
The following perspective on foreign joint venture was expressed:
“The purpose of a joint venture is to create a win-win situation for all the 
partners. Each partner must be fully committed to contribute equally in the 
venture. The mutual benefit must exist and fairly distributed across the 
partners” (personal interview with Firm D Group’s President, May 12,
2004).
Both Firm D’s President and his older brother thought that the future business opportunities 
lie not only in the REM auto-part distributorship, but also in the investment of a joint 
venture OEM auto-part manufacturing (Ibid.).
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having been in the auto-part trading (aftermarket) business since 1966, Firm D 
Group was quite accustomed to the imported auto-parts. However, since the firm had not 
been involved in the auto-part manufacturing business, it lacked the technical knowledge 
and experience needed to produce the high-quality OEM auto-parts. To remedy such 
weakness, Firm D Group learning strategy was to have its employees and President trained 
in the production technology in Japan. Firm D Group’s President and his older brother 
were good friends of a Japanese firm and planned to invite this firm to invest in a joint 
venture. During the start-up phase, Firm D Group’s President stayed in Japan for two years, 
during which he received extensive, technical training on-the-job. After two years, he was 
fluent in speaking and listening in Japanese language (though could not formally read and 
write). The President described his experience,
“My elder brother had requested me to travel to Japan soon after I finished 
my junior grade in high school and once in Japan I stayed at the house 
owned by the President of the Japanese firm. Since I was trained in a hands- 
on manufacturing environment, most of the learning activities were 
conducted on-the-job; there were no formal lecture theatres or textbooks”
(personal interview with Firm D Group’s President, May 12, 2004).
After his training, Firm D Group’s President planned to invite the Japanese firm President
to invest in Thailand. The Japanese firm declined the invitation, due to the firm
unprepared-ness for overseas investment activity. It was not until over several years later
that this Japanese firm decided to come and invest in Thailand (Ibid.).
188 In Thai education system, this grade level is called Ma-tha-yom 5.
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6.1.5 Firm L (1972-1990)
External Factors Shaping Firm L Strategies
From 1972 to 1980, the significant changes in the Thai automotive industry 
included the introduction of local content requirements (LCR) and the import ban of 
vehicles; these were protective measures to support the import substitution regime. The 
protection measures led to much investment in vehicle assemblers and their foreign 
affiliated suppliers. Most of the production activities were incipient189, simple and involved 
no complex manufacturing process. Following the market trend, Firm L was an 
aftermarket (REM) auto-part trader, supplied simple auto-parts such as tires and wheels. 
Firm L did not have any manufacturing activities. The firm early learning strategy was 
shaped mostly by the President’s experience and passion for automotive wheel and tire 
accessories. But in the mid-1980s, other significant industrial changes comprised the 1985 
Plaza Accord Agreement, the incipient rapid growth of the Thai automotive industry and 
the continued increase of LCR. Consequently many Japanese carmakers and auto-part 
firms were attracted to invest in Thailand. In 1987, Firm L joined the bandwagon and 
expanded through forming a Japanese-Thai joint venture; this was part of its learning 
strategy to upgrade itself, from auto-part trader to a manufacturing firm.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Having been an REM auto-part trader for more than a decade, Firm L decided that it 
wanted to enter into the alloy wheel manufacturing business; this was its strategic goal 
since it expected that future business opportunities lay in manufacturing and not simple 
trading. Firm L also planned to learn the following from its joint venture partner (Manager 
Online, 1994):
• To learn to supply alloy wheels to the Japanese carmakers in Thailand such as 
Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Mitsubishi190
• To learn to manage a large distribution network of more than 400 distributor shops 
in Thailand
189 The word “incipient” refer to the firm’s early stage o f engaging in the activity. For example, “incipient 
production” means the firm had engaged in starting-up a new/improved production process and had not 
gained significant experience in it.
190 This was considered as learning benefit since prior to the joint venture Firm L was only an importer and 
distributor supplying the replacement equipment manufacturing (REM) auto-parts, thus the foreign joint 
venture was the first time that Firm L started to supply auto-parts to the Japanese OEMs.
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To learn to export, with Japan as the firm’s main market
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Firm L lacked the alloy wheel technical knowledge and manufacturing process 
experience; hence, in mid-1980s it planned to engage in a Japanese-Thai joint venture. 
During this period, the joint venture was possible since the Japanese auto-part manufacturer 
had been a close business associate to Firm L (when it was a trading firm) and this Japanese 
firm wanted to expand its manufacturing operation overseas. Involved in a foreign joint 
venture, Firm L had to transform itself from a mere trader to become an active 
manufacturer involved in production technology such as aluminium die-casting. Since the 
joint venture was a supplier to Japanese carmakers, the products had to comply with 
stringent quality control as well as meeting the competitive cost.
6.1.6 Firm S Group (1941-1965)
External Factors Affecting Firm S Group Strategies
During the early 1940s, the Thai automotive industry was virtually non-existent. 
Furthermore, most of the industrial development in Thailand was at a very early stage; 
there were only small pockets of auto-part traders and distributor. It was not until the early 
1960s that the Thai automotive industry started with simple assembly activity. During the 
time, there were no complex manufacturing activities. Most of the vehicles on the road 
were imported. Hence the local trading firms focused on only aftermarket (REM) auto­
parts satisfying the maintenance need of these imported vehicles. In 1941, Firm S was an 
auto-part trader with no manufacturing activities. But once the automotive industry started 
in 1961, Firm S aimed to be involved in auto-part manufacturing business, specialized in 
the production of undercarriage suspension parts.
Competitive and Learning Goals
In the early 1960s, Firm S decided to transition itself from a mere auto-part trader 
into a manufacturer for the REM auto-part market; this was the firm strategic goal. It 
started with the familiar product that the firm used to sell, the leaf springs and other 
undercarriage parts. The transition into manufacturing business was not effortless; Firm S 
planned to import the first lot of machinery from Japan and engaged itself in unpacking the
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technology through trial and error experimentation and informal technical assistance 
offered by the foreign experts.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Realizing that the background of auto-part trading was insufficient to assist in 
successful transition into the manufacturing business, Firm S President (founder) planned 
to engage in more trial and error experimentation with his well-acquainted auto-part, the 
leaf springs. Production in the early days involved much sporadic foreign expert 
assistance. Operating as a small family-run business, the process and product improvement 
plans were at best informal and ad hoc, nothing was systematic during the time. It was not 
until mid-1990s that Firm S Group started to engage in the development of systematic work 
procedures.
6.1.7 Firm SOM (1990-1994)
External Factors Shaping Firm SOM Strategies
The Thai automotive industry during the 1990s underwent incipient liberalization 
(for e.g. the removal of import ban on small car, the commitment to ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) in 1992 and the allowance for foreign firm to hold 100 per cent equity 
ownership in investment, see for example Siroros (1997)). These measures led to rapid 
growth rate of the industry through increased foreign direct investment (FDI). Firm SOM 
President, who had been working within the manufacturing industry for some years, 
decided to set up his own small, job shop producing simple auto-parts. The early learning 
strategy was quite parochial and passive, since at the time Firm SOM had only about 4 to 5 
employees. All employees only had technician background with limited formal education. 
There were no professional managers to guide the firm learning strategy, and the firm 
basically relied on only single production order from its only customer.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Viewing the rapid growth of the Thai automotive industry as future business 
opportunities and having experience working as a technician for other manufacturing firms, 
Firm SOM President set up a small manufacturing facility in 1995 to produce simple auto­
parts (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004). This was 
regarded as a conservative goal, lacking sufficient strategic focus on learning since the Firm
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SOM President neglected (was unaware of) other aspects of running a successful business, 
such as the hiring of capable personnel with sufficient management skills. Since all the 
firm personnel had low formal education and lacked managerial experience, consequently 
there was no one who could precisely formulate the initial, strategic learning goal for Firm 
SOM.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having been a technician with limited exposure to international competitive 
manufacturing processes, Firm SOM President lacked the wider perspective on 
manufacturing excellence and did not fully understand the managerial dimension of a 
business. Furthermore, during start-up, Firm SOM also lacked sufficient financial resource 
to properly invest in a manufacturing facility191. In terms of production order, it relied 
solely on one major customer (personal conversation with TAI Supply Development 
Manager, November 15, 2004). Due to deficient management background and lack of 
employees who are proficient at professional management, Firm SOM had poor search and 
learning strategy. Consequently during its start-up, the firm was unaware of other sources 
of technical knowledge. Firm SOM President was also unaware of any significant, 
technical changes within the competitive environment that could affect the firm future 
business opportunities.
6.1.8 Firm TKT (1973-1990)
Industrial Factor Shaping Firm TKT Strategies
During the 1970s, the Thai automotive industry was small, in terms of production 
volume and domestic demand and the local content requirements (LCR) were in its 
development stage. Most of the auto-parts produced were simple and did not require any 
sophisticated manufacturing technology. Firm TKT was performing simple chromium 
plating of plastic parts, which were either supplied to the local assembly plants or to the 
aftermarket automotive accessories. Therefore, the firm learning strategy during the start­
up focused mostly on simple plating processes and there were no formal plans to either 
implement manufacturing or design activities, and there were no export plans.
191 Firm SOM had debt financing since start-up, the primary lender comprised the banks and its main 
customer, Firm SML (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
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Throughout the 1980s, the automotive industry grew with more manufacturing 
activities, and in the mid-1980s there was a shift from import substitution to export oriented 
promotion. In addition, the 1985 Plaza Accord agreement impacted most Japanese 
carmakers, prompting them to relocate some manufacturing facility overseas (to Thailand) 
(see for example, Terdudomtham (1997)). Responding to these changes, Firm TKT 
increased its production capacity accordingly, but there was nothing substantial in terms of 
investment in new manufacturing plant. Most of the firm production processes still focused 
on simple plating of plastic parts and the substantial plant expansion did not occurred until 
the late 1980s and 1990.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm TKT simply had routine goal of regularly meeting the domestic customer 
demands and there was no specific focus on strategic learning during start-up. Firm TKT 
wanted to produce simple REM auto-parts, satisfying the domestic market, and expanded 
its production accordingly as new demand arose from new investment by the foreign 
carmakers. From 1973 until late 1980s, the sequential plant expansions were not 
significant and the firm did not aim at engaging in substantial OEM auto-part production.
It was not until the early 1990s that Firm TKT engaged in a more systematic production 
process.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having been a simple REM part manufacturer, Firm TKT lacked the capability to 
engage in mass production of auto-parts with systematic quality control. Most of its 
learning strategy focused on trial and error and there was no systematic, strategic learning 
plan. In addition having grown from a small family business, most of its employees had at 
most first-year high school formal education (TAI, 2003i: 7). In addition, sporadic 
technical assistance was sourced from the foreign experts; most of these came from the 
customer OEMs. Until the systematic plant expansion, which occurred in 1990, Firm TKT 
learning strategy was at best ad hoc and during start-up phase, there was no systematic 
program to ensure the systematic accumulation of technical knowledge.
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6.1.9 Firm TS Group (1960-1980)
External Factors Shaping Firm TS Group Strategies
Both Firm TS President and his elder brother knew that within the Thai automotive 
industry there were two important changes during the 1960s and 1970s: the government 
investment promotion policies and the imminent increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
by the Japanese carmakers. During the mid-1970s, Thai government policy was keen on 
increasing the local content requirements (LCR) as well as encouraging the production of 
import-substituted auto-parts in order to reduce the country severe problem of budget 
deficit. These two conditions had dramatically shaped Firm TS Group early learning 
strategy.
In 1977 when Firm TS Group just started, the Thai government had been 
implementing the local content requirements (LCR) for roughly two years. And in 1978 
the minimum LCR were subjected to a phased increase to 50 per cent by 1983 (see for 
example, OIE (2004)). Hence many Japanese auto-parts and vehicle assembly firms were 
on the lookout to either invest in wholly owned subsidiaries or form joint ventures with 
Thai firm and invested in the manufacturing facility. Firm TS Group was considered as an 
attractive candidate for joint venture; “The Japanese companies see the potential of the 
motorcycle seat maker [i.e. Firm TS Group] ... and that this could be good future supplier; 
the [J]192 family enter auto-part business from that day onwards” (Panthong, 2005a: 43). 
Since the early days, Firm TS President viewed the Japanese joint ventures as a learning 
opportunity and promptly seized it through the signing many joint venture agreements. In 
addition for Japanese firms, who did not prefer to invest in joint ventures, Firm TS Group 
had agreed to sign the technical assistance agreements. All these technical collaboration 
agreements (joint venture and technical assistance) formed a major part of Firm TS Group 
early learning strategy.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Since its inception in 1977, Firm TS Group learning strategy consciously aimed to 
gain more technical knowledge on the motorcycle parts production and later to use such 
knowledge to diversify to produce other products (automobile parts, electrical appliance,
192 As part of an agreement with the Australian National University’s Ethics Committee, the family name has 
to remain anonymous.
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agricultural engine parts and plastic auto-parts). Despite its origin as a small family 
business, Firm TS Group goal was strategic since it was planned (each joint venture served 
a knowledge-acquisition purpose) and addressed the significant technical capability gap, 
and furthermore, executed to ensure effective technology transfer.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having operated the small job shop and manufacturing of REM auto-parts, Firm TS 
Group, during the start-up phase, lacked the necessary technical knowledge and experience 
in the OEM auto-part manufacturing process. Firm TS Group planned to set up more 
foreign joint ventures, each engaging in different business group, producing different 
products. In this way, each firm could achieve a much more efficient technology transfer 
from the foreign firms, and contributed positively to the corporate group as a whole. Each 
firm would be responsible for its own technical collaboration, be it a formal technical 
assistance or license agreement(s) or joint venture agreemcnt(s). Each firm was responsible 
for interacting with the foreign, dispatched engineers and experts, trying to acquire and 
absorb the technical knowledge. In addition, each firm participated in sending its engineers 
overseas to absorb the technical knowledge.
6.1.10 Summary of Different Firm Strategies (start-up phase)
The pattern of competitive and learning strategies of the nine case study firms 
during the start-up phase is summarized in Table 6.2. During this phase, none of the firms 
engaged in formal planning of comprehensive or ambitious learning strategies. Some of the 
firms (Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, Firm L, and Firm S Group; see Table 6.2) were in 
transition from a small auto-part trader (dealership) to an auto-part manufacturing firm 
(either foreign joint venture or wholly Thai-owned). Other firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, 
Firm SOM, Firm TKT and Firm TS Group) were planning (or attempting) gradual business 
expansion from small job shops to becoming OEM auto-part manufacturers. All firms had 
competitive and learning goals that focused on the acquisition of routine production 
knowledge through two primary means: learning by trial and error (experimentation with 
small batch production) and, to varying degrees, sporadic sourcing of foreign, external 
expertise.
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With regard to the capability gap, all firms lacked a strong foundation on the 
manufacturing experience. But some firms were particularly deficient. For example, Firm 
SOM seemed to be the most deficient. It lacked basic manufacturing experience and also 
lacked a strategic perspective on learning to prepare itself for future business opportunities. 
In contrast, Firm AH Group, Firm D Group and Firm TS Group had been highly 
opportunistic and entrepreneurial, developing learning strategies that incorporated wide 
local networks (politically and economically). These firms were always on the lookout for 
new business opportunities and learning. Although these firms lacked OEM manufacturing 
capability and higher-level technical knowledge, they used their business networks and 
entrepreneurial skills to search for resources (usually outside the firm) to upgrade their 
learning strategies and direct a focus on the internal capability gaps. These firms were able 
to balance the trade-offs between exploitation (i.e. leveraging off current capabilities) and 
exploration (i.e. formulating plans on capability building for future opportunities) as well as 
creating synergy between the internal and external sources of knowledge.
6.2 Strategies During the Firm Expansion Phase
6.2.1 Firm AH Group (1989 - pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm AH Group Strategies
Thai government policy in the late 1980s was to shift its industrialization strategy 
from import substitution to export-oriented industrialization. Firm AH Group’s President 
made some prudent speculation about Ford establishing its production (export) base in 
Thailand, and Firm AH exports started well before the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the 
President did not wait passively for the export industrial policy; he searched for the export 
markets while this policy was in its planning stage. In his words,
“To us, it is becoming apparent that the Japanese have plans to make 
Thailand an offshore export base for cars, and it makes sense,... And if one 
has to withstand the Japanese competition, one has to do the same [i.e. Firm 
AH has to start its export activity]” (Rainat, 1988).
Consequently, it could be said that Firm AH Group had early plans for becoming an
exporter of the auto-parts.
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Competitive and Learning Goals
These thoughts led Firm AH to embark on an outward-looking learning strategy and 
set up a strategic goal, focusing on producing world-class products that are suitable for 
export. To Firm AH Group’s President, producing export-quality auto-parts was a 
realizable, stretched goal, and similarly, he wanted to engage in the search for capable 
engineers and technical managers capable of managing the engineering tooling design 
activities. In addition to incipient export planning, Firm AH also planned to increase its 
domestic market share, attempting to supply automotive jigs to virtually all the 
carmakers193.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since its inception in 1986, Firm AH Group had very little experience in producing 
auto-parts and tooling for export; it lacked the engineering capability to produce export- 
quality product and similarly it also lacked the human resources and the ability to achieve 
indigenous tooling design capability. But by the early 1990s, after an extensive 
international search for capable human resources, Firm AH Group’s President formed a 
capable international team of engineers and technical managers. The Group partially 
achieved a design capability by moving up from receiving just a detailed technical drawing 
to a conceptual drawing194.
In addition, Firm AH Group’s President was very outward looking and searched for 
opportunities to acquire or form a joint venture with other firms that would strengthen his 
auto-part business group. Firm AH Group had positive attitudes toward forming foreign 
joint ventures, and considered that such joint venture is an important learning strategy with 
at least many benefits (Anonymous, 1997b).
193 During its start-up, Firm AH supplied automotive tooling (jigs and dies) to only Ford and Mazda. Now it 
wanted to supply these products to the other carmakers, including the luxury and quality-conscious European 
carmakers.
194 Here a conceptual drawing, supplied by the carmakers, does not contain the detailed specifications. Firm 
AH Group had to fill in these specifications; the Group had achieved this in its low-volume jig design and 
thus constitutes evidence that the firm had improved its design capability.
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6.2.2 Firm CPC (1971 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm CPC Strategies
Throughout the 1970s, the Thai automotive industry had two significant changes: 
the implementation of the local content requirements (LCR) and the incipient production 
expansion through increased FDI in automotive assembly plants. Similarly, on the 
electrical appliance industry, the foreign firms had decided to invest in Thailand and set up 
more assembly plants195 (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18,
2004). Firm CPC had shifted its learning strategy in response to a business expansion 
strategy based on related product diversification. The expansion strategy involved two 
projects: the diversification of Firm CPC product and the establishment of a new joint 
venture firm, Firm BFC196.
The product diversification strategy engaged by Firm CPC was the production of 
plastic parts for electrical appliance (such as electric fans) and Firm BFC focused on the 
production of a new material, polyurethane foam, which was later used by Firm CPC in the 
production of auto-parts (motorcycle seat). Even though the strategy was product 
diversification per se, the learning associated with the production of these simple plastic 
parts for electrical appliances was proved to be useful preparation for the supply of future 
more complex motorcycle and auto-parts.
Competitive and Learning Goals
From 1970s to the pre-1997 years, the Thai auto-part industry had grown, with rapid 
growth during the 1985 to pre-1997 crisis. The goal of Firm CPC was to diversify its 
product offerings to supply plastic parts for electrical appliances (in the 1970s), for 
motorcycle parts (in the 1980s) and automobile parts (in the 1990s). The strategic goal was 
focused solely on product diversification and it was not strictly strategic; it did not plan for 
other managerial dimensions such as human resources development. The goal incorporated
195 The digression here into the electrical appliance and other industrial products was for the purpose o f  
illustrating the path o f the learning strategy o f Firm CPC. It assists in elaborating on the evolution o f Firm 
CPC and its affiliated firms, how they impact on the learning strategy o f Firm CPC.
196 The firm was owned and operated by a family member associated with Firm CPC President. As far as 
degree o f involvement, Firm CPC President was just a passive shareholder o f Firm BFC. There was very 
little collaboration in terms o f technology transfer (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 
18, 2004). It is important to note that Firm CPC and Firm BFC Group existed as independent and separate 
legal entities.
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plans for the purchase of new technology197, but the firm did not plan for the effective 
utilization of such technology, since the quality of skilled human resources was deficient.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
During the 1970s, when Firm CPC started the manufacture of plastic parts for 
electrical appliances, it lacked the ability to design and maintain the plastic injection molds; 
this constituted one significant technical knowledge gap. The firm learning strategy 
involved learning by trial and error and much on-the-job experimentation. Firm CPC 
engineers carried out mold modification and maintenance based on the imported molds.
6.2.3 Firm CSP (2002 -  2004)
External Factors Shaping Firm CSP Strategies
After 2000, the Thai automotive industry was completely liberalized with the full 
abandonment of local content requirements (LCR). Since start-up and during business 
expansion, Firm CSP prepared to become a capable OEM auto-part supplier by engaging in 
systematic work documentation and obtaining quality accreditation such as the ISO 9000, 
which was achieved in less than one year after initial start-up.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm CSP planned to move up the supplier tier structure by gaining more 
international quality accreditation. It had a competitive goal to meet all the minimum 
hurdles (good quality, low cost and on-time delivery) to become a competent OEM auto­
part supplier and aimed to increase its domestic market share, supplying more OEM auto­
parts to virtually all the carmakers. During the expansion phase, Firm CSP did not plan for 
learning any export activity nor did it plan to learn substantial design activities.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Due to a lack of systematic work standards, Firm CSP lacked the ability to maintain 
continuous manufacturing cost reduction, to improve auto-part quality, and to meet the 
targeted on-time delivery, as requested by the carmakers. To close this capability 
(knowledge) gap, Firm CSP planned to collaborate actively (and continuously) with several
197 About a year prior to the 1997 financial crisis, Firm CPC planned to invest in the modem manufacturing 
tools such as CAD and CNC machines.
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1 Qßpublic organizations , devising methods to meet the challenge of continuous cost 
reduction while maintaining product quality and on-time delivery.
6.2.4 Firm D Group (1980 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm D Group Strategies
Due to the continuous phased increase in LCR for both automobiles and 
motorcycles throughout the latter half of 1970s and the 1980s, most Japanese carmakers 
decided on the development of a low-cost vehicle capable of using higher local content and 
had a lower selling price suitable for most Asian markets199. In the early 1990s, Honda 
planned to develop its City model, and Toyota also planned to launch its Soluna model.
The awareness of the Japanese carmakers’ localization strategy enabled Firm D Group’s 
President to identify a learning opportunity. He actively searched for capable foreign 
engineers as well as extensively negotiated with these carmakers to allow his engineering 
team the opportunity to engage in learning simple auto-part design activities.
Competitive and Learning Goals
There were two strategic goals. The competitive goal was the formation of new 
Japanese joint ventures. Many Japanese small firms wanted to establish a manufacturing 
base in Thailand, but they were unsure of how to cope with the local bureaucratic issues. In 
his words, Firm D Group’s President described the situation during the late 1980s and early 
1990s:
“I thought to myself that each small-to-medium-sized Japanese firm 
contained its own accumulated technical know-how. The issue was how can 
we interest them [the Japanese firms] to come and invest in a joint venture in 
Thailand since most of them were afraid of excessive overhead costs in 
dealing with the bureaucratic processes such as the Board of Investment 
(BOI) applications, employees salary and the search for capable and 
qualified human resource” (personal interview with Firm D Group’s 
President, May 12, 2004).
The learning goal was the planned engagement in product design activities; Firm D 
Group’s President decided that he wanted to move up the technological ladder, from a mere 
OEM producer to having its own tooling and product design capability. The formal 
technical assistance project was formed between the Honda (automobiles) R&D Unit and
198 These are public organizations such as NSTDA and TAI.
199 The Japanese carmakers dubbed the product, the “Asian car” (Panichapat and Kanasawat, 1997: 23).
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Firm D Group. The project, the development of a parking hand brake design, was 
commenced during the early 1990s.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since Firm D Group’s President wanted to engage in more foreign joint ventures in 
a systematic way, the firm lacked the administrative system to handle the general 
management issues. Fie decided to set up two administrative firms (Firm CKB and Firm 
MNIH) to oversee the formation of such joint ventures (personal interview with Firm D 
Group’s President, May 12, 2004). In addition, the purpose of forming many new joint 
ventures was to support the technical knowledge gaps on the design capability. In addition, 
the President also planned an investment in a new firm, Firm D-tec, to engage in 
automotive tooling design and manufacturing. Firm D-tec will act as an internal supporting 
department for the increasing product design activities.
6.2.5 Firm L (1991 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm L Strategies
By the early 1990s, the Thai automotive industry was partially liberalized with high 
growth prospects. In 1990, Firm L was established as a separate, independent firm from the 
previously dissolved Japanese-Thai joint venture; the learning orientation shifted from that 
of a joint venture (dependent) to that of an independent Thai-owned firm. During the first- 
half of the 1990s, the marketing plan was to supply wheels to the replacement equipment 
manufacturing (REM) market and implement the new production technology. The supply 
to the REM market was a good start since it did not require high quality, cost, or on-time 
delivery as required by the OEMs. Hence the REM market served as a basic learning 
platform for Firm L to acquire its indigenous production capabilities prior to engaging in 
the more advanced OEM (or export) production capability. Later in the mid-1990s, Firm L 
planned to engage in extensive marketing activities overseas to increase its export volume. 
It also formulated plans to actively upgrade the existing product quality, from a domestic 
REM level to that of export-quality products (personal interview with Firm L Factory 
Manager, May 5, 2004).
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Competitive and Learning Goals
Equipped with modern production technology, Firm L aimed to become an 
independent Thai manufacturing firm producing high-quality aluminium alloy wheel for 
export. Its competitive goal was to achieve a premium brand status. Furthermore, it 
planned to invest heavily in the state-of-the-art production technology to ensure that such a 
strategic goal was achieved. But its learning plans included neither sufficient development 
of the human resources nor its existing suppliers200. It was not until recently that the firm 
started to invest intensively in a formal, human resource training scheme (and a training 
facility).
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since its establishment in the 1990, Firm L had been targeting the domestic auto­
part market, with very little focus on exports. Consequently to successfully export, Firm L 
faced two significant challenges: the product quality must be at an internationally 
acceptable level and the limited overseas marketing activities and narrow distribution 
network led to deficient awareness of customer needs. In addition, since alloy wheels are 
considered as fashion automotive accessories, an awareness of current wheel trends is a 
necessary input to the product design process.
To address the capability gaps, Firm L President engaged in developing a 
systematic work method and international product testing standards. He undertook an active 
overseas travel program, to search for new technology and potential export markets. The 
President started to allocate financial resources for extensive marketing-related travels, both 
domestic and overseas. These marketing activities assisted Firm L in monitoring the shift in 
customer needs. This export activity was crucial for survival during the post-1997 crisis 
years.
6.2.6 Firm S Group (1966 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm S Group Strategies
During the 1970s and the 1980s, there were two main industrial changes that shaped 
Firm S Group learning strategy. First, when the progressive localization scheme became
200 Most o f Firm L suppliers lacked the operational discipline; they tended not to strictly follow the delivery 
schedule and caused much production delay. This was one o f the obstacles that Firm L had to overcome in 
order to be qualified as a capable OEM auto-part supplier (personal interview with Firm L Design Department 
Chief, December 8, 2004).
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effective in the mid-1970s, many Japanese firms decided to comply by investing in more 
local auto-part manufacturing facilities. As a result, some Japanese auto-part suppliers 
decided to provide the technical assistance to Firm S Group and encouraged the Group to 
invest in an expanded, modern manufacturing plant201.
Secondly, the rapid expansion of the Thai automotive industry (during 1985 to pre- 
1997 crisis) had led to increase in FDI by multinational carmakers and global auto-part 
firms. This expansion started since the 1985 Plaza Accord Agreement. Most Japanese 
carmakers planned to relocate some manufacturing activities to Thailand. Together with 
the government’s progressive localization policy, this had bestowed many local Thai firms 
with the learning opportunities through forming new foreign joint ventures202.
Nevertheless the decision of these multinational carmakers to increase their FDI caused 
Thai auto-part suppliers such as Firm S Group to shift from REM to OEM market. The 
shift necessitated a transition in the learning strategy; since as an OEM-parts supplier, Firm 
S Group must comply with a more stringent quality, low cost and on-time delivery (QCD) 
requirements.
In the 1990s, the Thai automotive industry started to liberalize (with continued 
increases in LCR) and many Japanese auto-part firms were interested to invest in Thailand. 
Firm S Group responded by forming new joint ventures. The objective was to acquire 
production know-how related to auto-parts such as aluminium wheels, intake manifolds, 
aluminium castings, and brake parts (Anonymous, 1989a). In addition, during the early- to 
mid-1990s, Firm S Group planned for active engagement in many technical assistance 
agreements; many of which were a renewal of the existing contracts.
Competitive and Learning Goals
To seize the opportunity available within the growing Thai automotive industry, 
Firm S Group had competitive and learning strategies of transitioning from a REM auto­
part supplier to a first-tier OEM auto-part supplier and learning to produce higher quality 
products. The Group foresaw future business opportunities in the continued increase in
201 As for the US and European carmakers, they did very little to comply with the government’s localization 
scheme and by early 1980s some o f them had decided to leave Thai automotive industry altogether.
202 As for the US carmakers, they did not re-enter the Thai automotive market until the early- to mid-1990s; 
and their re-entry strategy was hampered by the 1997 financial crisis (see for example, General Motors, 
Thailand).
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FDI and more production expansion by the carmakers; this will lead to more OEM auto­
part production and sales.
Knowledge Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having been REM auto-part supplier for nearly two decades, Firm S Group lacked 
technical know-how on the OEM auto-part production. It planned to upgrade the 
production process and products to meet the OEM requirements on cost, quality and on- 
time delivery. Firm S Group realized its lack of advanced quality control system and 
systematic work procedures; consequently it planned to obtain international quality 
accreditations. In addition, in the early 1990s Firm S Group planned an investment in a 
computerized quality control system to ensure that its products will meet the strict quality 
standards as imposed by the multinational carmakers; “quality is inspected at almost every 
stage of the production process” (Firm S Group corporate website, accessed March 15, 
2006).
6.2.7 Firm SOM (1995 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm SOM Strategies
The Thai automotive industry during early 1995 to pre-1997 crisis continued to 
grow with much foreign direct investment (FDI) from the multinational carmakers. 
Contrary to industrial growth, Firm SOM, after its incorporation in late 1994, did not 
engage in any substantial business expansion. Likewise it did not actively engage in much 
human resource development program. Its learning strategy was still informal, lacking any 
explicit ambitious goal. This was due to the poor training and awareness of its management 
staff; all had technician background with limited formal education. Similar to the start-up 
phase, Firm SOM lacked professional managers to guide its learning strategy. The firm 
basically relied on production orders from a few firms that Firm SOM President and his 
brothers used to work as former employees. Relying on few large production orders 
exposed Firm SOM to high risk of having such orders cancelled, thus impacting the firm 
cash inflows.
Competitive and Learning Goals
There was no strategic goal. At best, Firm SOM had mostly conservative goals that 
directed the firm to meet the minimum production requirements in general continuous
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improvement activities and lacked specific targets on why such activities should take place. 
Moreover, the firm did not engage in any explicit goal-stretching learning strategy. The 
firm was passively producing according to its main customer (Firm SML) orders; this was 
the firm primary goal. The firm was not aware of the risk exposure due to limited customer 
base. In other words, if anything happen to the sales order from Firm SML, the firm would 
be in serious financial trouble.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since Firm SOM did not have any ambitious goal, it felt that all the production 
operations were meeting the pre-specified targets and that there were no significant threats 
emerging from deficient technical knowledge. The lack of awareness was due to Firm SOM 
President poor managerial capability, lacking the monitoring of the current competitive 
situation. This deficiency was partly due to the President limited training in formal 
education and insufficient externa! linkages.
With vague understanding of the competitive landscape, Firm SOM did not 
formulate any gap-closing strategy to address the existing knowledge weaknesses. For 
instance, Firm SOM did not bother to search for either potential technical assistance or joint 
venture agreements. It solely relied on a single source of informal technical assistance (its 
main customer, Firm SML). Consequently the firm had high risk exposure (having only one 
customer) and was ill-prepared to compete for future business opportunities.
6.2.8 Firm TKT (1991 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm TKT Strategies
The Thai automotive industry started to liberalize in the 1990s with removal of 
import ban on small cars, lowering of tariffs and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1992. The latest liberalization measure imposed by the government was the removal of 
local content requirements (LCR) in 2000. All these had impacted Firm TKT learning 
strategy.
In line with the industrial expansion, Firm TKT learning plan involved two 
significant developments. First was a major manufacturing plant expansion. The new 
facility commenced construction in 1988 and became operational in 1991. It also registered
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a new firm, Firm TKT-PI203, whose operation focused only on export products. To 
significantly export meant that the new firm will receive the tax incentives from the Board 
of Investment (BOI) (SET, 2005b). Second was the formation of Japanese-Thai joint 
venture; the aim was to acquire production know-how in chrome plating process for plastic 
auto-parts.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Having been an REM auto-part supplier for nearly two decades, Firm TKT lacked 
technical know-how for OEM auto-part production. It planned to expand production 
capacity and invested in modern plastic injection machines. Furthermore, it planned to learn 
to perform mold maintenance in-house. These the competitive and learning goals, aimed at 
better meeting the requirements enforced by the foreign OEMs. Though wanting to achieve 
the OEM supplier status, the learning goal did not involve learning from foreign joint 
ventures or soliciting much formal technical assistance. Firm TKT’s interest in foreign 
joint venture was limited until 2004; when the new Managing Director (MD) and Assistant 
MD set new competitive and learning goals.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
The firm lacked the ability to undertake systematic OEM auto-part production. 
Having started as a small family job shop, the firm lacked systematic work standards. To 
close this knowledge deficiency, it engaged in public training courses to focus on the 
development of systematic work procedures and international quality system accreditation. 
In addition, to enable successful penetration into the supplier group of the Japanese 
carmakers, Firm TKT engaged in a new Japanese-Thai joint venture, aiming to learn from 
the expert the chrome-plating process for plastic auto-parts. This was the only formal joint 
venture that occurred, and the firm did not actively search for any more foreign joint 
ventures.
■°3 In 2002, this firm was liquidated with the rationale that the company had decided to focus mostly on the 
domestic auto-part market. This was due to the rapid increase in domestic demand of plastic auto-parts 
caused by establishment o f many export production bases o f the multinational carmakers (SET, 2005b).
172
6.2.9 Firm TS Group (1981 -  pre-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm TS Group Strategies
During the latter half of 1980s, many Japanese carmakers decided to increase 
investment in Thailand as the result of both the 1985 Plaza Accord Agreement as well as 
the booming Thai economy with staggering increases in domestic vehicle sales. Mitsubishi 
was no exception, and it envisaged a bright future for the Thai automotive industry. Firm 
TS Group’s opportunity came in the early 1990s when Mitsubishi had announced its plan to 
set up an export base in the eastern region of Thailand and requested Firm TS Group to 
follow as their first-tier Thai supplier (Anonymous, 1990)204. The Group invested in a new 
production plant (Firm TSLA) suitable for mass production.
By 1993 the government provided generous incentives (investment and tax) for 
foreign carmakers to establish an export production base in Thailand. Mitsubishi responded 
positively with a relocation of its entire one-ton pick-up truck production to Thailand 
(Terdudomtham, 1997). By mid 1990s, other foreign carmakers (such as Isuzu, Toyota, 
Nissan, Ford/Mazda and General Motors) followed suit, establishing Thailand as a regional 
export base of one-ton pick-up trucks. “All (Japanese) manufacturers are now considering 
expansion in this country [Thailand]” (Anonymous, 1993).
These changes had several impacts on the operations of Firm TS Group. It had to 
sharply increase the annual production volume and product diversity and improve auto-part 
quality to match the level required for export. With the entry of the US carmakers205, Firm 
TSLA had to obtain the QS 9000 accreditation in order to successfully be accepted as first- 
tier supplier to the “Big Three” US carmakers206. It could be said that these changes 
impacted Firm TS Group’s learning strategy (making it more aggressive) and had shaped 
the learning path, particularly that of Firm TSLA.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm TS Group had a primary, competitive goal, to remain as a first-tier auto-part 
supplier for all carmakers. It realized that to continue to compete and serve as a first-tier
204 Prior to the public announcement, Mr. S (Mr. P older brother) was already preparing for the big business 
expansion. “[Mr. S] knew that the Japanese automaker [Mitsubishi] planned to relocate its one-ton pick-up 
truck production base from Japan to Thailand” (Panthong, 2005a).
205 Prior to their entry, Firm TS Group had dealt with mainly Japanese carmakers, who required only the 
quality accreditation o f ISO 9000. But the quality requirements imposed by the US carmakers were different.
206 These are “Big Three” US carmakers: General Motors, Ford and DaimlerChrysler.
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supplier, it must “follow source” the auto-parts for carmaker Mitsubishi (the case of Firm 
TSLA). In addition, the Group also realized that as more joint ventures were formed, and 
production tasks accumulated, it needed to learn to set up a formal corporate structure with 
clear demarcation among the business groups, ensuring effective internal corporate division 
of labor; this was its learning goal. The goal underlying the corporate restructuring was 
twofold: to ensure effective technology transfer (and learning) and to enable effective 
management at a corporate level. Hence the competitive and learning goals involved more 
than one focus and involved the long-term ambitious objective in learning the product 
design.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Prior to the establishment of Firm TSLA, the Group lacked the ability to undertake 
a systematic, mass production of OEM auto-parts with strict on-time delivery. To close 
this knowledge deficiency, Firm TSLA is locating literally “next door” to the carmaker 
Mitsubishi207 (researcher’s own direct observation, October 25, 2004) and whenever there 
were any problems regarding the products manufactured, the firm can immediately dispatch 
its own employees to rectify the situation quickly208. During the early expansion phase, 
Firm TS Group had acquired little transfer of technical knowledge through technical 
assistance and joint venture agreements.
In terms of planning for more systematic technology transfer, Firm TS Group 
engaged in new foreign joint ventures and technical assistance agreements. The Group built 
its own engineering team, capable of incipient design of automotive tooling and simple 
auto-parts. Through planned technical collaboration, the engineers and technical managers 
were trained extensively both in-house (on-the-job) and overseas at the carmaker’s parent 
firms (Japan).
6.2.10 Summary of Different Firm Strategies (expansion phase)
During the expansion phase, all firms engaged in active plans to improve their 
existing manufacturing processes.
207 The Mitsubishi carmaker set up its own production cluster, comprising more than 14 companies (including 
several o f Firm TS Group’s subsidiaries).
208 In the Thai automotive business, this policy enacted by both the carmaker and their first-tier supplier is 
called “door to door” policy (own direct observation during Firm TS Group meeting, December 20, 2004).
174
T
ab
le
 6
.3
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 F
ir
m
 S
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
E
xp
an
si
on
 P
ha
se
E
X
PA
N
SI
O
N
 P
H
A
SE
G
ap
-C
lo
si
ng
 S
tr
at
eg
y
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 s
ea
rc
hi
ng
/ 
hi
ri
ng
/ 
po
ac
hi
ng
 o
r 
hi
gh
ly
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
ci
an
s
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 s
et
 u
p 
o
f t
he
 i
nt
er
na
l 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 s
ea
rc
hi
ng
 f
or
 f
or
ei
gn
 p
ar
tn
er
 f
or
 jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
in
 l
ea
rn
in
g 
by
 t
ri
al
 a
nd
 
er
ro
r 
an
d 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
ti
on
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
in
 m
od
er
n 
pr
od
uc
ti
on
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
• 
S
ea
rc
h 
un
sy
st
em
at
ic
al
ly
 f
or
 p
ub
li
c
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
s 
as
si
st
an
ce
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 i
nf
or
m
al
 
as
si
st
an
ce
 f
ro
m
 f
or
ei
gn
 c
us
to
m
er
s
• 
P
la
n 
to
 i
nv
es
t 
in
 n
ew
 f
ir
m
s 
to
 o
ve
rs
ee
 jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
• 
S
ea
rc
h 
fo
r 
ca
pa
bl
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
an
d 
hi
re
 
th
em
, 
th
en
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ca
rm
ak
er
s 
fo
r 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 u
ps
tr
ea
m
 p
ro
du
ct
 d
es
ig
n 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
in
 s
ys
te
m
at
ic
 h
um
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
 t
ra
in
in
g 
fa
ci
li
ty
 a
nd
 p
ro
gr
am
s
• 
P
la
nn
ed
 t
ra
ve
l 
ov
er
se
as
 a
nd
 a
ct
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
ti
ng
 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 G
ap
• 
L
ac
ki
ng
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 a
bi
li
ty
 t
o 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 e
xp
or
t 
qu
al
it
y 
pr
od
uc
t
• 
L
ac
ki
ng
 m
ar
ke
ti
ng
 a
bi
li
ty
 t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 t
he
 d
om
es
ti
c 
m
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
ab
il
it
y 
to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
to
ol
in
g 
us
ed
 i
n 
pr
od
uc
ti
on
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
ab
il
it
y 
to
 c
on
ti
nu
ou
sl
y 
re
du
ce
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
, 
w
hi
le
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 h
ig
h 
qu
al
it
y
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
fi
rm
 t
o 
ha
nd
le
 a
ll
 t
he
 b
ur
ea
uc
ra
ti
c 
re
la
te
d 
to
 f
or
ei
gn
 jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
in
di
ge
no
us
 a
bi
li
ty
 t
o 
de
si
gn
 a
ut
o-
pa
rt
s
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
ca
pa
bl
e 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
to
 
ru
n 
th
e 
m
od
er
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
• 
L
ac
k 
th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
o
f t
he
 
ov
er
se
as
 m
ar
ke
ts
on
13o
O
ex
'3u
ceo
fa
c
cs
<U
>
'S
a
3o
U
• 
T
o 
le
ar
n 
in
ci
pi
en
t 
to
ol
in
g 
de
si
gn
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 a
nd
 e
xp
or
t 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
t
• 
T
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 m
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e 
by
 
su
pp
ly
in
g 
O
E
M
 t
oo
l 
fo
r 
al
l 
th
e 
ca
rm
ak
er
s
• 
T
o 
di
ve
rs
if
y 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 p
la
st
ic
 
pa
rt
s 
fo
r 
el
ec
tr
ic
al
 a
pp
li
an
ce
s 
an
d 
au
to
-p
ar
ts
• 
P
oo
r 
le
ar
ni
ng
 d
ue
 t
o 
li
m
it
ed
 
h
u
m
a
n
 r
es
ou
rc
es
• 
T
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 t
he
 d
om
es
ti
c 
m
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e,
 l
ea
rn
in
g 
to
 m
ak
e 
O
E
M
 
an
to
-n
ar
ts
• 
T
o 
fo
rm
 m
or
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
• 
T
o 
le
ar
n 
si
m
pl
e 
pr
od
uc
t 
de
si
gn
 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
• 
T
o 
en
ga
ge
 i
n 
m
od
em
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
• 
L
ea
rn
in
g 
to
 e
xp
or
t 
pr
od
uc
ts
fa a .
$ 2 o £ U S fa 2 o £.§ 33 2 .is fa •-
5—
fa £  <  ü fa U fa o fa Q O fa fa
T
ab
le
 6
.3
 (
co
nt
in
ue
d)
. S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 F
ir
i
o>
(/5
Cl
JS
to
3_o
‘ 7 ic
3to
*
W
o>
j=
-*->
bfl
B
C
3
Q
0 X 3
«
3U
C / 5
S
to
C/5
<
X
to
zo
M
C/5z
<
to
X
w
G
ap
-C
lo
si
ng
 S
tr
at
eg
y
• 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 f
o
rm
a
l 
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
 a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 f
o
re
ig
n
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
 f
ir
m
s
• 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 i
n
v
e
st
m
e
n
t 
in
 m
o
d
e
rn
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
• 
U
n
a
w
a
re
n
e
ss
 o
f 
c
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
 g
a
p
 l
ed
 t
o
 l
a
c
k
 o
f 
a
c
ti
v
e
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 f
o
r 
g
a
p
-c
lo
si
n
g
 s
tr
a
te
g
y
 a
n
d
 
p
o
o
r 
p
re
p
a
ra
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
fu
tu
re
 c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
o
n
• 
L
im
it
e
d
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 o
n
 n
e
w
 f
o
re
ig
n
 j
o
in
t 
v
e
n
tu
re
s,
 l
im
it
e
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
c
q
u
ir
e
d
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 
fo
rm
a
l 
c
o
ll
a
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 f
o
re
ig
n
 f
ir
m
s
• 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 s
y
st
e
m
a
ti
c
 w
o
rk
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
 a
n
d
 
q
u
a
li
ty
 s
y
st
e
m
• 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 n
u
m
e
ro
u
s 
jo
in
t 
v
e
n
tu
re
s 
a
n
d
 t
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
a
ss
is
ta
n
c
e
 a
g
re
e
m
e
n
ts
• 
T
o
 h
ir
e
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
a
l 
m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 a
n
d
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
 a
 
c
a
p
a
b
le
 e
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
 d
e
si
g
n
 t
e
a
m
• 
P
la
n
n
e
d
 c
o
n
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 p
la
n
t 
lo
ca
te
d
 l
it
e
ra
ll
y
 n
e
x
t 
to
 t
h
e
 c
a
rm
a
k
e
r,
 “
fo
ll
o
w
 
so
u
rc
e
”
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 G
ap
• 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 o
n
 
O
E
M
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
• 
U
n
a
w
a
re
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
is
te
n
c
e
 
o
f 
se
v
er
al
 c
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
 g
a
p
s
• 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 o
n
 O
E
M
 p
a
rt
s
• 
P
a
rt
ia
ll
y
 a
w
a
re
 o
f 
th
e
 
im
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 s
o
u
rc
e
s
• 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
fo
rm
al
 t
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 o
n
 m
as
s 
p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
O
E
M
 a
u
to
­
p
a
rt
s
• 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
e
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 o
n
 t
o
o
li
n
g
 
an
d
 p
ro
d
u
c
t 
d
e
si
g
n
C
om
pe
ti
ti
ve
 a
nd
 L
ea
rn
in
g 
G
oa
ls
• 
T
o
 t
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 R
E
M
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
s 
to
 
O
E
M
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
 m
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
re
rs
• 
T
o
 i
m
p
le
m
e
n
t 
a 
m
o
d
e
rn
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
• 
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
 g
o
a
l 
o
f 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 
u
su
a
l 
p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
: 
c
o
st
, 
q
u
a
li
ty
 a
n
d
 o
n
-t
im
e
 d
e
li
v
e
ry
• 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
a
n
y
 s
tr
e
tc
h
e
d
, 
a
m
b
it
io
u
s 
g
o
al
• 
T
o
 t
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 R
E
M
 p
a
rt
s 
to
 
m
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
re
 O
E
M
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
s 
an
d
 
e
le
c
tr
ic
a
l 
a
p
p
li
a
n
c
e
 p
a
rt
s
• 
T
o
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 f
ir
st
-t
ie
r 
O
E
M
 a
u
to
-p
a
rt
 
m
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
re
r
• 
T
o
 s
e
t 
u
p
 a
 f
o
rm
a
l 
c
o
rp
o
ra
te
 s
tr
u
c
tu
re
 
w
it
h
 c
le
a
r 
d
iv
is
io
n
 o
f 
la
b
o
r
• 
T
o
 e
n
g
a
g
e
 i
n
 i
n
c
ip
ie
n
t 
p
ro
d
u
c
t 
an
d
 
to
o
li
n
g
 d
e
si
g
n
 c
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
c/5 a a .
S o S £ S H S §—H
• -  ? .b  O .b  X • -  ^to t a  O t a  C/5 to  H to  H O
sz
C J
«3
<D
SZ
So
ur
ce
: 
ow
n 
el
ab
or
at
io
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 tl
Some firms (Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, Firm S Group and Firm TS Group; see Table 
6.3) were in a transition from an ordinary supplier (i.e. producing at various positions in the 
supply chain) to a strategic first-tier supplier position. These first-tier OEM suppliers 
engaged in quite aggressive learning strategies, incorporating extensive technical 
collaboration through technical assistance and joint venture agreements. In addition, these 
suppliers engaged in systematic quality accreditations and extensive, internal on-the-job 
training of their human resources. Two notable firms engaged in ambitious product export 
(for e.g. Firm L) and automotive tooling export (for e.g. Firm AH Group) activity. In terms 
of incipient tooling design activities, there were three firms that engaged in such 
endeavours: Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group. These three firms 
pursued realizable stretch goals that were not overly ambitious.
Other firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM and Firm TKT) were planning (or 
attempting) to transition themselves from small job shop production toward OEM auto-part 
manufacturers. The competitive and learning goals of these firms focused on and pursued 
the acquisition of routine production capability through three primary means: 1) investment 
in larger, more modem and systematic production facilities, 2) learning by trial-and-error 
and extensive experimentation and 3) sourcing of external technical experts (mostly 
domestic and a few foreign) (except Firm SOM, who did not source anyone).
With regard to capability gaps, all firms, to varying degrees, lacked the tooling 
design capability and the experience of export activity. For instance, Firm SOM seemed to 
be the most deficient since it not only lacked product design experience; it also lacked the 
managerial ability to run a viable manufacturing business. On the other hand, other firms 
(Firm AH Group, Firm D Group and Firm TS Group) were very alert and highly 
opportunistic always on the lookout for new learning opportunities. For instance, Firm AH 
Group set an ambitious goal of exporting its indigenous automotive tool since the late 
1980s. Though they lacked formal product design capability and higher-level technical 
knowledge, these firms can utilize their aggressive learning strategy and entrepreneurial 
ability to extensively search for ways to overcome the capability gaps.
6.3 Strategies During the Adaptation phase
Recall from Chapter 5 that the changes within the Thai automotive industry, during 
the transition from expansion into adaptation phase, included:
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• The removal of import ban and opening up of the industry to competition in the 
early 1990s
• The severe impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997
• The establishment of Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) in 1998
• The removal of local content requirement in 2000, i.e. full liberalization
• The aim to become an international export base of one-ton pick-up trucks
6.3.1 Firm AH Group (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm AH Group Strategies
Even though the 1997 crisis had some severe impacts on Firm AH Group, they were 
well ameliorated by the opportunities opened to the firm. The export strategy was “the way 
out” of the crisis209. Since the domestic auto-part demand shrank drastically, Firm AH 
Group searched for export markets. Soon after the 1997 crisis, the Group exported 
products worth 150 million Baht, which is about 60 per cent of the production volume 
(Anonymous, 1997a) and in 1998, it increased its export volume to 70 per cent of the total 
production (Anonymous, 1997b). By increasing exports soon after the crisis, the Group 
turned the economic crisis into the business opportunity which leads to increase sales 
earnings. Deyo and Doner (2000: 138) commented that:
“[Firm AH Group] was one of a very few local auto firms to grow during the 
crisis. As of summer of 1999, there were no layoffs and the company 
continued to attract new customers, especially for dies and jigs.”
[italics added]
Firm AH Group’s President was fully aware of the increased liberalized competitive 
environment. He actively searched for external business partners to strengthen the firm’s 
technical knowledge. In addition, the Group searched overseas for potential acquisitions 
and joint ventures. Firm AH Group planned to export its flagship product, the assembly 
jigs, through an overseas facility. Furthermore, the Group views the two large Asian 
markets (i.e. India and China) as major opportunities, and plans to invest in China, through 
an acquisition (Anonymous, 2004c), and it continues to look for a potential investment in 
India.
209 “[Firm AH] used the crisis o f 1997 to actually strengthen its position, invest in capacity, rationalise the 
market and emerge as a winner (Pandey, 2005).
178
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm AH Group plans to transition itself from manufacturer of simple tooling Gigs) 
to higher-level, automated tooling, and to start supply of auto-parts to the luxury European 
carmakers. For instance, the firm aims to learn and develop automotive assembly jigs with 
world-class quality for Mercedes Benz and Volvo. In addition, the Group also aims at 
internationalizing its manufacturing facility across ASEAN, China, and India. These plans 
formed the Group’s competitive and learning goals in becoming a leading regional auto­
part supplier.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since in the past the Group had been supplying assembly jigs mainly to US and 
Japanese carmakers, it lacked the experience regarding producing automotive tooling for 
the more quality-conscious European carmakers. After an extensive search, the Group 
planned to acquire a German subsidiary in Malaysia. This German firm had been 
supplying assembly jigs to Mercedes Benz and through acquisition the Group attempted to 
acquire technical knowledge on the European automotive jig production. Other gap-closing 
plans included the investment in an engineering unit in 2004 (Firm AE210). In terms of 
human resources, Firm AH planned to hire and train a large pool of formal engineering 
graduates to manage the operations of its new firms (both domestic and overseas).
6.3.2 Firm CPC (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm CPC Strategies
The impact of the financial crisis on Firm CPC was severe, but not lethal. The 
financial crisis had caused Firm CPC to reallocate its worker by shortening each work shift. 
Prior to the crisis, the firm organized its workers into two shift periods (each is 12 hours 
long). After the crisis, the firm retained roughly the same number of workers but dividing 
the total work hours into three shifts (each is 8 hours long). Hence each worker had reduced 
work hours (from 12 to 8 hours). In this way the firm saved on the labor costs (personal 
interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
210 This firm is devoted exclusively to engineering research and product design activities through computer- 
aided design, manufacturing and engineering (CAD/CAM/CAE) tools.
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As described earlier, Firm CPC produced diversified products, from household 
goods, electrical appliance parts, motorcycle parts and auto-parts. The auto-parts were the 
most affected by the crisis, but the impact on other goods was not as severe. The President 
stated,
“The impact of the crisis on motorcycle parts was not as severe as the auto­
parts. Similarly, the severity of the impact on the orders of electrical 
appliance parts was (on average) less severe than that of motorcycle parts.
Hence we relied on these orders to survive the crisis” (personal interview 
with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
Firm CPC did not rely on much export as part of survival strategy during the financial
crisis.
In the 1990s, the Thai automotive industry had liberalized with the commitment to 
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1992, followed by the full abandonment of 
LCR in year 2000. Moreover, the ban on small car imports as well as the restriction on 
foreign equity percentage in joint venture firms was lifted. Firm CPC viewed this 
liberalization as a threat encroaching on its domestic market share. The President stated,
“[Firm CPC] along with the Thai government have to adjust ourselves to 
compete at a new level. If we do not have efficient management system 
(both public and private), the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) became a real 
threat. On the other hand if we are prepared manageriaUy, then FTA could 
be our opportunities” (personal interview with Firm CPC President,
December 18, 2004).
Hence Firm CPC only viewed the liberalization of Thai automotive industry as the 
opportunities under the condition that both the public organizations and private firms 
upgrade themselves managerially and collaborated with each other. Furthermore, it viewed 
that this adjustment was unlikely to occur, due to the complex bureaucracy plaguing the 
Thai industrial development system (Ibid.).
Competitive and Learning Goals
The firm did not have any explicit goal stating a particular objective such as it 
wanted to achieve a first-tier auto-part supplier. Firm CPC President said:
“In the auto-part business (excluding motorcycle parts), we are not in the 
first-tier group yet. I think we belong to the third tier group [He was 
laughing jokingly]” (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 
18, 2004).
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Firm CPC merely wanted to increase its domestic share (both auto-parts and electrical 
appliance parts) and continued with the “general” continuous improvement activities. 
Hence, Firm CPC’s goal lacked any ambitious learning plan to engage in higher value- 
added design activity.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Since Firm CPC lacked a definite commitment to become a first-tier auto-part 
supplier, it did not bother to search extensively for technical assistance, either foreign 
assistance or joint venture agreements. The firm lacked the learning strategy to address the 
existing knowledge gap regarding the auto-part production technology. Firm CPC President 
felt ambivalent about the plan to invest (and commit) in modern plastic injection process 
software" . As a result, the firm was ill-prepared for future competition within the Thai 
automotive industry.
6.3.3 Firm CSP (2005 to current)
External Factors Shaping Firm CSP Strategies
After 2000, the Thai automotive industry was fully liberalized and competition 
among the auto-part firms became more intense. To thrive in the new environment, Thai 
auto-part firms had to ensure that they can meet the minimum performance requirements 
dictated by the multinational carmakers. This was the rationale for Firm CSP, in 2004, to 
undergo two major upgrades on quality standards: the upgrade on ISO 9000 (from year 
1994 to year 2000 version) and the latest ISO/TS 16949212 accreditation. Hence it could be 
said that Firm CSP was well aware of the liberalized regime and planned its learning 
strategy to acquire an internationally, well-accepted quality standards. Compared with 
prior phases, the firm was aware that hiring knowledge workers, such as engineering 
graduates was crucial to the success in upgrading quality standards. The firm planned to 
invest further to ensure its future competitiveness.
211 This software is called Moldflow. It has the capability to model (in real time) the temperature profile and 
flow profile o f plastic melt within the injection mold. Through such analysis, the firm is able to save time and 
cost on its mold design activities.
2,2 This quality standard is the most up-to-date in the auto-parts industry. The Japanese, the US and the 
European carmakers accept it as the standard that all first-tier auto-parts supplier must possess.
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Competitive and Learning Goals
Besides aiming at becoming a first-tier auto-part supplier and to increase the 
domestic share, Firm CSP also aimed at finding the “right” potential foreign joint venture 
or technical collaboration partner. Currently the strategic goal also involves the search for 
potential European OEM customers. Consequently, it could be said that compared with 
prior to 2004, now Firm CSP is more active in its search for potential technical 
collaborative partner.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Having started as a small family-owned firm, Firm CSP quickly grew into a 
medium-sized firm, but still lacked formal linkages with foreign firms. It acquired most 
production knowledge from its recent investment in plant expansion and interaction with 
the foreign OEM customers. It did not acquire higher-level knowledge on automotive 
tooling and product design. Consequently, the capability gaps existed in these areas, and 
they impacted Firm CSP’s future business opportunities. Carmakers (such as Isuzu) had 
recommended that Firm CSP participate in the early product development activities.
Aiming to close such gaps, the General Manager travelled to overseas conferences in search 
of a potential technical collaboration partner. But the search plan was passive as the 
General Manager stated that his firm is not ready to commit to investment to enable future 
co-design activities:
“Isuzu wanted my design engineers to join in the auto-part co-design 
activities in Japan; this means that I have to send my Thai engineers 
overseas. I have not done so yet, as it is too expensive to arrange for such 
travel” [italics added] (personal interview with Firm CSP General Manager, 
November 23, 2004).
Hence it is highly likely that Firm CSP will not include much design activity in the near 
future. For the long term, it remains to be seen how Firm CSP would deal with the auto-part 
design and development issue.
6.3.4 Firm D Group (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm D Group Strategies
The 1997 crisis crippled the domestic demand for automobiles as well as 
motorcycles. The severity of the impact on Firm D Group was due to the fact that the firm
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had focused a great proportion of its business on auto-part manufacturing. Firm D Group’s 
President described the impact:
“Out of 2,200 employees, I had retired about 300 and these were temporary 
employees who stayed with the company for less than 4 months (the 
probation period). The rest of the employees, particularly the tooling design 
expert engineers and technicians, were retained” (personal interview with 
Firm D Group’s President, May 12, 2004).
Hence the need to cut the overhead costs such as employee salary was necessary for
survival throughout the financial crisis years. But the crisis impact was not lethal as it did
not significantly affect the sales volume of the electronic component, as most parts were
targeted for export. This was the basis of the survival strategy throughout the post-crisis
years. The President described:
“During 1997,1 had about 73 per cent of my production output tied to auto­
parts and the remainder supplied to electronics industry. Once the crisis hit, 
the Thai Baht had devalued. This created business opportunities for the 
electronics parts since most were targeted for export. Hence my move was 
to decrease the proportion of auto-part manufacturing and increased the 
production of electronics parts. The earnings generated from the electronics 
parts export sales, even though did not generate huge profits (i.e. business 
growth rate was stagnant), but had enabled me to pay my remaining 
employees their monthly salary” (personal interview with Firm D Group’s 
President, May 12, 2004).
Hence it could be argued that without proper product diversification implemented prior to 
the crisis, Firm D could have been significantly affected (financially) by the 1997 crisis.
The growth in FDI meant that Firm D Group, it had to compete head-on with larger, 
more technically-capable global suppliers. The President elaborated,
“The opportunities for pure Thai213 auto-part firms will be smaller and 
smaller, once global firms like Denso and Toyoda Gosei had decided to 
enlarge its Thai-based operation (the previous operation was already huge, 
the upcoming-new operation is even larger). These global firms compete for 
production orders in aluminium die casting business from Toyota 
(Thailand); hence they are our domestic competitors. They also exported 
their finished products to the same overseas markets that we have been 
exporting our products; hence they are also our international competitors”
(personal interview with Firm D Group’s President, November 16, 2004).
However great the threat, there were ample business opportunities. Having won the
contract to supply auto-parts, the Group was trying to engage in further product
213 The Thai government uses the phrase “pure Thai” to denote the auto-part firms that have either 100 per 
cent Thai ownership or Thai equity majority ownership (Kitaphanich, 2002).
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development projects from Toyota. Firm D Group’s President expressed his learning 
strategy with Toyota,
“Since early 2000, Thai Board of Investment (BOI) announced its newest 
policy; the Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) elements and for 
carmakers to qualify for such incentives they must demonstrate that they 
have engaged in research and product development activities with a Thai 
firm. Hence, I am negotiating with Toyota; pointing out that it can qualify 
with this incentive if it engages in a collaborative project with Firm D 
Group. The aim is to further enhance the Group’s product development 
capability, particularly the development of parking hand brake. I also asked 
for Toyota’s permission to send in ‘guest engineers’ to participate in the 
design, either in Thailand or Japan. The Toyota executives had responded 
positively” (personal interview with Firm D Group’s President, November 
16, 2004).
Competitive and Learning Goals
Hence from the description above, it could be argued that Firm D Group’s strategic 
goal was not merely a business expansion on hand brake production and sales, but also the 
leveraging of know-how on improving the current product development activities, to “break 
into” the once highly centralized research and design (R&D) activities among the 
conservative keiretsu supplier group of Toyota. This was indeed a high stretch goal, 
focusing on knowledge acquisition to open future business opportunities. In addition, Firm 
D Group planned to follow the Japanese motorcycle and carmakers, to secure the market 
share within the ASEAN region (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) (personal interview with 
Firm D Group’s President, May 12, 2004). This competitive goal is indeed a challenging 
one and requires support such as: meticulous planning, negotiation, personal contacts and a 
strong, experienced engineering design team capable of turnkey (i.e. design, manufacture 
and test) product and process development activity.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Throughout the expansion phase, Firm D Group had all operations located 
domestically. Hence, the Group lacked the ability to “follow source” the foreign OEMs 
located regionally in Asia. Due to this lack of overseas manufacturing facility, the Group
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planned to invest in Vietnam, to produce motorcycle parts for Honda214 (Firm D Group 
corporate brochure, 2004).
For further developing the flagship product (parking hand brake), the Group lacked 
the following capabilities:
• Lack of high-level linkage within Toyota to enable participation in value-added 
design activities;
• Lack of deeper understanding of polymer chemistry, the use of TPOs215 as a 
substitute material. The Group’s engineers lacked understanding of how this 
material would perform in its actual use in vehicle.
To address the knowledge gaps, Firm D Group’s President attempted to bring in the 
research and development (R&D) department from its long-time Japanese joint venture 
partner. Pursuing the ambitious goal, Firm D Group wanted the Japanese partner to set up a 
local R&D firm based in Thailand216. With regards to the limited knowledge in material 
science, Firm D Group’s President planned to solicit assistance from public research 
organization (such as MTEC and TAI), to assist in the development of the TPOs for hand 
brake. In addition, other research collaborative projects were planned. For instance, the 
plan to use computer-aided engineering (CAE) in modelling the process parameters for 
aluminium die casting process.
6.3.5 Firm L (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping the Firm L Strategies
The impact of the 1997 crisis on Firm L was severe, but not lethal217. The reason 
was the increase in exports. Soon after the 1997 crisis, Firm L decided to lay off a portion 
of its employees, those that were still working in the probation period218. Finding foreign 
customers was quite challenging, but nevertheless achievable through significant upgrade 
in product quality. Hence the learning strategy focused on ensuring that the products
214 Since Firm D Group has been a first-tier, strategic supplier for Honda, the motorcycle maker requested the 
Group to invest in a manufacturing facility in Vietnam. The recently established firm is a joint venture 
between Honda (Japan), Honda (Thailand) and a Vietnamese local firm (Tran, 2002: 21-22).
215 Thermoplastic Polyolefins
216 At the time of this writing, Firm D Group is still pursuing this learning goal.
217 In fact the crisis impact even had positive effect on Firm L learning strategy. Since to enable successful 
export, Firm L engaged in multiple plans to upgrade the product quality and attempt to achieve on-time 
delivery.
218 The firm had managed to keep the expert mold designer along with the other well-experienced engineering 
managers.
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passed the required international product testing, and on the internal training the employees 
with systematic work procedures.
The ISO 9000 accreditation project, which had commenced shortly before the crisis, 
was accelerated during the post crisis years219 and Firm L received the accreditation in 1998 
(corporate website, accessed March 15, 2006). Thus it could be said that Firm L had 
converted the 1997 crisis into a catalyst for its employees to stretch their production 
capabilities and to thrive in the export market.
With the Thai government lowering the import tariff on auto-parts, many imported 
wheels flooded the Thai market, and posed a threat to Firm L.
“These wheels came mainly from China and Taiwan, since the wheels over 
there faced stiff competition. Hence these small manufacturers have to 
develop ‘quick copy’ strategy to try to capture as best as possible higher 
market share overseas [i.e. inclusive of Thailand]” (Manager Online, 2005).
To neutralize the threat, Firm L implemented a novel marketing strategy, re-branding and
creating customer awareness. In short, the firm tried to create awareness among Thai
consumers that its wheel brand is at a premium level, and that the product met all the
international safety standards.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Firm L’s learning strategy involved a transition into the OEM market, specifically 
after the firm became more proficient with the REM production. It realized that the 
domestic consumers do not value the brand highly. Consequently, the firm planned to 
engage in an active brand awareness campaign to raise brand value perception. In this 
regard, Firm L attempted to supply its alloy wheel to the British Formula One; this project 
is currently ongoing (The Nation, 2005).
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
A problem facing Firm L during exporting was the poor quality of its products“ . 
To address this problem, Firm L created a systematic work procedure and training scheme. 
Another capability gap was the lack of experience in using computer simulation modelling
219 The acceleration o f the ISO 9000 project was feasible due to the financial crisis. Production orders were 
down and this allowed more free time for the employees, who later decided to focus more time on the ISO 
9000 project (personal interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
220 Historically, more than 85 per cent o f the total production output was targeted at domestic consumers; the 
quality level was not able to match that o f an export alloy wheel (personal interview with Firm L Factory 
Manager, May 5, 2004).
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for the production process and mold design. In this area, Firm L collaborated intensively 
with Chulalongkorn University and TAI to acquire such advanced knowledge on design. In 
addition, Firm L intended to fulfil its learning goal by investing in the most up-to-date 
production technology, and subjected its engineers to learning such technology.
6.3.6 Firm S Group (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm S Group Strategies
The impact of the 1997 crisis to Firm S Group was almost lethal. The Group sold 
its majority equity in most of the Japanese joint ventures and entered into an immediate 
debt-restructuring program. The 1997 crisis had a significant disruptive impact on the 
continuity of the implementation of its competitive and learning strategies. Many learning 
activities were paused until the recovery that took place after year 2000. The Group had 
insufficient resources to continue the implementation of its ambitious learning strategy 
set forth through many Japanese joint ventures.
Even though the 1997 crisis had severely impaired its learning strategy, Firm S 
Group had struggled to plan an expansion of its business and form new joint ventures. The 
President was confident of the future growth of the OEM auto-part market. The Group still 
engaged in technical assistance through continuous renewal of its agreements. Since 2000, 
the Group engaged in a corporate restructuring in order to prepare itself for the transition 
from a family-owned business to a public firm.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Once the transition into OEM market was completed, Firm S Group aimed at 
influencing the Thai automotive industry policy. It did this by allowing the Vice President 
to lead the Thai Auto-part manufacturers Association (TAPMA). This was part of the 
firm’s strategic goal, to shape the industrial environment. In addition, Firm S Group also 
planned to modernize its production capacity and engage in early product design activity in 
order to meet the increasing demand of the multinational carmakers, who wanted to 
establish a global export base in Thailand.
221 Insufficient resource means lack o f financial resources. As far as other resource such as time, Firm S 
Group had plenty o f free time, especially during the post-1997 crisis years when many carmakers in Thailand 
had either stopped or scaled-down their production activities.
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Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Despite its transition from REM to OEM auto-parts, Firm S Group did not engage 
in any product design activities. At best, the Group focused on advanced tooling design 
using computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM). Consequently, Firm S 
Group lacked of indigenous product design experience. The plan to acquire the design 
capability involved investment in a new engineering team, focusing on the development of 
auto-part design capability. In addition, the firm also invested in a modem manufacturing 
facility capable of meeting the stringent requirements imposed by the carmakers and to 
facilitate production of new product designs .
6.3.7 Firm SOM (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm SOM Strategies
The financial crisis had a severe impact on Firm SOM. There was a reduction in 
sales which led to a requirement for rather large debt financing223. It requested the lender 
to postpone debt repayment for a year after the financial crisis. The 1997 crisis was not 
lethal because Firm SOM President managed to search for new production orders, 
producing metal parts for musical instruments. The Engineering Manager stated,
“The impact of the financial crisis on auto-part industry was very severe, but 
the impact on the metal parts for musical instruments was less severe”
(personal interview with Firm SOM Engineering Manager, November 15,
2004).
Consequently, the production order for musical instrument ameliorated the impact of the 
financial crisis. However, other serious mismanagement issues severely affected the firm.
Firm SOM indirectly suffered from the liberalized regime, since the customers were 
freed to source auto-parts from any suppliers who could meet the requirements. Every year 
Firm SOM was requested by Firm SML (its main customer) to reduce the prices224. Firm
222 The Group also engaged in relocating some o f its production activities to the Eastern Seaboard area, where 
Thai automotive cluster is located (researcher’s own observation, December 17, 2004).
223 Most o f Firm SOM debt since 1994 was from family members, borrowing from several Thai banks and its 
customer Firm SML; all were domestic lenders. The total amount o f debt in 1997 was 1.2 million Baht; this
was large compared to firm size (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November, 24, 2004). 
224 Each year Firm SOM must meet the (average) cost reduction o f 3 to 5 per cent.
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SOM did not strategically plan for such aggressive cost reduction and in 2004, it cannot 
meet Firm SML’s request225. The President expressed:
“Historically, we were able to meet the annual cost reduction requirements.
But this year [2004], our firm faced with a sharp rise in raw material and 
labor cost, and were unable to meet the cost reduction. I decided to return 
more than 100 auto-part items that were accepted earlier. The reason was 
simple; my firm cannot meet the target manufacturing cost. Moreover my 
equipment and machinery were outdated; even if I could meet the 
production cost I might not be able to meet the quality requirements” [italics 
added] (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
In addition, Firm SOM also suffered from other problems:
• Old vintage equipment and machinery that lacked the capability to produce high- 
quality product at low cost
• Financial debt, Firm SOM did not setup adequate depreciation fund to replace these 
worn-out machines; hence their replacement was impossible (personal interview 
with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004)
Although the liberalization measures did not impact Firm SOM directly, the continuous 
price reduction requests made by Firm SML significantly affected Firm SOM’s cash flow, 
reduced its working capital, and threatened its very survival. Firm SOM President stated his 
gloomy future:
“Now I have to find ways to generate revenue in order to pay all the 
expenses. December [2004] will be the crucial month; if I cannot increase 
the earnings, my firm will be in serious trouble” (personal interview with 
Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
Competitive and Learning Goals
The firm did not have any focused strategic goals and its learning goal also lacked 
focus. It simply engaged in planning for “general” continuous improvement activities. 
Overall the firm faced many operational and managerial problems, and it is unlikely that 
the business will survive.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
Firm SOM has plenty of capability gaps, but Firm SOM President was unaware of 
most of these gaps and their implications for firm competitiveness. There were no
225 Firm SOM returned the previously accepted production contract comprising over a list o f  over 100 auto­
parts.
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measures to monitor or rectify such gaps. Since Firm SOM President was unaware of the 
existing deficiencies, there was no coherent gap-closing strategy. Firm SOM did not 
proactively engage in measures to access external technical know-how. Firm SOM 
currently faces serious problems on many fronts (financial, human resources, technological, 
operational and managerial) and its learning strategy did not seem to be properly aligned 
with either the internal resources or the external competitive environment.
6.3.8 Firm TKT (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm TKT Strategies
The investment expansion continued in 1995 for Nissan, in preparation for new 
model launch in 1997. However when the 1997 crisis hit, Firm TKT’s learning production 
capacity expansion was paused, and the firm engaged in immediate corporate restructuring 
(Treerapongpichit, 2004). This prompted the firm to sell its equity in the joint venture to 
another partner in 1999 (SET, 2005b). During the late 1990s, the firm decided to continue 
the planned business expansion and to form a new foreign joint venture, but to also 
implement a damage-control plan in response to the 1997 crisis. Firm TKT survival 
strategy included the product diversification:
“The impact of the crisis on the electrical appliance was less severe than that 
of the auto-parts. ... This was because the selling prices of electrical 
appliances are cheaper than those of the automobiles. Most Thai people 
purchase cars using some kinds of debt financing. With the 1997 crisis, the 
financial institutions went bankrupt and there were no available loans.
Consequently, people could not purchase new cars, leading to sales decline 
and the cut back of auto-part production. This is why the crisis impact was 
more severe for the auto-part industry” (personal interview with Firm TKT 
Managing Director, November 5, 2004).
Post 1997 years did not offer only threats; there were business opportunities 
resulting from the liberalization policy. Since the Thai government (via BOI) provided 
very liberal investment incentives, many carmakers had set up production bases in 
Thailand. When Toyota announced that it would relocate all the pick-up truck production 
from Japan to Thailand“  , Firm TKT stood to receive immense benefits. As a result, Firm 
TKT production order increased dramatically (Krungthep Turakij, 2006). Consequently, it 
could be said that not only did the liberalization measures posed as great threat to Firm
“ 6 As o f 2006, Toyota is establishing Thailand as its only pick-up truck production base in the world and to 
annually produce 280,000 pick-ups by the end o f 2006 (Busarawong, 2004b).
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TKT, but it also presented the firm with much benefits, under the condition that Firm TKT 
had sufficient capability to capitalize on such business opportunity.
Competitive and Learning Goals
In line with the expanding Thai automotive industry after the 1997 crisis, Firm TKT 
planned to become a top-tier plastic auto-part supplier in Thailand (TKT, 2004: 14), and 
later aimed to become a top producer within ASEAN. The Assistant Managing Director 
stated:
“We are confident that within the next 2 to 3 years [i.e. by 2008] we will 
become a regional player. We view that the ASEAN market is 2-3 times 
larger than the domestic market, then there is sufficient room in the market 
for our firm to grow” (Krungthep Turakij, 2006).
This was the current strategic goal of Firm TKT. To achieve such an ambitious aim
required the ability to manufacture high-quality plastic auto-parts at competitive prices with
assured on-time delivery.
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
In achieving its first goal of becoming a leading plastic auto-part supplier, the firm 
realized its weakness in plastic mold and tooling design capability. This was because 
historically the firm did not actively plan for any foreign technical collaboration until 2004, 
when it acquired a Thai mold manufacturing firm227. In 2004, Firm TKT was actively 
searching for a technical collaboration, a prospective foreign partner firm, to engage in 
automotive mold and tooling design activities (Anonymous, 2004f: 40). Hence it could be 
said that Firm TKT’s learning strategy was still in a transition stage, from passive to active 
search, and it remains to be seen what the outcome of such transition in the firm learning 
strategy will be.
227 Most of Firm TKT technical assistance agreements (prior to 2004) were o f informal type and usually 
involved sporadic interactions with the Japanese OEMs’ expert technicians and engineers. The firm learning 
strategy involved neither the signing o f formal technical assistance nor forming o f  extensive joint ventures 
(with the exception o f joint venture with Okawa). In all, Firm TKT was on the conservative side in engaging 
in formal, external technical collaboration, and tended to rely more on the informal, sporadic technical 
assistance and internally-focused learning strategy.
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6.3.9 Firm TS Group (post-1997 crisis)
External Factors Shaping Firm TS Group Strategies
The impact of the crisis was very severe, but not lethal (personal interview with 
Firm TS Group Vice President, October 19, 2004). The crisis led to a strike by the 
workers228 and also caused financial difficulties. Firm TS Group suffered from financial 
liquidity problem and requested the Japanese carmakers for extended credits and other 
forms of financial assistance229. The impacts affected the learning path of Firm TS Group. 
However, the impacts were not uniform across the business groups, some subsidiary firms 
managed to prosper during the post-1997 years. The Engineering Manager stated:
"... sure, the crisis had severe impact on the auto-part sales, but it had very 
little impact on motorcycle parts sales and it merely affected the sales of 
electrical appliances such as simple rice cookers. Regardless of the crisis, 
the people still feel hungry and have to cook their rice. The electrical 
appliance group that suffered from 1997 crisis were the luxury items such as 
the air conditioners” (personal interview with Firm TS Group Engineering 
Department Manager, October 29, 2004).
One such subsidiary within the TS Group that thrived during the crisis was Firm 
TSLA; it had managed to turn the financial crisis into a business opportunity. This firm had 
been one of the strategic, first-tier suppliers for Mitsubishi and it actively learned the 
production techniques and submitted many auto-part projects. Prior to the crisis, the 
Japanese carmakers turned down many of the submitted projects; the projects’ target costs 
(and selling prices) could not be met due to high costs of imported materials. Once rejected, 
Firm TSLA kept many of these projects as part of the corporate archives.
Soon after the 1997 crisis, Firm TSLA pulled out the archived projects and re­
submitted them to the Japanese carmakers. The difference was this time the proposed 
bidding prices had dropped, on average, from 30 to 40 per cent (personal interview with 
Firm TSLA Plant Manager, October 25, 2004). With severe devaluation of Thai Baht after 
the 1997 crisis, many cost figures were not as restrictive as the ones prior to the crisis. As a
“ 8 One of the impacts o f 1997 crisis was reflected in an unhappy group o f 3,000 employees who decided to 
take matters into their own hands and formed a strike by blocking the Bangna-Trad road in front o f the Firm 
TS Group head office (Ibid.). The strike aimed at the senior management for cutting their allowances and 
year-end bonuses (Human Rights Watch, 1998).
” 9 One form o f Financial assistances offered to Firm TS Group was allowing the firm to raise the selling price 
of certain auto-parts to alleviate the financial liquidity problem (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice 
President, October 19, 2004).
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result the Japanese carmakers gladly seized the opportunity to produce the same auto-parts 
at much lower costs, and eagerly approved many other projects230.
The abandonment of local content requirements (LCR) had no significant impact, 
because of two reasons: the fact that within ASEAN, Thailand had the largest and most 
developed automotive supplier base (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice 
President, October 19, 2004) and the Group had prepared itself for a liberalized 
environment by investing in overseas manufacturing facilities. This was done as a hedge 
(risk management) against the shifting of motorcycle and motor vehicle manufacturing 
activities into other regional countries231 (Ibid.). The current Vice President continues to 
craft strategic plans to invest overseas in Asian countries232 (Ibid.). Consequently, should 
the carmakers decide to relocate or source its parts regionally via established regional 
production networks, the Group (either its wholly-owned subsidiary or foreign joint 
venture) will be able to deliver the parts at a specific geographical location in a timely 
manner. In this way, Firm TS Group will be able to better satisfy its regional customers 
(motorcycle and carmakers) and maintain its market share leadership.
One of the important changes was the imminent implementation of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) initiated in 1992. Almost all carmakers agreed that AFTA 
should be implemented fully (and quickly) in order to reap the benefits of production 
economies of scale . Firm TS Group viewed this as both opportunity and threat. As a 
threat, for instance, the AFTA created a low import tariff scheme resulting in more auto­
parts being sourced from Indonesia to Thailand threatening the group’s domestic market 
share. The Group’s Vice President stated: “The reason that has pushed us to go to Indonesia 
by next year [i.e. 2006] is AFTA” (Panthong and Master, 2005: 47). This threat was 
neutralized by Firm TS Group taking a preemptive step to invest in a joint venture 
manufacturing plant in Indonesia. Strategically, the cheaper Indonesian-produced auto­
parts can then be imported into Thailand through the subsidiary of Firm TS Group, seizing
230 Examples o f auto-parts that were approved include upper and lower arms, oil filter and air filter (Ibid.). 
This resulted in increase in annual sales of Firm TSLA. The firm annual revenue had increased from 2 billion 
Baht in 1997 to 2.4 billion (in 1998) and 2.8 billion (in 1999) (Ibid.).
231 Since the increasing liberalization after the 1997 crisis, the Thai automotive industry strengthened the local 
production networks in preparation for the changing trend in global sourcing implemented by the carmakers. 
Complementary products have been exchanged through the production networks o f carmakers under the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme programme (Chiasakul, 2004).
232 These countries are ASEAN, China and India.
233 See for example, TAI (2003h) and (Dunne, 2002: 7).
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the benefit from AFTA low import tariff rates. Hence in this sense the Group viewed 
AFTA as a business opportunity.
Competitive and Learning Goals
Aside from aiming to operate regionally by investing in production operations 
overseas, since the late-1990s, Firm TS Group was requested by the carmakers to 
participate in the tooling and product design activities. As the firm lacked the capability to 
engage in advanced automotive tooling design, it decided to invest in a new firm (R&D 
Unit), specializing in internalizing auto-part design capability. Equipped with such a firm, 
the Group aimed at becoming a leading auto-part supplier in ASEAN, India and China. In 
others words, it aimed to become a regional player within the auto-part industry. The 
future plan is for the R&D Unit to engage in more design activity regionally (see Section 
7.3.9 for more details).
Capability Gap and Gap-Closing Strategy
After the 1997 crisis, Firm TS Group competitively aimed to become an own brand 
manufacturer, but it lacked the technical know-how on advanced product design and also 
the marketing capability. But having been in the auto-part industry for almost three decades 
and engaged in more 30 technical assistance and formal joint venture agreements, the 
Group acquired a great deal of technical knowledge related to routine production 
capabilities. By the mid-1990s, Firm TS Group planned to set up an R&D Unit, 
specializing in internalization of auto-part design capability. In addition, this unit was also 
responsible for designing important automotive tooling using advanced production 
technology234. In the past three years, the R&D Unit collaborated extensively with the 
public organizations on further improvement in the design activities. Similarly, to 
accomplish the aim in becoming a leading auto-part supplier in Asian region, the Group 
planned aggressive investment in overseas manufacturing facilities, either wholly-owned or 
joint venture with the local firms . This investment assisted the Group in dealing with the 
existing deficiency regarding the lack of overseas manufacturing facility.
234 The technology includes modern manufacturing software packages such as computer-aided design, 
manufacturing and engineering (CAD/CAM and CAE).
235 An example o f  this is the establishment o f a recent joint venture, Firm TSN, in India (Than Settakij, 2005).
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6.3.10 Summary of Different Firm Strategies (adaptation phase)
During the adaptation phase, all firms (except Firm SOM) engaged in active plans 
to further improve their existing manufacturing processes and to move up the production 
value chain. Some firms (Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group; see Table 
6.4) were attempting a transition from an ordinary first-tier supplier to engage in more 
complex product and tooling design activities. This transition involved closed 
collaboration with the carmakers and the dispatching of the firm’s engineers to overseas 
training facilities236. For instance, through many years of OEM production experience and 
a capable team of engineers, Firm TS Group had stretched its competitive goal to become 
an own brand manufacturer, claiming to be the first in Thailand to produce an indigenous 
electric golf cart. Similarly, Firm D Group moved up from a passive OEM auto-part 
producer and actively planned to become a supplier that designed and manufactured a 
parking hand brake for many Japanese carmakers237. Likewise, Firm AH Group succeeded 
in designing the turnkey assembly jigs, and supply virtually to all the carmakers, including 
exports to ultra-quality conscious Japanese and European carmakers.
Other firms (Firm L and Firm S Group) were planning (or attempting) to transition 
from a medium-sized auto-part firm to a larger, more design-oriented OEM auto-part 
manufacturers. Being the only firm that engaged in the aftermarket (REM) auto-parts, Firm 
L was unique in that it pursued an independent, aggressive marketing strategy, and 
exported its product (alloy wheel)238. Firm L did not have the luxury of the carmakers’ 
assistance, supplying the market research or systematic forecast of market trends; it relied 
on its own market analysis and distribution network. Although slightly more advanced 
than Firm L, Firm S Group was facing a similar situation; it produced both REM and OEM 
auto-parts, with initial focus on the former, but a shift to the latter. Recently, the Group 
actively planned a new engineering design department, capable of participating in product 
design activities. It still remains to be seen how Firm S Group’s design engineer team will 
fare.
236 The dispatch o f Thai engineers for overseas training and participation in the auto-part design activity is 
called “guest engineer” (Anonymous, 2004a).
237 Examples o f the carmaker that bought parking hand brake from Firm D Group include: Honda, Toyota, 
Isuzu, and Hino.
238 Currently the firm exported about 70 per cent o f its production output, with USA as its main export market 
(Krungthep Turakij, 2005).
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The remaining firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM and Firm TKT) were still in 
a decision stage, and with unfocused product diversification, they lacked the solid 
commitment to auto-part design activities. As in the expansion phase, Firm SOM was still 
the worst performer. Not only did it lack the commitment to higher-level innovative 
activities, but it also lacked the managerial capability to ensure a viable, manufacturing 
business. Among the four, Firm CSP and Firm TKT were considered to be the better 
performers in terms o f the awareness as well as the formulation o f strategies for upgrading 
and learning. These two firms actively engaged in investment in new production 
technology, and continuously sought to improve their production operations through 
extensive collaboration239. Lastly, Firm CPC’s strategies were slightly more aggressive 
than Firm SOM; it engaged in general continuous improvement activities, but still lacked a 
focus on the upgrading o f the auto-part production process. Although slightly different in 
their strategic stance, both Firm CPC and SOM were largely uncommitted, and somewhat 
unaware o f the need to advance into the auto-part design activities.
6.4 Summary of Different Patterns of Firms’ Strategies
Having described firm-level strategies for each common phase, it is useful to 
combine the key competitive and learning strategy characteristics across all phases, for 
each firm. The objective is to derive a dynamic, firm strategy pattern (or patterns) across 
the firms. From Table 6.5, there are three distinct evolutionary patterns o f firm strategies.
First are the patterns o f what could be termed the “strong learners” (Firm AH 
Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group). They have several common characteristics. 
Each firm had successfully migrated from a conservative strategy to engage in an ambitious 
(well-defined and aggressive) strategy, incorporating much planning for extensive technical 
collaboration through technical assistance and jo in t venture agreements. Their competitive 
and learning goals shifted from conservative to ones that are semi- to highly stretched, yet 
realizable. Similarly, the awareness o f the firms’ resources and capabilities were well 
grounded. These firms had transitioned from ordinary awareness to high-level alertness, 
eager to search for sources o f internal and external knowledge to strengthen their existing 
resources and capabilities.
~39 The technical and managerial assistance were mainly provided by both the foreign customers and the 
assistance programs prepared by the public organizations (for e.g. the Thailand Automotive Institute).
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In other words, these progressive learning firms ensured that their pre-specified strategic 
goals were within reach, given their existing resources and capability. At the same time, 
these firms ensured that goals served the purpose of further building on such resources and 
capabilities. Prior to goal setting, the “strong learner” firms were realistically assessing 
themselves and did not aim at unrealistic goals. These firms were the ones who started out 
with a conservative goal, then later successfully transitioned into ambitious, stretch goals. 
They also engaged in planning activities that assisted in increasing the level of awareness of 
their own knowledge deficiencies. With increased awareness their strategies directed the 
learning activities which enabled them to remedy the existing firm weaknesses.
In contrast, the second set of firms could be termed the “weak learners” (Firm 
CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM and Firm TKT). These firms did not complete the transition 
from conservative goals to ambitious ones (see Table 6.5). They engaged in ineffective 
search activities that ensured only minimum awareness of the changes in their competitive 
environment. As a result, these firms lacked sufficient ability to assess external 
opportunities and challenges. For instance, Firm SOM had highly conservative competitive 
and learning strategies, basically unaware of most of the assistance programs that were 
available from the public organizations; the firm passively received sources of information 
through only one main customer. Likewise, both Firm CPC and Firm CSP, historically, did 
not plan for extensive search for external sources of knowledge through foreign technical 
collaboration. It was not until recently (i.e. in 2005) that such competitive and learning 
strategies were implemented at Firm CSP. Similarly, historically Firm TKT did not plan to 
form joint ventures or engage in much foreign technical collaboration, and it was only in 
2004 that it began to look for a foreign partner to assist with automotive tooling design. 
Consequently, as a result of such a static strategy240, these firms did not plan for active 
capability (knowledge) gap-closing activities; and their knowledge deficiency largely 
remained unattended. Overall, when compared with the “strong learner” firms, the effect of 
passive and conservative learning strategy of “weak learner” firms had crippled them from 
seizing future challenging business opportunities; hence they tended to view the liberalized 
automotive regime as threats rather than opportunities.
“40 Static here means that the competitive and learning goals remained as “conservative” throughout the three 
phases for these four firms. Likewise, their awareness o f technological and managerial deficiencies remained 
at “unaware” to “partially aware” throughout the three phases, see Table 6.5.
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The third group of firms could be termed the “average learner” firms (Firm L and 
Firm S Group)241. The firms are located in between the strong and the weak learner firms. 
Both firms have moderately ambitious competitive and learning goals. For instance, Firm 
L wanted to be able to produce the best alloy wheel within the Asian region and Firm S 
Group wanted to become a world-class OEM producer of axle shafts. Ffowever, the 
awareness of their capability gap was not fulfilled by the synergistic implementation of 
firm learning strategies. For instance, Firm L aimed at becoming an OEM auto-part 
supplier, but did not want to form any future joint venture with foreign firms (especially the 
Japanese)242. Moreover, the firm had upgraded itself with the most sophisticated equipment, 
but was a bit behind in upgrading the most important resource -  personnel skills. Similarly, 
Firm S Group also aimed at becoming a world-class supplier, but was faced with the 
inability to timely implement plant and equipment upgrade. Even though the firm age is 
more than half a century, the upgrade of plant equipment into a world-class modern 
production facility did not occur until the latter half of the 1990s, despite its competitor 
upgrading in the late 1980s.
Inter-firm differences in competitive and learning strategies are analyzed further in Chapter 
8 (Section 8.1), where the focus of the analysis will be on differences in firm competitive 
goals, learning goals, and how these differences influence the firms’ divergent competitive 
and learning positions.
241 These firms are basically the firms that have sufficient capability to compete with other auto-part firms in 
the domestic OEM market (Firm S Group) and export REM market (Firm L). The “strong learner” firms are 
slightly more competitive than the “average learner” firms, in terms o f their well-defined aggressive 
competitive and learning goals and superb awareness when assessing their existing weaknesses and strengths 
related to their capabilities.
242 Firm L managing director claimed that the Japanese business partners are excessively opportunistic 
(personal interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
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Chapter 7 -  Firm Learning Activities and Mechanisms
The objective o f this chapter is to describe the firm-level learning activities and 
mechanisms carried out by the nine case study companies over their lifetime. Since the 
start dates and ages o f the case study companies are different, the common phases were 
defined to assist in the organization o f the empirical findings. In order to facilitate the 
findings and analysis, the three common phases were similar to the ones defined earlier in 
Table 6.1 (see also p. 146 o f this thesis). This chapter concludes with a summary on the 
emerging patterns o f firm-level learning activities, aiming to discern the differences in the 
learning activity patterns between the “ strong learner”  firm  from and the others.
7.1 Learning Activities During the Start-up Phase
7.1.1 Firm AH Group (1979 -  1988)
Learning the Investment Activities
Firm AH Group founder is originally from a small town in Malaysia“43. In 1985, he 
migrated to Thailand set up two businesses: a Ford dealership and a manufacturing business 
(through acquisition). The sources o f investment funding were derived from the business 
partners and relatives. The manufacturing business was a small operation.
"... [In 1986, Firm AH production plant] was a tiny operation in a rented 
factory ... the [production] volume was very low but we built our reputation 
slowly. I bought junked machinery from disused tin mines in Perak. The 
machines costed about RM 244 3,000. We repaired them cheaply and used 
them in our plant”  (Pandiyan, 2003: 5).
In 1988, Firm AH President emulated the Japanese carmakers by laying down the export 
strategy for the Thai-made jigs245; he conducted a feasibility study on such undertaking246.
243 Firm AH founder received his undergraduate education in Industrial Management and Engineering from a 
New Zealand university in 1974. After graduation he worked for a truck company for a couple o f years. In 
1979 he set up a Mitsubishi and Proton dealership in Malaysia. It was not until early 1986 that he had 
transitioned his firm from an automotive dealership into a manufacturing firm.
244 Malaysian Ringgit.
~45 A jig  is an apparatus that holds the vehicle body parts in their correct position while they are being welded 
together. Hence it has the important function o f ensuring the accuracy o f each position relative to those o f 
other body parts. “ No other piece o f equipment is as crucial to assembling car bodies as the jig. Making jigs, 
which sell for up to 400,000 US$ isn't easy. It requires a deep knowledge o f car-building techniques and 
extreme precision in manufacturing. I f  the jig  is misaligned, the car w ill be too (Fairclough, 1994).”  The low- 
volume jig  is one o f Firm A H ’s flagship products.
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He realized that this task was not an act which could be accomplished overnight. He 
planned to invest in the resources that would ensure the quality and manufacturing cost of 
his products was at least as competitive as his competitors. In addition, he invested in an 
international search and recruitment of a talented team of human resources to accomplish 
the export task.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and Industrial 
Engineering247 & Human Resource Development248)
In 1986, the firm continued with the production of jigs, dies and original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) pressed auto-parts. Firm AH Group’s production process was 
simple and did not involve much high-level technology and most of the routine 
production improvement activities were focused on craft-like skills; hence, the common 
form of learning mechanism was by doing the production activities with much trial and 
error. In addition to learning-by-doing, the President understands the concept of continuous 
quality improvement, “We’re disciplined... if you think 95% [quality level] is enough, 
you’re in trouble” (Shari, 2003).
In the late 1980s, the problem facing the automotive industry was the low 
production volume and hence the challenge to reach the minimum economies of scale249. 
Coping with this challenge, the Group decided to design the low-volume jigs, a niche 
product with few competitors. The need for low-volume jigs arose from the ineffective 
rationalization policy which allowed many carmakers to enter the Thai market and led to 
overcapacity. For each car model, there was low volume production and thus the need for 
low-volume jigs . Firm AH’s low-volume jig was unique and could manage to 
simultaneously keep the cost low as well as operating at low production rate, without 
sacrificing the product quality. At the time there were few Asian firms who could produce 
this low-volume jigs and the decision to produce jigs was a good one since it brought in
246 It was informal study since Firm AH President relied on many personal (yet international) contacts, and 
through these informal connections, he received updating news on the changes within the Thai automotive 
industry.
247 Represented as “IE” from here onwards.
248 Represented as “HRD” from here onwards.
249 Janssen (1987) reported that in the late 1980s Thai automotive industry had a small market size with 
100,000 vehicles sold annually. This leads to the problem o f economies o f scale.
250 Here low volume means at a production rate o f about 10 cars an hour (which is typical o f any assembly 
plants in most Southeast Asian countries). This is in contrast to high volume production in Japan and USA 
where production rate is at about 50 to 60 cars per hour (Fairclough, 1995).
251 In Thailand there are very few competitors in jigs manufacturing, one o f the known firms are Auto CS, a 
large jigs manufacturer from Toyota Motor (Thailand) (AH Group, 2003).
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businesses from local carmakers which needed lower-cost advantages and enabled Firm 
AH to learn and keep abreast with progressive process and product technologies (Pandiyan, 
2003).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
During its early days, Firm AH Group linkage consisted of mostly informal and 
personal linkages. For instance, Firm AH President met with the Ford Regional Director in 
1985 when the firm applied for and won a contract to become a Ford distributor in Thailand. 
During the time, the Regional Director also assisted Firm AH President in naming the new 
dealership (Changsorn, 2002). Other linkages were personal friends of the President that 
were located in Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand. Consequently, these linkages did 
not provided the direct technology sources for Firm AH; however, it did provided sources 
of information on the direction for further business expansion. An example was the 
information regarding the acquisition of a Thai firm, producing jigs and dies for Ford and 
Mazda.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Initially, all of Firm AH Group products were targeted at the domestic markets and 
there were no formal market research. However, Firm AH President had in mind plans 
for export252.
7.1.2 Firm CPC (1965- 1970)
Learning the Investment Activities
The firm was established in 1965 as a small business with less than 100 employees. 
The founder did not have any formal education; he was a hands-on technician who learned 
by doing simple experiments. The investment in manufacturing processes was not 
significant and there were neither formal feasibility study nor the plan to produce any 
OEM auto-parts.
252 He stated, “To us, it is becoming apparent that the Japanese have plans to make Thailand an offshore 
export base for cars, and it makes sen se ,... And if one has to withstand the Japanese competition, one has to 
do the same [i.e. Firm AH has to start to export]” (Rainat, 1988).
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Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two important learning activities. First was the plastic production 
process improvement. Engaging in manual plastic injection process during its start-up, Firm 
CPC underwent learning by trial and error and extensive in-house experimentation. There 
were no formal schools for technicians.
“In those days there were neither university courses nor formal curricula on 
the plastic production process. My father did not receive much formal 
education; therefore, he and his technicians had to learn by trial and error”
(personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
In addition, Firm CPC’s plastic injection machines were manually operated; they required
the technicians to manually pull the handle. Due to skills inconsistency, the firm faced the
challenge of poor operational performance. The defect rates were high and most
technicians lacked the practical experience. They did not fully understand the principles
underlying machine operations. Therefore, Firm CPC struggled to find foreign expert(s)
(from Hong Kong and China) who could assist with the production activities (personal
interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004). Hence, it could be said that most
early production process improvements were mostly absent and the improvement activities
were at best ad hoc. This was due to the lack of formal human resource training.
Second was the improvement in the tooling used in the production process. Firm
CPC concentrated on producing simple household goods with almost no production of the
auto-parts253. This was because the Thai automotive industry did not begin until the early
1960s and the plastic auto-parts industry was virtually absent. Then in the 1970s, the firm
moved on to produce electrical appliance plastic parts such electric fan casing and cover for
an electric kettles (Firm CPC corporate website, accessed December 15, 2004). In terms of
tooling, Firm CPC imported all the molds from Japan and none were produced in-house
(personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
In addition, Firm CPC did not have any formal human resource development
programs, since it was a small family business. At best, the training courses were on-the-
job trial and error sessions. With deficient human resources, the firm did not engage in any
long-term continuous improvement activities.
253 Examples o f household parts included plastic basket, bowls and other tableware.
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Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm CPC did not learn much about linking with other firms or organizations. For 
instance, the active public support and training activities were unavailable during mid- 
1960s and did not occur until after the establishment of the Thailand Automotive Institute 
(TAI) in 1998. Since its establishment, Firm CPC engaged in neither foreign joint venture 
agreement nor formal technological assistance. Consequently, it could be said that the Firm 
CPC learning with regard to linkage activities were limited and at best, the linkages 
involved only the foreign equipment vendors.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm CPC did not develop any marketing capability. There was neither market 
research nor advertising activities. The firm’s products were basic commodities and 
targeted at the local consumer markets.
7.1.3 Firm CSP (1995 to 2001)
Learning the Investment Activities
The investment in the new production facility was minor. The firm had about 40 
employees and the business was set up as a partnership among relatives.
“All of us had prior experience in aluminium die casting, working as 
employees in an aluminium die casting firm. We viewed that aluminium is 
a good substitute material for iron and other steel-related material; hence an 
opportunity for our team to invest in Firm CSP in 2000” (personal interview 
with Firm CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004).
Hence it could be said that the investment plan was analyzed through a group of engineers
and personnel who were well acquainted with the supporting industry such as aluminium
die casting process.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three types of learning activities: process improvement, tooling 
improvement (including product diversification, but no product design) and work standard 
improvement.
First were the production process improvement activities. The President of Firm 
CSP owned a small family business (Firm SRI) that manufactured rubber seal, rubber 
engine mount, and oil seal. During that time, the soon-to-be General Manager of Firm CSP
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had been working in another die casting firm and accumulating much production 
experience. Soon he retired from that firm and joined Firm CSP as a General Manager. 
Much of the firm’s production process set up was from General Manager’s prior experience.
Second were the product diversification and tooling improvement activities. Firm 
CSP supplied much of electronics as well as electrical appliance parts. It did not focus 
much effort on the auto-parts and the firm engaged in much product diversification.
“During Firm CSP start-up, we cared a lot about achieving a short 
[financial] payback period. We accepted virtually any production orders that 
we could find and also had the capability to produce. Our firm was not 
selectively picking sale orders; we simply produced as much as we could 
and tried to fully utilize our invested production capacity” (personal 
interview with Firm CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004).
Consequently it could be said that Firm CSP had already engaged in product
diversification, producing for electronics and electrical appliance as well as the auto-part
industry. It also positioned itself at various points along the supply chain, ranging from
third tier to first-tier auto-part suppliers (Ibid.). Additionally, Firm CSP did not learn any
product design activity.
Last was the improvement in the work procedure. Firm CSP invested its effort into 
the quality management system, ISO 9000, and gained this quality accreditation in only a 
year after establishment (from www.tisi.go.th234, accessed February 15, 2006). In addition, 
the firm management was highly committed to continuously upgrade the quality 
management systems.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There are two types of linkage: domestic and foreign. Firm CSP engaged much in 
the former rather than the latter. For instance, Firm CSP had received much assistance 
from public organizations to continuously improve the production process. Such assistance 
enabled the firms to provide training courses that were more systematic. With regard to the 
foreign linkage, Firm CSP started out as a 100 per cent Thai-owned firm and did not 
receive much foreign technical assistance.
TISI = Thailand Standards Industrial Institute
207
Learning the Marketing Activities
The marketing activities of Firm CSP were inward-focused on only the domestic 
market. Very little focus was on export, since the General Manager stated that the firm 
would like to secure the domestic market first prior to the expansion of its products 
overseas (personal interview with Firm CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004).
7.1.4 Firm D Group (1966 -  1979)
Learning the Investment Activities
Three significant investments in new firms occurred: Firm M, Firm MNI, and Firm 
D Group. The origin of Firm D Group started with the investment of a trading firm in 
1966, Firm M (corporate website, accessed February 15, 2006). Throughout the first 
decade, Firm M’s only focus was on REM auto-parts, with virtually no manufacturing 
activities and no joint venture with foreign firms255. After linking and leveraging on the 
business relationship with a prospective Japanese partner, Firm M was ready to transition 
into the auto-part manufacturing business.
In 1977, the investment in Firm MNI was initiated as a manufacturing plant 
specializing in producing OEM brake parts. It was a joint venture with a Japanese brake 
producer. Two years later, the investment in Firm D Group was also a foreign joint 
venture. Firm D President succinctly expressed his early working style as:
“During the late 1970s, I worked and lodged within the factory premises, 
along with a group of 5-6 employees. We live together as a family unit”
(personal interview with Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
Firm D President frequently travelled to Japan to receive advice on proper tooling design.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three learning activities: learning the production process improvement, 
learning the product and tooling improvement, and learning to develop the human 
resources.
255 From 1966 until mid-1970s, most o f the businesses conducted by Firm D group were in dealership 
activities. The auto-parts were targeted at the replacement equipment (REM) market, and most auto-parts 
were simple and required little sophisticated technology. Examples of the auto-parts were wiper blades, 
automotive belts, automotive lamps and bulbs, shock absorbers and hubs and bolts (Firm M corporate 
website, accessed January 15, 2006). These were mostly stand-alone and non-critical auto-parts, and most 
carmakers did not require the same level o f quality and cost as required by those o f the OEM auto-parts.
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First were the production improvement activities. Initially, the Group’s production 
activities were virtually non-existent since it was an aftermarket auto-part distributor and 
not a manufacturer. Later, the foreign joint ventures assisted Firm D Group with 
continuous technical assistance and the issues regarding product quality, low cost and 
delivery punctuality. Consequently, most production process improvement activities started 
to shift from trial and error experimentation to a more systematic work procedure to 
enhance the consistency of the production process. Again, through foreign joint ventures, 
Firm D Group managed to successfully transition from a REM part distributor to an OEM 
manufacturer.
The second learning activity was related to the product and tooling improvement. 
Firm MNI and Firm D Group were capable of producing motorcycle and automobile 
products. Firm MNI was responsible for producing motorcycle brake parts and supplied 
them to Suzuki motorcycles, while Firm D was producing automotive braking system and 
aluminium die casting auto-parts (personal interview with Firm D President, May 12,
2004).
The acquaintance with the simple REM auto-parts (from 1966 to 1977) served as an 
appropriate training ground for accumulating technical knowledge that was useful later 
during the transition into the OEM manufacturing activities. Consequently, it could be said 
that the starting point of REM distributorship had served two learning purposes for Firm D 
group: 1) the long-term development of business ties (with a Japanese firm) that eventually 
lead to future joint ventures, and 2) the experience with REM auto-parts served as a basic 
learning platform that facilitated Firm D transition into OEM auto-part business.
The third learning activity involved the human resource development which started 
with on-the-job training of Firm D President. His two-year home-stay with a Japanese 
manufacturer had taught him many things.
“I learned how to speak and listen in Japanese; as well as understanding the 
Japanese culture since I stayed at his home and also worked as an employee.
His home was a typical conservative Japanese family with many strict rules.
I had absorbed the Japanese tacit ‘ways of doing things’. Some of these 
occurred automatically, as I was not always aware. Today, when I converse 
with a Japanese, that person perceives me as a native Japanese” (personal 
interview with Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
Hence it could be said that the production experience of the President was formed during
his visit to Japan. The experience had enabled him to solicit much informal assistance and
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formed many successful Japanese joint ventures. Having lived and worked in Japan, the 
President understood quite well the Japanese philosophy of continuous improvement 
(Ibid.).
Even though trained in Japan, the President described his manufacturing experience 
as quite deficient.
“Due to our prior business activities concentrated on REM auto-parts, we 
never had any experience running an OEM business. Sometimes we hired an 
outside contractor to build a mold; we did not know how to measure the 
quality of the product. At times, we even got rip-off by some unscrupulous 
contractors. Often times, we relied on the learning by trial-and-error”
(personal interview with Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
To make the process of learning by trial-and-error more productive, Firm D President
decided to form more foreign joint ventures and travelled to Japan (again) for another three-
month on-the-job training.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm D had a well-balanced “link and learn” capability; and the linkages were of 
two types: domestic and foreign236. The firm had well-grounded domestic knowledge of 
Thai auto-part industry. Furthermore, with investment in foreign joint ventures (Firm MNI 
and Firm D) the firm obtained significant linkages with foreign technology sources. These 
foreign linkages enabled Firm D Group to develop the production capability necessary for 
the auto-part manufacturing business.
For instance, the foreign technical assistance agreement signed by Firm D in 1979 
was with Firm ASK (Japan). Firm D Group had set as an objective to produce the brake 
shoes and pads, but it lacked the know-how on both the production process and product. 
Firm ASK provided the know-how on the production of brake pads for Suzuki motorcycles. 
Besides this formal technical assistance, Firm D President often relied on his personal 
connection with the Japanese businessmen as well as the technicians. In addition, the 
foreign linkages afforded Firm D Group to frequently send both the President and his 
engineers overseas to absorb the foreign knowledge first-hand.
256 The domestic linkages were mostly dealing with the local automotive repair shops, whereas the foreign 
linkages were with the suppliers o f imported auto-parts.
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Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm D marketing activities were focused on the domestic market, since very little 
auto-parts were exported. In addition, with the assistance of Japanese OEM supplier Firm 
D Group did not invest much time into activities such as market research or forecasting.
7.1.5 Firm L (1972- 1990)
Learning the Investment Activities
From 1972 to 1987, Firm L was a small auto-part trader. It was not until 1987 that 
Firm L decided to invest in a foreign joint venture, a manufacturing business257. This joint 
venture had plans to invest in increased production capacity and to diversify into 
producing engine parts (from www.enkeithai.co.th, accessed January 15, 2005). 
Unfortunately, this joint venture was dissolved in 1990, due to disagreements. Firm L had 
transitioned to become an independent Thai firm. The initial investments included: the 
investment in the low pressure aluminium die casting machines and the hiring of about 70 
to 80 employees, inclusive of a couple of engineers with many technicians (personal 
interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004). There was no major investment in 
production capacity in this period.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
Firm L main products had always been the production of aluminium alloy wheels; 
there was no product diversification. There was not much activity related to the continuous 
improvement. The firm engaged in two important learning activities: learning to 
transition from auto-part trader to become a manufacturer and learning to transition out of 
the foreign joint venture and became independent.
First was the learning that involved the transition from an auto-part trader to a 
manufacturer. Since Firm L was an aftermarket trader, it did not engage in any 
manufacturing activities (Manager Online, 1994). Consequently, there was no 
improvement to the production process. From 1987 onwards, the foreign joint venture 
provided Firm L with foreign technical knowledge on the production process; specifically
257 The roots o f  Firm L started with a small trading firm (Firm L & S) in 1972 and then in 1977 when the sons 
and daughters o f Firm L & S owner started their own business expansion, following in the footsteps o f  their 
father (Manager Online, 1994). The expanded firms include two business groups: the alloy wheel and tires 
business and the chemical industry business.
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the firm learned the aluminium die casting process238. Through this joint venture, Firm L 
started to produce alloy wheels for the carmakers. The joint venture also provided Firm L 
with the opportunity to learn OEM production technology. It was not until 1990 that the 
joint venture was dissolved, and Firm L was an independent Thai firm. Throughout this 
period, Firm L did not engage in any product design activities.
The second learning activity occurred in 1990, after the joint venture was dissolved. 
Much codified technical knowledge was accumulated into Firm L by its President, who 
read self-taught books on the theory of aluminium die-casting259. In addition during the 
joint venture, the President had the opportunity to train closely with the Japanese engineers 
and absorbed the technical knowledge. In 1990, the firm was on its own and relied quite 
heavily on independent learning by trial-and-error as the means to develop its own human 
resources, and at times it had to search for external technical assistance. Thus it could be 
said that Firm L President working style was quite adaptive, continuously searching for 
new knowledge to supplement his own knowledge gaps and always on the lookout to 
purchase the newer equipment as long as the long-term benefits justify the costs (personal 
interview with Factory Manager, May 5, 2004).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
For Firm L, the shift between domestic and foreign linkages was a dynamic one. 
Prior to 1987, all the linkages were domestic (except the links with foreign suppliers for the 
imported auto-parts), and furthermore, the linkages were largely related to the domestic 
trading network. The foreign linkage was evident in 1987 when the firm formed a 
Japanese joint venture. This foreign link allowed Firm L to learn the aluminium die casting 
production technology. Later, when the joint venture was dissolved, Firm L reverted back 
to relying mainly on the domestic linkages for production knowledge.
258 In addition, Firm L founder received an engineering education from overseas (USA); hence he was able to 
conduct an independent assessment of the alternative aluminium die casting manufacturing processes. He 
searched for more technical information and analyzed the pros and cons of the gravity die casting production 
process, when compared with the low-pressure aluminium die casting (personal interview with Firm L 
President, May 4, 2004).
~5Q Having earned an engineering degree, Firm L President understood full well the principles of aluminium 
die-casting. He was equipped with the ability to self-teach himself with new die casting techniques by 
reading books and consulting with his friends who were in the alloy wheel business.
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Learning the Marketing Activities
Prior to 1990, most of the firm’s production volume focused on meeting the 
growing domestic demand and not much was focused on the export activity since the 
domestic demand growth was more than sufficient fuel business growth. Consequently, the 
firm did not engage in much detailed market research or the search for export. The linkage 
with foreign firm enabled Firm L to enhance its domestic distribution network. The joint 
venture allowed Firm L to achieve two domestic marketing capabilities: to learn to 
supply alloy wheels to the Japanese carmakers and to learn to manage a large distribution 
network (more than 400 shops) (Manager Online, 1994). Without the joint venture in 1990, 
Firm L reverted to the smaller domestic REM auto-part market.
7.1.6 Firm S Group (1941 -  1965)
Learning the Investment Activities
Having been an auto-part trader for two decades“ , Firm S Group decided to invest 
in its first manufacturing facility in 1962261. It imported a machine from Japan and learned 
to produce undercarriage suspension auto-parts262. Three years later, the firm invested in 
additional production lines to learn to produce brake and clutch linings. Besides this, there 
were no other major investments in manufacturing facility. Other minor investment 
included the programs to have the workers trained on-the-job; these were unsystematic and 
relied only on trial-and-error.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two main learning activities related to Firm S development of 
production capability: learning to operate the REM auto-part trader and learning the 
transition from a trader into a manufacturer.
260 In 1941, Firm S Group founder and his partners established a partnership (Firm Y) to sell after-market 
auto-parts. “[The establishment o f Firm Y] marks the beginning o f the [Firm S] group (Firm S Group 
corporate website, accessed December 20, 2004). This partnership was only a trader and distributor o f auto­
parts and there were no manufacturing activities.
261 In 1962 this firm was a limited liability partnership under a different name. Firm BSK was the new name 
given to the facility after the production capacity expansion in 1976. The firm registered capital investment 
was 30 million Baht and during its first year o f operation it had about 100 employees.
262 During the early days o f Thai automotive industry, Firm S Group manufacturing plant claimed to be the 
first and arguably the only one in Thailand to produce leaf spring (corporate website, accessed January 10, 
2006).
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First was the learning related to the operation o f an auto-part trader. Since most 
trader activities concentrated on only few products; it was relatively easy for Firm S Group 
to manage close contact with the foreign suppliers. The Group learned to collaborate with 
these suppliers. It could be said that starting out as a trader was advantageous, as the 
Group’s initial learning activities were related to getting acquainted with the auto-parts 
prior to engaging in the manufacturing activities. Second was learning that involved a 
transition from a trader to a manufacturer. After importing the Japanese equipment, the 
manufacturing plant experimented extensively with “ reverse engineering” the imported 
auto-parts. The early products were the leaf and coil springs. Most products prior to the 
1980s were concentrated only on the REM auto-parts, and there were no OEM production. 
In 1965, Firm S Group started to learn how to produce brake and clutch linings using the 
same facility (through additional production lines). A ll o f the tooling was imported, and 
there were no indigenous tooling design facility.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
The domestic linkages were mostly with the local automotive repair shops, to sell 
the REM auto-parts. The foreign linkages were with the suppliers o f imported auto-parts. 
Consequently, neither o f these two linkages contributed significantly to the Group’ s 
production activities. The exception was when the auto-part manufacturing had started, and 
this provided the link with foreign equipment vendors. Here the Group learned how to 
operate the production equipment to produce simple REM auto-parts.
Learning the Marketing Activities
A ll o f the learning activities related to marketing were domestically oriented, i.e. to 
supply the local market. Firm S Group did not pursue any export activities. Consequently, 
there was no need for systematic market research or any forecasting activities.
7.1.7 Firm SOM (1990 -  1995)
Learning the Investment Activities
Initially, Firm SOM invested in a residential home to accommodate 4 to 5 
technicians . Later, the business grew bigger, and it had to relocate (personal interview
263 Several years prior to its establishment, the firm founder had been working as a technician at two Thai 
manufacturing firms: l )  PVC pipe manufacturer and 2) a heat exchanger (a device used for cooling/heating
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with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004). Lacking the financial capital for 
relocation, Firm SOM relied on its customer for financial assistance. It appeared that Firm 
SOM was passive in searching for other sources of assistance, and had only a very basic 
level of investment capability.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
The early learning was craft-like work with much trial and error activities to 
produce simple auto-parts. The condition was akin to a repair shop, rather than a 
manufacturing firm (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004). In 
addition, Firm SOM was a third-tier auto-part supplier264. The assistance that the firm 
received was very basic production capabilities. At best, Firm SOM produced according 
the customer-provided specifications, and the firm relied only on its main customer for 
technical assistance.
“Firm SOM was lucky to receive the assistance from Firm SML, which had 
provided us with production orders as well as technical assistance on setting 
up the production processes. We were satisfied with the received production 
orders, since it saved our firm the time to search for customers” (personal 
interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
Hence it could be said that Firm SOM had a passive stance on improving its production
capability, in particular it relied on a single customer for many assistances (financial and
technological). In addition, all the firm’s personnel were technicians, and there were no
professional managers.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Even the domestic linkages were limited for Firm SOM. Firm SOM basically 
relied on a single domestic linkage, i.e. its main customer (personal interview with Firm 
SOM President, November 24, 2004). Besides this, there were no other links. The firm did 
not have any organization development programs, nor did it engage in any search for 
sources of new knowledge. Additionally, Firm SOM did not aim at learning through any 
foreign joint venture or technical assistance agreements (Ibid.).
fluid) manufacturer. Firm SOM President has very limited formal education; he foresaw very little future in 
working as an employee. After gaining sufficient production experience in mold and tool making, he decided 
to team up with his younger brother and opened his own small job shop in 1994 (personal interview Firm 
SOM President, November 24, 2004).
264 Firm SOM was essentially a subcontractor for Firm SML, who was producing auto-parts for a first-tier 
supplier such as Firm TS Group (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
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Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm SOM’s domestic market share was limited, and the firm was highly exposed 
to the risk of losing its main customer. The firm did not even bother to plan (or think 
about) the export activity.
7.1.8 Firm TKT (1973 -  1990)
Learning the Investment Activities
The early learning was concerned with simple electro-plating process for plastic 
parts. In 1973, the business was a small job shop. Later in 1980, Firm TKT was 
incorporated with the registered capital investment of 5 million Bahr (SET, 2005b). It 
was not until the plant expansion in 1990, when investment in the production process 
became more systematic.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three learning activities: learning to operate the imported equipment, 
learning to produce simple plastic parts, and limited learning in the development of human 
resources.
First was the learning activity related to the simple production process. Since the 
firm was small, the production activities were conducted internally (involved neither formal 
technical assistance nor foreign joint venture agreements). Consequently, the learning 
activities involved much doing by trial and error. The workers would design the process 
themselves and performed trial runs, and the problems that occurred were solved through 
successive data gathering and iterative problem-solving sessions (personal interview Firm 
TKT Managing Director, November 5, 2004). Second was the learning activity related to 
the production of simple products. Firm TKT early products were simple plastic parts . 
There was very little focus on the plastic auto-parts. Most tooling and mold were imported, 
with insignificant emphasis on the indigenous design of such tools (Ibid.). Third was the 
learning activity related to human resources development. Initially, the qualifications of 
Firm TKT personnel comprised only technicians who had graduated with at most high
265 The shareholders were the majority Thai and minority foreign (Hong Kong) shareholders (Lauridsen, 
2000: 41).
266 Examples were household plastic goods and simple chromium-plating o f  plastic parts for electrical 
appliance.
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school diplomas. The firm seldom hired formal engineering graduates. It was not until 
after the move to the new factory in 1990 that the firm started to hire engineers (Ibid.).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Most learning activities were developed through domestic linkages. It learned to 
network with the local repair shops and distributors. Additionally, there were few foreign 
linkages. Firm TKT involved in neither formal technical assistance nor foreign joint 
ventures.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm TKT supplied the domestic markets with simple plastic parts. Since all 
products were targeting the domestic market, Firm TKT did not engage in any export.
7.1.9 Firm TS Group (1960- 1980)
Learning the Investment Activities
There were two significant investment projects: a small repair shop and two 
formal manufacturing firms (related to set up of Firm TS Group).
The first project started with an investment in 1960; it was a job-shop“ with 
several repairmen working on motorcycle seats. The business orders came from the owners 
of the imported vehicles who needed the simple repair work“ . By 1964, this shop 
expanded to produce the OEM motorcycle seats (Somsak, 1983). The second major 
investment was related to the two formal manufacturing firms. One was the set up of Firm 
SAS to produce automotive and motorcycle seats. Another major investment was made 
as a spin-off from Firm SAS; it was Firm TS Group270.
267 The total investment amount in the job-shop was only 40,000 Baht (Anonymous, 1983b). The investment 
did not involve any mass-producing equipment or modem machinery, and the production tasks were highly 
labor-intensive.
268 Some of the firm orders came from the domestic taxi cooperatives that needed to have their seats cover 
with plastics (Anonymous, 1983c). Another large job was the production of metal roof for Fiat automobiles, 
which were assembled by Kamasutra Assembly plant (Ibid.).
"69 In 1972, Firm SAS had registered capital of 30 million Baht with 400 employees (Anonymous, 1983b). 
The firm engaged in a technical licensing agreement with Namba Press Works (Japan) to learn seat 
production technology. Various training courses were conducted for employees and Japanese experts were 
frequently dispatched to assist with production technology (personal interview with Firm SAS Chief 
Operating Officer, November 6, 2004).
210 The rationale was Firm SAS wanted to separate the motorcycle parts division as a separate unit in order to 
achieve effective learning and technology transfer from the Japanese partner firms. Firm TS Group had a
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Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two main learning activities: learning to produce OEM products and 
learning to develop the human resources.
The first learning activity had to do with production activity and reverse 
engineering. Firm TS Group focused on the OEM motorcycle parts271, with negligible 
amount in REM parts272. The Group would “take apart” the imported parts to reverse 
engineer its components. This was done through learning by trial and error. The Group 
utilized the “copy and develop” approach to learning (Panthong, 2005a: 44). Hence the 
imported automotive parts were taken apart to see if there were any components that could 
be reproduced in-house and then supplied to the domestic carmakers. The copy and 
develop model was utilized within each subsidiary that was responsible for production of a 
single auto-part that utilized the same technology (Panthong, 2005a: 44).
The second learning activity was the early development of human resources. The 
Group’s President actively searched for his employees from many sources" (Anonymous, 
1983b). Additionally, the President always views the continuous learning as paramount.
“I always think about how to create a Thai society where production workers 
are more capable. I looked to the Japanese; they were able to upgrade their 
human resources. They were able to manufacture their own products and 
exported them globally. 1 wanted to develop the human resource pool for 
Thailand” (Anonymous, 1983b).
The President also believes in the philosophy of hard work and commitment to the 
continuous learning274. Hence it could be said that Firm TS Group highly emphasized the 
development of human resources.
registered capital o f  20 million Baht and mostly supplied motorcycle parts and later various other engine parts 
(personal interview with Firm TS Group Senior Engineering Manager, October 29, 2004).
271 During the late 1970s, Firm TS Group main products focused on mainly motorcycle seats with very little 
variety o f other auto-parts. In 1978, the Group received an order from two Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers to produce seats. There were negligible amount o f automobile (4-wheel) parts.
272 This was in accordance with Firm TS Group learning strategy, which was to engage in supplying the major 
domestic motorcycle makers and carmakers in Thailand with OEM automobile and motorcycle parts.
273 The technicians were from small family-owned shops. The administration staffs were from the normal 
hiring process. The freshly graduated engineers were from university and they were provided with sufficient 
training. The management personnel consisted entirely o f family relatives.
274 “Even though I had very little formal education, I learned from more experienced businessmen who had 
knowledge on the business ventures. I used this as a way to enhance my own knowledge and learned how to 
successfully run my businesses. This knowledge assisted me during the transition from a mere repair shop to 
become an OEM auto-part manufacturer” (Anonymous, 1983a).
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Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm TS Group had a well-balanced “link and learn” capability, utilizing both 
domestic and foreign linkages. The Group networked widely with the local repair shops 
and supplied them with simple products. In addition, the Group also supplied auto-parts to 
the domestic carmakers. These linkages enabled the Group to learn the simple production 
activities, and it served as a platform to progress into more complex production. For 
foreign links, in 1977 the first joint venture was formed with Honda (motorcycles) to 
produce various motorcycle parts. This linkage was part of the Group’s learning strategy 
to efficiently transform itself from a repair shop into a manufacturer. The foreign joint 
venture also enhanced the Group credibility as first-tier auto-part supplier.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Most of the Group’s marketing activities were focused on the domestic market; 
very little auto-parts were exported. Since the foreign partner was assisting the Group with 
the marketing activity, it did not invest much time into systematic market research or sales 
forecasting.
7.1.10 Summary of Different Firm Learning Activities and 
Mechanisms: Start-up Phase
The pattern of learning activities and mechanisms of the nine case study firms 
during the start-up phase is summarized in Table 7.1. All firms started out as small 
businesses, either as a repair job shop or an auto-part trader, with moderate investment 
activities. Most firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and Firm TKT) did not engage in 
any plans to invest in complex set of learning activities. At best, some of the firms (Firm 
AH Group, Firm D Group, Firm L, Firm S Group, and Firm TS Group) were in a transition 
process from a small auto-part trader to an REM or OEM auto-part manufacturing firm.
In addition, all firms were initially involved in using the passive leaming-by-doing 
production activities. Not all firms were engaged in the purposive learning mechanisms. 
Only some firms implemented the more active learning by searching for foreign partners as 
well as importing the foreign technology (for example, Firm D Group, Firm L, Firm S 
Group, Firm TS Group). Other firms accumulated their production capability by 
implementing learning by hiring and training engineering graduates (for example, Firm AH 
Group, Firm CSP, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group).
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The products produced by all the firms were simple. For instance, Firm AH Group 
produced simple automotive tooling; Firm CPC produced simple household plastic parts; 
and Firm CSP produced simple aluminium die casting parts. Moreover, most firms used 
the production of the simple parts as a training ground to enable transition into more 
complex auto-parts (for example, Firm S Group, Firm TS Group). Although producing 
more complex auto-parts, none of the firms were engaged in the design activities.
In addition, firms managed their linkage activities differently. Some firms used their auto­
part trading businesses as a leveraging platform to solidify their ties with the foreign 
suppliers, leading to joint venture firms (for example, Firm D Group and Firm L). Other 
firms leveraged on their personal relationships with the vehicle makers to form joint 
venture (Firm TS Group) or acquire other firms (Firm AH Group). These firms were more 
active in using learning by searching and forming linkages with foreign technology 
(knowledge) sources. In contrast, other firms did not attempt to search for such linkages 
with foreign firms at all, and were lacking the access to foreign technology sources (for 
example, Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and Firm TKT). Only Firm AH Group made 
explicit plan, aiming at export, the other firms focused solely on the domestic market.
7.2 Learning Activities During Firm Expansion Phase
7.2.1 Firm AH Group (1989 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
There were two significant investment projects: production expansion in the 1990 
and another subsequent expansion in 1996. In 1990, the Group expanded its production 
capacity by purchasing machineries and invested in a factory. From late 1980s until 1997 
(pre-crisis) the Thai automotive market had expanded rapidly and the carmakers’ 
requirement for tooling (jigs and dies) had become much more demanding. To keep up 
with these changes, in 1996 Firm AH Group invested in a new production plant275. The 
new site had four times the space of the old one, thus providing more area for a complete 
turnkey production of jigs. In other words, Firm AH Group planned to use this site to 
produce modem auto-part tooling.
275 Firm AH bought 24,000 square meters (about 10 acre) of land in Ayuthaya to build a new world-class 
factory (AH Group, 2003). The total investment was about 1 billion Baht, of which 300 million was the land 
cost.
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Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three significant learning activities: an upgrade to modern production 
technology, systematic productivity improvement activities, and involvement in the turnkey 
low-volume jig production.
First was the upgrade of production technology. In 1991, Firm AH Group 
introduced computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and computer 
numerical control (CNC) machines276. This investment was necessary since the Group 
received design data on CAD drawings, and it needed the ability to open the received CAD 
file and translated the information into design requirements (Deyo and Doner, 2000: 131). 
In addition, Firm AH President stated:
“We learned early that if you want to compete, you must be able to interface 
technically with the big manufacturers. ... If you don't change with the times 
[or] if you don't follow the trend, after a while you can’t even talk to them”
(Crispin, 2002).
Second was the systematic improvement in productivity, including human 
resources development. Prior to 1995, the work monitoring and documentation were quite 
loose . Firm AH realized its existing work practice lacked a standard. Furthermore, to 
achieve the IS09000 and QS9000 accreditations, systematic work documentation was
9 7 8necessary. The work documentation started with Firm AH Tooling Director , whose 
responsibility was to oversee the start and finish dates for each tool development279. The 
established work standard enabled the Group to consistently deliver high quality product in 
a timely manner280.
Firm AH Group also engaged in active human resource development. As 
mentioned above, the Group relied on two mechanisms to develop and retain its bright
276 “In 1991, [the firm] became the first among its peers to introduce CAD/CAM technology and CNC 
machines” [italics added] (De Meyer and Garg, 2005: 88).
277 This is not surprising since the early development o f low-volume jigs or small volume production o f  
pressed auto-parts required neither formal work monitoring nor systematic documentation. Moreover Firm 
AH Group did not achieve quality standards (such as IS09000 and QS9000) until 1999.
278 After searching for some time during the late 1980s, the firm hired an Australian Tooling Director whose 
direct responsibility was the design, manufacture and test o f low-volume jigs and other automotive stamping 
dies. This expert on jigs and automotive tooling came directly from Ford Australia, where he had worked for 
nearly 30 years.
~79 The time duration between the dates were conveyed to the foreman o f the jig shop who would break down 
the projects into a sequence o f simpler tasks such as “tooling design, base fabrication, base machining, unit 
fabrication, unit machining, unit assembly, installation, inspection, piping, try-out and buy-off’ (Deyo and 
Doner, 2000: 130-131).
280 Within the automotive industry, this is popular phrased as QCD -  Quality, Cost and (on-time) Delivery.
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talent: extensive in-house training as well as overseas plant visits and measures to 
improve workers’ morale. The President expressed:
“I also take great care of my staff since money can buy factories, machines, 
but not people. Human resources are the most important decisive factor 
toward company work and productivity improvement” [italics added]
(Chaiwat, 2003).
Moreover, the Group also retained its workers; the President said, “Once we get them [the 
capable employees] we don’t let them go” (Fairclough, 1995).
Last learning activity was the turnkey design of low-volume jigs. In the late 
1980s, Firm AH produced the manual low-volume jigs that used simple technology and 
tools. For instance, the simple tools used by these jigs were caster wheels and thus they 
were easy to maneuver around (Deyo and Doner, 2000: 129) making them suitable of low- 
volume, flexible job shop production. Through such developments, Firm AH was able to 
cut costs282, but maintain the same level of quality. It won a contract to supply this low- 
cost, low-volume jig to Honda Automobiles in the late 1980s. Prior to the early 1990s, 
Firm AH Group did not produce its own jig design, that is the detailed specification 
drawings were provided by the carmakers and the firm just responded by producing the jig 
according to the supplied drawings. This situation however was different in the early 
1990s.
283By 1990s, there was evidence that Firm AH was capable of turnkey jig projects . 
Firm AH Group was equipped with CAD/CAM technology, had a trained set of 
international technical and engineering staff and enjoyed a growing automotive market due 
to booming foreign direct investment. New learning opportunities arose when it won 
contract to design vehicle assembly jigs for other carmakers284. This learning activity was 
different from the previous manual jig design; it incorporated the use of newer equipment
281
281 On the issue o f  overseas training Prof. Arnoud DeMeyer from INSEAD (France) remarked: “[Firm AH] is 
a true knowledge management company, ... it had a policy to send its employees to various parts o f the world 
to gain new skills and then teach other staff members at the home office” (Pandey, 2005).
282 Firm AH was capable o f producing a jig for 100,000 to 200,000 US dollars; this is significantly less than 
the cost that most Japanese carmakers could make them. Hence it is logical for these carmakers to outsource 
the jig production and other tooling tasks to Firm AH in order to save money as well as plant size (Deyo and 
Doner, 2000: 129).
283 i.e. designing, manufacturing and testing its low-volume jigs
~84 In 1993, Firm AH designed jigs for the Jeep Cherokee, Honda Civic and Ford Ranger (Mazda) pickup 
truck.
2 2 4
and the ability of the engineering team to design, produce the prototype jigs, and subject 
these jigs to rigorous testing285.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There were several foreign joint ventures and formal technical assistance 
agreements. In 1990, the Group formed two joint ventures with Sanoh Industries (Japan) 
and Nissho Iwai (Japan) to produce brake tubing. Later in 1995, the Group signed a 
technical assistance agreement with Kurata Corporation286 (Japan) who had expertise in 
fuel tank manufacturing (AH Group, 2003: 5). The agreement was to assist Firm AH with 
the production of fuel tanks for the Ford/Mazda pick-up truck287. In the same year, Firm 
AH signed a distributorship and service agreement to supply Kawasaki robots in Thailand. 
Then in 1996, the Group formed another joint venture with a US-based firm, Arvin 
Industries . The purposes of these joint ventures and assistance agreements were: to 
equip the Group with sufficient breadth of OEM auto-part product portfolio289 (risk 
management) and to provide the technical assistance for the production of auto-parts.
Learning the Marketing Activities
In terms of marketing activity, Firm AH President aimed at exporting his Thai-made 
jigs. He went directly to the Japanese and told them there was no point in making master 
jigs for only each individual Asian country’s small (and fragmented) domestic market, 
when it was possible to mass produce them at Firm AH and lower the cost at the same time. 
The result was that Japanese brought the participants from various countries including 
Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan, and Firm AH Group had the 
opportunity to demonstrate the master, low-volume jigs to them. The marketing efforts 
paid off and orders have been coming in ever since290 (Rainat, 1988).
285 The Tooling Director stated, “We used to get drawings from our customers ... and make the jigs to their 
specifications, ... Now we do the design work ourselves” (Fairclough, 1994).
286 Later this firm changed its name to Keylex Corporation.
287 At this stage, Firm AH was able to produce the fuel tank per se, excluding other parts such as the ‘tank 
sender’ (i.e. the instrumentation that is attached to the tank to measure the level o f remaining fuel). This 
knowledge regarding tank sender will be acquired by Firm AH in its subsequent technical assistance.
288 Unfortunately this venture was short-lived due to the impact o f the 1997 financial crisis.
289 By 1996, Firm AH had three related product areas: 1) the design, manufacture and assembly o f  automotive 
body jigs, 2) the design and manufacture o f dies and 3) the production o f  pressed parts such as fuel tanks, 
body panels, exhaust systems, and brackets (Deyo and Doner, 2000: 128).
290 Assembly jigs on the new Ford Falcon have been ordered from New Zealand, the President was sure that, 
Firm AH will also be making (assembly) jigs for Malaysia's new BMW 5 series” (Rainat, 1988).
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7.2.2 Firm CPC (1971 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
There were no significant investment projects. At best, the investment involved a 
gradual expansion of production capacity. Most learning on selection of new equipment 
was from foreign and domestic vendors. In the 1980, the firm invested in equipment and 
tooling to supply the plastic motorcycle parts291. Then during the early 1990s, Firm CPC 
increased its investment in production capacity, installing more new plastic injection 
machines to produce auto-parts292. In 1996, the firm also invested in modern equipment 
such as computer-numerical control (CNC) machines and computer aid design (CAD) tools.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three important learning activities: the improvement in the production 
activities, improvement in tooling and production technology, and improvement in human 
resources.
First was the improvement in production activities through product diversification. 
Firm CPC had been producing simple plastic commodity products since 1965. In mid- 
1970s, the firm underwent production expansion and learned to produce plastic parts for 
electrical appliances. This learning was a useful preparation for future production of plastic 
motorcycle and auto-parts. In addition, the firm also learned to perform simple mold 
maintenance. Later, Firm CPC learned to produce the OEM motorcycle parts , and it 
was different from small lot-size production of household goods. Firm CPC must meet the 
strict requirements of high quality, low cost and on-time delivery. Finally in the 1990s,
Firm CPC learned to supply automotive plastic parts294.
2q| Examples of motorcycle parts were fenders, plate bottom seat, leg shields and rear rail grab.
:q: This investment followed the firm’s competitive strategy, to further diversify to increase the supply to both 
the automotive as well as the motorcycle makers, since during the early 1990s, the Thai auto-part industry 
was under rapid expansion (until the 1997 crisis) along with the increased localization.
‘93 The motorcycle parts produced were plastic cover for engines, front fenders, but not motorcycle seats.
This was because most seats were still using metal frame rather than plastic ones (personal interview with 
Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004). Other motorcycle parts produced by firm included the rear rail 
grab and seat foam. The foam was made of polyurethane and supplied by the sibling joint venture company, 
Firm BFC. These motorcycle parts were supplied directly to the Japanese OEMs such as Suzuki and Flonda. 
Consequently, Firm CPC has been a first-tier motorcycle parts supplier (Ibid.).
294 Examples included the plastic casing for automotive air conditioner blower, plastic center console (interior 
trimming parts) and the plastic battery cover for trucks (Firm CPC Corporate Website, accessed February 15, 
2006). Initially, the firm started with the production of simple parts such as the battery cover for trucks and 
the interior console of a car. Later it produced a blower casing for automotive air conditioner; this part was
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Second was the improvement in tooling and production technology. Initially, Firm 
CPC imported the molds from Japan, and it had the opportunity to learn to become an OEM 
supplier.
“Once we started to import the molds; we had the opportunity to learn. We 
observed via the Japanese experts their production techniques and their 
problem-solving decisions on the shop floor. Our firm then tried to emulate 
and transferred this know-how to finally try to maintain our own molds”
(personal interview Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
In addition, in 1995 there were investments in computer-aided design (CAD) and computer
numerically controlled (CNC) machines. This was necessary because the OEM customers
required the firm to achieve higher precision.
Third was the limited human resources development. Normally, Firm CPC relied
on the expertise of its Japanese customers to assist its workers with the training in work
procedures. Often times, Firm CPC own technicians had to fumble around to learn the
improved production technique.
“I think that the technicians back in the 1970s had more experimental skills 
that today’s technicians. There were no formal university or college courses 
to attend. All that they did were to sharpen their technical skills via practical 
training, learning from the foreign experts. Often times, they had to learn by 
trial and error and achieved improvement in production technique” (personal 
interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
Firm CPC lacked the explicit learning activities that focus on systematic human resource
training. Moreover, Firm CPC did not have any formal training programs since the firm
was operated as a small family-owned business. At best, the training courses consisted of
sending the workers to attend the Thai government supplied courses“ .
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm CPC tended to focus more on the domestic linkages, neglecting the foreign 
ones. For instance, Firm CPC is a member of the Federation of Thai Industry (FTI), Plastic 
group, of which Firm CPC President commented that the organization was too 
heterogenous and did not sufficiently focus on the plastic producers (Lauridsen, 2000: 40). 
Overall Firm CPC participation with the organizations and the search for outside expert
supplied to another first-tier auto-part firm, who in turn supplied to Mitsubishi to be assembled into a pick-up 
truck (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
295 This type o f training was insufficient because the active public support in on-the-job training did not occur 
until after the establishment o f the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) in 1998 (personal conversation with a 
Managing Director o f an auto-part firm, March 22, 2004).
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assistance was passive and lacking continuity. In addition, there were no foreign joint 
ventures or technical assistance agreements.
Learning the Marketing Activities
All of Firm CPC marketing activities were focused on capturing only the domestic 
market share. There was an insignificant focus on export; hence there were neither 
gathering of foreign market intelligence nor overseas customer search.
7.2.3 Firm CSP (2002 -  2004)
Learning the Investment Activities
There was a major investment in plant expansion. In early 2004, Firm CSP had 
expanded and invested in land and modem equipment such as computer aided design and 
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and computer numerical control (CNC) machines. The 
investment also included the recruitment of more engineers296. Other investments 
concentrated on the improvement of production processes and in creation of work 
standards .
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three learning activities: learning to produce OEM auto-parts, learning 
about simple mold design and maintenance, and learning to develop human resources.
First was the learning activities related to the production of OEM auto-parts. Firm 
CSP began to produce the OEM auto-parts, and the important criteria are: high quality, on- 
time delivery and competitive price. The Japanese OEMs always put pressure on Firm CSP 
to reduce the prices, almost every year.
“To be able to produce for Japanese OEMs, we have to continuously 
improve our operations. Without such commitment, our firm would not be 
able to meet the required cost reduction, and we will surely lose our OEM 
customers” (personal interview Firm CSP General Manager, December 15,
2004).
296 In 2003, the firm had about 200 employees, o f which 14 were engineers; this was considered a major 
increase from the 40 workers and a couple engineers (in 2000).
"97 For instance, Firm CSP was committed to the investment in time and effort to obtain the most up-to-date 
quality accreditation, ISO/TS 16949 in 2004. This was because part of the firm’s competitive goal was to 
become a first-tier auto-part supplier.
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Since 2001, the firm focused mainly on the OEM auto-parts, with very little REM auto-part 
production volume*- .
Second was the investment in modern production technology. The purpose was to 
design and produce the mold. Back in 2000, the firm started off with simple mold design 
for the electrical appliance parts, and then followed by auto-part mold design (personal 
plant visit, November 12, 2004). Hence the firm progressed gradually from simple mold 
design to more complex ones. The third learning activity was the human resources 
development. Firm CSP engaged in a two types of training schemes. First were the 
training offers that were available from new equipment vendors. Secondly, the employees 
spent most of their time learning on-the-job. They usually experimented with mold design, 
maintenance, and production; they were learning by trial-and-error.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There are two types of linkage: domestic and foreign. Firm CSP relied mostly on 
the former and not very much on the latter. For instance, the domestic linkages with the 
public organizations comprised two collaborative projects with TAI. The first project was 
Invigorating Thai Business (ITB)299. Firm CSP engaged in collaborative problem solving 
with the ITB consultant who provided solutions to the firm operational problems300. The 
second collaboration with TAI occurred under the Automotive Experts Dispatching 
Program (AEDP), which started from 2003. Firm CSP learned significantly on two main 
operational issues: 1) the production techniques related to aluminium die casting (personal
298 “Since inception, Firm CSP had focused on the OEM auto-parts. We focused very little on REM 
production because we thought that competition within the REM market is more cutthroat and based 
solely on price alone. Our firm had the capability to produce high quality auto-parts at a competitive 
price and this qualified us into the OEM auto-part market. Within the REM market the quality did 
not matter much, it was fierce price war among the manufacturers” (personal interview with Firm 
CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004).
299 The project duration was from May 2003 to September 2004 (from www.thaiauto.or.th. accessed March 
25, 2006).
300 One o f the problems was the issue o f  poor inventory control and management. Since Firm CSP did not 
purchase any state-of-the-art software for such matter, it had to make do with a modified spreadsheet 
(Microsoft Excel) program. The ITB consultant had provided the firm with an inventory management 
program, designed in general for the Thai small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The firm learned about the 
use o f  such program and found that the generalized version o f the program was deemed to be unsuitable to 
Firm CSP inventory management system. It had to adapt the given program, essentially learning by trial and 
error in the adaptation process. Consequently the firm learning activities conducted under the ITB program 
was not highly successful.
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plant visit, November 11 and 12, 2004) and 2) the plant management technique that would
301ensure high productivity (Ibid.)
Learning the Marketing Activities
The marketing activities of Firm CSP are still inward-focused on only the domestic 
market, with very little focus on export. Firm CSP’s competitive goal was to secure the 
domestic market share first prior to expansion into export (personal interview with Firm 
CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004).
7.2.4 Firm D Group (1980 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
Realizing the increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) trend, in 1990 Firm D 
Group decided to invest in two more firms: Firm CKB and Firm MNIH to oversee the 
formation of foreign joint ventures. Most Japanese firms wanted to invest in Thailand, but 
were unsure of how to cope with other bureaucratic issues. These two firms would assist in 
such matters. Many other investment in foreign joint ventures occurred during this period 
(see Table 7.2). Another important strategic investment was Firm D-tec .
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two main learning activities: incipient product design and tooling 
improvement activities. In both activities, human resources development was crucial. The 
third learning activity involved the product diversification.
The first learning activity was related to product design. Throughout the 1980s, the 
Group had been supplying the brake parts and the aluminium parts to all the major 
motorcycle makers. Often times, the Group received the detailed specification drawing 
from the OEMs and produced strictly according to such drawing. It did not outline or
301 The problems facing the firms were: high defect rates, uneven temperature distribution during the cooling 
stage and trapped air bubbles inside the mold, causing porosity. The Japanese expert, along with the Thai 
engineer, guided Firm CSP to collect relevant operational data to determine the root cause o f the above 
problems. First were the learning activities on solving problems related to the aluminum die casting 
production techniques. Then after the rectification measures were implemented, the firm was able to reduce 
the defect rates, at the first instance, from over 3 per cent to less than 0.3 per cent (from www.thaiauto.or.th, 
accessed on March 25, 2006). On the plant management issue, Firm CSP learned to solve the problems 
related to low productivity, inventory management, and general plant management issues (Potisarangkul et 
al., 2005: 13-15).
‘ This is the Group’s engineering design unit, which was instrumental in enhancing the Group’s product 
design capability.
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engage interactively in arriving at these detailed specifications. The President wanted his 
engineers to actively participate in outlining the product specifications303. This vision 
materialized in the early 1990s when Honda carmaker decided to invest locally304. Within
Table 7.2 Foreign Joint Ventures for Firm D Group During Its Expansion Phase 
_______  (1980 -  pre-1997 Crisis)_________________________________________
Year Partner Firm (country) Expertise / Knowledge
1986 Koito Manufacturing 
(Japan)
Bangkok Diecasting and 
Injection (Thailand)
Production of automotive lamps (both cars and 
motorcycles), plastic injection molding process and 
aluminium die casting mold and parts
1987 Mitsuboshi Belting (Japan) Production technology of various types of automotive 
belts: timing belts, V-belts, etc.
1989 Keihin Group (Japan) 
Keihin Metal (Japan)
Carburetor production process technology (both cars 
and motorcycles) and the production process of springs 
(both cars and motorcycles)
1994 Toyo Roki (Japan) Design and production of automotive filtration 
equipment air cleaner, canister, power steering oil tank
1994 Nanyo (Japan) 
Sugiyama (Japan) 
FCC (Thailand)
Production technology of compressor parts for 
automobiles
1994 Nichirin (Japan) Production of hydraulic brake hose for motorcycles
1994 Atsumitec (Japan) 
H.P.D.
Production technology of engine parts via special 
plating system and heat treatment
1995 Ota Seimitsu Kanagata 
(Japan)
Tooling (jigs and fixtures, mold) design and production
1995 Asakawa Seikakusho 
(Japan)
Research and production of high-tensile bolts and 
fasteners for cars and trucks
1996 Tanaka Precision (Japan) Production of clutch parts, piston pins and ball race for 
motorcycles
1996 Firm TFS Production of sintering products, utilizing the 
knowledge of powder metallurgy processing
Source: corporate document and personal interviews with the President in 2004
the Asian region, Honda planned to produce the “Asian car”, Honda City (Panichapat and 
Kanasawat, 1997: 23). The concept was to source as much as possible the locally produced 
parts and saved on the production and transport costs (Ibid.). This meant that Honda would
o nr
comply with the Thai government’s 54 per cent local content requirement . The situation
303 In other words, Firm D President wanted his engineering (and technician) team to engage in more product 
and tooling design activities, rather than passively accepting the given product specifications provided by the 
carmakers (and motorcycle makers).
304 In the early 1990s, there was a significant Japanese foreign direct investment, of which Honda 
Automobiles was one of them. Honda had been selling cars in Thailand for quite some time through the 
assistance of a local assembly plant, Bangchan General Assembly (personal interview with ex-Managing 
Director of this assembly plant, November 6, 2004). But realizing the Thai booming economy and planning 
to setup an export production base, it had decided to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary in Thailand in 1992.
305 For this Honda City model, the carmaker wanted to raise its percentage local content from 54 to 60 
(personal interview with Firm D President, April 29, 2004)
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created a business opportunity for Firm D Group, who had been a first-tier supplier for 
Honda306.
Firm D President did not stop at viewing this as only a business growth opportunity; 
he viewed it as a learning opportunity. He negotiated with Honda (Japan) for technical 
assistance and full support for his engineering team. The purpose was for his team to 
engage in designing the hand brake, which will normally occur in Japan (personal interview 
with Firm D President, April 29, 2004). The negotiation was difficult, but was successful. 
Consequently, Firm D President assembled a team of design engineers to work with the 
Japanese counterpart on designing the hand brake prototype. This activity was challenging 
and invaluable, since Firm D President managed to contact the Honda research and 
development engineer (from Japan) to assist with the design. Once the prototype was 
produced, the Thai engineering team had to travel to Japan to obtain Honda managers’ 
approval (Ibid., December 13, 2004). It could be argued that the Group learned 
significantly about the product design process, and since then, Firm D flagship product has 
been the parking hand brake for passenger cars and trucks307 (corporate brochure, 2004).
The second learning activity involved the tooling maintenance capability. Initially, 
there were always problems with mold maintenance. The President described an instance 
where he had to again travel to Japan to learn about mold modification:
“During the early stages of OEM production, the die casting mold was the 
most expensive piece of tooling and it was prone to damage during the 
production trial runs. Hence, the mold needed constant maintenance. Firm 
D Group know-how on mold repair was limited; often times, I had to carry a 
30 to 40-kilogram mold to Japan to receive an expert advice. Once I arrived 
in Japan, I observed how the Japanese technicians conduct the maintenance 
activity. I recognized that they only welded certain little portions of the 
mold surface; then I thought to myself that my Thai technicians should be 
able to do this. I intended to transfer what I had learned and trained my 
own technicians to be more self-sufficient, [italics added] (personal 
interview with Firm D President, May 12, 2004)
306 In fact not only is Nissin Kogyo (partner in Firm D Group) a first-tier supplier o f Honda, but Honda Motor 
(Japan) also owns 34.6 per cent o f Nissin Kogyo (2005: 13). Hence it could be said that whatever Firm D 
Group propose, Honda Motor will take such proposal rather seriously. Moreover it would be even more so if  
such proposal leads to a mutual benefit for both Firm D Group and Honda Motor.
307 This hand brake was first supplied to mainly Honda passenger cars (Honda City) since mid-1990s. Then 
later the similar type o f hand brakes were indigenously designed, produced, and tested, and then supplied to 
other Japanese car and truck makers such as Isuzu, Hino (a truck manufacturer that is part o f Toyota Group) 
and Toyota Hilux pick-up trucks (personal interview with Firm D President, April 29, 2004).
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Firm D President was aware of his firm’s existing capabilities and the learning capability of 
his own workers. He wanted his own technicians to be more self-sufficient in performing 
simple mold maintenance. More importantly, the President placed great emphasis on 
human resources development. This did not mean that Firm D President wanted to be fully 
independent from the Japanese firms; rather, the President believed that his engineers 
should consult the Japanese experts only on difficult technical matters. It appeared that 
Firm D President wanted to “stretch” his engineering team capability. Several years later 
the President invested in Firm D-tec (a tooling design unit), where most of the simple mold 
maintenance were done in-house.
The last learning activity involved the product diversification. The diversification 
on electronics product started in the 1990s, when the President recognized that Firm D 
Group’s core competence in aluminium die casting process could be applied to the 
production of aluminium casing for electronic parts. In doing so, his engineers learned 
minor process adaptation.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
The number and quality of domestic linkages remained roughly the same308, but the 
number of foreign linkages grew rapidly. Both Firm MMIH and Firm CKB assisted the 
Group to quickly expand its foreign joint venture network (see Table 7.2). Each foreign 
firm brought with it the technical knowledge. Firm D Group intended to leverage on these 
linkages to transfer the production knowledge and enhance the Group’s capabilities 
(personal interview with Firm D Group President, November 16, 2004).
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm D marketing activities were focused on the domestic market; very little auto­
parts were exported. The exception was with the aluminium parts for the electronics 
industry; these were exported to Asian regional countries. However, the production volume 
of these parts was not significant when compared with the auto-parts (personal interview 
with Firm D President, May 12, 2004). In terms of moving up the product value chain,
Firm D Group’s ability to market its own design of the parking hand brake signified its 
progress towards more complex marketing activities.
308 These were basically linkages with public organizations such as BOI and other public organizations.
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7.2.5 Firm L (1991 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
Firm L major investment was in the CAD/CAM system and ANSYS software309. 
This enabled its engineers and technicians to design new alloy wheels efficiently.
However, the painting system and the heat treatment were still manually operated, causing
i i n
the products to suffer from many inconsistencies and defects . The other investment 
projects were related to the incremental improvement in production technology such as the 
investment in low-pressure aluminium die casting equipment. Other minor investments 
included the hiring of foreign experts to assist with the production process. In addition, 
there was no investment in the new production facility.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three main learning activities: the searching and learning of better 
production process technology, learning to design large wheel, and learning to re-organize 
the firm internal structure (inclusive of human resources development).
The first learning activity was the improvement in the production process. The 
investment in new technology was the low-pressure die casting system. Back in 1987 when 
Firm L President was working within the joint venture, the technology used was gravity die 
casting. Through studying various books and consulting the experts, the President decided 
that the low-pressure die-casting was a superior technology311. He added that this 
technology is appropriate to mag wheel production since the molten aluminium is injected 
into the center of the mold (wheel) allowing uniform cooling to occur, and thus achieving 
the required strength and elongation ~ (Ibid.). Firm L was interested in producing high- 
quality alloy wheels. Most of the times, the firm performed many experiments via 
adjusting the temperature, pressure, and mold design to achieve better quality wheels.
309 ANSYS is a software used for analysis o f  alloy wheel strength.
310 Later when the export production volume increased, Firm L invested in the latest automatic cleaning and 
painting system. In 2004, it claimed that this system is the most advanced in Southeast Asia.
311 “In gravity casting you cannot accurately control the flow o f aluminium once you poured it into the mold. 
The aluminium will naturally flow according to the gravitational pull. On the other hand, in the low pressure 
casting system, you can accurately control the aluminium flow by controlling the pressure. This will create 
smooth flow with the desired physical characteristics. Hence if the finished product quality is affected by the 
flow, you can perform the experiment to control the finished product quality by adjusting the aluminium 
flow” [italics added] (personal interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
312 Here the meaning o f elongation is that opposite o f brittleness. The elongation tends to be a trade-off with 
strength, i.e. a wheel that is too strong is usually very brittle (breaks easily under high impact force). Hence 
to simultaneously achieve both strength and elongation is a balancing act.
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Many trial runs were made on new mold designs. Sometimes the experiments succeeded, 
and other times they failed. There were no formal training courses; it was just Firm L 
President and a group of engineers who fumbled around and learn by trial-and-error 
(personal interview Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
The second learning challenge was the design of larger alloy wheel suitable for the 
US market, targeting the sports utility vehicle (SUV). This was a challenge for the design 
team, since large mag wheels usually required higher-level production capability313. The 
engineering team had to ensure an effective cooling design within the mold to achieve 
uniform temperature distribution across the mold (personal interview with Firm L Factory 
Manager, May 5, 2004).
The last learning activity was the firm internal re-organization. Firm L learned that 
one of the crucial steps in achieving marketable wheel design involved customer 
collaboration, as well as meeting product standards and safety. Often times, the wheel 
drawings were shared with the prospective customers and discussions usually involved 
adjustments to the style. The product design comprised two important issues: 1) the 
aesthetic appeal or the wheel fashion trend and 2) the engineering quality and safety. 
Consequently, two separate internal departments within Firm L were created. One was 
responsible for coming up with the innovative, aesthetic wheel design (which collaborates 
extensively with customers), and another was responsible for testing such design on quality 
standard and safety. Once these departments were created, Firm L decided to penetrate the 
overseas market. Exporting wheels has been a difficult task, many things had to change. 
This included more human resource development and the emphasis on cross-functional 
team (Ibid.).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
When learning by trial-and-error failed, Firm L decided to hire external consultants. 
There were two sources: domestic and foreign consultants. The domestic ones were 
mostly university lecturers and private consultancy firm. For instance, during the early
313 Since the low-pressure die casting process injects the molten aluminium from the middle (wheel hub) o f  
the mold, the cooling occurred as the raw material travels toward the rim. For larger wheels, the temperature 
difference between the hub and the rim is much greater, causing the physical properties (strength and 
elongation) o f the product to deteriorate. This is the technical challenge.
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1990s, various lecturers from Chulalongkorn University were hired in to teach the 
employees about computer aided design (CAD), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM)314. 
Other lecturers were hired to teach the engineers about the basic principles of low-pressure 
aluminium die casting (Ibid.).
The foreign technical consultants comprised one from the United States and 
another from Holland315. These two consultants were hired because Firm L was having 
many quality problems. Particularly, the firm could not achieve the required strength and 
elongation. Through these consultants, Firm L aimed to attempt the production of export- 
quality alloy wheels.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm L marketing activities were focusing on satisfying the high demand within the 
domestic economy. Very little emphasis was placed on export316. The President stated 
why export was not attractive,
“Our firm decided not to engage in export due to the strength of Thai Baht 
[against the US dollar]. Consequently, domestic sale of alloy wheels gives 
us much better earnings than export” (personal interview with Firm L 
President, May 4, 2004).
It was not until after the 1997 crisis that export activity became crucial. In particular, the 
export to larger markets, such as the United States and Europe, was deemed a necessary 
survival route.
314 “When we started to build our engineering design team, we asked for Chulalongkorn University training 
courses in CAD/CAM. The duration of the training lasted for about 2 to 3 months” (personal interview with 
Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
315 For instance, the President recalled his first consultant from the US. “I wrote a small advertisement in a 
US technical magazine stating that I would like to hire an expert on aluminium die casting. Many experts 
reply to Firm L with faxes. The technical expert travelled from the US and had visited our factory for two 
weeks” (personal interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004). Another consultant was from Holland. “... 
at one time, the Dutch technician came and assisted our production team for one week. He taught us the basic 
principles o f low pressure aluminium die casting and provided comments on our current production practices” 
(Ibid.).
316 As the Factory Manager pointed out, “About a year prior to the 1997 crisis, our firm had exported only 
about 10 to 15 per cent o f the total production volume and most o f target countries were within Asia” 
(personal interview Firm L Factory Manager, May 5, 2004).
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7.2.6 Firm S Group (1966- pre-1997)
Learning the Investment Activities
Many investment projects were implemented. First was the 1965 investment to 
augment the production facility, to include production of more products such as brake and 
clutch linings317. Later in 1975, the Group invested in a malleable iron production plant318. 
Then in 1983, the Group invested in a foreign joint venture (Mitsubishi group) to assist in 
the transition from REM to OEM manufacturer. From 1989 to pre-1997 crisis, Firm S 
Group had also invested in a total of 8 foreign joint ventures (see Table 7.3). Other 
investment projects included the set up of another modern production facility in 1995, 
along with the investment in modern quality control system. The new facility has been 
producing the rear axle and trunnion shafts319.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
Firm S Group had three main learning activities: learning to transition from REM 
to OEM auto-part manufacturer, learning to expand production capacity and operate 
modem equipment, and learning to develop the human resources.
The First learning activity occurred during the mid-1980s. It was the important 
transition from REM to OEM production, i.e. learning to produce OEM auto-parts.
In 1984 Firm S Group, via a technical assistance with Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing, had 
entered the OEM market. The Group learned higher level of production technology with 
increased automation and more stringent requirements on quality and delivery schedule. 
The products supplied to Mitsubishi carmaker comprised four items: leaf spring, coil 
spring, brake lining, and stabilizer bars.
Secondly, in 1990 Firm S Group learned to expand production capacity and all the 
production lines were relocated to a new site. During this time, the learning activity was 
more systematic. There were incipient training schemes put in place with the plan to 
achieve the international quality accreditation. In addition, in 1995 a new subsidiary was
317 Then in 1976, there was an investment to expand the same production facility, enabled it to produce coil 
spring. In 1979, another production line was introduced and it produced stabilizer bars.
318 This production plant received foreign technical support and collaboration; it was a malleable iron 
production facility to support the intermediate goods used in auto-part production.
319 The key production process was the forging process, which required engineers who could operate 
automated machines and robots to achieve high-level precision. Firm S Group claimed that this production 
facility is the largest o f its kind in Southeast Asia (plant visit and personal interview with Firm S Group Vice 
President, October 29, 2004).
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established with initial paid-up capital of 80 million Baht (corporate website, 2003). Its 
competitive objective was to advance the Group into higher-level manufacturing activity 
and to secure its market leadership in axle shafts320. In the same year, the Group also 
invested in a computerized quality control system, to enable its product quality to meet the 
required standards321. Consequently, more engineering graduates were hired and they 
learned the operation of this system.
Lastly was the systematic learning to develop the human resources. The 
qualification of the Group’s personnel during the 1960s and 1970s consisted mostly of 
technicians with only elementary or (at most) high school education. Historically, the 
Group hired few engineering graduates322. Through human resources training provided by 
Mitsubishi, the Group was able to improve its product quality (personal interview with 
Firm S Group Senior Engineering Manager, December 14, 2004).
After the firm had engaged in many foreign technical linkages, the Group started to 
hire formally-trained engineers (personal interview with Firm S Group ex-General 
Manager, October 20, 2004). The engineers’ training became more intense once the Group 
had entered into the OEM market, and some of them travelled to Japan (Gohsyu 
Corporation) to learn the axle shaft production process323. These engineers learned through 
trial production and making process adjustments. In addition, in 1997 Firm S Group 
engaged in a 5S324 training program; this was a collaborative effort between Firm S Group 
and the Thailand Productivity Institute (Anonymous, 1998) .
3:0 This production process and product design received technical assistance from two Japanese firms: Gohsyu 
Corporation and Ibara Seiki.
321 “Quality is inspected at almost every stage of the production process” (corporate website, accessed 2006).
322 In addition, during the first two decades of development, Firm S Group did not bother to source its 
personnel regionally or internationally. Even after the establishment of manufacturing business in the early 
1960s and the late 1970s, the firm still did not have any systematic documentation for work management and 
the Group had a quite conservative view on upgrading (personal interview with ex-General Manager of Firm 
S Group, October 20, 2004). It was not until the firm was preparing itself for the partially liberalized 
automotive industry during the early 1990s that it had started to establish a systematic work management and 
collaborative joint venture partners.
3' * 3 These engineers were responsible for collaborating with the Japanese engineers in checking and auditing 
the new imported production line (personal interview with Firm S Group Engineering Chief, November 15, 
2004).
324 5S is a Japanese style of work management; it comprises Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu and Shitsuke. The 
main principle underlying 5S is the system for executing operational tasks in a timely, neat order. In doing 
so, the firm has the ability to quickly trace the root cause of problems and develop a prevention scheme to 
control the recurrence of such problems.
325 The 5S learning strategy was a platform for Firm S Group to further build its positive organizational 
culture, to achieve higher work productivity (Ibid.). The program also served as a basis for further work on 
ISO 9002, QS 9000 and ISO 14001 accreditations.
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Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Both types of linkage (domestic and foreign) were present during this period. Two 
examples of important domestic linkages were discussed: TAPMA and Thai-Japan 
Technology Promotion Association.
First was the domestic linkage with the Thai Auto-part manufacturer Association 
(TAPMA). As the Vice President of Firm S Group was also the President of TAPMA, this 
linkage was obvious. As the President of TAPMA, he has the responsibility to ensure that 
the Thai auto-part suppliers learn to become more competitive326. Second was the 
domestic linkage with the Thai-Japan Technology Promotion Association. In early 1997, 
Firm S Group collaborated with the association to train its staff on quality management . 
Firm S learned to initiate a quality standard “cross functional team”, which comprises a 
mixture of individuals from each subsidiary to ensure that all quality accreditations will be 
achieved in a timely manner. As a result, the ISO 9002 was obtained by the end of 1997 
(Anonymous, 1998), and a year later the Group obtained QS 9000j28 and was able to supply 
auto-parts to the US carmakers.
In addition, Firm S Group learned to form several foreign linkages. For instance, 
there were 8 foreign joint ventures, 4 of which were with the Asahi Tec Group (Japan) . 
The purpose was to acquire the die casting production know-how (see Table 7.3). 
Furthermore, Firm S Group was involved in learning the production technology through 
linkage such as foreign technical assistance agreements. From Table 7.4, all the assistance 
were provided by the Japanese firms, and the technology transfer focused on die casting 
production process, the machining of auto-parts, and the production of specific auto-parts 
such as axle shafts.
326 To provide technical as well as general knowledge to the Thai suppliers, TAPMA organized many 
seminars and training courses, often in collaboration with TAI.
327 The training courses comprised mainly issues related to IS09002, QS9000 and ISO14001 (personal 
interview with Firm S Group Engineering Chief, November 15, 2004).
328 This is the quality accreditation system required by the US carmakers.
329 The remaining joint ventures were targeted at learning the complex production o f  various auto-parts such 
as steering column, gearboxes, pumps, suspension ball joints and brake parts.
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Table 7.3 Foreign Joint Ventures for Firm S Group During Its Expansion Phase 
_________ (1966-pre-1997 Crisis) ____________
Year Partner Firm (Country) Expertise / Knowledge
1989 Asahi Tec Corporation 
(Japan)
Aluminium die casting process
1989 Asahi Malleable Iron 
(Japan)
Aluminium castings production
1993 Asahi Tec Group (Japan) Iron castings production process
199333U Asahi Tec Group (Japan) 
Shippo Moulds (Japan)
Know-how of aluminium mold used in the die 
casting production
1994 Yamada Seisakusho33 
(Japan) H.P.D.
Production of sophisticated auto-parts such as 
steering column, steering gear box, water pump 
and oil pump
1995 Tsuchiyoshi (Japan) Coated sand resins for mold production
1996 Nisshinbo (Japan) Production of automotive brake lining, disc brake 
pads and drum brake
199 7332 Somic Ishikawa (Japan) Production of steering linkages and suspension 
ball joints
Sources: corporate documents and persona interviews with the Group’s Vice President
Table 7.4 Foreign Technical Assistance for Firm S Group During Its Expansion
5hase (1966 — pre-1997 Crisis)
Year Partner Firm (Country) Expertise / Knowledge
1975 Nishioka Malleable Iron Production process of malleable iron for auto-
Industries (Japan) parts
1983 Mitsubishi Steel Production of steel products for supply to
Manufacturing (Japan) Mitsubishi carmaker
1988 Ibara Seiki (Japan) Machining process
1989 Asahi Tec Corporation 
(Japan)
Aluminium die casting process
1994 Asahi Tec Corporation 
(Japan)
Ibara Seiki (Japan)
Machining process o f casting auto-parts
1995 Gohsyu Corporation 
(Japan)
Ibara Seiki (Japan)
Production of automotive axle and trunnion shaft
Sources: corporate documents and personal interviews with the Group’s Vice President
330 It was a three-way joint venture.
331 In 2006 this foreign joint venture firm is known as Yamada Manufacturing and it specializes in the 
production o f functional parts for both 2-wheel and 4-wheel vehicles. Example o f functional parts include: 
automatic transmission parts, oil pumps, water pumps, steering columns, rack & pinion, speedometer 
gearboxes and belt converter parts. For the Japanese firm the joint venture serves the purpose o f creating a 
Southeast Asian manufacturing base.
33~ This joint venture was formed prior to the 1997 crisis.
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Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm S Group’s focus on only the domestic market started to shift towards indirect 
export. It had been supplying auto-parts to multinational carmakers who in turn export the 
completely built vehicles (CBU); hence the Group was technically an indirect exporter333. 
The Group attempted to become a direct exporter, but it faced two obstacles: the restrictive 
clause under the OEM contract (prohibiting the firm from exporting) and the inability to 
perform cost-effective product testing.
With the government policy now emphasizing export, the Group struggled to try to set up a 
direct export base for the Thai-made auto-parts334. However, the obstacles facing Thai 
firms were unqualified product testing facilities, and the issue of strict quality requirements. 
As a result, in 2006 Firm S Group current export level (determined as a proportion of its 
total production volume) is at a low 6 per cent335 (Family Know-How, 2006). One possible 
explanation was most Thai testing facilities (inclusive of the ones provided by Thailand 
Automotive Institute, TAI) were insufficient. Most Thai suppliers had to rely on overseas 
testing facilities that charged exorbitant fees. Hence, TAPMA President has argued for the 
setup of the local Automotive Research and Testing Center (ARTC)336.
7.2.7 Firm SOM (1996 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
In 1997, Firm SOM invested in relocating its production equipment from the 
former production site. The registered capital was half a million Baht, obtained as a
333 The first exporting experience came when carmaker M had decided that it will export it passenger car, 
Lancer Champ, to Canada for the first time333. Prior to this export carmaker M had asked all its Thai first-tier 
suppliers (inclusive of Firm S Group) to participate (personal interview with carmaker M, Executive Vice 
President, November 30, 2004).
334 It sets up a subsidiary firm to cater for this (Firm APEC). Today the firm operated with limited success, 
due to its inability to meet the costly product testing required of exported auto-parts. Without such testing 
scheme, Thai-made auto-parts could not be exported to the large markets such as the US, Japan or the 
European Union.
335 It is important to note that this low export volume of Firm S Group has persisted despite the fact that the 
Thai government has been promoting auto-parts export since mid-1980s. That was when the government 
started to shift from an import substitution to an export-oriented industrialization strategy. It is also important 
to note that despite the 1997 crisis, Firm S Group had maintained a 80:20 ratio of domestic versus export 
products (Anonymous, 1998). Hence it could be said that export earnings were not sufficient to alleviate the 
severe impact of the 1997 crisis. It is also worth exploring certain issues that had impeded Firm S Group’s 
ability to export (see also the previous footnote, above).
336 This was succinctly stated by TAPMA President (Firm S Group Vice President): “[The ARTC] is viewed 
as essential to certify the quality and standards of Thai auto parts as a control system for exports. Thai 
suppliers would no longer need to send their auto parts to Taiwan and Japan for testing as currently practised 
once the centre becomes operational, thereby reducing the testing costs by 30-50 percent” (Praiwan, 2004).
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• 337 • • •private loan from its main customer and several private banks . Besides this investment, 
Firm SOM was not committed to invest in other important resources . The firm 
continued its passive learning activities, operating the outmoded machines with very little 
knowledge on the investment in new equipment. The President provided the reason: “Ever 
since start-up, my firm has been laden with financial debt. We lacked sufficient working 
capital or funds to upgrade our machines” (Ibid.). But more importantly, even if the firm 
has sufficient finance to purchase the new equipment, it lacked the investment in hiring 
engineers, since most capable engineers had forsaken the firm and looked for better jobs 
elsewhere (Ibid.). This also implied that Firm SOM was facing a human resource crisis.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and iE & HRD)
There were two leaning activities: learning production plant expansion and limited 
learning to develop the human resources. In addition, an example of missed business (and 
learning) opportunity was provided.
The first learning activity was the production expansion and product 
diversification. In 1997, Firm SOM expanded into a rented warehouse. The firm had two 
main product groups: the auto-parts and the metal parts for small musical instruments.
From 1995 to 1997, the firm produced only auto-parts. At one stage, the firm was involved 
in producing automotive exhaust parts. But it failed to directly supply this part (this will be 
explained later) (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004). In
•  o  o n
1997, the firm started to produce the parts for the musical instruments .
The second learning activity was related to the firm’s poor human resources 
development. Firm SOM did not implement any formal procedure to ensure effective 
training program. Most of the jobs were assigned as they are deemed suitable to each 
worker’s experience, and more importantly, job assignments were based heavily on 
machine availability. At times, the President was involved in the job allocation tasks. 
Human resource training was considered to be poor. There was a lack of work 
standards, and the tasks were performed repetitively. Using manually-operated machines, 
Firm SOM also faced other problems.
337 The collateral used was the residential home that belongs to Firm SOM President and his relatives.
338 For instance, during the mid-1990s when other auto-part firms in the industry strategically expanded the 
business through investment in modern technology such as computer-aided design and manufacturing 
(CAD/CAM) and computer numerical control (CNC) machines, Firm SOM remained quite dormant.
339 The orders were obtained from Mr. B ’s brother, who had closed ties with his former employer (personal 
interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
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“Our technicians needed to be highly skilled to operate the manual 
machines. They needed to understand the job sequences as well as the 
selection of appropriate tools, in order to produce the right product.
Furthermore, the workers needed to gain sufficient production experience to 
operate the machine. The manually operated machines, in my view, were 
much more difficult to operate when compare with the computerized ones”
(personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 25, 2004).
Systematic training or documentation did not occur until 2003 when the firm acquired the
ISO 9000 standard (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
This lack of work standard and poor human resource training led Firm SOM to miss the
opportunity to upgrade itself to become a first-tier auto-part supplier.
Last was the example illustrating Firm SOM poor strategic planning in quality
management. The President made a “sequential learning mistake” in trying to upgrade
his firm into a first-tier auto-part supplier without first upgrading the quality system. The
President approached Arvin Meritor to sell his products. Arvin Meritor wanted to ensure
that Firm SOM could meet its strict criteria of high quality, target cost and on-time delivery
(QCD). It checked to see if Firm SOM had some sort of quality accreditation system put in
place. It turned out that Firm SOM did not have any quality system. Hence, the US firm
lacked the confidence that Firm SOM could meet its strict QCD criteria. Firm SOM ended
up missing the opportunity to become a first-tier supplier340.
“In 1997,1 sent in the price quotation to Arvin Meritor, but due to my firm 
weakness in quality system, the US firm declined to award me the 
production contract. Instead, they awarded the contract to Firm SML, who 
had full ISO 9000 as well as QS 9000 accreditations, and told us to supply to 
Firm SML and they, in turn, will buy the parts from Firm SML. I was very 
disappointed in my poor strategy, and missed out on the lucrative 
opportunity. Once Firm SML supplied Arvin Meritor, it was difficult for 
my firm to squeeze into the upper-tier. Our firm was virtually “locked out” 
of this market space” [italics added] (personal interview with Firm SOM 
President, November 24, 2004).
It could be said that Firm SOM lacked the strategic perspective. It did not understand that 
to compete, one must be fully equipped with the required quality standards. It could also be 
said that due to the President’s inadequate exposure to external collaborations and his 
limited international perspective, Firm SOM lacked the strategic vision (In particular, the 
firm lacked the ability to formulate competitive learning strategy). But what could be said
340 In the mean time, Firm SOM’s long-time customer, Firm SML, had picked up where it had left off and 
secured production contract with Arvin Meritor, making Firm SOM as its second-tier supplier.
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also was that Firm SOM learned from this mistake, and immediately decided to invest in 
ISO 9000 accreditation afterwards341.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm SOM only had internal joint venture agreement among family members.
There were no external joint ventures. Given the debt-laden situation and poor firm 
performance, it was quite difficult to find a sympathetic business partner (personal 
interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
Learning the Marketing Activities
As the firm mainly supplied auto-parts to only one main domestic customer, overall 
there was very little development of its marketing capability. Similarly, the idea of 
exporting was not planned for at all.
7.2.8 Firm TKT (1991 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
In the late 1980s, Firm TKT started to engage in an investment project to set up a 
new production facility342 and there were investment in new plastic injection machines and 
in the search and recruitment of engineers and technicians343 . The new facility was capable 
of mass-producing plastic parts for both the automotive industry and the electrical 
appliance industry. In 1995, another important investment was related to the set up of a 
foreign joint venture344. Other investment projects included the set up of modern 
production system with computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and the 
new paint room facility.
341 The firm received the ISO 9000 accreditation in 2003 (quite late when compared to its competitors), and 
obviously this was a bit too late to enter into a deal with Arvin Meritor.
342 Firm TKT increased the registered capital to 45 million Baht and also set up another subsidiary firm, Firm 
TKT-PI, responsible mainly for export (SET, 2005b). The rationale for this investment was to obtain the BOI 
privilege since the Thai government was trying to encourage its small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
export, and it was easier for newly established firm to obtain such privilege (Lauridsen, 2000: 41).
343 The new machines were capable of meeting the differentiated needs of the carmakers. In addition to the 
new machines, the number of employees increased to more than 200 (ASID, 2006).
344 At this time, the registered investment capital increased to 100 million Baht (from 45 million in 1991).
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three main learning activities: learning to operate the new production
facility, learning to operate the new modern production technology, and learning to upgrade 
the human resources.
First was the learning to operate the new production facility and product 
diversification. Firm TKT engaged in production of plastic auto-parts for the Japanese 
carmakers (Nissan and Toyota). Initially, the firm engaged only in the production of plastic 
parts for electrical appliance, with very few auto-parts. With the new factory, the firm had 
invested in more than 25 plastic injection machines, with varying capacity from 30 to 1,000 
tons (Firm TKT corporate website, accessed December 20, 2005). Consequently, the 
engineers and operators learned to operate these machines; and learning by doing and 
problem solving were conducted on the shop floor. The initial learning was usually 
conducted through the assistance of the foreign equipment vendors.
The second learning activity was related to the operation of modem production 
technology. Firm TKT invested in computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) 
system; this had enabled the firm to set up an in-house mold design and manufacturing 
division. In addition, Firm TKT gradually accumulated the capability to conduct simple 
mold maintenance 34> (2004: 7). The firm also invested in a new paint room, and the 
employees also learned to operate the room’s appropriate filtration and positive airflow 
system346.
The third learning activity was the human resources development. It was not until 
1990, that the firm started to hire engineering graduates (personal interview with Firm TKT 
Managing Director, November 5, 2004). The engineers were trained to operate modem 
plastic injection equipment; in 1993, the firm also started to engage in mold design and 
manufacturing activities (2004: 7). The OEMs’ strict requirements on quality, cost, and on- 
time delivery posed the need for Firm TKT’s engineers to effectively learn proper 
equipment operation. Consequently, the firm had also sent its employees for training at
345 This meant that, in the event where the customer-supplied injection mold broke down due to heavy 
repeated use, the firm could successfully perform simple routine maintenance in-house, with the guidance o f  
the foreign customers.
’46 The major problems o f the old paint room were the cloth fibers and dust particles that stuck onto the 
painted plastic parts, causing defective finished products (Khodee et al., 2004). The new filtration and 
positive air flow system helped in alleviating such problems (i.e. the pressure o f  the air within the room is 
higher than the environment, thus keeping the dust particles outside). Additionally, the filters were installed 
on windows, roofs and other places that prevented the incoming dust.
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various public Thai universities such as Chulalongkorn and King Mongkut University of 
Technology (personal interview with Firm TKT Managing Director, November 5, 2004). 
Most of the courses involved informal on-the-job training.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
The linkage with foreign firm started in this period. Even though not extensive, the 
single foreign joint venture was formed in 1995. After increasing its registered capital to 
100 million Baht (from 45 million Baht in 1991), Firm TKT formed a Japanese-Thai joint 
venture with Ogawa (Japan)34'. The purpose was to learn the chrome-plating technology. 
Instead of joint venture agreements, Firm TKT preferred to seek informal technical advice 
from the OEMs348. An exception to this would be the technical assistance (in 1996) with 
Kansei Corporation349 (Japan) (Anonymous, 1996). The assistance agreement was initially 
for five years, and it was not continued (hence it was an intermittent dispatch of Japanese 
experts). Consequently, it could be said that the linkage activities were quite limited.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Most of the products were targeted at the domestic customers, and Firm TKT did 
not engage in much export. Of the total production output, only 5 per cent were exported 
and these products were not yet up to the world-class standards (personal interview with 
Firm TKT Managing Director, November 5, 2004).
7.2.9 Firm TS Group (1981 -  pre-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
Firm TS Group aggressively invested in many new subsidiaries and built a 
diversified product portfolio (see Table 7.5). During the 1980s, the products included 
aluminium die casting parts, automotive seats, and vehicle chassis. Then in the 1990s, the
347 The new joint venture was to produce high-quality plastic parts with chrome plating to be utilized in both 
the auto-parts (radiator grilles for trucks) and electrical appliance parts industry (Lauridsen, 2000: 42).
348 For instance, Firm TKT supplied the emblem for Toyota vehicles and during the trial production runs, 
Toyota personnel had come to audit and assist the firms with production problems for more than 20 times 
(personal interview with Firm TKT Injection Section Chief, November 5, 2004). Other than this, Firm TKT 
did not engage in signing formal technical assistance, and it had very limited exposure to formal assistance 
agreements; for instance in mold design and production department, “[Firm TKT] does not use any 
technology in production or technician [technical] assistance from other company” [italics added] (SET, 
2005b).
349 This is part o f the Nissan Motor affiliated supplier group (Anonymous, 1996). This foreign firm assisted 
Firm TKT with the plastic resin technology.
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Group diversified to produce stamped automotive body parts, plastic parts, springs, wiring 
harness, and electrical tapes330. Similarly, there were many investments in forming new 
foreign joint ventures351 (see Table 7.6). Other investments included the training and 
development programs and the massive investment in modern technology352.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three main learning activities: learning to mass produce auto-parts, 
learning to produce diversified products, and learning to promote teamwork and upgrade 
human resources.
The first learning activity was the mass production of auto-parts. In the late 
1980s, when Mitsubishi decided to setup a pick-up truck production base353, Firm TS 
Group was selected as its first-tier supplier. Mitsubishi required the Group to invest in a 
new modern production facility (Firm TSLA)354, to produce auto-parts for assembly into 
the pick-up trucks. The Group's engineers learned (with the assistance of foreign firms) to 
set up a trial production process, test it, and transfer it for mass production. Much 
production activities were carried out as learning by systematic experimentation.
Second was the learning activity related to product diversification. Other products 
produced by Firm TS Group included pressed metal automobile, motorcycle parts, and 
agricultural diesel engine parts. In the early 1990s, the Group diversified itself to produce 
plastics as well as electrical appliances parts, and later it also produced electrical wiring 
harness, plastics parts, moulds, dies and other tools (see Table 7.5).
350 The plastic parts and springs were produced for both automotive (including motorcycles) and electrical 
appliance industries.
351 In total, there were about 5 new subsidiaries and 10 new foreign joint ventures established during this 
expansion period.
352 Examples included the investment of over 60 million Baht in sophisticated computer system such as Catia 
computer aided design (CAD) and other computer aided design manufacturing (CAM) softwares (Krungthep 
Turakij, 2003).
353 “Thailand will become the second largest maker of Mitsubishi cars after Japan.” It was expected that the 
14 companies operating in Laem Chabang will make 120,000 cars a year (Anonymous, 1990). Of these 
companies, more than half were subsidiaries and joint ventures owned by Firm TS Group; this illustrated the 
extent of ties that the Group had with the carmaker Mitsubishi (Ibid.).
354 Firm TSLA is one of the flagship firms managed by a General Manager is arguably the most capable 
engineer of Firm TS Group [italics added] (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice President, October 
19, 2004). At the request of the carmaker, Firm TSLA is located literally “next door” to Mitsubishi (own 
direct observation, 2004) and whenever there was any problem regarding the products manufactured it can 
immediately dispatch its own employees to rectify the situation with quick turn around time. In the 
automotive business, this policy of having the first-tier supplier located in close proximity to the vehicle 
assembly plant is called the “door to door” policy (personal direct observation during Firm TS Group 
meeting, 2004).
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The third learning activity was related to upgrading of human resources. Not only 
did Firm TS Group subject its technicians and engineers to on-the-job training, but also its 
President nurtured the value of strong teamwork355. The Group claimed that it has a very 
strong team of engineers356. This was because of the many foreign technical assistance and 
joint venture agreements that had encouraged the engineers to travel overseas to learn the 
foreign technology. The President viewed overseas training as important:
“I always encourage our employees to learn and enhance their knowledge. I 
encouraged them to have visits to other factories both domestically and 
internationally” (Somsak, 1983).
Hence it could be argued that Firm TS Group placed a strong emphasis on human resources 
development357.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm TS Group’s foreign linkage capability had increased significantly. The 
domestic linkages were with the public organizations such as the BOI. More importantly 
were the foreign linkages. For the foreign linkages, the increase came in two forms: the 
foreign joint venture and technical assistance agreements. The joint ventures included 
many foreign firms; each had its own area of expertise (see Table 7.6). From Table 7.6, the 
notable foreign joint ventures occurred in 1983. About five years after establishment, 
Firm TS engaged in joint venture in Malaysia. This signified the first time that the Group
iro
had ventured abroad as a technology transferor .
355 “[Firm TS President] encourages all employees to have high responsibility and have ability to collectively 
solve any problems. My employees and I [the President] live together as a family unit; we enjoy the good 
times and weathered the bad times” (Somsak, 1983).
356 “The production team that my father had built was second to none, both technically and operationally. I 
entrust them with all the details o f complex production management, allowing myself to focus on higher-level 
issues such as business development, organizational development, and marketing [italics added] (personal 
interview with Firm TS Group Vice President, October 19, 2004).
357 As a result o f extensive human resource training, the Group received an award (in 1993) from MMC 
Sittipol (Mitsubishi joint venture based in Thailand) on excellent collaboration in training workers. The 
course was titled “Production Engineering & TQC Management Course” (corporate internal document, 1993).
358 The Japanese OEMs entrusted Firm TS Group as their capable partner, who could assist them with the 
technology transfer task to Malaysia.
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Table 7.5 Products of Firm TS Group During the Expansion Phase (1981 -  pre-1997 
crisis)
Starting
Year
Subsidiary or 
Joint Venture
Main Products
1981 Firm TCI 
(subsidiary)
Produced aluminium die casting parts such as 
assembly parts for motorcycles, agricultural engines 
and automobiles. Later it produced aluminium parts 
for electrical appliance.
\ 9 S 2 ^ Firm QSI, OSI 
(joint venture)
Produced seats for carmakers and motorcycles in 
Malaysia
1989 Firm TSPKK, 
TSPKK-E and 
TSPKK-B 
(joint venture)
Started production of automobile and motorcycle 
chassis frames.
1989-90 Firm TSLP 
(subsidiary)
Initiated production of plastics parts for automobiles 
and motorcycles.
1991 Firm TSCSS 
(joint venture)
Joint venture firm started production of automotive 
and electrical appliance springs
1994 Firms TSH, TST 
(subsidiary, later joint 
venture)
Production of wiring harness and electrical tape
1994 Firm TSLA 
(subsidiary)
Mass production of stamping body parts, pressed 
parts, fuel tanks, instrument panels, and plastics 
parts, mostly for the carmaker Mitsubishi.
1996 Firm TSHP 
(subsidiary)
Diversified to produce plastics parts for household 
electrical appliances
Sources: corporate documents and personal interviews with the Group’s Vice President
Similarly the foreign technical assistance sought by Firm TS Group consisted of 
many firms (see Table 7.7). From Table 7.7, one can discern that almost all the assistance 
agreements were made with Japanese firms.
359 This year marked the first time that Firm TS had invested in an overseas manufacturing facility. Firms QSI 
and OSI were responsible for selling the Japanese know-how as well as machinery and tools to Malaysian 
firms (Anonymous, 1983b). This illustrated that the Japanese OEMs trusted Firm TS as a capable partner, 
with sufficient capability to train the Malaysian firms.
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Table 7.6 Foreign Joint Ventures of Firm TS Group During the Expansion Phase 
_________ (1981 -  pre-1997 crisis) _______________________________________
Year Partner Firm (country) Expertise / Knowledge
1982 Firm QSI, OSI Produced seats for carmakers and motorcycles in
(Malaysia) Malaysia
1988 Mitsubishi Motors (Japan) Design and setup of jigs and fixtures and machining 
center (lathe, drilling, boring, milling)
1988 Shinko Kogyo (Japan) Propeller shaft manufacturing process
1989 Press Kogyo (Japan) Automotive (one-ton pick-up) chassis and frame
1989 Honda, motorcycle (Japan) Automotive die casting, clutch set and motorcycle 
parts
1991 Cheng Shing Spring Automotive springs used in shock absorbers, engine
Enterprise (Taiwan) and electrical appliances
1992ibU DRB-Hicom Group 
(Malaysia)
First-tier supplier of Proton (Malaysian national car)
1993 Mitsuba Electric MFG Production process of electrical products
(Japan) (generators, starting motors and wiper motors) for 
automobile and motorcycle
1994 Nihon Sanso (Japan) Machine tools for metal processing such as lathe for 
removing metal
1995 Ikuyo (Japan) Mold manufacturing
1995 Honda (automobile and 
motorcycle) (Japan)
Production of speedometer
Sources: Corporate internal document, Project and Marketing Department (2004),
AS1D (2006), www.wesleynet.com and Firm TSLA website (accessed December 14, 2005)
The significant agreement was the Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (1989-1990), 
since this led to many other large-scale investment projects that contributed to the 
development of production capability361. Other important assistance agreements included
362many Japanese firms; each had accumulated its own expertise over many years .
360 This joint venture is located overseas.
361 It is also important to note in 1990 Mitsubishi dispatched a team of Japanese experts to assist Firm TS 
Group in setting up the new production lines, designing tools and other sophisticated auto-parts. All these 
learning activities formed part o f the carmaker and Firm TS Group “mutual strategy” to transition into a 
larger-scale production o f  vehicles, mostly for export.
362 The following are the Japanese firms that provided the technical assistance and their corresponding 
knowledge or technical expertise: Kokusan Denki (expert in the production o f electric motor and magnetos), 
Sankei Industry (expert in the production o f exhaust systems), Suiryo Plastics (expert in injection molding 
and urethane foam), Shinko Kogyo (expert in propeller shaft production), Press Kogyo (expert in vehicle 
chassis and frame production), Mitsuba Electric MFG (expert in electric motor production), Ikuyo (expert in 
mold production), Izumi Machine (expert in motorcycle parts-lower and upper arms), Wako Industrial (expert 
in oil and air filter elements production), Nagase (expert in plastics blow molding and its affiliate firms- 
Automotive Mold Technology and Creative Technology-both have expertise in computerized mold design) 
(personal interview with Firm TS Group Senior Manager, October 29, 2004 and various Japanese corporate 
websites, accessed February 15, 2006).
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Table 7.7 Foreign Technical Assistance of Firm TS Group During the Expansion and 
Adaptation Phases (post 1981)
Year Type of Agreement Agreement Partner (Location)
1982 Technical assistance agreement Kokusan Denki (Japan)
1986 License and technical 
assistance agreement
Shinagawa JT. Posha Densen (Japan)
1987 Technical assistance agreement Sankei Industry (Japan)
Suiryo Plastics (Japan)
Mitsuba Cable Industries (Japan)
1988 Technical assistance agreement Shinko Kogyo (Japan)
1989 License agreement Mitsubishi Motors Corporation 
Press Kogyo (Japan)
1989 Technical assistance agreement Press Kogyo (Japan)
1990 Personnel dispatch agreement Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
1992 Gentlemen’s agreement Sankei Industry (Japan)
1992 Technical assistance agreement Mitsuba Electric MFG (Japan)
1994 Technical assistance agreement Ikuyo (Japan)
Izumi Machine MFG (Japan) 
Wako Industrial (Japan)
1994 Update (continuation of) to Mitsuba Electric MFG (Japan)
prior technical assistance Suiryo Plastics (Japan)
agreement Nagase (Japan, Thailand)
1995 Technical assistance agreement Wako Industrial (Japan)
Musashi Seimitsu Industry (Japan) 
Tensho Electric Industrial (Japan) 
Dynoplast Elbatainer (Germany)
1998 Technical assistance agreement Sumino Kogyo (Japan)
2004 Technical collaboration Automotive Mold Technology (Thailand) 
Creative Technology (Japan)
Source: Corporate internal document, Project and Marketing Department (2004) and 
several Japanese corporation websites (accessed 2006).
Learning the Marketing Activities
Most of Firm TS Group marketing activities were focused on only the domestic 
market, and very little products were directly exported363. Since the foreign joint ventures 
were assisting the Group with the marketing activity, Firm TS Group did not invest much 
time into systematic market research, distribution network or sales forecasting.
363 Direct export means that Firm TS Group conducted the export by itself. Through connection with the 
Mitsubishi carmakers, Firm TS Group had been an indirect exporter since Mitsubishi has been exporting 
completely built vehicles from Thailand since the late 1980s.
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7.2.10 Summary of Different Firm Learning Activities and 
Mechanisms (expansion phase)
The pattern of learning activities and mechanisms of the nine case study firms is 
summarized in Table 7.8. The pattern pointed to three groups of firm.
The first group invested in many learning activities (for e.g. Firm AH Group, Firm 
D Group, and Firm TS Group). In addition, to the normal routine production, these firms 
invested in the search activities and formed new businesses through foreign partners. These 
firms engaged in more complex production activities. Moreover, they were also 
extensively involved in the continuous improvement programs. Their products were 
becoming more complex, and involved some design activities. For instance, Firm AH 
Group started to design automotive jigs, and Firm D started to design the parking hand 
brake. Similarly, Firm TS Group invested in a new subsidiary to design and mass produce 
pick-up truck parts for export (by Mitsubishi carmaker). In terms of linkage activities, 
these firms further solidified their relationships with the foreign firms, forming many new 
technical assistance, and foreign joint ventures. Such linkages enabled the firms to access 
new sources of knowledge, enabling them to develop their capabilities. For these firms, 
one of the key factors leading to effective learning activities was the emphasis on human 
resources development. All these firms emphasize extensive training, and sometimes 
overseas training of their engineers and technicians. In terms of marketing activities, 
these firms were at an early stage of becoming indirect exporters (i.e. they produced auto­
parts for carmakers to export).
The second group of firms were more moderate in their investment activities (for 
e.g. Firm L and Firm S Group). They also invested in search activities to link with foreign 
firms but not as extensive as the first group. Their production process and products were 
not as complex as the first group of firms, and involved limited design activities. For 
instance, Firm S Group produced undercarriage REM parts with little emphasis for OEM 
market. It was not until much later that the Group emphasized OEM auto-parts. Similarly, 
Firm L produced alloy wheels for both the OEM and REM markets, and the firm passively 
received finished drawings from their foreign partner and had limited design activities. In 
addition, these firms formed fewer linkages when compared with the first group, and their 
linkages did not involve much learning activities, nor were these linkages the result of a 
purposive search. Other factors retarding this group learning activities were poor (or
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delayed) development of the firms’ human resources. In terms of marketing activities, 
these firms focused mainly on the domestic market, with almost no emphasis on exports.
The third group of firms was mostly passive (for e.g. Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm 
SOM, and Firm TKT). They did not engage in any plans to invest in the complex set of 
learning activities. At best, some of these firms were invested in more production 
equipment to increase the production capacity per se, and there were no explicit learning 
activities associated with such investment. These firms’ products remained simple and 
there were no design activities. For instance, Firm CPC and Firm TKT produced simple 
plastic auto-parts. Similarly, Firm CSP continued to produce simple aluminium die casting 
parts. A third-tier auto-part supplier, Firm SOM was the. worst performer, and severely 
lacked the understanding for continuous improvement. In addition, the firms did not 
engage in any linkage activities. An exception would be Firm TKT, which formed a 
Japanese joint venture (Okawa), but it was severely impacted by the 1997 crisis (see 
Section 7.3.8). There were neither foreign joint ventures nor extensive technical assistance 
agreements, consequently these firms access to knowledge sources were largely limited. In 
terms of marketing activities, all firms focused on the domestic market, except Firm AH 
Group which started to export to regional markets.
In addition, all firms were involved in using the passive learning-by-doing 
mechanisms (see Table 7.8). Not all firms engaged in the more active learning 
mechanisms. Only some firms implemented the more active learning by searching for 
foreign partners as well as importing the foreign technology (for example, Firm AH Group, 
Firm D Group, Firm L, Firm S Group, Firm TS Group). These firms extensively 
implemented the “link and learn” mechanisms to effectively access the external sources of 
knowledge. Other firms conducted the learning activities by relying mostly on passive 
learning by doing and changing production activities per se (for example, Firm CPC, Firm 
CSP, Firm SOM and Firm TKT). Even though some of these firms hired and trained 
engineers, their knowledge sources were limited due to inadequate initial linkages with 
foreign firms. The “link and learn” mechanisms were largely absent in these firms, and in 
the case when such mechanism was present (for e.g. Firm TKT), it was not sustained.
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7.3 Learning Activities During the Adaptation Phase
7.3.1 Firm AH Group (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
In terms of business expansion, there were two new investment projects: 
investment in a specialized subsidiary firm and several investments in firm acquisitions. 
For instance, Firm AH Group decided to invest in a new subsidiary dedicated to 
engineering design and research and development. What Firm AH currently lacks is the 
basic research, new product development and complete turnkey design of other auto-parts 
(besides the jigs). These activities could further assist Firm AH in meeting the co-design 
activity as requested by the multinational carmakers, and thus gains more confidence and 
eventually higher sales order. The President realizes this strategic capability gap; and 
hence in 2004 he decided to setup a wholly owned subsidiary, Firm A ll’s Engineering 
Unit364. With this new firm, the President is confident at upgrading the design capabilities.
Another example was the investment in three firm acquisitions. First was the 
acquisition of a German subsidiary in Malaysia. In 1999, the Group acquired a portion of 
German jig manufacturing subsidiary in Malaysia; this was a strategic move to produce 
jigs for Mercedes Benz. Second was an acquisition of the US-based subsidiary in 
Thailand. In 2003, Firm AH Group made an acquisition which led to dramatic growth in 
both sales and technical knowledge. It acquired Parish Structural Products Thailand, PSPT. 
PSPT’s main product was the chassis for Isuzu pick-up truck; PSPT was the sole 
supplier . PSPT production activities included design dies, body shape, product testing 
and manufacture. In order to ensure successful acquisition, Firm AH needs to understand 
and master these production activities. After the acquisition, Firm AH installed a new
364 The Unit has the responsibility for Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) programs, engineering 
consultancy, engineering design and engineering research and development (2004).
365 See footnote #3 for a definition.
366 The deal will make Firm AH the sole manufacturer o f automobile chassis frames for the one-ton pick-up 
trucks that are made by Japan’s Isuzu (Anonymous, 2003a). Firm AH President and his board were very 
proud o f this acquisition; stating that “if  we can afford to buy an American [subsidiary] firm, this is [evidence 
of] reverse globalization; it illustrates the ability o f [a] Thai [firm] who is willing to fight and compete” 
(Tangsriwong, 2003).
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management system (Anonymous, 2004d) and rectified the existing problem of poor on-
time delivery (i.e. 14 per cent late delivery) and 1000 parts-per-million (ppm) defect rate .
Last was an investment acquisition of a Chinese firm in 2003 . Our future plan
is “to grow the company with additional diversified products from Thailand and to 
capitalize on the booming auto industry in China” (Ibid.). After the acquisition, the Group 
undertook an additional investment in new machinery to upgrade the plant to produce 
higher-quality product. In late 2004, the Group exported about 7 million US dollars worth 
of jigs to China, and this acquired firm assisted in such operations.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two important learning activities: the development of a continuous 
improvement program and the supply of high-end assembly jigs to Europe.
First was the development of a formal continuous improvement program. By 2002, 
Firm AH initiated a lean manufacturing program with the assistance from Ford/Mazda and 
Toyota Motor (Thailand). The Group had also hired LMC Lean Manufacturing Consulting 
GmbH to improve its production processes and train its workers. Firm AH President 
provided full support.
“Firm AH Group intends to work with the LMC consultants to roll out 
further improvements in the factory line especially in our processes, overall 
layout and overall productivity in order to set a new standard in achieving 
record quality parts per million” (LMC, 2002).
The resulting improvement was significant. In 2004, Firm AH was selected as a model
company (i.e. a positive example of successful implementation of lean manufacturing) by
the LMC consultants.
After more than two years of implementation of lean manufacturing, Firm AH won 
the Toyota Production System (TPS) Championship Award369. The Group has proved itself 
worthy as a Toyota supplier by winning similar award (again in 2005). In addition, the
367
367 The resulting new productivity was 100 per cent on-time delivery and 40-ppm defect rate (AH Group, 
2003: 15).
368 Firm AH Group purchased 75 per cent equity stake in Kunshan Chaitai-Xincheng Precision Forging 
(KCPF) (Anonymous, 2004b).
369 In a nutshell, the Toyota Production System (TPS) is a rational system (or a philosophy) that stresses low 
inventory and eliminating any non-productive work steps. Products are manufactured as per orders received 
and in the right quantity. The TPS Championship Award is a competition organized internally by Toyota 
Motor (Thailand) and its first-tier suppliers. The total number o f firms who had participated was seventeen 
and the one o f the criteria used in selecting the winner involved a ‘surprise’ visit to the manufacturing site by 
a panel o f  Toyota experts to observe and collect important data on the production process and product quality 
as well as productivity (personal interview with Firm AH Senior Manager, November 17, 2004).
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Group began a new project “AH Production System (APS)370”. It aims to upgrade the 
current lean manufacturing system through the use of modern information and 
communication technology.
Second was the design of automotive assembly jigs for the European carmakers. 
The Group was able to design assembly jigs that meet specifications provided by the most 
quality-stringent European carmaker -  Mercedes Benz. This illustrated that there was an 
accumulation of tooling design capability as well as a talented team of management and 
engineers supporting such project undertaking. Additionally, the Group also won the 
contract to supply a complete set of assembly jigs to Volvo Car and Truck (Sweden)-771.
Today, Firm AH Group supply of jigs and dies continued with the quality-stringent 
US and European carmakers. For instance, the production engineers at Daimler Chrysler 
stated that they purchased the dies made by Firm AH Group since it is cheaper than the 
ones used in Germany, and the quality of the dies was always better than those made in 
China and India. DaimlerChrysler had used five different dies (produced by Firm AH) to 
produce automotive body parts at a German manufacturing plant (Shari, 2003).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm AH Group displayed high-level of linkage capabilities. Since the project must 
be coordinated across different groups of individuals, the Group had learned to improve 
plant coordination beyond the traditional parent firm boundary. For instance, in the 
development of formal continuous improvement project, the Group learned to collaborate 
with one the world largest lean manufacturing software provider, Oracle and Deloitte 
Consulting373.
Other examples of learning the linkage capabilities included the firm’s ability to 
search and form numerous foreign joint ventures and technical assistance agreements. In 
1999, the Group signed a technical assistance agreement with Siemens VDO (Germany), 
and later in 2002 formed a joint venture. The purpose of technical assistance and joint
370 This is a hypothetical name since the researcher is obligated to maintain confidentiality.
371 Prior to the offering a contract, Volvo dispatched a team of engineers to visit Firm AH in Thailand to 
inspect the prototype jigs and to provide suggestion on further improvement (Charlesworth, 2003). Again this 
constituted abundant learning opportunities for Firm AH Group.
372 Oracle is one o f the world largest enterprise software companies.
373 O f particular interest to Firm AH Group is the Oracle’s Supply Chain Management (SCM) software 
module. Oracle stated that its software would assist a company like Firm AH to enable lean manufacturing, 
to reduce the risk in lean manufacturing implementation and to provide a flexible framework for bringing new 
facilities online (Anonymous, 2005b)
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venture were to “tank sender”374 for fuel tanks that were assembled into Ford/Mazda pick­
up truck. Up until early 2000s, most of the firm’s products and production activities 
focused solely on metal and none were in plastics. The management board decided that the 
firm should upgrade its production techniques on automotive plastics and electronics auto­
parts. Therefore, the Group decided to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to 
setup a joint venture with a Singaporean firm (Fischer Tech) whose main expertise is in 
plastics parts. The aim was to collaborate with Fischer Tech to produce automotive plastic
• 375products. In 2005, the Group formed another joint venture with Sojitz Corporation 
(Japan). The aims were:
• to broaden its product offerings in current regional markets
• to penetrate further in the Asian regional markets
• to reduce costs through higher productivity using information technology
• to achieve operational management excellence supported by IT and ERP 
implementation (Anonymous, 2006a).
Learning the Marketing Activities
With the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the focus of Firm AFI Group’s 
marketing activities had shifted to export; the Group learned to dramatically increase its 
export volume. Its production capabilities were further upgraded to match those of export- 
quality products. This was directed by the President learning strategy to become a 
worldwide supplier of jigs and dies. Many projects were implemented, for example:
• Quality certification programs (IS09000, QS9000, ISO 14001, ISO/TS169 4 9376)
• Improvement to current lean manufacturing programs
• Upgrading the information systems and technology program 
These projects contributed to support an increase in the export volume.
374 A “tank sender” is an instrument attached to the fuel tank used to measure the level o f remaining fuel. It is 
connected electronically to the instrument panel inside the driver cockpit.
375 Sojitz Corporation is a major player in world automotive industry. It is one the Japanese leading trading 
firms with 2004 sales o f over 40 billion US dollars. Moreover it employed more than 14,000 employees, 
spreading among its 157 subsidiaries around the globe (Mr.Y, 2006: 18-19).
376 It is the latest quality certification program that most multinational carmakers demanded from their first- 
tier suppliers. It is different from previous accreditation on the issue o f continuous improvement. To be 
qualified for ISO/TS16949, firms must display explicit evidence o f  upgrading and continuous improvement 
activities.
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7.3.2 Firm CPC (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
Firm CPC did not engage in any significant investment projects. There was neither 
investment in subsidiary firms nor joint ventures. The minor investment projects included 
investment in training of human resources through linkage with public organizations.
Other investments included the purchase of more machinery and the investment in the 
quality management such as the ISO 9000.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
The learning of production capability was ineffective. There were three obstacles: 
underutilization of invested modern production technology, lack of systematic and effective 
continuous improvement program and poor human resources management.
The first limitation deals with the problem of underutilized modem technology and 
poor commitment to invest in auto-part design tool. Having invested in CAD/CAM and 
CNC machines, Firm CPC was studying the cost and benefit of purchasing the Moldflow 
program^77 (Soucier, 2004). It was assessing the benefit achieved from virtual design of 
plastic injection mold (personal interview with Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004). 
The President was hesitant to buy the new software because: 1) most of the motorcycle 
parts did not require the production of prototype parts (or virtual part design), and Firm 
CPC was accustomed to producing the real auto-parts and 2) the computer aided design 
CAD/CAM system, which was acquired several years ago, was not fully utilized today 
(Ibid.). In addition, Firm CPC currently engages in very little auto-part parts design. 
Consequently, the benefits of the new Moldflow were doubtful. It could be said that Firm 
CPC was ambivalent about the preparation for future needs of customers, and it did not 
commit itself to seriously stretching the current production capability.
The second limitation deals with the poor ability of Firm CPC to continuously 
upgrade its production process and products. Firm CPC participation with the 
organizations and the search for expert assistance was passive, and focused mostly on the 
solution as an end in itself {not the means to an end). The TAI Consultant Engineer said:
377 Moldflow is the name o f the program and its features include the ability to virtually simulate the flow o f  
plastic melt as it enters the mold as well as the dynamic distribution o f the temperature as the mold cools. 
The two variables: raw material flow path and the cooling temperature distribution are essential design 
parameters for the plastic injection production process.
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“The Japanese expert {sensei) had visited Firm CPC several years ago.
Sensei had expressed that several years later, Firm CPC still focus on similar 
problems, namely high defect rates, designing jigs for product test, and 
understanding the physical properties of raw materials. The firm had not yet 
progressed to understand the problem-solving methods, the way to reach a 
fruitful solution on their own. Firm CPC workers were just interested in 
‘what the solution is’ rather than ‘what are the solution-finding methods’ ”
[italics added] (Personal conversation with Sensei and TAI Engineer 
Consultant, November 26, 2004).
Here it could be said that Firm CPC did not put in place, the mechanisms required to 
capture the learning of new production knowledge required in order to conduct effective 
continuous improvement activities. Lacking such mechanisms, it is highly likely that the 
firm would remain passive and persistently depend on the Japanese expert assistance.
The last limitation was the inability of Firm CPC to improve on its human 
resources. The President was highly conservative in hiring new engineering graduates . 
Most employees were trained through in-house training with sporadic visits of foreign 
experts. The President provided the reasons:
“Firm CPC has not been keen on hiring the engineering graduates. Since the 
Thai education system is weak, it is unable to produce qualified plastic 
production engineers. Even if we provide in-house training for this new 
intern, we are unable to achieve satisfactory training result. Hence our firm’s 
preferred way to human resource development is to engage the worker in 
long-term in-house training. This is a sensible route since the government 
had failed to provide qualified human resources” (Personal interview with 
Firm CPC President, December 18, 2004).
Consequently, it could be said that Firm CPC President was highly critical of the Thai 
education system. He had to rely on his ad-hoc in-house training programs and several 
other programs offered by the TAI. Note that there was a lack of complementarity here in 
what the firm needs and what the market could offer. The President’s ability to accurately 
discern his firm capability gap and complimenting it with the market resources is crucial. 
Firm CPC did not appear to have achieved this complementarity.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There are mainly two types of linkage: domestic and foreign, and Firm CPC tended 
to rely more on the former for its sources of technical knowledge. There were two 
domestic linkages and no foreign linkages. First domestic linkage was the collaboration
378 In 2003 out of 272 employees, there was only one engineer [italics added] (corporate internal document, 
accessed December, 2004).
262
had been with the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI). The firm has been continuously 
involved with TAI’s Automotive Expert Dispatching Program (AEDP). The AEDP would 
send out one Japanese expert along with one Thai engineer to visit Firm CPC. The 
objective was to have a discussion with the President about the current operational 
problems. Then the Japanese expert would require the firm to setup a kaizen team379. Firm 
CPC set up a team comprising six workers (TAI, 2005a). This team learned a new hot 
runner mold design . They also learned the procedure to ensure optimally controlled 
temperature, one of the crucial variables in the design (Ibid.).
The second domestic linkage was the involvement in public organization. In year 
2002, Firm CPC President was elected to lead the Thailand Plastic Industry Association 
(TPIA) as the President (from www.tpia.org. accessed January 15, 2006)381. Through such 
involvement, Firm CPC learned to stay up-to-date with the current technology. It also 
learned about the changes in government industrial policy.
In terms of foreign linkages, there was a limitation. Firm CPC did not engage in 
any foreign technical assistance or joint venture agreements. Hence, the only assistance 
received by Firm CPC was that of an informal expert assistance supplied by the OEM 
customers. Most often the assistance did not include any higher-value added learning 
activities such as product modification or design activities. The OEM-provided assistance 
was basically aiming for the Firm CPC acquisition of basic production techniques. It could 
be said due to this lack of formal assistance, Firm CPC had quite a limited exposure to the 
expertise available to upgrade itself to acquire the higher level of capability such as 
advanced OEM or product design capability.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm CPC, even under the impact of 1997 financial crisis, did not increase its export 
volume. The firm’s marketing activities was focusing on only the domestic market. Until 
today, Firm CPC export was less than 10 per cent382.
379 A kaizen team is a continuous improvement team form by the firm.
380 The hot runner means the path that which the hot plastic melt travels prior to entering into the mold.
381 The TPIA elected its President every two years, and Firm CPC President was elected in 2002 (from 
www.tpia.org, accessed March 15, 2006). The purpose o f  this organization was to collaborate with public 
organizations to ensure the stability and growth o f Thai plastic industry information center for all Thai plastic 
manufacturers. Another purpose was to negotiate with the Thai government on the industry-related policies 
(BOI, 2005).
382 In 2003, out o f 488 million Baht total sales revenue, only about 31 million Baht came from export sales. 
Hence the export volume did not increase after the crisis either (corporate internal document, 2003).
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7.3.3 Firm CSP (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
Today, Firm CSP was deciding on several investment issues. In terms of more 
expensive software such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or casting simulation, 
Firm CSP felt ambivalent about such investments. The reasons are twofold383: expensive 
software^84 and insufficient capability of the human resources (personal interview with 
Firm CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004). Consequently, the General Manager 
decided that it was a better option for Firm CSP to currently utilize what the public 
organization (for e.g. NSTDA) had to offer on the ability to perform casting simulation. 
Based on short-term cost savings alone, it could be argued that this was a wise decision. 
However on the long-term learning activities, and if Firm CSP wanted to be involved in 
future design activities, it needed to invest in such advanced technology and also train its 
engineers.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were two learning activities: learning to improve the productivity and 
learning to upgrade the human resources.
The first learning activities involve productivity improvement and product 
diversification. In late 2004, the auto-part production had increased dramatically, partly 
due to the establishment of pick-up truck production base (personal interview with Firm 
CSP General Manager, December 15, 2004). Currently, the firm is facing insufficient 
production capacity, and is undergoing a capacity stretching program, which receives 
technical assistance from TAI and NSTDA. In terms of products, Firm CSP had further 
diversified to produce more electrical parts as well as auto-parts . The second learning 
activity was the human resources development. Firm CSP had setup a formal training 
scheme for its employees: one was the top-down training requirements, tailored to suit the 
firm needs, and another was the bottom-up employee-suggested training, tailored to suit
183 These reasons were also supported by the NSTDA’s ITAP consultant who stated, “Most o f the users o f  
such high-level software are from the public research institutes and universities, and very few private firms 
actually purchase this type o f simulation software for private use” (NSTDA, 2005b: 2).
384 It costs over 3 million Baht just for a simple, functional module (personal interview with Firm CSP 
General Manager, December 15, 2004).
385 Examples o f current auto-parts produced are: aluminium oil pan for Isuzu trucks, compressor bracket for 
Toyota and other bracket mounts for Mitsubishi (personal plant visit, November 11,2004).
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each worker’s personal needs (Ibid.). These internal training schemes when implemented 
together with the assistance programs from TAI, Firm CSP was able to successfully meet 
the requirements ofISO/TS 16949.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm CSP began the transition from relying on domestic linkage to searching for 
foreign linkages. First was the discussion of another domestic linkage, followed by the 
search for foreign linkage.
The domestic linkage was the collaboration with the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (Industrial Technology Assistance Program -  ITAP). 
Firm CSP worked with a Japanese expert, who analyzed the firm’s problems and solved 
them. Firm CSP problems (NSTDA, 2005a) comprised:
• High defect rates
» Too much raw materials waste, have to determine a method to reuse the scrap 
materials
The Japanese expert taught Firm CSP engineers and technicians to properly collect 
operational data and analyse the possible problems’ root causes (Ibid.). The General 
Manager expressed his gratitude:
“The ITAP program assisted our firm in reducing the defect rates. This led 
to increase in profits. NSTDA has dispatched a Japanese expert to advise 
our firm on operational improvement and quality control techniques. This 
enhanced the firm’s credibility in the eyes of our customers, who viewed us 
as having a well-defined commitment to continuous improvement activities” 
(NSTDA, 2005a: 2).
Thus it could be said that without such assistance, Firm CSP (on its own) would be rather 
slow to accumulate such higher-level production capabilities.
At the time of this writing, Firm CSP had not collaborated internationally. 
However, since 2005 the firm is actively seeking for a foreign technical partner. For
386instance, the General Manager travelled to Germany to engage in a One-on-One Forum 
designed by Bayern Innovativ387 (Germany) (from www. 1 on 1 -forum.de, accessed March
386 This Forum focuses on the platforms necessary for technology transfer. The one-on-one meetings aimed at 
the initiation of (technical) cooperation between firms (from www.bayern-innovativ.de, accessed March 26, 
2006).
387 Established in 1995, Bayern Innovativ (Germany) is a publicly held company located in the Bavarian State 
Government. It focuses on 10 future-oriented technologies. The firm is the driving force for the intensification
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24, 2006). The ultimate goal was to search for the suitable technical cooperation partner as 
well as potential European OEM customers. Therefore, Firm CSP is more active in its 
search for potential foreign partner.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm CSP still would like to secure the domestic market share prior to expanding 
into export. Therefore, less than 10 per cent of the production volume were exported in 
2005 (NSTDA, 2005a: 1). This is arguably because of the firm’s young age as well as lack 
of readiness (perhaps insufficient marketing capabilities) for export.
7.3.4 Firm D Group (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
The significant activity comprised the overseas investment in a manufacturing 
facility. The investment was requested by Honda (motorcycles). In 1999 Honda requested 
Firm D Group to invest in Vietnam. This investment signified the Group’s first overseas 
investment388. During the project execution, the Group planned for appropriate 
equipment as well as tooling capable of producing large-scale OEM auto-parts. The 
Group also carefully managed its know-how transfer, i.e. the issue of what to transfer and 
what not to transfer. The President expressed:
“When Firm D was investing in a Vietnam, we have to think about what we 
should teach the Vietnamese. We had to be careful not to divulge our core 
knowledge assets because once these people learned the “tricks of the trade”, 
they could rise up to be our competitors” [italics added] (personal interview 
Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
Hence it could be said that Firm D group had achieved the status of technology transferor, 
rather than being only a recipient. Consequently, Firm D engineers could build upon such 
experience to fill their own capability gaps.
of cooperation among companies and across technologies (from www.bavern-innovativ.de. accessed March 
26, 2006).
388 Honda informed them o f ‘ramping up’ the motorcycle production capacity: first year with production 
capacity o f  200,000 units, then increasing 200,000 each year until reaching 1 million units by the fifth year 
(personal interview with Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
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Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were four main learning activities: the further related diversification and 
deepening of parking hand brake design, learning unrelated product diversification, 
learning improvement in production technology, and learning to improve the human 
resources.
The first learning activity was related to development of the Group’s parking hand 
brake. Having succeeded in designing the product, Firm D diversified further to supply 
their hand brakes to almost all Honda passenger cars. It had monthly production volume of 
30,000 hand brake sets and expected to increase to about 40,000 to 50,000 sets. Firm D did 
not rest on its laurels; it set the ambitious goal to supply virtually all of the Japanese 
carmakers in Thailand.
The successful design efforts had provided Firm D with sufficient credibility to 
approach Toyota and offered its parking hand brakes. Through several rounds of 
negotiation and lobbying, the Group won the contract to supply for Toyota389.
“As far as I know, I am the first company (outside of Japan) to design the 
parking hand brake for Toyota Motor Corporation. This was something that 
you can brag about, since most of Toyota auto-parts were always sourced 
from the conservative keiretsu suppliers” [italics added] (personal interview 
with Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
Not only did the Group successfully supply for Toyota, but it had also engaged in a bid to 
supply for Isuzu. This bid (and negotiation) is still ongoing (personal interview with Firm 
D Engineering Manager, December 13, 2004). It could be argued that the supply of 
parking hand brake to many carmakers had assisted Firm D Group to deepen its product 
design knowledge.
In addition, the Group’s management had been thinking about future product. 
Currently Firm D manufactures the mechanical parking hand brake and has very little 
know-how on the future electronic hand brake. It is worth noting how Firm D Group had 
prepared itself for this change. The Engineering Manager discussed with the Japanese 
experts:
“I had discussion with our Japanese partner about the engineering design of 
an electronic hand brake where the driver can simply push a button. We
389 Toyota had used Thailand as the only pickup truck production base in the world with export to all countries 
[italics added] (Busarawong, 2004a), and it planned to produce 400,000 vehicles by the end o f 2006 
(Wiriyapong, 2004). Hence this is a large-scale production operation.
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came up with a list of design variables. For example, how powerful should 
the electric motor be, how much tension should the cable withstand, should 
the tension be varied according to how hard should the driver push the 
button?” (personal interview with Firm D Engineering Manager, November 
16, 2004).
The Engineering Manager admitted that the Group’s know-how on electronic hand brake 
was limited. Firm D Group would most likely form more joint ventures to transfer the 
know-how on the design of an electro-mechanical system (Ibid.).
The second learning activity was related to the unrelated product diversification 
into electronics, which became crucial during the post-1997 crisis years. The financial 
crisis impact on the Group was not lethal. It did not significantly affect the sales volume of 
the electronic components, since most parts were exported (see section 6.3.4). Hence it 
could be argued that with proper product diversification, the Group learned to produce 
diversify product as well as ameliorating the severe impact of the 1997 crisis.
The third learning activity was the improvement in modern production technology. 
By 2001, Firm D invested in the computer-aided engineering (CAE) system390 that enabled 
the design engineers to achieve a lower cost and rapid prototype development. The R&D 
Department Manager expressed,
“Our firm uses CAE to develop product prototype, rectify the design 
problem points prior to the mass production phase. In all CAE activities has 
assisted us greatly with our R&D [product development] activities”
(Anonymous, 2003b).
The software can perform many virtual experiments on a number of simulated prototype 
designs. As a result, the product development time was reduced “from 3 months to only 2 
weeks" 391 [italics added] (Anonymous, 2003b).
The fourth was the improvement in human resources development. The Group 
hired engineering graduates as well as experienced Japanese engineers. The President 
expressed to his long-time Japanese friend :
“I knew [this Japanese friend] for quite some time and now I am asking him 
to find me a group of capable Japanese engineers. The Human Resource 
Manager and I will conduct the interview and the screening process and
390 The hardware and software bundle comprised up-to-date technology such as AutoCAD, Uni Graphics, 
Solid Works and Catia (personal interview with Engineering Manager, December 13, 2004).
391 In achieving these design tasks, Firm D Group was not isolated; rather it had ample collaborative projects 
with other public organizations, who taught them the operational details o f CAE software.
392 This person was also an advisor to Toyota Motor (Thailand).
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select the appropriate personnel to join Firm D-tec” (Personal interview with 
Firm D President, May 12, 2004).
Hence it could be said that the Group’s vision on human resource strategy is ambitious and 
is not limited to hiring just hiring technicians393. The President’s immediate plan is for the 
Group to be an engineering tooling design unit, supplying know-how on production line 
setup and testing; therefore, the engineering team must be capable of designing the 
production process as requested by the OEMs. To fulfil this endeavour, Firm D President 
planned to hire at least 50 more engineers and technicians, augmenting his current team of 
220 technicians and 80 engineers (personal interview with Firm D President, May 12,
2004).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm D Group had engaged in both types of linkages (domestic and foreign 
linkages) to enrich their learning activities. There were three projects. First, the 
domestic linkage assisted in the development of the automotive brake parts. It was a 
multilateral cooperation among Firm D Group, public research organizations, universities, 
and the Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI). For instance, Firm D Group started learning 
by collaborating with TAI since 2001. The first project was with regards to the design of 
panel assy brake parts. The problem was with the porosity394 within the finished die­
casting aluminium parts. MTEC had assisted with building the computer simulation model 
of the casting process and determined the possible problem areas within the mold during 
the casting process .
The second interesting domestic, collaborative design project was concerning the 
parking hand brake lever. In the production process the sheet metal after being pressed, has 
to be folded into a U-shape to form the handle part of the brake. The problem was the
393 Moreover, the Group required that all engineers and technicians learn the English language, “All o f my 
engineers and technicians have to learn the English language (personal interview with Firm D President, 
November 16, 2004). Since the President wanted his engineering team to travel overseas and conversed with 
foreign engineers, English language skills is a necessity.
394 Here porosity means the little pockets of air trapped within the auto-parts as a result of improper 
ventilation during the casting process. Hence this is a mold design issue.
395 Four other auto-parts that involved similar design techniques were investigated in 2003: bracket (TAI, 
2003c), cover comp (TAI, 2003d), handle (TAI, 2003e) and plate oil separator (TAI, 2003f). All these parts 
involved the high-pressure die casting production process which involved the mold design via computer 
simulation model. All were collaborative projects involving Firm D engineers and MTEC researchers. On 
average, the number of trial runs for new mold is about 2 to 5 times and each time costs about 70,000 Baht. 
Using the computer simulation model the number of trial runs is reduced to only twice, thus achieving an 
average cost savings of over 140,000 Baht. Moreover the computer simulation also enables faster mold 
development time (TAI, 2002c).
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sometimes this handle part is torn after the folding process. The MTEC researchers 
together with Firm D engineers had used the computer simulation and analysis technique to 
identify the area where the sheet metal is too thin as well as pointing out that folding the 
pressed sheet metal in one-single step into a U-shape handle is not a good idea (TAI, 
2002d).
The last example of domestic linkage was the collaborative project related to the 
chemistry of the plastics that cover the hand brake lever397. Normally this material was 
known to be polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and is toxic to the environment. Now with the 
growing awareness of the environment from the European Union, it was of mutual interest 
to both Honda and Firm D Group to use the environmentally-friendly material398. But due 
the lack of Firm D knowledge, it had requested a research team at MTEC to explore this 
possibility (TAI, 2003b). Currently, the project is ongoing and still waiting for approval by 
Honda headquarter in Japan399.
With regard to foreign linkages, Firm D Group formed two more foreign joint 
ventures: with Kayama Corporation (Japan), to learn the technology for cutting tool and 
machining process and another with Honda Foundry and Asian Honda Motor, to learn the 
technology for producing automobile pistons.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Most of the sales were still focused on domestic market with little product 
diversification into electronic parts. After the 1997 crisis the market situation was 
different. The export activity improved significantly after the 1997 financial crisis.
Despite such activity, the firm still did not invest heavily into the export of auto-parts.
306 The single-step folding process does not allow the metal sufficient time to flow and form a U-shape; hence 
the recommendation is to adjust the folding process from one to two-step process: 1) fold into a V-shape and 
then 2) fold into a U-shape (personal interview with Firm D Engineering Manager, December 13, 2004).
397 Even though the risk of using TPOs as a plastic cover for hand brake lever was high, Firm D President was 
still willing to undertake the project. The reason can be explained via his learning strategy; he wanted to 
illustrate to the Japanese carmakers (Honda and in the future Toyota) that Firm D was willing to invest in 
higher-level, complex learning activities.
398 It all started when one of Firm D employees noted that new environmentally-friendly chemical material 
called thermoplastic polyolefins (TPOs) at a seminar and brought about a discussion between Firm D 
President and his engineering team about the possibility of replacing PVC with TPOs.
399 “Once the researcher at MTEC had developed a chemical formula for production of TPOs, the 
development needed to be tested in a practical product application. None of the other Thai firms were willing 
to risk having their product image ruined due to poor quality plastic parts. Firm D was one of the few firms 
who were willing to take this risk and signed a three-way contract (Firm D, MTEC and TAI) for the 
development of TPOs used in the prototype hand brake. Once the prototype was produced, Firm D President 
travelled to Japan to ask permission from the Honda carmaker executives and have the Japanese engineers 
tested the prototypes (personal interview with Firm D President, November 16, 2004).
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7.3.5 Firm L (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
The investment projects involved a major plant expansion and installation of 
modem production technology. Within the firm, there was an investment to set up the in- 
house mold design department capable of designing more than 10 molds per month. In 
addition, the firm also recently invested in an engineering design team capable of 
collaborating with public organizations on the up-to-date engineering analysis on product 
safety and quality (plant visit and personal interview with Design Department Chief, 
December 8, 2004)400. Other minor investments included an investment in a formal 
training facility.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were mainly four learning activities: learning to operate the modem 
production process, learning to operate the new software for die casting simulation, 
learning to attempt to supply the British Formula One racing team, and the problematic 
learning due to limited human resources development.
The first learning activity was the operation of new production technology. Firm L 
realized that to be competitive in this alloy wheel business, it needed to enhance the 
productivity. It does this by investing in a new production facility, which increased the 
2003 production capacity from 250,000 wheels per year to 500,000 in 2005. There was 
also an investment in a modern cleaning and paint room. The old paint room was operated 
manually by operators and suffered from lack of consistency; it also suffered from dust 
particles that could contaminate the product surface during the painting process. Hence to 
cope with increasing exports, Firm L President had invested about 50 million Baht in an 
automatic cleaning and painting line401 (plant visit, December 8, 2004). Hence the huge
400 In 2004, Firm L was no longer a small firm; it has grown to become a medium-to-large size, family-owned 
firm with about 300 employees, of which 20 were engineers and technicians (Ibid.).
401 To properly clean the work-in-process mag wheel, sometimes there is more than one cleaning solution.
The new automatic line had the capability to incorporate the application of sequential cleaning solutions. 
Likewise, the painting process is becoming more complex, accommodating more than a single color. The new 
automatic line has the capability to lay down the paint sequences to achieve the exactly desired colour. For 
instance, “Some overseas customers preferred their alloy wheel color to be neither pure silver nor plain black, 
but something in between. Hence what we did during the painting was we setup the paint sequence to be first 
black and then follow by silver. The new paint was ‘smoked silver’, as we would like to call it. Without the 
automatic painting line, the consistency of such paint task was and still is quite difficult to achieve” (personal 
interview with Firm L R&D engineer, December 8, 2004).
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investment in new painting facility had allowed Firm L to produce the alloy wheel targeting 
specific customer preferences.
The second learning activity involved the operation of the advanced casting 
simulation software. Firm L President decided to purchase the software into a 
collaborative research project with TAI, NSTDA, MTEC, Kasetsart University and 
Chulalongkorn University, “I think we are one of the first private companies that bought 
such advanced casting simulation software”402 (personal interview with Firm L President, 
May 4, 2004). After the training courses and collaborative research, Firm L soon realized 
the benefit of such software in lowering the design costs and reducing the product 
development time. The software package comprised two parts: flow and thermal analysis 
(personal interview with Firm L’s R & D Section Head, December 8, 2004). Software 
training was conducted with an academic from Chulalongkorn University403.
To challenge the design team, Firm L decided to engage in an attempt to sponsor the 
British Formula One team with light-weight alloy wheels (2005). Firm L General Manager 
stated,
“We have a market dealership in England and the FI [Formula One] team 
was interested in our products. They already sent people to have a look at 
our factory already” (The Nation, 2005).
If the negotiation went as planned, then Firm L would start supplying the racing wheels to 
England by 2007 (Ibid.). This means that Firm L will be investing in a new production 
facility to the supply of racing alloy wheels (2005).
By supplying the British Formula One racing team, Firm L’s ambitious goal was to 
build superior brand image. More importantly, the firm wanted its design engineers in 
more complex learning activities. This was a more important learning goal.
“We view this (forthcoming) collaboration with the British Formula One 
team as a good [learning] opportunity. Even though we might not gain any 
financial profit in the short rum, what would follow is our rather extensive 
investment in research, development and manufacturing of prototype racing 
wheels, which will provide our engineering design unit a world-class 
[learning] experience” [italics added] (The Nation, 2005)
402 An NSTDA consultant commented on the software purchase as a bold move since very few private firms 
actually purchase this advanced simulation software simply for private use. This is because the software is 
very expensive, and the complicated settings o f many parameters required knowledgeable engineers 
(NSTDA, 2005b: 2).
403 The contact with the researcher at Chulalongkorn University was established with the aid o f  National 
Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA)’s program, Industrial Technology Assistance 
Project (ITAP) (NSTDA, 2005b).
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The General Manager added that the exposure to the technology of the world-class racing 
wheel will provide the firm with sufficient knowledge to produce premium-brand alloy 
wheels.
The last learning activity concerned the deficient training of the human resources. 
Having extensive investment in new equipment and advanced software, Firm L physical 
assets are second to none, but its human assets had problems keeping up. There were two 
problems: 1) the low aspiration of each employee and 2) the lack of formal training facility. 
The President attempted to solve these problems by investing in more technical books, 
building a library, and a training room. In short, the President was building an encouraging 
environment for learning.
“In the past, our firm lacked a formal plan for human resource training; 
hence now I am building a formal training plan. I am investing 1 million 
Baht404 and building a training room that can accommodate 100 people.
There will be training courses in English language training and computer 
software. I am trying to instil a learning culture within my firm” [italics 
added] (personal interview Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
Firm L believes strongly that a capable team of design engineers will constitute its future
core competence. Specifically, the design team must be able to pinpoint the exact customer
preferences (the aesthetic design) and assure the international standards on product safety
and quality.
To remedy the problem of limited human resources training, the President had 
committed Firm L to obtain the ISO 9000 quality accreditation project, which had 
commenced shortly before the crisis. After the 1997 financial crisis, the project was 
accelerated40^  and Firm L received its first formal quality accreditation in 1998 (corporate 
website, accessed 2006). It could be said Firm L converted the 1997 crisis into an impetus, 
a catalyst for its employees to stretch their production capabilities, to survive in the export 
market. But also important was the President, who can successfully conduct marketing 
activities accessing overseas market. Today, the firm also received the latest quality
404 This was considered to be a small proportion o f its annual revenue o f  800 million Baht in 2004.
405 The acceleration o f the ISO 9000 project was feasible due to the financial crisis. Production orders were 
down and this allowed more free time from the employees, who later decided to focus on the ISO 9000 
project (personal interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
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accreditation, ISO/TS 16949:2002406 and continues to increase its export (personal 
interview with Firm L President, May 4, 2004).
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There are two types of linkages: domestic and foreign, Firm L tended to rely more 
on the domestic linkages for learning activities. Furthermore, there were two important 
sources of domestic linkages: another alloy wheel manufacturer (Siam Lemmerz407) and 
public organizations (TAI, MTEC and NSTDA).
The First domestic linkage was Siam Lemmerz. Having a negative experience with 
the former Japanese joint venture partner, Firm L did not engage in any more joint ventures. 
Rather it searched for technical assistance via informal discussions and training courses. 
Firm L President and the Managing Director of Siam Lemmerz were good friends. Firm L 
benchmarked its production performance with Siam Lemmerz. Consequently, the President 
knew the strengths and weaknesses of Firm L performance. For instance, in production 
defect rates, Firm L has 19 per cent defect rates, while Siam Lemmerz had only 7 per cent. 
Hence the gap (12 per cent) had to be analyzed as to pinpoint the causes.
“Soon we realized that our production defect rates were too high. We took 
immediate action to check the engineering design process. For any product 
whose defect rate exceeds 7 per cent, the processes and the work procedures 
were isolated for analysis. We conducted multiple brainstorm sessions, using 
quality tool such as cause-and-effect diagrams4^ 8 to pinpoint the problem’s 
root cause” (Personal interview with Firm L Factory Manager, May 5,
2004).
Hence it could be said that this linkage with Siam Lemmerz enabled effective 
benchmarking and allowed Firm L to set key performance indices.
The second domestic linkage was the collaborative research with public 
organizations. The Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) acted as the link, introducing Firm 
L to researchers within other organizations such as National Metal and Material 
Technology Center (MTEC) and Kasetsart University. The three formal collaborative 
projects are worth noting:
406 This is the latest quality system accreditation within the automotive industry; all carmakers (worldwide) 
accepted this quality system.
407 Located in Thailand, Siam Lemmerz is a joint venture firm between Hayes Lemmerz SpA and the Siam 
Cement group (Thailand). Its main product includes aluminium alloy wheels for passenger cars and pick-up 
trucks (TSAE, 2003).
408 This diagram is also known as the Fishbone (Ishikawa) diagram.
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• In 2002 collaboration with TAI and Kasetsart University researcher on the analysis 
of impact test using a computer simulation model (TAI, 2002a)
• In 2003 another collaboration with TAI and MTEC on the aluminium alloy wheel 
design process (TAI, 2003a)
• In 2004 collaboration with NSTDA and Chulalongkorn University engineering 
researcher409 on the application of computer software in designing the aluminium 
wheels410 (Horee et ah, 2005)
The common element among these collaborative projects was the emphasis on the use of 
advanced computer simulation model for new product development. As a result, Firm L 
engineers gained better understand of their advanced design modelling tools and their 
limitations.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm L President created a capable marketing team, which assisted in increasing the 
firm’s export. Today Firm L marketing success was evident in its 70 per cent production 
volume exported to more than 30 countries worldwide, including the United States -  Firm 
L largest overseas market (corporate website, accessed on March 15, 2006)411. Firm L also 
collaborated extensively with overseas customers on satisfying their needs, in terms of 
innovative wheel design (Personal interview with Firm L Factory Manager, May 5, 2004).
7.3.6 Firm S Group (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
After the 1997 financial, Firm S Group took a strong defensive stance on its 
investment activities; it attempted to salvage what was left of the Group’s foreign joint 
ventures412. Consequently the only major investment project during this period came later
409 This researcher has a doctoral qualification from the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (MIT), USA, 
in the area o f Metallurgy (Chulalongkorn University website, accessed 2006).
410 This project also resulted in another journal article publication at Prince o f Songkhla University. See 
(Lalitu-rai et al., 2005) for more details.
411 The actual name o f the website was withheld to uphold Ethics Committee agreement, which is to assure 
the firm confidentiality.
412 “The [Firm S] Group, one o f Thailand’s top three auto-part makers, has sold most o f its stakes in 
nine subsidiaries to Japanese companies and creditors. The company has decided to reduce its 51% 
holding in nine affiliates to just 5%. Existing Japanese partners have agreed to buy the shares in 
order to keep the operations o f the companies afloat” (Anonymous, 1999b: 5).
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in 2005413. The project was the modern manufacturing plant in Eastern Seaboard area414. 
The plant will focus on the mass production the Group’s flagship product, the axle shaft, 
supplying both the Japanese and US carmakers.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
Firm S Group was pre-occupied with corporate debt restructuring, it did not engage 
in much learning through the operation of production activity. Furthermore, the massive 
shrinkage in the domestic demand impacted the learning by doing activities, and there was 
not much to do in terms of introducing new products. The only learning activity was the 
set up of a training scheme to develop the human resources. Initially the training followed 
the outline stated in the ISO 9000 quality accreditation system, which was obtained by the 
end of 1997 (Anonymous, 1998), and a year later, the Group obtained QS 9000 and was 
able to supply auto-parts to the US carmakers.
In 1998, Firm S Group created an internal training department. The training 
program consisted of collaborative project with the Thai Productivity Institute (TPI). The 
TPI sent in a team to assist the Group with productivity improvement. After six months, 
Firm S Group had achieved the targeted level of productivity. It was selected by TPI as a 
role model factory (Anonymous, 1998). In addition, Firm S Group also collaborated with 
the Department of Skills Development (DSD) to learn formulation of skills development 
strategy. In October 1998, the Group planned an upgrade of the education levels of its 
employees415.
Hence it could be said that one of the positive impact of the crisis was the idle time 
for Firm S Group to think about human resources development.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Both types of learning linkage (domestic and foreign) were initiated by Firm S 
Group, though much focus was on the former. There were at least two examples of 
domestic linkages.
413 To alleviate the burgeoning debt and expedite the restructuring process, in 2005 Firm S Group was 
converted from a family-owned private firm to a public one. The capital raised from the stock market was 
used to fund new investment project.
414 This area was dubbed by the Thai government and Asian Week magazine as ‘the Detroit o f the East’.
415 For workers who had achieved year 1 to year 4 o f high school education diploma, Firm S Group will 
continue to support their education at the vocational level.
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First was the domestic link with the university research group. In the early 2000s, 
Firm S Group collaborated with the academics at the Center of Operations for Computer 
Aided Research Engineering (COCARE) Department of King Mongkut University. Most 
of the projects were related to the enhancement to the firm’s design capabilities416. Second 
was the linkage with TAI. During the early 2000s, the Group sent its engineers to attend 
three off-the-job training courses offered by TAI: Preventive Maintenance course,
Workers’ Safety course, and Metal Fatigue course417. In addition, Firm S Group 
collaborated with TAI on productivity improvement418. The problem was concerning the 
overwhelming increase in demand of axle shafts from the multinational carmakers and the 
need to stretch production capacity. The TAI consultancy team requested Firm S Group to 
set up a kaizen team419, responsible for learning the productivity improvement technique. 
After about four months of learning the continuous improvement activities (cycle time and 
bottleneck analyses), the Group was able to increase its production capacity420. Another 
example of collaborative project with TAI involved the production of rear axle shaft. The 
purpose was to learn the design of axle shaft via “reverse engineering”. Again Firm S 
engineering team collaborated with Kasetsart University research team and come up with 
an optimized design of axle shaft421.
Another domestic linkage was with TAPMA. The Vice President of Firm S Group 
was elected as TAPMA President in March 2003 (Automobile Information Center, 2003). 
Historically, TAPMA was renowned for its ability to effectively lobby Thai government for
416 Examples of training courses comprised: design and development of disc brake (casting and machining), 
design and development of leaf spring and courses in finite elements analysis (a form of mathematical 
analysis to determine the physical properties of auto-parts).
417 The researcher had the opportunity to attend this training course and observed that Firm S Group had 
requested an academic at Department of Aerospace Engineering, Kasetsart University to perform a virtual 
testing and experimentation of its flagship product, the rear axle shaft.
418 This project was part of a wider project undertaken by the TAI, the Automotive Experts Dispatching 
Program (AEDP). At the time of this writing, AEDP is still on going and it is a collaborative effort between 
TAI and Japan External Trade Related Organization (JETRO) to upgrade Thai auto-part suppliers.
419 The continuous improvement team (kaizen) consisted of 5 engineers and technicians from Firm S Group 
(personal plant visit, December 17, 2004)
420 Together the TAI team and Firm S Group kaizen team performed three things (TAI, 2005b): 1) balancing 
workload between the five different work operations and two different machines, 2) improvement on the 
tooling (combining tools and adjusting the speeds), and 3) reconfigure jigs and re-balancing the work 
operations.
421 The recommendation was proposed for Firm S Group to reduce the use of its surface heat treatment 
coatings by 2 millimeters (TAI, 2004a: 7); this would reduce the processing time by 0.2 seconds per axle 
shaft. The reduction contributed to higher productivity and lower production costs (Ibid.).
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protectionist policies. TAPMA collaborated actively with other public organizations422 for 
appropriate policy formulation. One issue was the set up of a modern, public product 
testing facility (as discussed earlier). TAPMA President has argued for public investment 
in a local Automotive Research and Testing Center (ARTC) responsible for auto-part 
testing423.
With regards to learning through foreign linkages, Firm S Group was passive. It 
neither searches for more foreign technical assistance nor joint venture agreements424.
First was the lack of new technical assistance. From 1999 to 2005, the Group had 
renewed a total of three agreements with no active search for more agreements425.
“[Firm S] Group has a policy of renewing technical agreements for the 
production processes and product development that are deemed to still 
require future technical assistance in order to develop greater efficiency and 
process improvements” (SET, 2005a).
Thus it could be said that the Group intended to continue to receive the “usual” technical 
assistance, but the more pressing issue was the quality of such assistance in meeting future 
competition, which seemed to be lacking. Historically, the Group appeared to 
underemphasize the building of its product design capabilities.
Second was the lack of new foreign joint venture. After the 1997 crisis, there were 
no new foreign joint ventures. However, in 2005 the Group had bought back some of its 
lost equity in former joint ventures426. Firm S Group is currently on the lookout for more 
potential foreign partners.
422 Example organizations were Ministry of Industry, Thailand Automotive Institute and Federation of Thai 
Industries.
423 TAPMA President argued: “[The ARTC] is viewed as essential to certify the quality and standards of Thai 
auto parts. Thai suppliers would no longer need to send their auto parts to Taiwan and Japan for testing as 
currently practised once the centre becomes operational, thereby reducing the testing costs by 30-50 percent” 
[italics added] (Praiwan, 2004).
424 One possible explanation of lack of learning through foreign linkages was the severe impact of the 1997 
crisis. There were primarily two main impacts: burgeoning debt and selling of equity to Japanese joint 
venture partners. One year after the onset of the 1997 crisis, the Group sales had plunged to 750 million Baht 
(from 1.3 billion in the previous year) (Anonymous, 1999b). On issue of debt, the Group had about 3.5 
billion Baht debt and a monthly interest payment of 20 million Baht (Anonymous, 1999a; 2000). Since the 
crisis until early 2000s, the Group had been continuously engaging in debt restructuring process, leaving no 
room for resource commitment to learning. Consequently, most learning activities were paused due to the 
significant lost of control on all its Japanese joint ventures formed during 1993-1997. The Group was 
operating in a “damage control” mode to salvage whatever that was left of the corporation.
425 These agreements were with three Japanese firms: Ibara Seiki, Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing, and 
Gohsyu Corporation.
426 The management board approved the following two equity buy-back purchases (Anonymous, 2006d): 1) 
purchase the shares holding in Somic Manufacturing joint venture, shares transacted was 600,000 (97.8 
million Baht) and Firm S Group’s equity will be increased to 20 per cent and 2) purchase the shares holding
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“With some products, relying on [the current] technical [assistance] 
agreements is not enough; we may need to find more joint-venture 
partners,... Firm S Group is seeking a foreign partner for its coil-spring 
business427 ...” (Khumkun and Changsorn, 2003).
Thus it could be said that Firm S Group aimed to strengthen its foreign linkage capability,
and planned to learn more about its coil spring design.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Most of the marketing activities were focused on supplying the domestic market 
and very little on export. It was because Firm S Group faced the obstacle of unqualified 
product testing facilities. It was also because the investment in the testing facility required 
large capital resources and the Group was unwilling to commit. As a result, Firm S Group 
current export level is at a low 6 per cent of its total production output (Family Know- 
How, 2006).
7.3.7 Firm SOM (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
In 2001, Firm SOM invested in production capacity expansion, and at that time, 
the firm employees increased to about 100. The firm registered capital was l million 
Baht429. The firm also invested in training courses with TAI (Personal interview with Firm 
SOM President, November 24, 2004). In addition, Firm SOM did not have any other new 
investment projects. On the contrary, in 2004 the firm suffered severe downsizing
in Yamada joint venture, shares transacted was 12,000 (2 million Baht) and Firm S Group’s equity will be 
increased to 20 per cent.
427 A comment could be made here about the slow rate of Firm S Group in seeking such a foreign partner. 
Since relative to its competitors (for e.g. Firm D Group and Firm TS Group), Firm S Group appeared to be 
very slow in acquiring the product design capability.
428 It is important to note that this low export volume of Firm S Group has persisted despite the fact that the 
Thai government has been promoting auto-parts export since mid-1980s. That was when the government 
started to shift from an import substitution to an export-oriented industrialization strategy. It is also important 
to note that despite the 1997 crisis, Firm S Group had maintained a 80:20 ratio of domestic versus export 
market products (Anonymous, 1998). Hence it could be said that export earnings were not sufficient to 
alleviate the severe impact of the 1997 crisis. It is also worth exploring certain issues that had impeded Firm 
S Group’s ability to export.
429 In 2001, the firm registered capital increased to 1 million Baht (from half a million in 1995), which is not 
high when compared to an average Thai auto-part firm. However, the increase in capital investment was large 
when compared to Firm SOM’s small size.
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(personal plant visit, November 15 , 20 04)430. This was due to the cancellation of 
production order from its main customer in early 2004. In addition, Firm SOM also 
liquidated some of its outdated equipment and machinery, and it managed to keep the 
remaining key equipment. Since the firm was in financial trouble, there was no 
investment plan to purchase any modern equipment (personal interview with Firm SOM 
President, November 24, 2004).
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
The firm learned to produce diversified product (metal parts for musical 
instruments) using the same production facility. Since the firm did not have sufficient 
capability to invest in modern production technology, the learning activity related to such 
technology was absent. In addition, the firm also suffered from other operational 
problems431. Since early 2000s, the firm suffered from poor human resources 
management. In 2004, the high personnel turnover prevented Firm SOM from achieving 
an effective training program. Once trained, the personnel tended to seek better job 
opportunities elsewhere432. Due to lingering financial trouble, Firm SOM was unable to 
provide the incentives and fringe benefits to attract great talents to stay with the firm. The 
poor human resource management greatly affected the firm’s learning strategy. In 
particular, it limited the scope of learning activities that Firm SOM can engage in.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
The learning through foreign linkage was very limited. Since Firm SOM was 
busy with solving operational as well as financial problems, it did not have sufficient time 
to concentrate on searching for new technical assistance agreement or any joint ventures433. 
Frequently, Firm SOM’s only learning activity occurs through limited domestic linkage,
430 The floor space used for production activity had decreased by more than 50 per cent. Firm SOM 
technicians along with TAI Japanese expert were determining ways to cramp the remaining equipment into 
the remaining floor space (Ibid.).
431 In 2004, the firm had ample problems trying to keep its domestic manufacturing operations afloat. After 
the decision to cancel the large production orders from its main customer, Firm SOM President stated: “Now I 
have to find ways to generate revenue in order to pay all the overhead expenses. December [2004] will be the 
crucial month for my firm. If I cannot increase the cash inflow, my firm will be in serious trouble” [italics 
added] (personal interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
432 Out o f the 100 employees that Firm SOM had in 2003, only 40 remained with the firm in 2004 (personal 
interview with Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004).
433 Even if Firm SOM could successfully locate the potential foreign partner, it is highly unlikely that this 
would lead to the set up o f a joint venture. This was because o f the firm’s serious financial trouble and 
massive downsizing in 2004.
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consists of general continuous improvement activity434 offered by the TAI. The firm had 
limited collaboration with other public organizations, and most collaboration lacked 
specific target. This was to be expected since the firm was not able to formulate a well- 
defined learning strategy. Due to high personnel turnover rate, the benefits that arose from 
the linkage activities were not fully captured435. The President was pre-occupied with the 
more immediate problems of severe shortage of working capital (personal interview with 
Firm SOM President, November 24, 2004). Again, the firm had little time to focus on an 
appropriate learning strategy.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm SOM’s learning related to marketing activities was focused on supplying the 
auto-parts only for the domestic market and no export. Hence, it could be said that Firm 
SOM had limited exposure to exporting activity, and that most of its marketing activities 
were domestically oriented. Within the domestic market, Firm SOM was very passive in 
terms of searching for new customers. It continued to rely on the few customers, o f which 
Firm SML was the main one.
7.3.8 Firm TKT (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
After the recovery from the 1997 crisis, there were three significant investment 
projects. First, in 2003 the firm was investing in the second factory (2004: 32). This new 
factory produced plastic parts for electrical appliances, and some auto-parts for Toyota436.
434 For instance, the Japanese expert and the Thai engineer from TAI assisted Firm SOM in plant management 
issues such as plant layout and productivity improvements. The focus was more on the former rather than the 
latter. For instance in 2004, Firm SOM had downsized and the TAI team was responsible for finding ways to 
fit the remaining machinery and equipment into the reduced manufacturing floor space.
435 Two technicians went missing for three days without informing Firm SOM’s Personnel Department of 
their whereabouts. Other newly arrived workers stayed and worked for only about a year (on average), then 
they decided to leave the firm and searched for better jobs (personal plant visit, November 15, 2004). This 
high turnover rate caused much delay in the scheduled production plan as well as discontinuous 
implementation of learning strategy. In all, the collaborative efforts expended with TAI did not achieve full 
benefits. This was due to the lack of long-term commitment of Firm SOM’s employees, the lack of 
willingness to learn as well as the poor qualifications of the workers. Since Firm SOM had been in financial 
trouble, it reduced the manager’s monthly salary. This caused some of the management team to resign from 
the company and seeked better job opportunities elsewhere. The result of high turnover of personnel was the 
discontinuous leaning activity and poor accumulation of firm capabilities.
436 Toyota planned to launch a new Innovative International Multi-vehicle (IMV) project, producing Hilux 
Vigo pick-up trucks. IMV Project uses Thailand as a global production base. This explained part of the 
reasons why Firm TKT was eager to invest in the production plant expansion.
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Second, it invested in the third production facility to produce mold for injection process. 
Third, Firm TKT invested in an acquisition. It competitively aimed at becoming self- 
sufficient in the mold design and manufacturing; hence, it acquired Mold and Die 
Manufacturing (Anonymous, 2004e). Currently, Firm TKT is searching for an investment 
in a possible joint venture (personal interview with Firm TKT Managing Director, 
November 5, 2004).
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
There were three learning activities: the limited advancement in learning to use new 
design tool, limited learning through the foreign joint venture, and learning to develop the 
human resources.
The first learning activity was concerned with the limited learning in new design 
tool. Firm TKT did not invest in the computer assisted engineering (CAE) software for 
mold design. It relied heavily on the manual labor of highly skilled technicians, whose 
responsibilities were to observe and rectify design problems during the trial production runs 
(personal interview with Firm TKT Injection Section Chief, November 5, 2004). The 
manually-adjusted mold design was costly (and time-consuming) when compared with the 
computer-assisted design. Secondly, the joint venture with Okawa did not last because of 
the 1997 crisis, by 1999 Firm TKT had to sell its shares (SET, 2005b). As a result, the 
planned expansion through joint venture was put on hold. Consequently, the attempt to 
learn the chromium-plating technology from Okawa did not fully materialize (i.e. it was 
prematurely truncated). The third learning activity was upgrading the human resources.
To keep up with the production expansion, Firm TKT must upgrade its human resource437. 
All the employees were required to undergo formal training to achieve a vocational 
diploma status . Fluman resources development was viewed as necessary, since Firm 
TKT must be able to continuously reduce its manufacturing costs (3 to 5 per cent annually) 
as requested by the carmakers (Ibid.: 6).
437 In the early 2000s, the firm utilized a “4-6-3” plan, meaning that those who had achieved grade 4 and 6 
elementary education were encouraged to continue formal education until the 3rd year high school diploma.
438 “We have 107 employees438 that have educational qualifications lower than mat-tha-yom 3438. We 
supported these workers to further their education and anticipated that by mid-2003, all our employees will 
graduate with mat-tha-yom 3 certificate” (TAI, 2003i: 7).
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Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
There were two types of “link and learn” activities: domestic and foreign linkages. 
On the domestic side, Firm TKT linked with BOI and TAI. Currently, Firm TKT also 
searches for possible linkage with a foreign technology supplier.
First was the domestic linkage with BOI. During 1993-94, Firm TKT was 
involved in the BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD) Program. The 
program was designed by BOI to conduct matchmaking activities (i.e. between the 
Japanese OEMs and the small-to-medium Thai suppliers). The program resulted in mixed 
success for linking the firm with their prospective Japanese customers. As Lauridsen wrote
“The firm Managing Director... did not remember these match-making 
activities but did not rule out the possibility of a match-making effects, . . .”
[italics added] (Lauridsen, 2000: 18)
Hence, the benefit of such collaborative linkage with BOI was unclear. Second was the 
domestic linkage with TAI. Later after 2000, the collaborative projects between Firm 
TKT and Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI) had intensified. Firm TKT had two 
collaborative projects with TAI. The first was a training course, conducted in December 
2002, in raw material selection for plastic parts design439. The second project involved 
more hands-on activity. It was concerned with the defect reduction in the plastic part 
painting process440. From both projects, Firm TKT employees learn the productivity 
improvement methods.
Currently, Firm TKT stepped up its search for a foreign linkage. This was because 
the firm was aware of the limited foreign linkages as well as the existing knowledge 
(capability) gaps. Historically, the firm was deficient in the capability to design and 
manufacture large injection mold, and the acquisition made in 2004 was insufficient. 
Therefore, Firm TKT needed the foreign technology on large injection mold production. 
Consequently, the firm is now searching for any potential foreign partner441.
439 It was a three-day course conducted as within lecture theater environment, and hence there were not much 
on-the-job learning activities.
440 The TAI sent in a team of 3 personnel: one Japanese expert and two Thai engineers. Firm TKT had to set 
up a corresponding kaizen team, responsible for performing the learning activities as advised by the Japanese 
expert’s team (Khodee et al., 2004).
441 “[Firm TKT] is interested in setting up a firm, joint venture, a holding or subsidiary with interested EU 
[European Union] firms and is also seeking assistance in R&D [research and development] as well as 
manufacturing rights. The business would also like to establish mutual technical cooperation and a joint 
production agreement” (from www.euthailandpartenariat.com. accessed March 15, 2006).
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Learning the Marketing Activities
Currently, Firm TKT export activity was still limited. In 2002, Firm TKT-PI, 
which was set up as an exporting firm in 1991 under the BOI export privileges, was 
liquidated (SET, 2005b), thus the firm’s export volume had declined. It was not until 
recently when Firm TKT decided that it wanted to focus more on export442.
7.3.9 Firm TS Group (post-1997 crisis)
Learning the Investment Activities
The investment in new manufacturing facilities and foreign joint ventures 
continued. After 2000, these included overseas investment in India and Malaysia443. The 
President stated, “Doing businesses today, you can’t stay just in one country” [italics 
added] (Changsorn, 2004). In addition, the Group invested in a representative office in 
Yokohama, Japan (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice President, October 19, 
2004). All of these investments were conducted through the Engineering Managers of Firm 
TS Group, some of which were Japanese experts. Consequently, it is clear from these 
investments that the Group possesses sufficient investment and project execution 
capability and aims to become a competitive regional auto-part supplier.
Learning the Production and Product Activities (Process, Product and IE & HRD)
Firm TS Group production capability progressed toward a more diverse stance yet 
focused on specific product development. There were three main learning activities: 
learning to operate modern production technology to mass-produce auto-parts for all 
carmakers444, learning to design its own tooling and to produce own brand product, and 
learning to upgrade the human resources.
First was the learning activity related to the operation of modem production 
facility and mass production. To qualify as a first-tier supplier for US carmakers, the
44" Another reason why (historically) domestic market was more attractive than export was because of the 
establishment o f production bases by many multinational carmakers since the mid-1990s, and this had led to a 
dramatic increase in the domestic demand for plastic auto-parts (Ibid.).
443 As o f 2006, the Group is currently searching for ways to expand its production overseas in India,
Indonesia, Cambodia, and possibly China.
444 Prior to the 1997 crisis, most o f the Group customers were mainly the Japanese OEMs. Since 1996 
onwards, the Group began to supply auto-parts to the US carmakers and European such as Ford, General 
Motors and DaimlerChrysler. This constituted a new learning activity in terms o f increasing the proportion o f  
modern production equipment and paying attention to new quality accreditation system such as the QS 9000 
and TS 16949.
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Group had to undergo the QS 9000 accreditation process, which was completed in 1998.
The Group started to supply plastics interior trim and stamped sheet metal parts to 
AutoAlliance (personal interview with Firm TSLA Plant Manager, October 25, 2004).
Later in 2003, Firm TS Group felt the need to better meet the on-time delivery requirement 
and decided to invest 2 billion Baht in the largest445 auto-part production plant in the 
Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estate (Hemaraj Land and Development, 2003). The new plant 
aimed to supply auto-parts to the US “Big Three” (Changsorn, 2005).
The second learning activity was an improvement in the firm’s tooling and product 
capability. In 2001, the Group continued to invest in the software, computer aided 
engineering (CAE) for tooling design and production (Krungthep Turakij, 2003).
Currently, the Group is capable of producing large tooling (molds and dies) according to 
the OEM-provided conceptual drawings (personal interview with Firm TS Group 
Engineering Manager, October 29, 2004). Another remarkable achievement was the 
Group’s first own brand product -  a small electric vehicle. The Group conducted R&D 
informally since 2002 and established a formal R&D Unit446 in 2003. Since inception, 
R&D comprised two main projects: the design of an electric golf cart and the design of a 
three-wheeled vehicle for the Asian market447 (personal interview with Firm TS Group 
Chief Engineer -  R&D Unit, November 2, 2004).
The third learning activity involved the improvement in human resources. Firm 
TS Group has been sending its engineers and technicians for training related to CAD/CAM 
and CAE, and quality management systems448. Within the R&D Unit, formal technical 
training by Japanese experts occurs frequently. Recently, the Group has been sending its 
staff to station in Yokohama (Japan) to actively absorb the technology and skills on product 
design, but this has been a difficult task, due to the high operating cost (2004a). The 
rationale for sending engineers overseas was because most of the new product development
445 Rated by the annual production capacity, this new plant is the largest in Thailand (Changsorn, 2005).
446 Currently, this Unit has the responsibility of internalizing parts design capability (Anonymous, 2005a)
447 As of 2005, this project was still on going.
448 Examples of these courses were: Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) applications to tooling design. 
Quality management training courses comprised ISO 9000:2000, ISO 14000, ISO 18001, QS 9000 needs 
assessment (GPC, 2003), and ISO/TS 16949. Design software training courses were: PRO/Engineer and 
Unigraphics.
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occurred outside of Thailand449. As part of an efficient human resource management, the 
Group constantly emphasizes teamwork.
“If you compare company to company, our [Firm TS Group] teamwork is 
second to none, especially at the management level. I believe you cannot 
buy teamwork. The only thing you can do is to build it, and the only thing 
you invest in is time” [italics added] (Panthong and Master, 2005: 46).
Hence it could be said that Firm TS Group has come a long way since its inception on
human resources development, with the current emphasis on unique organizational culture
emphasizing teamwork. The Group also aimed to become self-sufficient in advanced
product design capability.
Learning the Technology Linkage Activities
Firm TS Group engaged extensively in searching for technical assistance from both 
domestic and foreign sources. First were the main domestic linkages with TAI and the 
public universities.
An exemplar of domestic linkage was the electric golf cart project. Firm TS Group 
did not design the entire vehicle in isolation; it was developed with the assistance of many 
interested parties (for instance: Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI), Japanese foreign 
experts430, its supplier, and researchers from Kasetsart University and King Mongkut 
Institute of Technology). Three notable collaborative projects were:
• The design and testing of the steering system for an electric vehicle (TAI, 
2004e)451.
• The design and testing of a damper system for an electric vehicle (TAI, 2004c)432.
449 The President succinctly described the persistent lack of Thai engineers and technicians’ experience in 
auto-part design: “The development of human resource is very important and considered one of the critical 
success factors. Unfortunately in Thailand, most of the training activities on engineering design lacked the 
required technological depth. Our group had been in auto-part business for a long time, but we still have 
knowledge deficiency on product design capability. I think the Thai government should try to setup a training 
course to close this knowledge gap” [italics added] (Krungthep Turakij, 2003).
450 Within Firm TS Group, there are well over 30 Japanese permanent employees spreading across all the 
subsidiaries (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice President, October 19, 2004).
451 Two design problems were pointed out: 1) the poorly-designed rubber bushing was damaged easily after a 
few usages and 2) the design of the spindle arm was too much on the conservative side, that is excessive raw 
materials were expended. After rectification, the Group learned better design of rubber bushing, and the 
computer modelling skills useful for future designs.
452 Another collaborative project with the university was the design of the golf cart chassis; it was a team 
effort between the university researcher and personnel from Firm TSR&D (a subsidiary within the tooling 
business group) (Ibid.). The research team had calculated the appropriate value of spring stiffness as well as 
displaying the mechanical characteristics of the damper system under varying loads (the amount of weight 
that was placed on the vehicle, both static—when vehicle is at rest—and dynamic—when the vehicle is in
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• Finally, the design and development of a transmission system for an electric 
vehicle (TAI, 2004f)453.
Once the design activities were finalized, about 10 golf cart prototypes were produced. The 
product was tested on Firm TS Group own golf course and the procedures were emulated 
from the Japanese carmakers434. During testing, the prototypes suffered from some design 
problems (personal interview with Firm TSLA Plant Manager, October 25, 2004). Once 
these problems were rectified, the golf cart was finally launched in 2005 (Anonymous, 
2005a). It is important to note that over 95 per cent of the golf cart components were 
indigenously developed by Firm TS Group and its suppliers. The remaining 5 per cent was 
the electric motor455. Prior to the golf cart launch, the Group decided to invest in a new 
production plant; Firm TSVT456.
Another example of domestic linkage was by Firm TSLA457, who engaged in a 
collaborative project with the Institute of Field Robotics (FIBO) at King Mongkut Institute 
of Technology University (Saeng, 2005). The project involved two developments: the 
development of automatic welding process458 and the design a three-axis robotic material 
handling system. Again this automated system provided the required consistency with 
lesser cycle time, hence higher level of productivity. There were four other collaborative 
projects by Firm TS Group on issues such as quality control, preventive maintenance, and 
improvement in general plant productivity459.
motion). Firm TS Group’s engineers learned the techniques related to computer aided engineering (CAE) 
analysis. This knowledge will be useful for future design of a damper system, reducing the manufacturing 
costs and lead-time for product development.
453 The research team built and tested prototypes, to plot out the mechanical and other physical (noise) 
properties. As a result, the engineers learned the design and analysis of the properties of a transmission 
system. Furthermore, the engineers also learned the optimized design techniques. This made the transmission 
system lighter, yet still passed the product safety requirements.
454 “[Having been their first-tier suppliers for many years,] Firm TS Group learned from carmakers such as 
Toyota and Mitsubishi. When they finished building the prototype vehicle, they actually use it to see if any 
problems may occur during the actual usage. After the golf cart prototypes were used for quite some time, the 
Group took the whole vehicle apart. An analysis was conducted for each parts and components, searching for 
signs of any premature failure” (personal interview with Firm TSLA Plant Manager, October 25, 2004).
455 The motor was sourced from General Electrics (USA) (personal interview with Firm TS Group 
Engineering Manager, October 29, 2004).
456 The investment was 144 million Baht to produce the golf carts with annual production capacity of 6,000 
units. The firm is wholly Thai-owned and employed about 144 Thai nationals. It was expected that the export 
of golf carts will occur in 2008 and would generate approximately 692 million Baht in annual earnings.
457 This is a subsidiary within Firm TS Group.
458 The auto-parts were for Mitsubishi vehicles: 1) the “front end” and 2) the “upper plate lower skirt” (Ibid.).
459 The collaboration was with the Department of Industrial Management at King Mongkut Institute of 
Technology, North Bangkok. The four projects were: 1) development of a handbook for quality control tools 
in process improvement and supplier quality improvement (Koonsuwan and Sreprapai, 2001; Pengsuwan and
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Similar to the domestic linkages, Firm TS Group engaged in extensive foreign 
linkage, with many investments in foreign joint ventures460 (see Table 7.9). For instance 
in 1997, the Group formed a joint venture with Honda and established Firm TTD461 (ASID, 
2006). Another joint venture formed in the same year was a four-way joint venture with 
two Indonesian firms and one Malaysian firm. In 2002, Firm TS Group formed another 
joint venture with Press Kogyo (Japan) and learned about the production processes of pick­
up truck chassis462. Additionally, the Group acquired Siam Auto Manufacturing (SAM)463 
in 2005 and planned to be the largest supplier of one-ton pick-up truck chassis in Thailand. 
In addition, there were three more important foreign joint ventures. First was an Indian 
joint venture with Jay Bharat Maruti Group (Menon, 2003; Than Settakij, 2005) (see Table 
7.9). The aim was to produce motorcycle parts for Honda and Suzuki (in India) and then 
followed by the automobile parts. In addition, the Group also signed additional contracts to 
produce fuel tanks464 (Than Settakij, 2005).
Nawaphanom, 2001), 2) the study of (critical success) factors (Meksuwant and Suelung, 2002), 3) increase of 
welding process efficiency and quality (Suasawat and Pongjumpee, 2001), and finally, 4) development of 
preventive maintenance handbook for press machines (Udomsri et al., 2002).
460 Amidst the 1997 crisis and its aftermath, Firm TS Group took only a short time to re-cooperate and had 
ameliorated the severe impacts. The Group, however, did not remain dormant throughout the crisis and its 
aftermath period. It actively searched for domestic business opportunities as well as international ones by 
forming more foreign joint ventures (Automotive World, 2003).
461 This firm produces plastics parts such as power window switch. The production technologies used were 
dies, plastic injection machine and machining center.
462 Today, the Group produced chassis parts for Mitsubishi, Ford and Mazda pick-up trucks (personal 
interview with Firm TS Group Vice President, October 19, 2004).
463 “SAM is a subsidiary of Nissan [Japan] and is the sole supplier of one-ton pickup truck chassis for Nissan” 
(Anonymous, 2005c). In March 2005, Nissan had plans to setup a global pickup truck production base in 
Thailand. The President of Nissan (Thailand) stated, “We're transferring all pickup truck capacity to 
Thailand” (Arnold, 2005). Consequently this important acquisition was a very sensible strategic move for 
Firm TS Group: “[Firm TS Group] will be the largest producer of one-ton pickup chassis in Thailand with 
annual production capacity of 580,000 units (50,000 of which came from Siam Auto Manufacturing” [italics 
added] (Anonymous, 2005c; Duangkaew and Savangvareesakul, 2005).
464 1 ) Bajaj Company, a producer of motorcycles. Currently construction of the new 350 million-Baht factory 
is ongoing. The targeted product is fuel tanks, supplied at an output of 5,000 units per day and 2) another 
Indian firm located in the city of Aurangabad. The investment amount was 200 million Baht and similar to 
above the targeted product is fuel tanks, supplied at the same production output.
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Table 7.9 Foreign Joint Ventures of Firm TS Group During the Adaptation Phase
(post-1997 crisis)
Year Partner Firm Partner Expertise
1997 Honda (automobile and Production of plastic switch for power windows and
motorcycle) tooling for plastics production process
1997’ DRB-Hicom Group To supply auto-parts to the Timor car (Indonesian
(Malaysia)
PT Amalmus Wibawa Agung 
(Indonesia)
PT Timor Industri Komponen 
(Indonesia)
national car)
2002 Press Kogyo (Japan) Design and production of automotive chassis
2003’ Jay Bharat Maruti Group 
(India)
To supply motorcycle parts within the Indian market
2003 Ion Bond (USA) Metal surface finishing (plating/dipping) processes
2004 Dra’xlmier (Germany) Production of wiring harness and automotive wiring 
to all European carmakers
2005 Mitsubishi Cable Industries Local product design and testing capabilities. Plan
(Japan)
Ryosei Electro-Circuit 
Systems (Japan)
to setup a locally based R&D center.
2005 IT One and Accenture Productivity improvement via software such as the
(Thailand) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
2005” Ashok Leyland (India) Currently discussing the possibility joint pick-up
Tata (India) truck production plant
This joint venture is located overseas. This possible joint venture is currently under discussion. 
Sources: Corporate internal document, Project and Marketing Department (2004),
ASID (2006), www.wesleynet.com and Firm TSLA website (accessed December, 2005)
Second was the German joint venture to produce electrical wiring harness and 
cable465. In 2004, Firm TS Group formed a joint venture with Dra’xlmier Company 
(Germany), aiming to supply the wiring harness to all the European carmakers (in 
Thailand) (Chamber of Commerce, 2004). Third was the Malaysian joint venture. Firm 
TS Group had decided that it lacked the expertise in logistics and wanted to sell off 49 per 
cent equity (of its subsidiary, Firm SLC) to a Malaysian Konsortium Logistics (Changsom, 
2004). According to the President of Firm TS Group, “... the move reflected the Group's 
policy to focus on core businesses while outsourcing non-core businesses by forming joint 
ventures with professionals [italics added] (Ibid.). Thus it could be said that Firm TS 
Group’s decision to outsource its logistics activity will incur two benefits: 1) more focus of 
the Group’s resources on core activities and 2) learning experience via knowledge transfer 
from Konsortium Logistics.
465 This venture also included the set up of a technical R&D center that would oversee the development and 
design of integrated wiring system. With such center, the Group does not need to send the product to Japan 
for testing.
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Besides these joint ventures, Firm TS Group also engaged in other foreign 
technical assistance and collaboration. For instance, in July 1998 the Group signed a 
technical assistance agreement with Sumino Kogyo (Japan)466 (See Table 7.7). This 
agreement enabled the Group to supply metal-stamping auto-parts to AutoAlliance, and 
also learned the progressive stamping technology. In December 2005, Ford (partner of 
AutoAlliance) announced that Firm TS Group will enter into a new “Aligned Business 
Framework” agreement467 (Ford Motor Company, 2005).
In sum, Firm TS Group has been highly active in nurturing both domestic and 
foreign linkages which led to many diverse learning activities. With the sufficient ability to 
manage such diversity, all these learning activities would contribute to higher rate of 
capability development.
Learning the Marketing Activities
Firm TS Group has been an indirect exporter because it supplied auto-parts to the 
carmakers, which in turn did the exporting (personal interview with Firm TS Group Vice 
President, October 19, 2004)468. Additionally, the Group did not engage in any direct 
export. About 93 per cent of all production volume were targeted at the domestic market 
and the remaining amount were directly exported (Anonymous, 2005d).
Even though the Group did not engage in much direct product export, it had a 
history on the export of technical know-how. It had exported the installation know-how to 
the two Malaysian subsidiaries (Firm OSI and Firm QSI) during the 1980s. Another recent 
agreement on the export of know-how was to Cambodia. The recipient firm is Firm NCX, 
and the transferred technologies was the production of motorcycle handle bar, wiring 
harness, and motorcycle frame (Anonymous, 2006b). In addition in 2005, Firm TSMM 
started to export automotive tooling to regional Asian countries (Firm TS Group corporate 
website, accessed June 15, 2006).
466 This firm has been a long-time affiliated supplier o f  Mazda Motor Corporation (Sumino Kogyo, 2000).
467 Firm TS Group was one among a list o f  handful strategic suppliers announced by Ford. Some other first- 
tier auto-part suppliers comprised: Johnson Controls, Dana, Delphi, Hella, Pirelli and Visteon. Furthermore 
Ford said that these first-tier strategic suppliers have “the capability to provide technological innovations and 
show a commitment to quality, costs and delivery performance”(Autoindustry UK, 2005).
468 Another corroboration on the Group’s low export activity: in 2002, Firm TS Group exported a negligible 
amount: out o f its 15 billion Baht annual sales, only 2 per cent were (direct) exports (Krungthep Turakij, 
2003).
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7.3.10 Summary of Different Firm Learning Activities and 
Mechanisms: Adaptation Phase
The pattern of learning activities and mechanisms of the nine case study firms is 
summarized in Table 7.10. Similar to the Expansion Phase, the pattern pointed to three 
groups of firm.
The first group invested in many activities (for e.g. Firm AH Group, Firm D 
Group, and Firm TS Group). In addition to the routine production activities, these firms 
invested in the extensive search activities and formed many new businesses as well as 
foreign joint ventures (some are overseas). For instance, Firm AH Group invested in an 
acquisition in China, and Firm D Group invested a production plant in Vietnam. Similarly, 
Firm TS Group invested in production plant in India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These firms 
engaged in more complex production activities, utilizing modem production technology 
such as CAJD/CAM and CAE. Moreover, they were also committed to be extensively 
involved in the continuous improvement programs and more systematic human resources 
development.
For Firm AH Group, Firm D Group and Firm TS Group, their products were 
becoming more complex, advancing from ordinary OEM auto-parts to own design 
manufacturing (Firm AH Group and Firm D Group) and even own brand manufacturing 
(OBM) (Firm TS Group’s golf cart). In terms of linkage activities, these firms further 
solidified their relationships with the foreign firms. The extensive foreign linkages enabled 
the firms to:
• access many new sources of knowledge, enabling them to develop their capabilities
• access overseas market
For these firms, one of the key factors leading to successfully capability development was 
the emphasis on human resources. All these firms (for e.g. Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, 
and Firm TS Group) emphasize extensive in-house and overseas training of their engineers 
and technicians. In terms of marketing activities, these firms have been indirect exporters 
(i.e. they produced auto-parts for carmakers to export). In addition, Firm AH Group was 
considered to be a direct exporter, since it has been exporting automotive jigs and dies to 
many carmakers around the globe. As of 2006, Firm TS Group also planed to export its 
Thai-made electric golf carts.
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The second group of firms were more moderate in their investment activities (for 
e.g. Firm L and Firm S Group). They invested in search activities to link with foreign firms 
but these were limited and somewhat hampered by the impact of the financial crisis (for 
e.g. Firm S Group). Their production process and product technology were not as 
sophisticated as the first group of firms, and involved limited or simpler design activities469. 
For instance, Firm S Group completed the transition from REM to OEM auto-parts. It had 
recently engaged in preliminary design activities by setting up an Engineering Design unit, 
but is still in its infancy stage. Firm S Group development was hampered by the severe 
impact of the 1997 crisis. For Firm L, it has been producing alloy wheels for the REM 
markets, and recently the firm started to co-design the alloy wheels with their customers. 
However, the wheel design was much simpler when compared to that of more complex 
auto-parts such as a parking hand brake or an electric vehicle. In addition, these firms 
formed fewer foreign linkages when compared with the first group. Other factors retarding 
this group learning activities were the unsystematic development of human resources. In 
terms of marketing activities, Firm S Group has been focusing mainly on the domestic 
market, while Firm L had shifted it focus to export. Export increased dramatically for Firm 
L after the 1997 crisis, because it was viewed as the only survival route. On the other hand, 
Firm S Group’s export did not increase much because it could not meet the product quality 
and testing requirements, due to lack of local product testing facilities.
The third group of firms was the worst performers (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm 
SOM, and Firm TKT). They did not engage in any plans to invest in the complex set of 
learning activities. At best, some of these firms invested in modem production equipment 
to increase the production capacity, and there were insufficient learning activities to fully 
utilize such investment (for e.g. Firm CPC and Firm SOM). These firms produced only 
simple products. For instance, Firm CPC and Firm TKT produced simple auto-parts. 
Similarly, Firm CSP continued to produce simple aluminium die casting parts, and was 
reluctant to commit in the co-design activity with the carmaker. Among the four firms in 
this group, Firm SOM was still the worst performer. It suffered severely from financial 
mismanagement and other operational problems. Overall, these firms did not engage in any 
product design activities.
4b9 The words “limited”, “simple”, “moderate”, and “complex” were used to denote the relative differences in 
the learning activities between the firms in the first and the second group. These words should not be 
interpreted using their absolute meanings.
295
In addition, the firms did not engage in any long-term linkage activities. There 
were neither foreign joint ventures nor extensive technical assistance agreements, 
consequently these firms access to knowledge sources were very limited. For Firm TKT, 
its foreign joint venture failed to continue after the 1997 crisis. However, the situation 
today is changing. Both Firm CSP and Firm TKT are searching for potential foreign 
technical collaboration. In terms of marketing activities, all firms focused on the domestic 
market, and there were limited exports470.
In addition, all firms continued using the passive learning-by-doing mechanisms 
(see Table 7.8). Only some firms implemented the more active “learning by searching” for 
foreign partners as well as extensively learning the foreign technology (for example, Firm 
AH Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group). These firms extensively leveraged on the 
linkages with foreign firms and learned new production and product technology. In short, 
they implemented “link and learn” mechanisms. Some firms attempted to link with the 
foreign firms and learn, but their linkages did not last and the learning activities were 
prematurely truncated. For instance, Firm S Group’s joint ventures suffered severely 
during the 1997 crisis, and their learning activities were paused. Similarly, Firm L foreign 
joint venture was dissolved, and since then, the owner had negative perception about other 
Japanese joint ventures. Other firms accumulated their capabilities by relying mostly on 
just learning by doing per se (for example, Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and Firm 
TKT). Even though some of these firms hired and trained engineers, their knowledge 
sources were very limited due to limited linkages. Their “link and learn” mechanisms were 
largely absent.
7.4 Summary of Different Patterns of Firm Learning 
Activities and Mechanisms
Having presented firm learning activities and mechanisms for each common phase, 
it is useful to combine the key characteristics across all phases, for each firm. The 
objective is to derive a dynamic, learning activities (and mechanisms) pattern(s) across the 
firms. From Table 7.11, there are three groups of pattern of firm learning activities and 
mechanisms.
470 This does not mean that these firms do not want to export. It simply means that the firms are not ready for 
export (for e.g. Firm CSP and Firm TKT, who states that in the future they plan to export to Asian countries).
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First are the patterns of the “strong learner” firms (Firm AH Group, Firm D 
Group, and Firm TS Group). They shared several common characteristics. Each firm had 
successfully migrated from simple learning activities (for e.g. basic investment and routine 
production activities) to engage in more complex activities (for e.g. own product/brand 
design and advanced production processes). Their learning mechanisms also shifted from 
passive (i.e. learning-by-doing) to ones that are more active (for e.g. learning-by-searching, 
by-hiring, and by-training). It is important to note that once these firms migrated to more 
active learning mechanisms, they did not stop the passive learning-by-doing activities.
They conducted both types of mechanisms, and moreover, the passive and active learning 
mechanisms complemented each other. In other words, these progressive-learning firms 
ensured that their combinations of various learning mechanisms were synergistic (thus 
achieving “synergistic combination”) (see Table 7.11). These firms performed extensive 
“search, link, and learn” activities with foreign partners in order to sufficiently gain access 
and acquire the targeted know-how. They also coupled the complex learning activities with 
sufficient (and timely) strategic human resources development, enhancing the learning 
ability of their engineers.
On the contrary, the “weak learner” firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and 
Firm TKT) did not complete the transition from simple learning activities to the more 
complex ones (see Table 7.11). In other words, each firm failed to migrate from the basic 
investment and routine production and linkage activities to engage in the more complex 
ones (for e.g. own product/brand design and advanced production processes). Their 
learning mechanisms remained at the passive level (i.e. learning-by-doing per se), largely 
neglecting the more active mechanisms (for e.g. learning-by-searching, by-hiring, and by­
training and by linking with foreign firms). It appeared that these firms (due to their poor 
planning or lack of commitment) did not want to engage in more complex learning 
activities, and thus there were no need to execute the more active mechanisms for learning. 
In other words, these sluggish-learning firms failed to strategically plan for future 
competition, and thus did not engage in more complex learning activities to build 
capabilities. These firms did not sufficiently perform the “search, link, and learn” activities 
with foreign partners; this was not part of their strategic goals. They also did not put much 
emphasis on the strategic human resources development (or if they did, it was planned 
rather inadequately). This led to the limited learning ability of their engineers and 
technicians.
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The third group of firms is the “average learner” firms (Firm L and Firm S 
Group). These firms located in between the strong and the weak. They partially completed 
the transition from simple learning activities to the more complex ones (see Table 7.11). In 
other words, each firm failed to fully engage in the complex learning activities (i.e. limited 
ability to design product and to operate advanced production processes). Their learning 
mechanisms remained at the moderate level (i.e. learning-by-doing plus few other active 
mechanisms). Similar to “weak learner” firms, these firms largely neglected the more 
active learning mechanisms (for e.g. learning-by-searching for foreign partners and 
sustaining that linkage). It appeared that these firms did not want to fully engage in more 
complex learning activities, and thus there were no need to synergistically combine the 
active learning mechanisms with the more passive ones. In other words, these moderate­
learning firms failed to strategically plan for future growth, and perceived little value of 
synergy between learning mechanisms to build capabilities (see Table 7.11). These firms 
did not sufficiently perform the “search, link, and learn” activities with foreign partners. 
Initially, they searched for and linked with foreign partners, later when such activity faced 
obstacles these firms abandoned their effort and did not sufficiently learn from their foreign 
partners (i.e. the learning was truncated). They placed some emphasis on the strategic 
human resources development, but their training programs were either unsystematic or 
lacking continuity. This inadequate human resources training led to the insufficient 
learning ability of their engineers.
299
Chapter 8 -  Inter-firm Differences in Strategies, Learning 
and Capability Development
In this chapter, the findings discussed in Chapters 5 to 7 are drawn together and 
assessed from the perspectives of the conceptual and analytical frameworks provided in 
Chapter 3 and 4 (see Tables 3.1 to 3.4 and Figures 3.1 to 3.3). Particular emphasis is 
placed on the inter-firm differences in strategies, learning activities, and capability 
development. The analysis also addresses the three research questions (see Section 1.2).
8.1 Intra-Industry Differences in Firm Strategic Paths
Through four and a half decades, the Thai automotive industry has undergone a 
sequence of changes in policies, incentives, market growth rates and it has experienced 
external shocks (see Chapter 5). Throughout this period, different firms perceived this 
sequence of changes differently. Some firms viewed the changes as business opportunities 
(i.e. challenge to be overcome); whereas, other firms viewed these changes as threats and 
did not attempt to embrace them. Consequently, different firms formulated different 
competitive and learning strategies depending in part on their perceptions of the external 
changes (see Tables 6.2 to 6.5).
8.1.1 Firm Competitive Strategy
8.1.1.1 Competitive Goals
As the automotive industry evolved, the evidence in Chapters 6 and 7 suggests that 
the case study firms had different perceptions of external opportunities and challenges. The 
“strong learners’''471 (Firm AH Group, Firm D Group and Firm TS Group) tended to view 
many challenges as business opportunities (i.e. challenging competitive goals). Through 
external networking with foreign firms and their personal connections (see Tables 7.2, 7.6 
to 7.8) on numerous foreign technical assistance and joint ventures), these firms assessed 
such challenging opportunities with greater confidence that they could manage the risks. 
These firms were able to determine the feasibility of realizing their competitive strategy, 
since it would be futile to aim for an ambitious but unachievable competitive goal.
471 It is important to note that the labels “strong learner”, “average learner”, and “weak learner” are defined 
relative to each other. These labels serve the purpose o f simplifying the cross-firm comparative analysis.
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Once the assessment and feasibility were conducted, these firms pursued their ambitious 
goals by aggressively expanding their businesses through investment in overseas markets, 
manufacturing more complex products that were demanded by the carmakers, and planned 
the development of capabilities to stay abreast of their competitors (see Figure 8.1).
In contrast, the “weak learners” firms (Firm CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and Firm 
TKT) were extremely slow to perceive the implications of changes within the external 
environment and even slower to see these as opportunities. They tended to view these 
changes as problems that they should avoid. As a result, these firms tended to stay with the 
unambitious competitive goals (Figure 8.1). These firms tended to be passive in their 
business outlook and invested little to expand their business operations. They were 
satisfied with the existing business operations and the domestic market share. Without 
ambitious goals, there were no systematic assessment or feasibility studies for investment 
in new ventures or learning programs. Most of their competitive strategies focused on 
current firm operations, emphasizing the increase of domestic market share.
The “average learners” (Firm S Group and Firm L) had ambitious competitive 
goals, but the development of strategies to achieve those goals lacked rigor and focus (see 
Figure 8.1, middle oval). Their competitive goals were not achieved in a timely manner, 
causing them to lose out on some business opportunities. For instance, Firm L aimed to 
become an OEM supplier. But due to its failed investment in building a relationship with a 
Japanese auto-part supplier as well as the slow implementation of human resource training 
programs, it did not succeed with the OEM joint venture business (see Section 7.1.5).
Since establishment, Firm L’s ability to manage a transition from REM auto-parts to an 
OEM auto-part producer was not developed (this situation is resembled by the two dotted 
arrows coming out of the “average learner” oval in Figure 8.1). Should the firm able to 
remedy such situation it might be able to successfully achieve the competitive goal, it 
would take on the upper path, the upper dotted arrow in Figure 8.1. On the other hand, if 
Firm L failed to successfully realize its goal (i.e. unsuccessful competitive strategy), then it 
is likely that the firm will move onto the lower dotted arrow in Figure 8.1.
8.1.1.2 Competitive Positions
With respect to the product-market position (see Table 3.1 for a definition), the 
“strong learner” firms (i.e. Firm AH Group, Firm D Group and Firm TS Group) quickly 
re-positioned themselves from distributing (or producing) low-value added REM auto-parts
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to full-scale manufacturer of OEM auto-parts, and finally, to start engaging in product 
design with the carmakers. From the start, these firms have collaborated with the vehicle 
makers to start to become actively involved in the production organization process (see 
Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.4, and 6.1.9 during start-up phase, Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.4, and 6.2.9 during 
the expansion phase). Product design capability is one of the crucial requirements if indeed 
these firms decided that they wanted to position themselves as first-tier auto-part suppliers. 
For instance, Firm AH Group actively involved itself with the Mercedes Benz design 
engineers to come up with successful designs of automotive assembly jigs. As a result, the 
firm became an international jig supplier for Mercedes Benz. Similarly, Firm D Group 
engaged actively in hand brake design. Likewise, Firm TS Group set up a representative 
office in Japan (see Section 7.3.9 for details) to ensure that any urgent product design issues 
and problems are addressed in a timely manner.
In contrast, the “weak learner” firms had conservative competitive goals, which 
precluded the possibility of engaging in intensive collaboration with the carmakers, thus 
foregoing the opportunity to learn to design new products. The longer they postpone such 
collaboration, the more their product-market position will deteriorate, because the higher 
the likelihood that they could not meet the carmakers’ new product design requirements.
The “average learner” firms tended to position their products in either the REM market 
(for e.g. Firm L) or low-value added OEM parts (for e.g. Firm S Group). They were unsure 
of the route to strengthening their competitive positions; hence they were slow to engage in 
an ambitious competitive strategy.
With respect to the capability-market position (see Table 3.1 for a definition), the 
“strong learner” firms tended to focus resources on product design capability.
Importantly, external linkages enabled these firms to gauge their existing design 
capabilities against the upcoming requirements posed by the carmakers. Product design 
capability became important because as the Asian automotive industry moved toward 
higher levels of liberalization, most foreign carmakers engaged in setting up regional 
production networks want to have their auto-part suppliers able to follow them both in auto­
part design activity and in sourcing locations. Hence, the crucial capability for the first-tier 
suppliers is to send in their “guest engineer” (i.e. Thai engineer usually had to travel 
overseas) and participate with the carmakers on designing new products. This was indeed 
what Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group were engaging in (at the time of 
this writing).
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In contrast, the “weak learner” firms engaged in neither producing more complex 
products nor did they collaborate to build the necessary capabilities to “stay ahead” of the 
competition. They merely exploited the existing capabilities just to survive the current 
competition. Additionally, some of these firms (for e.g. Firm SOM and Firm CPC) were 
still struggling with meeting the basic manufacturing capability requirements of quality and 
price. The “average learner” firms (i.e. Firm S Group, Firm L) were neither focused nor 
coherent and their learning activities did not strengthen their capability-market positions 
when compared to those of the “strong learner” firms.
8.1.2 Firm Learning Strategy
8.1.2.1 Learning Goals and Capability Gaps
For “strong learner” firms, their learning goals, similar to the competitive goals, 
were also ambitious. In other words, their specified target knowledge and skills acquisition 
goals were at a higher level, and it usually required the firm to stretch their existing 
capabilities. For instance, after having been in operation for about a decade, Firm AH 
Group wanted to acquire the knowledge to build assembly jig and to be able to supply these 
for the European carmakers (for e.g. Volvo and Mercedes Benz, see Section 6.3.1 and 
7.3.1). Often times, the foreign design engineers visited the Group to discuss, exchange 
design knowledge, and solve problems on the prototype jigs. In this way, Firm AH Group 
attempted to close their product design capability gap. Similarly, Firm TS Group also had 
ambitious learning goals. The Group wanted to acquire the knowledge to successfully 
build its own indigenous golf cart (see Sections 7.3.9 for details). Likewise, Firm D Group 
collaborated extensively with the Japanese carmakers to acquire the knowledge to fully 
design the hand brake (see Section 6.2.4 for details).
In contrast, the “weak learner” firms did not have ambitious learning goals. There 
were no specific targets pertaining to what knowledge acquisition activities were needed to 
fill capability gaps. As a result, the knowledge acquisition activities were at best ad hoc, 
and some of these capability gaps remained unfilled. For instance, both Firm SOM and 
Firm CPC had always been a customer of Thailand Automotive Institute, receiving much 
technical assistance from the Japanese experts. Despite extensive assistance, the firms still 
dwelled on the same continuous improvement activities (for e.g. same defect problem on 
similar auto-parts) and did not move on to more challenging tasks (see Section 7.3.2 and
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7.3.7). This was because these firms lacked an explicit target for knowledge acquisition. 
Their perception of the competitive environment also focused mostly on short-term profit 
gain, rather than on long-term sustainability.
The “average learner” firms occasionally had ambitious learning goals, but they 
were slow to realize the importance of commitment to such learning strategy. For instance, 
during the start-up phase Firm L started out an ambitious learning goal. It wanted to learn 
the production process of an OEM alloy wheel, but after learning for 4 years with a foreign 
partner it had decided to become independent and moved into the REM auto-part business 
(Section 6.1.5). Additionally Firm L did not aim to train its human resources pool early 
enough to keep up with the new technological equipment.
In sum, the “strong learner” firms first set ambitious learning goals, and then this 
was followed by the identification of the existing capability gaps that must be filled. This 
in turn led to the acquisition of requisite knowledge, skills, and resources to fill the gaps. 
Firm AH Group, Firm D Group, and Firm TS Group served as examples of firms who 
realized the importance of advanced learning and moved quickly from conservative 
strategy (i.e. OEM subcontractor learning strategy) to an ambitious strategy (for e.g. own 
design and own brand learning strategy) (see Figure 8.2). Their learning approach could be 
characterized as ambitious, realistic, goal-oriented and committed. The “weak learner” 
firms set conservative goals and did not have explicit plan for knowledge acquisition.
Often times, they focused on mainly enhancing the basic production capability, at the cost 
of foregoing the development of innovative capabilities. Finally, the “average learner” 
firms were somewhere between the characteristics of the strong and the weak learners.
8.1.2.2 Learning Positions: Balancing the Tensions
There are two tensions that needed to be managed. First was the tension between 
exploitation and exploration. By engaging in designing world-class jigs (for e.g. Firm AH 
Group), designing OEM hand brake for carmakers (for e.g. Firm D Group), and its own 
golf cart (for e.g. Firm TS Group), these firms were exploring ways to compete for the 
future. They attempted to balance the tension between learning to exploit today’s 
capabilities and learning to explore future possibilities. On the other hand, the “weak 
learner” and “average learner” firms did not engage in sufficient exploration learning 
strategy.
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Their rather conservative strategy or slow-pace aggressive learning strategy did not 
encourage such exploration. These firms tended to remain in learning to exploit today’s 
capabilities, and they were largely ill-prepared to compete for the future.
Second was the tension between internal capability and external sources of 
knowledge. Having taken such ambitious learning aims, the “strong learner” firms also 
sought external sources of knowledge as well as technical assistance. They attempted to 
achieve synergy and integration between internal capabilities and the new external sources 
of knowledge. These “strong learners” accomplished this over a long period of time, as it 
was evident that they took the initiatives to link with foreign firms (usually since start-up 
period) (see Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.4, and 6.1.9). It is important to note that the development of 
collaborative mechanisms with foreign firms required investment (sometime over long 
periods) in relationship-building (i.e. trust-building) to then enable learning (Firm D Group 
and Firm TS Group served as clear exemplars).
The “weak learner” firm, on the other hand, did not seek much external knowledge. 
This was because they neither aimed at becoming a world-class auto-part supplier nor 
engaged in design auto-part for carmakers. Their conservative learning goals required the 
use of their internal capabilities with sporadic access to external knowledge and capabilities. 
It is also the case that these weak learners had (or would have had) difficulty building 
collaborative relationship with foreign auto-part suppliers and/or carmakers.
Likewise, for “average learner” firms, they sometimes required extensive external 
assistance (usually during plant start-up or installation of major plant equipment), but after 
such events, these firms did not tap into external sources of knowledge. Consequently, the 
degree of synergy and integration between internal capabilities and external sources of 
knowledge was more sporadic when compared with those of the “strong learner” firms.
8.2 Cross-firm Differences in Processes: Learning 
Activities and Mechanisms
8.2.1 Firm Learning Activities
“Strong learner” firms started their foreign partner linkage activity very early on, 
usually in the start-up phase. For instance, Firm AH Group had personal connection with 
the Regional Director of Ford (see Section 7.1.1). Similarly, Firm D Group linked up with 
their long-time Japanese supplier. This occurred at the time when Firm D Group was only
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a mere after-market auto-part trader, this relationship later formalized into a Japanese-Thai 
joint venture producing OEM automotive brake parts (see Chapter 7, start-up phase -  
“learning the investment activities”). Likewise, Firm TS Group started as part of a joint 
venture with the Japanese motorcycle maker firm.
As the demands of customers changed, these firms were also committed and 
responded to invest in modem production technology. For instance, Firm AH Group set up 
a tooling design unit equipped with computer-aided design capability. Similarly, Firm D 
Group set up a subsidiary, Firm D-tec, whose responsibility was to enhance the Group 
parking hand brake design capability. In pursuing the goal of achieving product design 
capability, Firm TS Group established an R&D Unit capable to indigenous design and 
manufacture the golf cart (see Figure 8.3). Hence, these external and internal 
organizational developments played a major role in developing the capability to learn.
While “weak learner” firms developed investment and routine production 
activities, their ability to link up with foreign technological partners (i.e. sources of 
knowledge) was very limited. For instance, Firm SOM had no linkage with foreign firms at 
all. The firm’s only linkages were with its main customer (see Sections 7.1.7, 7.2.7, and 
7.3.7). Similarly, Firm CPC had limited linkages with foreign firms. Its main learning 
activities focused on production capability improvement, which was occasionally supported 
by foreign technical consultants. The linkage was by no means a committed relationship 
over an extended periods and lacked continuity. Consequently, there were no effective 
relationship-building activities for the weak learners. The “weak learner” firms also had 
limited investment in ambitious learning activities. For example, Firm SOM, Firm CSP, 
and Firm CPC did not aim at learning to design auto-parts, but passively used the pre­
specified drawings provided by the vehicle manufacturers. These firms were not interested 
in investment in activities, which would lead to higher auto-part design capability472.
The “average learner” firms were located in between the weak and the strong. 
Similar to the “strong learners”, these firms were interested in investing in activities to 
learn to produce better quality auto-parts. But their learning activities tended to lack 
commitment and were mostly incomplete.
A 1 ~ For the time being, they were not also interested in moving up the production value chain.
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For instance, Firm L invested heavily in upgrading its production technology and bought 
state-of-the-art machinery; but it neglected the human resource development and training.
In this way, the ability of its personnel to fully capitalize on the equipment capability was 
not realized (see Section 7.3.5 for details)
8.2.2 Firm Learning Mechanisms
For both the “strong learner” and “average learner” firms, their learning 
mechanisms had transitioned from passive, semi-automatic learning by doing to a 
combination of passive leaming-by-doing and more active learning mechanisms. In 
particular, the “strong learner” firms began to continuously experiment with new ideas as a 
way of learning. For instance, Firm TS Group experimented with electric golf cart 
construction (for the first time), to pull together its varied expertise, its auto-part supplier 
group, and technical collaboration with Thailand Automotive Institute (TAI). In this 
project, a multitude of learning mechanisms was involved, ranging from learning-by-doing, 
by searching for the most suitable electric motor vendor, by continuously collaborating 
with TAI (and lower-tier suppliers) and by hiring permanent Japanese employees.
Similarly, Firm D Group, during its start-up phase, engaged extensively in learning-by- 
visiting Japanese factories as well as learning-by-doing production activities. The firm 
combined in a synergistic way the passive and active learning mechanisms. In addition, the 
firm also attempted to continuously maintain such synergy throughout its learning 
activities, i.e. these learning mechanisms were maintained throughout the start-up, 
expansion, and adaptation phase (see Figure 8.4).
Although engaging in both passive and active learning mechanisms, the “average 
learner” firms did not achieve a balance and synergy between two types of learning 
mechanisms. At times, these firms would learn by investing in more conscious activity 
such as searching for foreign technical expert, hiring more capable engineers, and training 
its employees. However, these were conducted at best sporadically and not continuously. 
For instance, Firm L had hired foreign technical experts for several weeks to teach the 
employees about die casting technique. Then it moved on to rely on the training from 
Thailand Automotive Institute on the same subject matter. These were not done 
systematically. As these approaches lacked synergy, the firm did not achieve the overall 
learning objective.
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Unlike the other groups, the “weak learner” firms largely neglected the use of more 
active learning mechanisms. For instance, Firm TKT, Firm CSP, Firm CPC and Firm SOM 
relied on the passive learning-by-doing and did not pursue active learning by searching or 
hiring more capable engineers (see Sections 7.3.2, 7.3.3, 7.3.7, and 7.3.8). The firms 
conservatively relied on the traditional internal learning by trial and error, and when 
problems arise they would occasionally ask some external experts for assistance. Most of 
the assistance was focused on improving the general basic production capability, and not on 
product design capability.
8.2.3 Impact of Firm Strategies on Learning Activities and 
Mechanisms
From the evidence provided in Chapters 5 to 7, and the analysis conducted above, it 
appears that “strong learner” firms who had more ambitious competitive and learning 
strategies were more adept at focusing on the strategic learning activities. Additionally, 
these firms were also able to effectively implement both the passive and active learning 
mechanisms. On the contrary, the “weak learner” and “average learner” firms, who did 
not have the ambitious competitive and learning strategies, were not able to systematically 
manage their choice of learning activities and mechanisms. In addition, these firms choice 
of learning activities tended to focus on basic production capacity and general productivity 
improvement.
The characteristics of firm strategies had a significant impact on the way firms 
conducted their learning activities and choice of learning mechanisms.
8.3 Cross-firm Differences in Capability Development and 
Alignment
8.3.1 Rates and Types of Capability Development
Even though all firms started out with a basic level of capability during the start-up 
phase, through time firms implemented different strategies and learning activities and 
mechanisms, and achieved different rates and types of capability development. For “strong 
learner” firms, it took them on average about 20 to 29 years to move from the basic level 
of capability to advanced capabilities in almost all technical functions (see Figure 8.5).
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For instance, Firm AH Group took 20 years (i.e. 1985-2005) to progress from basic 
production capability to an advanced level of capability in all areas. Since its start-up the 
Group ambitiously aimed at becoming an OEM auto-part supplier, and hence, it engaged in 
the necessary investment in learning activities. Examples included search and linkage 
activities executed to obtain updated information on technical changes and to assess 
different routes to becoming an OEM part supplier. This was the inception of the Group’s 
linkage capability which led to information for acquiring the automotive tooling 
manufacturing firm (see Section 7.1.1). During the expansion phase, Firm AH Group 
engaged in investment expansion, both in the modem equipment and hiring (and poaching) 
of capable human resources. This was when the firm developed its investment capability. 
Later, during the beginning of adaptation phase, the firm also set up a formal tooling design 
unit and engaged in extensive, systematic productivity improvement programs. This was at 
the time when the Group enhanced its production process and product design 
capabilities.
Similarly, both Firm D Group and Firm TS Group achieved similar progress within 
29 years (i.e. 1976-2005 for both firms). For example, Firm D Group started with an 
ambitious goal of supplying OEM auto-parts, and its opportunity came during the early 
localization policy period. Not only did the Japanese firm decide to invest in Thailand, it 
also wanted to form a joint venture with a Thai firm that it could trust. Firm D Group was 
such a firm. Firm D had been in close ties (both personal and business ties) with a Japanese 
automotive brake supplier. This was the starting point of the Group accumulating the 
linkage capability, followed by the investment capability. From that time onwards, Firm 
D Group engaged in extensive technological licensing as well as forming over 10 foreign 
joint ventures (see Table 7.2). These relationships with many Japanese firms led to the 
accumulation of production process and product capabilities. The capability culminated 
in Firm D Group’s ability to achieve a turnkey design and manufacturing of automotive 
hand brakes by mid-1990s (see Section 7.2.4).
For the “strong learner” firms, all of firm-level strategies, the learning activities, and
learning mechanisms functioned as a “learning system” -  in that the various specific
activities and mechanisms were developed within a coherent strategic framework and were
interdependent. This contributed to the firm’s success in progressing from the basic
production capability to the intermediate, and then, the innovative level of capabilities. It is
also worth noting that most of the “strong learner” firms did not develop an advanced level
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of marketing capability473. This was because most of these firms were OEM auto-part 
suppliers, and they did not have to conduct extensive, systematic market research. These 
firms worked as OEM subcontractors responding the production orders as dictated by the 
carmakers.
The “weak learner” firms required a longer time to achieve only the intermediate 
levels of capability. For instance, Firm CPC and Firm TKT spent over 40 and 33 years, 
respectively, to achieve only the intermediate level of investment and linkage capability. 
These firms’ production and product capabilities still remained at the basic level, since they 
did not have the ambitious strategies to collaborate with the vehicle makers to engage in 
product co-design activities. Additionally, their linkage capability only recently moved 
into the intermediate level due to their recent effort to search for a technological 
collaboration partner (for e.g. Firm TKT and Firm CSP, see Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.8).
Among the “weak learner” firms, Firm CSP was a young firm, and it was too early 
to assess whether it will develop higher levels of capability in the future. However, what 
could be said (at the time of this writing) is that this firm did not have sufficient 
commitment to engage in product design activity with the carmaker474; hence, it is highly 
likely that the firm will not achieve the intermediate level of production process and 
product capabilities in the near future. Among all the “weak learner” firms (i.e. Firm 
CPC, Firm CSP, Firm SOM, and Firm TKT), Firm SOM was the worst performer, in terms 
of strategies, learning activities, and rates of capability development. Additionally, Firm 
SOM suffered from a multitude of managerial as well as operational problems (see Sections 
7.1.7, 7.2.7, and 7.3.7). Within 10 years, the firm barely reached the intermediate level in 
investment capability, and its linkage capability remained at a basic level.
It is important to note that, because these “weak learner” firms did not initially 
commit themselves to form linkage with foreign firms and to formulate ambitious 
competitive and learning strategies during its start-up phase, their learning activities lacked 
direction, rigor, and focus. Consequently, when compared to the “strong learner” firms, 
these firms’ capability development did not progress rapidly.
473 Another reason why these firms did not develop advanced marketing capability was pointed out by 
Schmitz and Knorringa (2000: 190-191), who stated that due to the fear (of the multinational firms) that once 
the local firms acquired the marketing capability, they are capable to directly competing head-on. 
Consequently, most multinational firms were willing to assist the local firms only with the production 
capabilities, not the marketing capability.
474 From personal interview Firm CSP General Manager on December 15, 2004. For more details, please 
refer to Section 6.3.3
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For “average learner” firms, the time required to achieve the intermediate level of 
capability ranged from 19 to 45 years (see Figure 8.5). Firm L, who took 19 years to 
achieve the intermediate level of capability in all technical functions (except linkage 
capability), was heavily involved with equipping itself with state-of-the-art production 
equipment and machinery. It did not however improve the other aspects of the firm; for 
instance, it did not bother to search for and implement foreign technological linkages that 
would enable it to sell the products to the Japanese carmakers.
Similarly, after about 45 years of development, Firm S Group also excelled in all 
technical areas, except linkage and marketing activities. Its linkage capability was not as 
stable and continuous as that of the “strong learner” firms (the links with foreign partner 
firms were abruptly truncated during the 1997 financial crisis). This was in contrast to the 
“strong learner” firms who were able to maintain their linkages, though through much 
negotiation and financial assistance from the carmakers (for e.g. Firm TS Group) as well as 
negotiation with the local financial institutions (for e.g. Firm AH Group). As a result of its 
poor linkage activities, Firm S Group suffered severely during the post-1997 crisis years, 
and most of its process and product learning activities were paused for quite some time (see 
Section 6.3.6).
Hence, “strong learners” were able to develop an advanced level of capability in 
almost all areas more quickly than the other groups of firms.
8.3.2 Dynamic Multiple Alignment and Firm Learning System
The above analysis suggests that firm learning processes are both manageable and 
systemic. The evidence suggests that for firms to develop a fast rate of capability 
development, all “learning system” elements must continually be aligned (firm’s 
competitive strategy, learning strategy, learning activities, and learning mechanisms) (see 
Figure 8.6).
On the basis of this analysis, the “learning system” elements that need to be 
managed and aligned and the characteristics that contribute to building a faster rate of 
capability development are:
• Competitive strategy -  ambitious goal aimed at building set of capabilities to
prepare the firm to progress into future competitive positions
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• Learning strategy -  ambitious goal aimed at learning to both exploit existing 
capabilities and to explore the future capability building, and at the same time, 
achieving balance and integration between the internal and external sources of 
knowledge
• Learning activities -  high-level of continuous commitment to implement the 
strategic learning activities as directed by the firm learning strategy
• Learning mechanisms -  achieving balance and synergy between the passive and 
active types of learning mechanisms
To be able to quickly develop capability, firms must ensure that these four elements 
aligned all the time at the upper level (see Figure 8.6). However, this is not to be 
misconstrued that if all the above properties were achieved, then firms will automatically 
achieve capability development. The internal dynamics within the firm and the ever- 
changing external environment also have significant impacts, and firms must continually be 
on the lookout for any mis-alignment that may occur. Firms should always properly re­
align the “out of aligned” element(s) to ensure that its “learning system” will function 
properly. This requires much conscious monitoring effort. Additionally, firms must also 
learn to manage its “learning system” so that it could acquire the “capacity to learn”.
“Weak learners” had a form of alignment but at the lower level (see Figure 8.6). At 
this level, firm competitive and learning strategies lacked ambitious goals, and at the same 
time, these firms’ learning activities did not involve the strategic or synergistic combination 
of learning mechanisms. These firms’ “learning system” performed at a lower level, until a 
trigger (e.g. aspiration to formulate ambitious goals) is used to transition the system into a 
temporary mis-alignment, and then once the system elements are re-adjusted the firm 
would eventually move into the upper level alignment. Absent such a trigger (for e.g. 
ambitious goals), these firms will most likely continue to develop a slower rate of 
capability accumulation and remain vulnerable to changes in the competitive environment.
A mis-alignment occurs when at least one of the system elements is “out of 
alignment” with the others (see Figure 8.6). For example, a firm is in mis-alignment when 
it has an ambitious competitive strategy with an inadequate support from the learning 
strategy, or when it has an ambitious learning and competitive strategy, but does not 
implement the required learning activities. Mis-alignment can also occur when a firm’s 
learning activities are carried out with poor choice of learning mechanisms. For instance,
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Firm L, which aimed to become an OEM supplier (i.e. competitive strategy), did not 
manage the linkage activities and human resource investment activities well enough to 
enable it to achieve that goal. As a result, the firm competitive and its learning strategy and 
learning activities were mis-aligned.
Similarly, a mis-alignment can also occur when firms do not have any ambitious 
strategy, but attempt to engage in complex learning activities which require proper 
management of the combination of learning mechanisms (see Figure 8.6). For instance, 
Firm CSP, who neither aimed to become a world-class auto-part producer nor to be 
involved in co-designing auto-parts, started to engage in complex learning activities such as 
advanced inventory management and cost-reduction design techniques. But without the 
proper guidance from the competitive and learning strategies, it would be rather difficult for 
such firm to coordinate and synergistically combine the learning activities and mechanisms. 
Such mis-alignments would certainly slow down the firm rate of capability development.
8.4 Summary
Several points arise from this analysis.
1. Following the key assumptions from both the SRBL (Penrose (1959; 1995), Rumelt 
(1984; 1991), Hamel and Prahalad (1989), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Nelson (1991), 
Stalk (1992), Hamel and Prahalad (1993), Teece and Pisano (1994)) and the LFL 
(Mukdapitak, 1994) that firms are heterogeneous with respect to their strategies, this 
research extended this view further by emphasizing that the latecomer firms’ are 
different with respect to their competitive and learning strategies. These two 
strategies depended crucially on how each firm perceived the external changes in the 
meso environment. In particular, the sequence of meso-level changes offered each firm 
with a unique perspective on business opportunities as well as challenges.
Firms which perceived such changes as opportunities (i.e. the “strong learners”) 
will respond with ambitious competitive and learning strategies (i.e. strong “strategic 
intent” (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989) and “strategy as stretch” as well as “leverage” 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1993)). These firms often aimed at significantly upgrading their 
competitive as well as current capability positions, in order to successfully seize the 
emerging, future business opportunities. In contrast, firms who did not embrace such 
changes (i.e. “weak learner” firms who lacked the “strategic intent”) or embrace such
challenges but did not follow-through with well-coordinated learning activities (i.e.
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“average learner” firms who had “strategic intent” but lacked the management of 
learning activities) were more likely to view the external changes more as threats. As a 
result, their learning activities remained conservative, lacked commitment, and 
unfocused with very low emphasis on new knowledge acquisition.
2. The analysis indicated that the relationship between firm strategies and the learning 
activities and choice of learning mechanisms was significant. This findings went 
beyond the learning concepts expressed in the LFL (for example, Bell et al. (1982), 
Scott-Kemmis and Bell (1988), Hobday (1991; 1995b), Kim (1997a; 1998; 1997b), and 
Tran (1999; 2002)) and in the SRBL (Winter (2000), Zack (1999) and Zollo and Winter 
(2002)). In particular, not only did the evidence confirm that learning is not an 
automatic process, but the evidence also suggests that the relationship between firm 
competitive and learning strategies and firm learning activities and mechanisms was 
similar to the “extended learning process” concept (Rush et al., 2004: 328) and 
“integrated learning” (Bessant et al., 1996). This extended view of firm learning did 
not look at firm internal learning-by-doing activities per se, it looked at the firm’s 
broader strategic learning activities comprising firm awareness, willingness to change, 
willingness to learn (Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000), and the formulation of realistic 
learning strategy based upon firm capability as well as the awareness (and assessment) 
of external opportunities and challenges.
In other words, it could be said that the emphasis on firm awareness, willingness 
to change, and learning strategy directs our attention more to the firm’s “capacity to 
learn” rather than the specific learning activities themselves. In addition, the evidence 
suggests that this “capacity to learn” should also include the firms’ choice of learning 
mechanisms in relation to their learning activities and strategies. If a firm chooses to 
adopt an ambitious learning strategy and complex learning activities, then it should 
choose a well-balance, synergistic combination of learning mechanisms. This finding is 
in line with the widely accepted stylized fact expressed in the LFL (Bell (1984), Tran 
(1999), Figueiredo (2001; 2002a) and Dutrenit (2000)) that the choice of learning-by­
doing per se was insufficient for effective accumulation of capability.
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3. The analysis also suggests that all the “strong learner” firms possessed the initial ability 
to first “link-up” with the foreign firms475, then leveraged on these linkages to enable 
effective transfer of the technical know-how and learn the production and product 
technology (i.e. these firms searched, linked, and learned, see Section 7.4). This 
emphasized the importance of the non-technical capabilities expressed in some of the 
LFL (for e.g. technology linkage capability (Abdulsomad, 2003; Arnold and Thuriaux, 
1997; Ernst et ah, 1998a; Kim, 1998; Poapongsakorn and Tonguthai, 1998;
Techakanont, 2001; Techakanont and Terdudomtham, 2004; Tran, 1999; UNIDO, 2002; 
Virasa, 2005)). Without such an initial search and linkage, it was highly likely that the 
“strong learner” firms would not be able to tap into the important foreign knowledge 
sources. Poor search and linkage capability would hinder the significant know-how 
transfer for these latecomer firms. Hence, the ability to initially search, link, leverage, 
and learn is essential (Mathews, 2002; UNIDO, 2002), and should be emphasized as a 
component of the latecomer’s firm “capacity to learn”.
It is also important to note that some latecomer firms may be able to initiate 
successful search and linkage activities, but they cannot sustain their complex learning 
activities and manage the diverse range of learning mechanisms (for e.g. Firm S Group, 
Firm L, or Firm TKT). The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 suggests that this failure to 
learn is due to the inability to synergistically combine the external with the internal 
sources of knowledge. In other words, these firms lacked the “combinative 
capabilities” (Kogut and Zander, 1992) and/or “integrative capabilities” (Iansiti and 
Clark, 1994) and/or the ability to learn from others (Garvin, 1994; Levitt and March, 
1988) and/or the “potential absorptive capacity” (i.e. the ability to acquire external 
knowledge and assimilate and learn) (Zahra and George, 2002). In addition, the 
analysis went beyond these factors, and suggests that one additional reason why these 
firms failed to manage their “learning system” was because of the lack of the higher- 
level alignment (see Figure 8.6).
4. The dynamic capabilities framework (of the SRBL) and particularly the concepts of 
paths, positions, and processes (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) can
475 For examples, Firm AH Group initially linked with Ford (later known as Ford/Mazda joint venture), while 
Firm D Group linked with Japanese automotive brake suppliers through a joint venture and Firm TS Group 
initially linked with the Japanese motorcycle makers, also through a joint venture. All o f these linkage 
activities started during the firm’s start-up phase and were maintained throughout the expansion and 
adaptation phases.
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usefully be extended to the LFL (Kim and Nelson, 2000a; Teece, 2000). In this 
analysis, the “strong learner” firms chose ambitious strategies, thus embarking on 
ambitious competitive and learning “paths”. Although initially located at a 
disadvantaged “position” (i.e. poor assets, inadequate resources, and significant 
capability gaps), they managed to utilize their ambitious strategies as a focusing tool to 
efficiently direct and coordinate the firm’s learning “processes” in order to achieve a 
fast rate of capability accumulation. The analysis extends Teece’s proposition (see 
Section 3.3.1) that although latecomer firms are initially at a disadvantage “position”, 
they can successfully overcome this disadvantage if they are willing to:
a. intelligently select the desirable competitive and learning “paths” (i.e. 
competitive and learning strategies), with high level of commitment
b. learn to become better at managing the learning “processes” (Teece, 2000: 123) 
(i.e. firm learning activities and choice of learning mechanisms)
c. engage in the linkage and collaboration with foreign firms, and learn to 
strengthen their own weak “positions”
5. The concept of firm “learning system” and alignment was emphasized in both the 
SRBL (Senge (1990), Tidd et al. (2001; 2005), Beer et al. (2005), Leonard-Barton 
(1995; 1993), Garvin (1994), Bontis et al. (2002), Sanchez and Heene (2005), Drejer 
and Riis (1999) and Drejer (2000; 2002)) and the LFL (Figueiredo (2002a; Figueiredo, 
2002c), Dutrenit (2000) and Alcorta (2005)). This analysis suggests that a firm’s 
learning system evolves over time and that the system elements (i.e. competitive 
strategy, learning strategy, learning activities and mechanisms) must function properly 
and be aligned (and re-aligned when necessary).
The “strong learner” firms in this analysis had ambitious competitive and 
learning strategies that were aligned with their complex learning activities and a 
synergistic combination of learning mechanisms. Such ambitious strategies had to be 
well-aligned with changes in the external opportunities and challenges. At times, the 
external opportunities occasionally required these firms to re-adjust their strategies, 
aiming for more ambitious targets (and seized the opportunities). Thus, if a firm is 
committed to achieving the stretch competitive and learning goals, it must learn to re­
adjust the associated learning activities and mechanisms to be able to achieve the 
ambitious competitive and learning strategies. However, it is also important to note that
what is clearly important is a firm’s (or more precisely its owners or senior managers)
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understanding of the external environment (in order to identify changes, opportunities, 
and threats) and internal environment (capability gaps and goals). Equipped with 
sufficient external (foreign) linkages, the “strong learners” tended to have a well- 
informed understanding of the external context as well as better ability to assess their 
own capability gaps and goals; and hence, clearer perceptions of opportunities (i.e. 
better than either the “average learners” or the “weak learners”).
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Chapter 9 -  Conclusions
This thesis has focused on the key characteristics of strategies for learning in auto­
part firms in Thailand. It has sought to explain the sources of variation in the level and type 
of strategic learning effort put into learning activities, learning mechanisms, and the 
consequent rates of accumulation of firm capabilities. While the case studies show the 
marked differences between firms (at the level of strategy, structure, and capability -  i.e. 
“paths”, “positions”, and “processes”476), they also show that firms are not isolated islands, 
rather they are a group of “connected islands” capable of extensive collaboration with other 
organization. Collaborative learning was among the business firms themselves and 
between firms and non-firm organizations.
The issue of how firm competitive strategies influence inter-firm differences in 
competitive advantage has been addressed in the SRBL (see for example, Nelson (1991), 
Teece and Pisano (1994), Leonard-Barton (1995), Mumford (2000), and Drejer (2000)).
The issue of how learning activities can ensure that latecomer firms will catch-up 
technologically has been addressed in the LFL (see for example, Bell et al. (1982), Scott- 
Kemmis and Bell (1988), Dutrenit (2000), and Figueiredo (2001). However, an integrated 
approach, combining the three key concepts (firm strategies, learning activities (including 
learning mechanisms), and firm capability accumulation), has not been explicitly explored 
in either body of literature. Moreover, an approach that combines these concepts while 
linking them to the role of the dynamic meso-level environment has also been lacking. 
Hence, this thesis has drawn on the insights provided by the SRBL and LFL, and developed 
an integrated conceptual framework (see Chapter 3), which is capable of better explaining 
the learning processes used by the latecomer firms in accumulating the capability.
The motivating objective of this study has been to develop a conceptual framework 
that provides a foundation for effective managerial decision-making. For this purpose, 
concepts must not only have explanatory power in an abstract conceptual framework per se, 
but they must also have a direct link to the managerial practice. Consequently, the research
476 These three terms were borrowed from the dynamic capabilities framework (Teece and Pisano, 1994; 
Teece et al., 1997).
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strategy has combined multiple sources of evidence (mostly qualitative) and was based on a 
comparative, multiple-case study approach and detailed and extensive fieldwork.
9.1 Revisiting the Research Questions
The section draws together the findings and analyses of this research in relation to 
the three research questions:
1. What were the competitive and learning strategies of Thai auto-part firms?
a. How did these firms perceive the opportunities and challenges arising from 
changes in the macro- and meso-environment?
b. How did firms respond, in terms of their firms’ competitive and learning 
strategies, to these external changes?
2. To what extent can the differences in firm learning activities and mechanisms be 
explained by the differences in firm competitive and learning strategies?
3. What are the implications of the firm “learning system” -  the dynamic alignment 
(and re-alignment) between the key characteristics of firm competitive and learning 
strategies and the learning activities and learning mechanisms -  on the rate of firm 
capability accumulation?
9.1.1 Impact of the Meso-Environment Changes on Firm Strategies
Chapter 5 described the development of the Thai automotive industry over four and 
half decades. Over this period, there were many important changes. These were described 
in terms of changes in the three main sets of actors: l) the institutions (inclusive of public 
policies, regulations and incentives), 2) the private sector firms, and 3) the non-firm 
organizations. The private auto-part firms have been the central focus for analysis. This 
industry analysis suggested that throughout its development, the industry had offered the 
private firms with a sequence of business challenges as well as opportunities. The Thai 
auto-part firms, who were rated as “strong learners” (see Chapters 6 to 8 on the analysis) 
were the ones who exhibited high degree of “strategic learning capacity” (Figure 3.2) and 
“balanced aggressiveness” (Table 6.5). In other words, their competitive and learning 
strategies responded positively to the changes within the industry, adjusting and/or 
increasing in their investment in intensive learning effort and conducting a diverse, yet
more or less strategic set of learning activities. In addition, the strong learners’ strategies
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were by no means passive. Their strategies actively anticipated the upcoming changes 
within the global, regional, and the Thai automotive industry, and aggressively responded 
to create future business opportunities (see Table 9.1 for the description of how “strong 
learner” firm strategies were unique from the others).
In contrast, as the industrial changes took place, the “weak learners477” and “average 
learner” firms were the ones who were slow to adapt, relying on a conservative view, 
believing that the conversion of the Thai automotive industry from protection to 
liberalization offered too much challenges (mainly threats) and few business opportunities. 
The competitive and learning strategies in such firms were both parochial (i.e. built few 
links with foreign firms and sought little export opportunities) and conservative (i.e. 
engaged in few or no attempts to form stretch goals). The “weak learner” firms were 
reluctant to embrace the opportunities inherent in industrial changes. Compared to the 
“strong learners”, they were slower to commit to search and foreign linkage activities.
They moderately invested in learning effort and conducted a narrow range of learning 
activities with poorly-coordinated learning mechanisms. Thus, these firms had a relatively 
passive learning stance, lacking aggressiveness, and ambitious goals. Rather than 
anticipating future business opportunities, these firms reacted to the current changes within 
the Thai automotive industry.
The industry-level changes impacted the latecomer firm strategies in two ways. 
These changes offered both opportunities and threats, but most importantly, it was the firm- 
level subjective perception of such opportunities and threats that guided the formulation of 
firms’ competitive and learning strategies. First, if firms perceived the changes as business 
opportunities, they would: 1) positively formulate ambitious competitive as well as learning 
goals to capture such opportunities and 2) assess the existing capabilities and the feasible 
means (i.e. the “gap-closing strategy”, see Tables 6.2 to 6.4) to realize the goals.
477 It is important to note that the difference between “strong learner” and “weak learner” firms is a matter o f  
degree (as Chapter 8 had indicated with the “average learner” category). Here the “weak learner” and “strong 
learner” are presented here as a dichotomy for the purpose o f a simple summary (summarized from Chapters 
6 to 8) o f the comparative analysis among firms with the different set o f strategies and learning activities, and 
how this difference would contribute to accelerating or slowing down the process o f firm capability 
accumulation.
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These “positive thinking” firms were usually large in size and their strategies, once 
implemented, would normally have an impact on the competitive level within the industry 
(i.e. these firms raised the “competitive benchmark levels” for the other competitors or 
smaller firms). In this way, these firms’ competitive and learning strategies also shaped the 
meso environment.
Secondly, in contrast to the “strong learner” firms, weaker firms tended to perceive 
upcoming challenges more as threats, and hence, they were more likely to plan for 
defensive (i.e. not ambitious) competitive or learning strategies, whose main purpose was 
to guard their businesses (i.e. neutralize threats) and not to capture the growing business 
opportunities. These firms did not wish to set the industry benchmark levels, rather these 
weaker firms were usually shaped by the environment, and had very little influence on the 
future industry development trajectory.
9.1.2 Firm Strategies and the Impact on Firm Learning Activities 
and Mechanisms
As described in Chapters 6 to 8, “strong learner” firms set ambitious, yet realizable 
future learning goals. The implication of setting such goals is the widening gaps between 
the actual (current) firm capability and the capability required to achieve such goals. Hence, 
the “strong learner” firms were highly aware of such gaps. They were aware of the search 
activities required to locate the specific knowledge sources. Often times, these sources 
were located outside the firm; and the formal agreements such as technical assistance or 
joint ventures were necessary to access these resources. Positively embracing industrial 
changes, the strong learners promptly anticipated and formed such agreements in order to 
close the future (as well as current) capability gaps and achieve their ambitious competitive 
and learning goals.
It is important to note that forming such agreements per se was insufficient to 
ensure a fast rate of capability accumulation, the concurrent improvement in the firm 
learning activities was necessary as well. The strong learners were aware of this fact and 
re-adjusted the firm learning activities in a timely manner. For instance, Firm AH Group 
realized that in order to better capture the benefits of foreign assistance and joint venture 
agreements (and also better serve their foreign customers), the Group needed to re-organize 
the corporate structure, enabling it to actively engage in more engineering design activities.
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Therefore, it invested in an Engineering Unit to oversee the advanced engineering design 
tasks480. Similarly, both Firm D Group and Firm TS Group also re-organized its corporate 
structure, by investing an R&D Unit, to focus more on engineering design activities. In 
sum, the “strong learner” firms had ambitious, future-oriented goals, and sufficient 
supporting learning activities, and they made the firm’s overall strategic direction clear to 
the employees and in turn making the ambitious goal more realizable.
In contrast, the analysis in Chapters 6 to 8 suggested that the “weak learner” firms 
did not set ambitious competitive and learning goals. They were quite content with the 
conservative competitive goal and exploitation of their current business operations, with 
little desire to either expand the future business opportunities. As a result, the managers (or 
owners) of such firms paid less attention to firm capability development and were only 
partially aware (or unaware) of the firm’s existing capability gaps. The managers of “weak 
learner” firms were only partially aware that in a liberalized automotive environment, firms 
must adjust (and continually re-adjust) their learning activities in a timely manner. 
Additionally, they were even less aware of the future capability gaps, and learning activities 
and mechanisms needed to fill such gaps. With such limited awareness, the search space 
for new knowledge in these firms was limited mostly to only internal search activities, with 
less learning effort expended on external searches for foreign technical assistance as well as 
joint venture agreements. Consequently, the improvement to firm capability mostly 
focused on internal learning activities and more passive learning-by-doing mechanism, with 
very little external knowledge input and other more active learning mechanisms.
In sum, the “weak learner” firms had unambitious competitive and learning goals, 
with limited awareness of future capability needs and persistent knowledge gaps. This led 
to a low level of learning effort to search for new knowledge to improve the firms’ 
capabilities. The poor learning activities, in turn, led to unclear firm strategic direction 
(poorly formulated learning strategy), with poor goal-setting that self-reinforced the limited 
awareness on firms’ capability gap leading to (again) limited improvement in the firms’
480 These tasks included computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), moreover it also included 
computer-aided engineering (CAE) capable o f simulating the product design and trial production run prior to 
actual production (i.e. “learning before doing” (Pisano, 1996b)). Moreover, the Unit has the responsibility of 
sending engineers overseas (i.e. guest engineers) to collaborate with the carmakers and learn about new  
product design.
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learning activities. As long as the firm strategies remained inward-focus and conservative, 
this “vicious cycle” continued.
9.1.3 Alignment between Firm Strategies, Learning Activities, and 
Learning Mechanisms: Implications on the Rate of Capability 
Accumulation
The thesis has explicitly explored the influence of key characteristics of firm 
strategies on its learning activities and mechanisms. In particular, the analysis in Chapter 8 
suggested that the dynamic multiple alignment (firm strategies, learning activities, and 
learning mechanisms) had a significant influence on firms’ differing rates of capability 
accumulation. In particular, the analysis suggested that within a dynamic industrial 
environment, firms must continuously align (and re-align) their competitive and learning 
strategies with the learning activities and mechanisms in accordance to the targeted rate of 
capability they wish to achieve (see Figure 8.6). In this regard, there are four conclusions 
from this analysis:
• Firm competitive and learning strategies played a key role in steering, shaping, and 
focusing both firms’ learning activities and the learning mechanisms, and the 
combination of these factors had a significant impact on the rate of firm capability 
accumulation. These four elements (competitive strategy, learning strategy, 
learning activity, and learning mechanism) interacted with each other in an 
interdependent, systemic way, such that they form a firm’s “learning system” (see 
Figure 9.1). The firm learning system could either perform poorly or adequately or 
somewhere in between. The implication derived from the quality of a firm’s 
“learning system” is that each firm will have a differing systemic learning ability to 
steer the direction and accelerate the rate of capability development.
• Also important to note is that the analysis suggests all “strong learner” firms have a 
similar fundamental element which is the source of their ambitious strategies. This 
is their unique ability to nurture the long-term relationships with domestic and 
foreign partners (sometimes at a personal level) to enable them to “keep the 
network alive”. Then they are able to leverage on such relationship to quickly 
sense the upcoming business opportunities, and in turn, learn to formulate 
ambitious strategies based on such process. It is argued here that this strategic
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relationship formed by the firms enables them to gauge their own existing 
capabilities and learning needs and to effectively assess “what should I learn next” 
issue. All this could be described as the firm’s “strategic outlook” (see Figure 9.1 
and Table 9.1). It is a systemic characteristic that assists these firms to learn at a 
higher level, i.e. learning about how to formulate the ambitious competitive and 
learning strategies.
• Though initially all the sampled firms engaged in conservative competitive and 
learning strategy formulation and conducted simple learning activities, the 
alignment pattern was very different between the “strong learner” and the “weak 
learner” firms. In particular, the “strong learners” quickly transitioned into more 
ambitious strategies, followed by complex learning activities, and thus operated at 
an upper-level alignment, whereas the “weak learners” remained at either a lower- 
level alignment or mis-alignment (see Figure 8.6).
• As the business opportunities (and challenges) opened up within the industrial 
context, the “strong learner” firms were the ones who were able to quickly shift 
themselves into an upper level (“balanced aggressive” firm strategies and complex 
combination of learning activities), see Figure 9.2 (outermost loop).
On the other hand, the “weak learner” firms tended, in the long-run, to remain at a 
lower alignment level and at best temporarily transitioned into stages of either 
aggressive learning strategy or complex learning activities, but these firms were 
highly unlikely to transition to the upper-level alignment, and were thus not being 
able to achieve a fast rate of capability accumulation, see Figure 9.2 (innermost 
loop).
During their start-up phase, the “strong learner” firms implemented what were essentially 
conservative learning strategies with simple learning activities. This led to the ability to 
quickly develop basic production capabilities, required to run efficient plant operations, and 
capabilities to ensure effective coordination among the firm diverse learning activities. 
Later, during the early production expansion and adaptation phases, the “strong learner” 
firms promptly shifted to a more “balanced aggressive” strategies. In this mode, the firms 
were able to effectively complement their internal learning effort with outside sources of 
technical knowledge, combining an often diverse range of learning activities.
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Figure 9.1 Firm Learning System
Firm Competitive 
Strategy
Firm Learning 
Strategy
Improved or New 
Firm Capabilities
Firm Learning 
Mechanisms
Firm Learning 
Activities
Stock of Accumulated 
Capabilities
Environment
Macro- and
Meso-
Source: own elaboration based on the research
This led both to a faster rate of accumulation of advanced capabilities, and to both the 
successful capture of existing business opportunities and the preparation for upcoming 
business opportunities and future expansion.
The “weak learner” firms’ alignment pattern between strategies and learning 
activities was different from that in “strong learners”, especially in the later phases of 
expansion and adaptation. Similar to the strong learners, during its start-up phase, the 
“weak learner” firms were able to implement conservative strategies in order to develop 
basic production capabilities. But in the expansion phase, these weak learners either had 
insufficient strategic direction to guide the complex set of learning activities, or where they
had aggressive strategies they lacked the sufficient capability to carry out such strategies.
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As a result, these firms were basically stuck with the simple learning activities and the 
weak learners’ capability level tended to remain at the basic routine production capability.
Weak (and average) learner firms may from time to time embark on more 
aggressive strategies or more complex learning activities. But with a lack of both 
continuity and alignment, it is highly unlikely that these firms will achieve a long-term, 
sustainable level of advanced innovative capability. The innovative capability sporadically 
acquired by these learning firms was only at best temporary. Lacking a sustained intensity 
of learning effort, and locked into conducting largely simple learning activities, any new 
high-level capability acquired by these weak learners will deteriorate as the industrial 
technology quickly changes. Relative to these changes, the level of acquired innovative 
capability will most likely revert back to just the basic production capability. For instance, 
the case study of Firm CPC, Firm TKT, and Firm SOM clearly illustrated this point (see 
Chapters 6 to 8 for details).
9.2 Implications for Corporate Management and Policy
The findings and analysis of this research can inform managerial decisions in a 
developing country context regarding three issues: 1) firm-level learning strategies, 2) 
learning activities and choice of learning mechanisms, and 3) the dynamic alignment within 
firm “learning systems”. The implications toward the policy issue are also discussed.
9.2.1 Firm Competitive and Learning Strategies
The key characteristics of a firm’s competitive and learning strategies were critical 
in controlling the composition of the implemented learning activities, and in turn 
accelerating or slowing down the rate of firm capability accumulation. The research 
finding suggests that even though the “ambitious goals” characteristic was a crucial 
strategic component for firm capability building, ambitious goals per se were insufficient 
for effective firm learning strategy. Firms must also engage in balancing the other 
characteristics of the learning strategy by realizing the existence of capability gaps and 
planning the purposive search activities, with the objective of finding appropriate 
knowledge sources. In addition, the search space needed not be limited to within the firm 
(as was the case of “weak learner” who overly emphasized internal firm learning); it could 
be a search for an external expert (or long-term joint venture partner(s), as was the case of
“strong learner” firms) who could supply the firm with the necessary knowledge. Here, the
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managers must not limit the firm to purely internal search, since they may not find the 
required knowledge needed by the firm.
Nevertheless, the “strong learner” firm’s external search for knowledge was not an 
unbounded one; it had to be built on the basis of the existing capabilities and firm’s current 
learning activities. The “strong learners” recognized that managers must realize that the 
business opportunities and challenges and firm internal learning activities and mechanisms 
are always changing. To formulate such dynamic strategies, managers must always take 
into account the current firm level of capability as well as the current external business 
opportunities. As in the “strong learner” firms, managers must anticipate future business 
opportunities and formulate their competitive and learning strategies accordingly.
This conclusion is consistent with the (varying) emphasis on latecomer firm’s 
“dynamic capabilities” in the relevant literature from the LFL (for example, Abdulsomad 
(2003), Mukdapitak (1994), Bell and Pavitt (1995), Intarakumnerd and Virasa (2004), Kim 
(1998; 1997b), Amsden (2001), and (Rush et ah, 2004)) and the SRBL (for example, Teece 
and Pisano (1994) and Teece et al. (1997) on dynamic capabilities, Arnold and Thuriaux 
(1997), Drejer and Riis (1999), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Drejer (2002), Heene and 
Sanchez (1996), Sanchez and Heene (2004), and Augier and Teece (2006)). Although 
different in their focus (i.e. the LFL emphasizes learning process within a latecomer firm 
context and the SRBL emphasizes sustainability of competitive advantage and 
organizational/strategic learning within the industrialized firms), both literatures emphasize 
the ability to continuously integrate external and internal sources of knowledge (i.e. 
learning) effectively in order to enhance firm competitiveness. Both literatures (again to 
varying degrees) also emphasize how firms should prepare capabilities for future 
competition.
The interest here is in drawing on both of these sets of literature (i.e. LFL and 
SRBL), integrating them if that is possible, in order to develop a conceptual framework that 
can guide managerial decision-making. A “well-functioning competitive strategy” will 
allow firms to sense the upcoming business opportunity, while a “well-functioning learning 
strategy” will allow firms to seize such opportunity, through directing a focused set of 
strategic learning activities and mechanisms (recall Figure 3.2). Firms who were able to 
simultaneously exercise the “sensing” and “seizing” of upcoming opportunities are said to 
have “strategic learning capacity”. Firm managers should attempt to do what they can to
accumulate (and learn) such “learning about how to learn” capacity.
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9.2.2 Firm Learning Activities and Mechanisms
If the learning strategy is a firm’s learning plan, then the learning activities are the 
implementation of such a plan. To be successful in accelerating the capability 
accumulation process, firms must be able to conduct learning activities that are guided by 
the key characteristics of strong learners’ strategies (ambitious goals, cognizant of 
capability gaps, balanced external knowledge sources with internal ones, and balanced 
focus on current and future business opportunities). In aiming at these strategy 
characteristics, the analysis suggested that firm learning activities must possess at least two 
important features: sustained high level of learning effort (supporting Kim’s (1997a; 1998; 
1997b) argument) and synergistically coordinated mechanisms to engage in the wide range 
of simple as well as complex learning activities. This coordination must ensure that the 
overall outcome of various learning activities will be synergistically combined to achieve 
the desired characteristics of firm capability development (supporting earlier findings by 
Bell (1984), Tran (1999), Techakanont (2002; 2004), and Abdulsomad (2003)).
The learning activities must be shaped by a firm’s existing stock of capabilities (i.e. 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990)) as well as the direction provided by the 
firm’s learning strategy. At any given time, certain learning activities are feasible, although 
some may be quite challenging and required the firm to exert an extra amount of learning 
effort (and more extensive search activities). However, some learning activities may 
simply be infeasible due to insufficient absorptive capacity. Consequently, managers must 
assess firm learning goal(s), along with existing/future capability gaps, and determine the 
feasible learning activities.
A manager’s task is to focus on managing the firm’s “learning system” (Bontis et al., 
2002; Garvin, 1994; Senge, 1990) (see Figure 9.1), ensuring that the implementation of 
firm strategies leads to sufficient learning effort and that resources are expended in relation 
to the aligned components for upgrading. In addition, managers must ensure that each 
learning activity (within the diverse set of learning activities) serves its purpose of closing a 
particular capability gap, fulfilling the desired learning strategy, and moving the firm closer 
to achieving its ambitious goals. Managers should be wary of prematurely limiting 
themselves to only a single learning activity (Figueiredo, 2001; Tran, 1999). Often times, 
they must keep an open mind and implement a sufficient diversity of learning activities,
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since relying on only one learning activity, no matter how effective it is, is unlikely to yield 
any effective learning outcome.
While the LFL literature recognizes the important role played by the latecomer 
firm ’s “ extended learning processes”  (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; 1995; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Kim, 1997a; 1998; Lall, 1987; 1992; Rush et al., 2004). This analysis stresses the 
key role o f a firm ’s competitive and learning strategies in guiding the firm ’s learning 
activities and coordinating firm  learning mechanisms (i.e. the strategies steer the firm ’s 
“ extended learning processes” ).
9.2.3 The Dynamic Multiple Alignment and the Rate of Capability 
Accumulation
This study concludes that a firm must achieve multiple alignments between its 
strategies, learning activities, and learning mechanisms in order to accelerate the rate o f 
firm  capability building. The alignment issue was a complex one, and managers must 
deliberately manipulate the key characteristics o f competitive and learning strategies as 
well as the composition o f firm learning activities. The combination o f firm learning 
activities must be properly aligned (and continually re-aligned) to the learning strategy 
characteristics, and this alignment has to be dynamic. That is, this alignment must also 
change w ith the firm  competitive strategy and the industrial evolution, which offers the 
opening-up or closing-down o f future business opportunities and challenges. When such 
delicate and dynamic alignment between competitive strategy, learning strategy and 
learning activities is achieved, firms have a higher chance o f speeding up the process o f 
capability accumulation (see Figure 9.2). This study also stresses the extent to which the 
effective alignment o f the components o f a firm ’ s “ learning system”  at a high level o f focus 
and intensity can lead to a “ virtuous cycle” , which incrementally upgrades both capability 
and firm ’ s “ capacity to learn” .
Consequently, the role o f managers must start with two things: 1) sensing the 
external business opportunities and threats and 2) properly managing firm competitive and 
learning strategies to seize such opportunities (and/or neutralize threats). Managers (or 
firm  owners) must ensure that the organizational goals are realistically ambitious; that is, 
future learning goals must be ambitious and at the same time realizable. Managers must 
also recognize that ambitious goals often come w ith challenging capability (and knowledge) 
gaps, which the firms must attempt to fill. Facing widening gaps, the managers must
337
effectively direct the strategic search procedures to find (as well as select) the appropriate 
knowledge sources (both internal and external) to support the firm’s existing and future 
learning activities. Managers must have the confidence and ability to manage the higher 
level of short-term risk that will be involved in ambitious goals and investment of resources 
in learning and change.
Next, the managers must oversee the direction of the complex combination of 
learning activities, ensuring that they effectively tap into the appropriate knowledge sources 
and are properly integrated into the firm existing knowledge base, which in turn further 
shapes the firm future learning strategy characteristics. All these require the managers to 
carefully monitor the dynamism that occurs, in particular, the dynamic alignments between 
firm competitive and learning strategies and the associated learning activities. Managers 
must realize that this alignment is dynamic and the evolution in the industrial environment 
requires further changes in the firm learning strategy, and thus a re-alignment is likely to be 
inevitable. Consequently, in a highly turbulent business environment, the dynamic 
alignment task facing the managers is a continuous and highly challenging one.
This study develops the “learning system” concept for the LFL, focusing on the 
issue of dynamic multiple alignments (Beer et al., 2005; Bontis et al., 2002; Hung and Lien, 
2005; Lin et ah, 2001; Ward et ah, 1996). It also extends the SRBL firm’s dynamic 
capability framework (Teece, 2000; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et ah, 1997) to the 
context of latecomer firm capability development (see Section 8.4). It argues that the 
“capacity to learn” in latecomer firms is related to the alignment of the components of the 
“learning system” in the context of ambitious goals, level of learning focus and intensity, 
and degree of synergy in implementing the learning mechanisms.
9.2.4 Policy Implications
The thesis was not designed to address issues of public policy related to capability 
development. Automotive industry policies were considered, but not examined in details, 
as they were relevant to firm strategies (see Chapter 5). The presented evidence in Chapter 
5 does highlight the importance of policy (both national-level and meso-level) in shaping 
the firm-level strategies and learning activities.
Based on the evidence of the “strong learner”, “average learner”, and “weak 
learner” firms, the findings and analysis suggest that government should design industrial
policy based upon the level of capability achieved by the firms. Certain incentives, such as
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research and development (R&D) promotions and tax privileges, should be granted based 
upon the rates and levels of capability achieved by the firms. Firms that were “strong 
learner” are highly likely to be interested in further developing their higher-value product 
design engineering and development activities and to further secure their domestic first-tier 
supplier status, or even move up to become regional or even international auto-part 
suppliers.
In contrast, firms who are still struggling to accumulate the basic production 
capabilities (the “weak learner” or the “average learner” firms) are highly unlikely to 
respond to such incentives. The firms with the basic level of capabilities would require an 
industrial policy that would encourage further upgrading as well as provide sufficient 
linkages to the multinational carmakers, in order to expose these firms to the international 
competitive pressures. A useful exercise for the government would be to conduct a large- 
scale, industry specific survey, in collaboration with the public research institutes as well as 
the non-firm organizations (for example, Thailand Automotive Institute, National Science 
and Technology Development Agency), to determine the appropriate incentives as well as 
the upgrading programs suitable for the different groups of firms with differing levels of 
capability. The result of such study could be used for the industrial policy design purposes.
9.3 Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis has argued that issues of firm competitive and learning strategies, the 
interaction with firm learning activities (and mechanisms), and the rate of firm capability 
development is complex. The analysis comprised the detailed evolution of the Thai 
automotive industry as well as the evolution of the firms’ competitive and learning 
strategies, the learning activities, and the rates as well as types of capability accumulation. 
Other factors that could affect firm learning strategy and rate of capability accumulation 
were the policy at the national and at the global levels. While acknowledging the existence 
of such influence, this study did not systematically analyze the role of these factors.
This study has shown that the studies in the LFL did not explicitly link the issues of
firm competitive and learning strategies with the differing rates of firm capability
accumulation. In particular, the literature has not explored the details of how learning
strategy, acting as mediating variable, can assist the latecomer firms in controlling the
effectiveness as well as coordination of the diverse learning activities. While this study has
explored the relationships among firm strategies, learning activities, and rates of capability
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accumulation, it could not address all the relevant factors that lead to faster rates of 
capability accumulation, and some interesting, unanswered questions remain.
For example, while the thesis established an important linkage between firm competitive 
and learning strategies and the rate of capability accumulation, it did not analyze how this 
relationship could link into the policy issue, particularly in terms of industrial policies at the 
national level. Similarly, even though the study recognized the existence of policy changes 
within the wider automotive industry context, the impact of these policy changes on the rate 
of capability accumulation of the automotive firms was not systematically analyzed. 
Consequently, future research could incorporate an analysis of the interaction among the 
impact of changes in the global automotive industry, the national policy, and the Thai 
automotive industry policy on the firms’ rate of capability accumulation. It would also be 
useful for future research to explore the relationship between overall national-level industry 
policy and the sectoral-level automotive industry policy. The outcome of such research 
would permit a greater understanding on how global automotive changes and the choice of 
national-level policy influence firm learning strategies, firm learning activities, and finally, 
the rates and types of capability accumulation.
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A: Ethics Committee -  Written Consent Form
Name of Researcher: Mr. Chaiwat Chitravas (PhD Student)
Researcher Address: The Australian National University
The Sir Roland Wilson Building (120)
Acton, ACT 0200 
AUSTRALIA
E-mail: chaiwat.chitravas@anu.edu.au
Telephone: +61 2 6125 9837
Facsimile: +61 2 6125 4895
Thank you for your participation in this research.
Brief Project Description:
The research would focus on technological capability building in Thai firms with an 
emphasis on two industries, automotive parts and food. The purpose is to examine the strategies 
used by Thai firms in undertaking activities leading to the accumulation in technological 
capabilities. One of the important activities is the technological learning processes and associated 
learning mechanisms; thus research would analyze the interactions between technological 
capabilities and learning processes.
Detailed Statement Regarding Consent and Confidentiality:
I (the participant) understand that I am being briefed on the research purpose and methods. 
The researcher had informed me that his doctoral thesis will include the information provided by 
me with the possibility of quotations of this information. I (the participant) understand that 
participation in this research is voluntary. I (the participant) am aware that I have the rights to 
choose not to participate and that by choosing to participate (i.e. to answer the questions put forth 
by the researcher in an interview) I do so willfully and that no coercion, inducement or influence is 
involved. In addition, there is nothing that impairs my decision to participate in this interview. I 
(the participant) also understood that I could withdraw from this at any time.
The researcher had briefed to me that the confidential information provided by me shall be 
treated to the best of researcher’s ability as confidential and that no one will have access to this 
information (both in raw data and published formats). Moreover, the raw confidential data will be 
stored in a locked file cabinet and if they are stored in a computer, they will be password protected. 
If it is necessary, all names and other confidential information are mentioned using a generic 
symbol that is totally unrelated and untraceable to the readers. As the researcher has assured me of 
these measures; I have willingly provided him with the confidential information and allowed the 
researcher to tape-record the interview sessions. The researcher guarantees that the following 
conditions will be met:
1. My real name or the name of the firm will not be used in the written report, unless written 
permission is given.
2. If granted permission to audiotape the interview, the tapes will be used for purpose of this 
research only. The tape record of the interview will be kept secure and only the researcher 
will have access.
3. I (the participant) will receive access to a copy of the final report of the interview prior to 
thesis submission, so there is the opportunity to offer any changes to the report, if 
necessary.
4. Regarding the intellectual property issue, no portion of the research shall be directed 
towards the purposes of commercial exploitation.
(Participant) Sign.........................Date .
(Researcher: Chaiwat Chitravas) Sign..........................Date
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B: Letter of Request for an Interview
Subject: Request for interview 
To: Executive Director
Mr. Chaiwat Chitravas is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at The Australian National University. 
He is conducting research on Thai automotive industry. His particular focus is on capability 
development and learning activities; different categories of firm capability are production 
processes, products, organization management, linkages (cooperation between firms and 
other institutions), and marketing activities.
This research will most certainly benefit the development of public policy planning process, 
ensuring that the policies and incentives are meeting the private firms’ needs. In addition, 
the research result will benefit learning at educational institutes and the national economic 
development. Due to these benefits, the Board of Investment (BOI) endorses this research 
and requests your company to please kindly provide Mr. Chaiwat the opportunity to 
interview you and your relevant staff.
On behalf of the BOI and Mr. Chaiwat, I sincerely appreciate your kind assistance.
Sincerely Yours,
Senior Executive Advisor
Office of the Board of Investment (Thailand)
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C: Fieldwork Interview Questions
C1. For Business Firms
General Information: (for both C l .I and C l .2 below)
Name, contact, education background, job responsibilities, job position 
Please briefly describe the history of the firm
Please describe the initial ownership structure and subsequent changes
Operational characteristics -  what are the annual production capacity, annual turnover,
export sales/volume)? Who were/are the main customers?
What were significant achievements and challenges in the past?
What were achieved in terms of the quality system standards, automotive industry 
standards (QS 9000/ TS16949)?
C1.1 Top Management Personnel: CEOs, firm owners, and General Managers
1) Environmental/External Factors:
How do you perceive the impacts of: oil crisis during 1970s? increased local content 
requirement? 1997 Asian financial crisis? free trade agreements? economies/diseconomies 
of scale? fragmented markets? local content abandonment (2000) ? How do these changes 
affect your firm’s goals and objectives? and your competitive positions?
Which of the above factors lead you to upgrade your: production process? products? 
linkages? human resources? marketing activities (export)? Why?
How do you perceive the changes in government policies? For e.g. BOI tax incentives? Or 
other government industrial promotion scheme? How do these changes affect your firm’s 
goals and objectives? and your competitive positions?
What are other factors that influence your decision to learn/upgrade? Why?
2) Firm Strategies and Learning:
What are your firm’s: market goals? product development goals? production process 
improvement goals (e.g. percentage reduction in defect rates)?
How important are the following to your company’s future?: becoming the first to market, 
meeting customers needs, having products exported overseas, achieving world-class quality, 
training the local engineers and technicians, collaborating with public organizations, 
collaborating with customers on design activities, improving products, and improving 
production processes. Why?
What are your firm’s learning goals? Which of the following did you engage during the 
learning/improvement activities?: organizational restructuring, on-the-job training, off-the- 
job training, in-house research, expert consultancy and collaboration with universities. How 
important is each of the above? Did each of these activities contribute to: improvement in 
competitive positions? and/or closing the capability gaps? If so, how? If not, why?
What are your future learning plans? Any other factors related to firm learning 
strategy/upgrading?
C1.2 Operational-level Personnel: middle managers, engineers and technicians
What are your job position and primary responsibilities? How long have you been working 
for the firm?
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1) Investment Activities:
Feasibility study, plant expansion, site selection, search for sources of technology and 
equipment, detailed plant layout, basic engineering design, recruitment and training of new 
personnel, project outline and management, plant start-up and debugging, and overseas 
investment.
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before)?
2) Routine Production Activities:
What have been the past and current production process technology improvements? 
Procurement of raw materials, quality management (ISO 9000, QS 9000, and TS 16949), 
production problem-solving (debugging plant), routine equipment maintenance, capacity 
stretching, production organization and supply chain management (JIT, etc.), applied 
research and improved process design methods (for e.g. automation, robots, etc.), and 
continuous improvement programs.
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before?)
3) Product-related Activities:
What have been the past and current product improvements?
Basic product design, product quality management, minor/major product adaptation, 
product testing, product design improvements, reverse engineering, advanced product 
design (CAD/CAM), new product development (i.e. own design manufacture, ODM), and 
strategic alliance for product technologies.
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before)?
4) Linkage-related Activities:
What have been the past and current linkages with other firms and/or organizations? 
Procurement of knowledge from local/foreign experts and external organizations (for e.g. 
Thailand Automotive Institute, Productivity Institute, Thai-German Institutes, public 
universities), technology transfer from OEMs or firms in the OEM group, coordination
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within the supply chain, ability to link internally among the business groups (for firms that 
are corporations), and networking in public seminars, conferences and business associations. 
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before)?
5) Marketing Activities:
What have been the past and current marketing activities?
Market research, management of logistics and distribution systems, systematic monitoring 
of market trends, brand creation and management (i.e. own brand manufacture, OBM), 
product differentiation, coordination with retailers and customers, export market, links with 
domestic/overseas buyers and strategic alliance/networks.
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before)?
6) Outcome of Learning:
Over time, is your firm able to: design better products? operate advanced production 
processes? form stronger linkages with foreign firms? expand operation overseas? directly 
export products? engage in more complex technological activity?
If so, how? If not, why?
Improvements in quality performance (e.g. reduction in parts per million, ppm), 
cost performance (e.g. percentage year-to-year), on-time delivery (e.g. percentage delayed), 
engineering and management capability (i.e. does it support the production of better 
products in lesser time and lower costs).
For each of the item listed above, the following questions were asked:
• What were done?
• How was it done? (for e.g. doing on-the-job training, doing in-house 
R&D/experimentation, hiring foreign expert assistance, searching for collaboration 
with others, hiring/training new personnel, visiting overseas plant, etc.)
• Any obstacles? What are they?
• What can your firm do now (that cannot be done before)?
C2. For Non-firm Organizations
1) General Information:
Name, contact, education background, job responsibilities, job position
Please briefly describe the history of your organization and the main responsibilities
Who are the main clients?
What were significant achievements and challenges in the past?
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2) Impact of External Factors on Firms:
How does your organization perceive the impact of the following factors on Thai auto-part 
firms? Positive/Negative? Why?
Investment promotion policy, import substitution policy, export-oriented policy, free trade 
agreements, Automotive Master Plans, “Detroit of Asia” plan, BOI policies, MOI policies, 
the 1997 financial crisis, local content abandonment, and OEM sourcing 
strategies/decisions
Does your organization think any of the above factors lead firms to upgrade their 
production process, product engineering, technology linkage, and marketing activities? 
Why?
What do you think are the other factors affecting Thai suppliers? Why?
3) Strategies for Assistance to Thai firms:
Does your organization have conscious plans to assist Thai firms with development of 
capabilities? If so, what are the assistance programs? If not, why?
How did your organization implement such assistance programs? When was it started? 
Why do think such programs were appropriated?
Which activities do you think Thai firms rely on most from foreigners? Investment, 
production, product, linkage, and/or marketing activities? Why?
What are the main obstacles facing firm learning/upgrading? Why?
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